Solutions manual to accompany contract theory:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
MIT Press
2007
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Bildet Erg. zu: Bolton: Contract theory |
| Beschreibung: | IX, 140 S. |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804139349634187264 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS PREFACE XI 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 HIDDEN INFORMATION, SCREENING 3
2.1 QUESTION 1 3 2.2 QUESTION 2 3 2.3 QUESTION 3 4 2.3.1
CHARACTERIZATION OF FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 4 2.3.2 TWO TYPES 5 2.3.3
CONTINUUM OF TYPES 5 2.4 QUESTION 4 7 2.5 QUESTION 5 7 2.5.1
ENTREPRENEUR S UTILITY 8 2.5.2 FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 8 2.5.3 SECOND-BEST
SOLUTION 9 2.5.4 BINDING CONSTRAINTS 10 2.5.5 LOW-TYPE ALLOCATION 11
2.5.6 FULL SCREENING PROBLEM 11 2.5.7 DISCUSSION 12 2.5.8 COMPETITION 12
3 HIDDEN INFORMATION, SIGNALING 15 3.1 QUESTION 6 15 3.2 QUESTION 7 15
3.3 QUESTION 8 16 3.3.1 BOTH TYPES INVEST 16 3.3.2 ONLY BAD FIRMS INVEST
17 3.3.3 WASTEFUL ADVERTISING 17 3.4 QUESTION 9 18 3.4.1 NO COSTS OF
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 18 3.4.2 COSTS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS 20 VI CONTENTS 4
HIDDEN ACTION, MORAL HAZARD 23 4.1 QUESTION 10 23 4.1.1 RANDOMIZING
SCHEME CANNOT BE OPTIMAL 23 4.2 QUESTION 11 24 4.3 QUESTION 12 24 4.4
QUESTION 13 25 4.4.1 CEO COMPENSATION 25 4.4.2 COMPARISON 26 4.5
QUESTION 14 27 4.6 QUESTION 15 27 4.6.1 SELF-FINANCING 28 4.6.2
DEBT-FINANCING 28 4.6.3 EQUITY-FINANCING 30 4.7 QUESTION 16 31 4.7.1
POSTTAKEOVER VALUE 31 4.7.2 BID PRICE 32 4.7.3 SECOND BEST CONTRACT 32
4.7.4 FIRST BEST CONTRACT 33 5 DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION 35 5.1
QUESTION 17 35 5.2 QUESTION 18 35 5.2.1 EX-POST PAYOFFS 36 5.2.2
COMPARISON OF DISCLOSURE REGIMES 37 5.2.3 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 38 5.3
QUESTION 19 38 5.3.1 UNIQUE OPTIMAL CONTRACT 38 5.3.2 OPTIMAL RANDOM
VERIFICATION 40 5.3.3 OPTIMAL CONTRACT WITH RISK AVERSE ENTREPRENEUR 41
5.4 QUESTION 20 41 6 MULTIDIMENSIONAL INCENTIVE PROBLEMS 43 6.1 QUESTION
21 43 6.2 QUESTION 22 44 6.2.1 FIRST-BEST OUTCOME 45 6.2.2 LINEAR
CONTRACTS 45 6.3 QUESTION 23 47 6.3.1 FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 48 6.3.2
EVIDENCE-BASED REWARDS 53 6.3.3 DECISION-BASED REWARDS 54 6.3.4
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 56 6.4 QUESTION 24 57 CONTENTS VII 7 BILATERAL
TRADING AND AUCTIONS 59 7.1 QUESTION 25 59 7.2 QUESTION 26 60 7.2.1 IC
AND IR CONSTRAINTS 60 7.2.2 EFFICIENT TRADE 61 7.2.3 COMPARISON WITH
MYERSON-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM .... 62 7.3 QUESTION 27 63 7.4 QUESTION 28
63 7.5 QUESTION 29 63 7.5.1 EXPECTED PAYOFF 64 7.5.2 STANDARD AUCTIONS
65 7.5.3 OPTIMAL AUCTION 66 7.5.4 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION 66 8 MULTIAGENT
MORAL HAZARD AND COLLUSION 69 8.1 QUESTION 30 69 8.1.1 ATTAINING THE
FIRST BEST UNDER RISK NEUTRALITY 70 8.1.2 RISK AVERSION 71 8.2 QUESTION
31 72 8.3 QUESTION 32 73 8.3.1 OPTIMAL SIDE CONTRACT 74 8.3.2
RESTRICTION TO COLLUSION-PROOF CONTRACTS 75 8.3.3 OPTIMAL
COLLUSION-PROOF CONTRACT 75 8.3.4 COLLUSION IMPOSSIBLE 77 8.4 QUESTION
33 79 9 DYNAMIC ADVERSE SELECTION 81 9.1 QUESTION 34 81 9.2 QUESTION 35
82 9.2.1 FULL COMMITMENT 82 9.2.2 NO COMMITMENT 84 9.3 QUESTION 36 84
9.3.1 PURE ADVERSE SELECTION 85 9.3.2 ADVERSE SELECTION & MORAL HAZARD
86 9.4 QUESTION 37 87 10 DYNAMIC MORAL HAZARD 89 10.1 QUESTION 38 89
10.2 QUESTION 39 89 10.2.1 DEBT EQUALS CASH FLOW 91 10.2.2 RELAXING THE
CONSTRAINT 91 10.2.3 OPTIMAL VALUES OF DEBT 91 10.2.4 RANDOM
FIRST-PERIOD CASH FLOW 92 10.2.5 KNOWN NEW INVESTMENT RETURN 92 10.2.6
NEED FOR SHORT-TERM RISKY DEBT 93 10.3 QUESTION 40 93 VIII CONTENTS
10.3.1 CHARACTERIZATION OF RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM . . 94
10.3.2 FIRST-PERIOD ALLOCATION 95 10.3.3 POSITIVE RETURN OF
FIRM-SPECIFIC PROJECT 95 11 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 99 11.1 QUESTION 41 99
11.2 QUESTION 42 100 11.2.1 FIRST-BEST ALLOCATION OF ASSETS AND
INVESTMENT LEVELS . . 101 11.2.2 OPTIMAL ASSET OWNERSHIP 101 11.2.3
COMPARISON 103 11.2.4 EX POST BARGAINING WITH AN OUTSIDE OPTION 103 11.3
QUESTION 43 104 11.4 QUESTION 44 105 11.4.1 FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS 106
11.4.2 OPTIMAL CONTROL STRUCTURES 110 11.4.3 COMPARISON WITH AGHION K
BOLTON (1992) 112 12 UNVERIFIABLE INFORMATION CONTRACTING 113 12.1
QUESTION 45 113 12.2 QUESTION 46 114 12.3 QUESTION 47 114 12.4 QUESTION
48 115 12.5 QUESTION 49 115 12.5.1 FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 116 12.5.2 NO
INITIAL CONTRACT 116 12.5.3 SINGLE-PAIR CONTRACT 117 12.5.4
AT-WILL-CONTRACTING PROVISION 118 12.5.5 NO DIRECT EXTERNALITIES 120
12.6 QUESTION 50 121 12.6.1 FIRST-BEST OUTCOME 122 12.6.2 NULL CONTRACT
WITH RENEGOTIATION 122 12.6.3 NO RENEGOTIATION 123 12.6.4 CONTRACTING
WITH RENEGOTIATION 123 12.6.5 DISCUSSION 125 12.7 QUESTION 51 125 12.7.1
AGHION-TIROLE WITH QUADRATIC EFFORT COSTS 125 12.7.2 STRONG CONFLICT OF
INTEREST 127 12.7.3 RANDOM CHOICE OF PROJECT 128 13 MARKETS AND
CONTRACTS 131 13.1 QUESTION 52 131 13.1.1 OBSERVABLE AND CONTRACTIBLE
ACTION 131 13.1.2 UNOBSERVABLE OR NON-CONTRACTIBLE ACTION 132 13.1.3
COMMON AGENCY 133 13.2 QUESTION 53 134 13.3 QUESTION 54 134 CONTENTS IX
13.3.1 FIRST-BEST SOLUTION 135 13.3.2 JOINT CONTRACT 135 13.3.3 COMMON
AGENCY 136 13.3.4 COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 137 BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 PPN:
265183324 TITEL: SOLUTIONS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONTRACT THEORY / ARTHUR
CAMPBELL .... - CAMBRIDGE, MASS. : MIT PRESS, 2007 ISBN:
978-0-262-53299-0PBK.ALK. PAPER; 0-262-53299-9 BIBLIOGRAPHISCHER
DATENSATZ IM SWB-VERBUND
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| spelling | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory Arthur Campbell .. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 2007 IX, 140 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Bildet Erg. zu: Bolton: Contract theory Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143389-0 Aufgabensammlung gnd-content Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s DE-188 Campbell, Arthur Sonstige (DE-588)133516318 oth http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014715.html lizenzfrei Inhaltsverzeichnis SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017714219&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4143389-0 |
| title | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory |
| title_auth | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory |
| title_exact_search | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory |
| title_full | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory Arthur Campbell .. |
| title_fullStr | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory Arthur Campbell .. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory Arthur Campbell .. |
| title_short | Solutions manual to accompany contract theory |
| title_sort | solutions manual to accompany contract theory |
| topic | Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Kontrakttheorie Aufgabensammlung |
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