Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency: a global perspective
In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book offers a comprehensive review of the literature, proposes new indices and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central bank governance, which are af...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Basingstoke [u.a.]
Palgrave Macmillan
2009
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book offers a comprehensive review of the literature, proposes new indices and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central bank governance, which are afterwards applied to global central banks. It argues that, while it may not always be desirable for the central bank to supervise financial institutions, there is a strong case for all central banks not to overlook financial stability issues.--Publisher's description |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 270 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0230201075 9780230201071 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book offers a comprehensive review of the literature, proposes new indices and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central bank governance, which are afterwards applied to global central banks. It argues that, while it may not always be desirable for the central bank to supervise financial institutions, there is a strong case for all central banks not to overlook financial stability issues.--Publisher's description | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804139226773585920 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
List of Figures x
List of Tables
xi
Notes on the Contributors
xiii
Foreword
xv
Preface
xvii
Acknowledgements
xix
Introduction
1
1
Survey of Models and Indicators of Independence
6
Introduction
6
Base indicators of independence
7
First indicator of
de
jure independence:
Bade and Parkin
(1977) 8
Alesina s political response
(1988, 1989) 10
Grilli, Masciandaro,
and
Tabellini (1991) 12
Two of the most widely used indicators: Cukierman
(1992) 16
Aggregation of two legal measures: Alesina and
Summers
(1993) 18
A new legal indicator: Eijffinger and
Schaling
(1993) 20
Political vulnerability of central banks:
Cukierman and Webb
(1995) 20
Subsequent literature and empirical studies on base indicators
25
Theoretical and empirical clarifications on
central bank independence
25
Endogenizing the inflation bias
29
Robustness of independence measures
32
Causality of hypotheses on central bank independence
35
Robustness and sensitivity of results,
and search for new measures
41
Independence, credibility, and costs of deflation
51
Conclusions
59
Appendices:
63
I. Variables in Cukierman s LVAU-LVAW indices
63
II. Variables in Cukierman s QVAU-QVAW
67
vi
Contents
III.
Summary of base indicators of
de
jure independence
69
IV. Summary of base indicators of
de
facto independence
77
V. Summary of empirical studies on
de
jure independence
81
VI. Summary of empirical studies on
de
facto independence
88
2
Survey of Models and Indicators of Accountability
90
Responsibility and accountability
90
Responsibility
91
Accountability
91
The concept of accountability in the literature
93
Briault, Haldane, and King
(1996): de
jure and
de
facto accountability
93
Bini-Smaghi and
Gros
(2000):
ex ante and ex post
accountability
94
de Haan,
Amtenbrink, and
Eijffinger
(1998):
three main features
95
Castellani
(2002) 97
Siklos
(2002) 97
Time inconsistency and accountability
98
Delegating monetary policy to an independent
central bank
98
Override
98
Contractual solution
99
Indicators and measures of accountability
99
Briault, Haldane, and King
(1996) 99
de Haan,
Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger
(1998) 100
Bini-Smaghi and
Gros
(2000
and
2001) 102
Stasavage
(2003) 104
Siklos
(2002) 104
Accountability indices: comparison of empirical results
105
3
Survey of Models and Indicators of Transparency
107
Introduction
107
Rationales for transparency
108
Boost central bank credibility
108
Influence expectations
108
Protect central bank independence
109
Strengthen the understanding of monetary policy
109
Reduce informational asymmetries and uncertainty in
financial markets
110
Enhance market efficiency 111
Contents
vii
Eliminate
government uncertainty on the
performance of monetary policy 111
Enhance fiscal and monetary policy coordination 111
The concept of transparency in the literature 111
Transparency and accountability 111
Characteristics of transparency
112
Aspects of transparency in the policy-making process
114
Indicators and measures in the literature
116
General observations
116
Siklos
(2002) 117
Eijffinger and Geraats
(2004) 117
Stasavage
(2003) 118
de Haan
and Amtenbrink
(2003) 120
Comparison between measures
121
Conclusions
122
4
Indicators of Independence, Accountability,
and Transparency
124
Methodology for assessing central bank independence
124
General considerations
124
The GMT
(1991)
index
124
The Cukierman
(1992)
index
126
Assessment procedure and sampling
127
Methodology for assessing central bank accountability
and transparency
127
General considerations
132
Detailed index of accountability
136
Detailed index of transparency
145
5
Global Trends in Central Bank Governance
151
Global trends in central bank independence
151
Central bank independence in the late
1980s 152
Central bank independence as of end-2003
152
Developments in central bank independence over time
159
Global trends in central bank accountability and transparency
163
Accountability scores 1*>3
Transparency scores 167
Relationships between independence, accountability,
and transparency
*
7^
Accountability and transparency
1
7^
Accountability and independence 173
viii Contents
Transparency and independence
175
Additional considerations
178
Conclusions
178
Global trends in central bank governance
179
Trends by stages of economic development and regions
179
Relative deficit of accountability
179
Relative deficit of transparency
182
Appendices:
187
I. Independence: country sample
187
II. Independence: political scores for advanced
economies
(2003) 190
III. Independence: political scores for emerging
markets
(2003) 192
IV. Independence: political scores for developing
countries
(2003) 194
V. Independence: economic scores for advanced
economies
(2003) 198
VI. Independence: economic scores for emerging markets
(2003) 200
VII.
Independence: economic scores for developing
countries
(2003) 202
VIII.
Independence: evolution for GMT sample
(late 1980S-2003)
206
IX. Independence: evolution for Cukierman sample
(late 1980S-2003)
208
X. Independence: summary indices
(late 1980S-2003)
213
XI. Accountability database
(2006) 220
XII.
Transparency database
(2006) 224
XIII.
Detailed governance scores
228
6
Independence and Inflation Performance:
New Empirical Evidence
232
7
Policy Lessons from Global Trends
237
Overview
237
Relationships between the pillars of central bank governance
238
Consensus views
241
Principle
1:
set price stability as one of the primary
objectives of monetary policy
242
Principle
2:
curtail direct lending to governments
242
Contents ix
Principle
3:
ensure full independence for setting the
policy rate
243
Principle
4:
ensure no government involvement in
policy formulation
243
Principle
5:
ensure that accountability corresponds to
the level of independence
244
Principle
6:
ensure that transparency corresponds to
the level of accountability and financial market
deepening
244
Role of central banks in financial supervision
245
Theoretical considerations
245
Survey of practices
247
The way forward
249
Sequencing of reforms
251
Stage
1:
clarify objectives and establish basic
instrument independence
252
Stage
2:
establish the building block of accountability
254
Stage
3:
strengthen further political independence,
accountability, and transparency
255
References
256
Index
264
In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken
a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book brings together the three pillars
of central bank governance and provides a joint analysis of central bank independence,
accountability, and transparency. It offers a comprehensive review of the literature,
proposes new indices, and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central
bank governance, which are afterwards applied to global central banks globally. This
timely volume argues that there is a strong case for all central banks to be always
involved in financial stability issues.
This book offers the largest data sets ever published on these topics, and discusses
the evolving role of central banks. The global trends that are identified should help
policy-makers in countries in which legal frameworks have fallen behind to fill the
gap by bringing their central bank legislation in line with actual practice.
Bernard J.
Laurens
is currently Deputy Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets
Department, International Monetary Fund, US. He began his career in the IMF in
1992.
During his tenure, he has been extensively involved in domestic and external
financial sector issues, and modernization and liberalization of countries monetary
frameworks and exchange and capital account issues. His recent publications
include: Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
(1998),
Managing Capital
Flows: Lessons from the Experience of Chile
(1998),
Monetary Policy at Different
Stages of Market Development
(2004),
Measures of Central Bank Autonomy:
Empirical Evidence for
OECD,
Developing, and Emerging Market Economies
(2006),
China: Strengthening Monetary Policy Implementation
(2007),
and Central Bank
Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends
(2008).
Prior to joining the Fund, Bernard
Laurens
worked for the Bank of France. He also holds a degree in economics from
the
Institut
d Études Politiques
of Paris.
Marco Arnone is Director of the Centre for Macroeconomics
&
Finance Research
(CeMaFiR), Italy, and Adjoint Professor of Economics and Finance of Emerging Markets
(University of Eastern Piedmont), Italy. He has worked as an economist in the
IMF s Monetary and Financial Systems and African Departments, and has taught
at Milan s Catholic and State Universities. His recent publications include: Primary
Dealers in Government Securities
(2005),
Venture Capital for Development
(2006),
Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance, and Financial Supervisors Architecture
and Banking Supervision
(2007),
External Debt Sustainability and Domestic Debt
in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(2007),
Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from
Global Trends
(2008),
and Anti-Money Laundering by International Institutions: a
Preliminary Assessment
(2008).
Jean-François
Segalotto
is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Macroeconomics
&
Finance Research (CeMaFiR), Italy. His research work and interests focus on monetary
economics and institutions. His publications include: Central Bank Autonomy,
Macroeconomic Performance, and Monetary Frameworks: a Global Comparison
(2005),
Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for
OECD,
Developing,
and Emerging Market Economies
(2006),
and Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from
Global Trends
(2008).
|
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| author | Laurens, Bernard Arnone, Marco Segalotto, Jean-François |
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| id | DE-604.BV035572583 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:40:43Z |
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| isbn | 0230201075 9780230201071 |
| language | English |
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| publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Laurens, Bernard Verfasser (DE-588)171330072 aut Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective Bernard J. Laurens ; Marco Arnone ; Jean-François Segalotto 1. publ. Basingstoke [u.a.] Palgrave Macmillan 2009 XIX, 270 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book offers a comprehensive review of the literature, proposes new indices and calculates new measures of the three pillars of central bank governance, which are afterwards applied to global central banks. It argues that, while it may not always be desirable for the central bank to supervise financial institutions, there is a strong case for all central banks not to overlook financial stability issues.--Publisher's description Banques centrales Banques centrales - Comptabilité Banques centrales - Gestion Zentralbankautonomie stw Banks and banking, Central Banks and banking, Central Accounting Banks and banking, Central Management Transparenz (DE-588)4185917-0 gnd rswk-swf Berechenbarkeit (DE-588)4138368-0 gnd rswk-swf Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd rswk-swf Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd rswk-swf Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 s DE-188 Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 s Berechenbarkeit (DE-588)4138368-0 s Transparenz (DE-588)4185917-0 s Arnone, Marco Verfasser (DE-588)171543157 aut Segalotto, Jean-François Verfasser aut Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017628136&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017628136&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Laurens, Bernard Arnone, Marco Segalotto, Jean-François Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective Banques centrales Banques centrales - Comptabilité Banques centrales - Gestion Zentralbankautonomie stw Banks and banking, Central Banks and banking, Central Accounting Banks and banking, Central Management Transparenz (DE-588)4185917-0 gnd Berechenbarkeit (DE-588)4138368-0 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4185917-0 (DE-588)4138368-0 (DE-588)4130528-0 (DE-588)4751640-9 |
| title | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective |
| title_auth | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective |
| title_exact_search | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective |
| title_full | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective Bernard J. Laurens ; Marco Arnone ; Jean-François Segalotto |
| title_fullStr | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective Bernard J. Laurens ; Marco Arnone ; Jean-François Segalotto |
| title_full_unstemmed | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency a global perspective Bernard J. Laurens ; Marco Arnone ; Jean-François Segalotto |
| title_short | Central bank independence, accountability, and transparency |
| title_sort | central bank independence accountability and transparency a global perspective |
| title_sub | a global perspective |
| topic | Banques centrales Banques centrales - Comptabilité Banques centrales - Gestion Zentralbankautonomie stw Banks and banking, Central Banks and banking, Central Accounting Banks and banking, Central Management Transparenz (DE-588)4185917-0 gnd Berechenbarkeit (DE-588)4138368-0 gnd Notenbankpolitik (DE-588)4130528-0 gnd Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Banques centrales Banques centrales - Comptabilité Banques centrales - Gestion Zentralbankautonomie Banks and banking, Central Banks and banking, Central Accounting Banks and banking, Central Management Transparenz Berechenbarkeit Notenbankpolitik |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017628136&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017628136&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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