The EC merger regulation: substantive issues
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| New Title: | Lindsay, Alistair The EU merger regulation |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
London
Sweet & Maxwell [u.a.]
2009
|
| Edition: | 3. ed. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | LXIX, 733 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9781847038692 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The EC merger regulation |b substantive issues |c Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge |
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Titel: The EC merger regulation
Autor: Lindsay, Alistair
Jahr: 2009
CONTENTS
PAGE
Preface
Tables of Legislation
A. Table of EC Treaties, Secondary Legislation and Notices xxi
B. United Kingdom International Guidelines xxvii
C. United Kingdom Legislation xxix
Tables of Cases
D. Table of ECJ and CFI Decisions xxxi
E. Table of Merger Decisions (Numerical) xxxv
F. Table of Merger Decisions (Alphabetical) li
G. Table of Joint Ventures and ECSC Decisions lxvii
H. Table of Table of National Cases Ixix
PARA.
I THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR MERGER CONTROL
II Introduction 1-001
1-2 Criteria for Assessing Market Performance 1-O02
(a) Consumer welfare 1-003
(b) Total welfare 1-008
(c) Efficiency 1-009
(d) Analysis of criteria 1-010
1-3 The Effects of Mergers on Market Performance 1-012
(a) Efficiencies 1-013
(b) Market power 1-014
(c) The trade-off between efficiency and market power 1-023
1 -4 Measurement of the Predicted Effects of Mergers on Market
Performance 1-026
1 -5 Empirical Evidence of the Effects of Mergers on Consumers 1-028
CONTENTS
1.6 Overview of Analysis
(a) Theories of competitive harm 1-029
(b) Framework for analysis 1-033
(c) Rebutting theories of competitive harm 1-034
(d) Unifying principles?incentives and abilities 1-035
(e) Relevance of economic theory 1-036
2. THE SIEC TEST AND OTHER LEGAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
2.1 Introduction 2-001
2.2 The Objectives of EC Merger Control 2-003
2.3 The Change to the Substantive Test in the ECMR
(a) The Commission's 2001 consultation and 2002
proposals 2-008
(b) Possible deficiencies in the "dominance" test 2-009
(c) The adoption by the Council of "compromise" text 2-011
2.4 Interpreting the SIEC Test
(a) Formally, the new test broadens the Commission's
jurisdiction 2-012
(b) What is meant by "significant impediment to effective
competition"? 2-013
(c) The "significant impediment to effective competition"
test in practice 2-019
(d) "De minimis" exception 2-020
(e) "Dominant position" 2-021
(0 Mergers involving existing monopolies 2-024
(g) "Substantial part of the common market" 2-025
2.5 Burden and Standard of Proof
(a) Burden of proof 2-026
(b) Standard of proof 2-028
2.6 Period Over which the Predicted Effects of the Merger are
Examined 2-035
2.7 Relationship between the ECMR and Arts 81 and 82, National
Regulatory Systems, Contractual Restrictions and State Aids
(a) Arts 81 and 82 2-037
(b) National regulatory systems 2-040
(c) Contractual restrictions 2-041
(d) State aids 2-042
2.8 Investigative Techniques 2-049
2.9 International Comity 2-053
3. MARKET DEFINITION
3.1 Introduction 3-001
vru
CONTENTS
3.2 Product Market Definition: Introduction 3-005
3.3 Product Market Definition: Demand-Side Substitution
(a) The SSNIP test 3-006
(b) Evidence: introduction 3-012
(c) Pricing evidence 3-013
(d) Shock analysis or event studies and other evidence of
historic switching 3-022
(e) Switching costs 3-024
(0 Functional interchangeability 3-025
(g) Product characteristics 3-026
(h) Trade relationships 3-027
(0 Evidence of sellers' business decisions 3-029
G) Sellers' relative costs 3-030
(k) Critical loss analysis 3-031
0) Demand characteristics 3-032
(m) Previous cartel activity 3-033
(n) Evidence from customers and competitors 3-034
(o) International categorisations 3-035
3.4 Product Market Definition: Supply-Side Substitution
(a) The SSNIP test 3-036
(b) Evidence 3-037
3.5 Specific Issues in Product Market Definition
(a) Continuous chains of substitution 3-038
(b) Own label goods 3-039
(c) Original equipment/replacement goods 3-040
(d) Differentiated products 3-041
(e) Captive production/in-house supplies 3-042
(0 Secondary markets 3-044
(g) Two-sided markets 3-046
(h) Range and cluster goods 3-047
0) One-way markets 3-048
G) Outsourcers or resellers who sub-contract to actual
suppliers 3-049
(k) Durable goods 3-050
0) Recycled goods 3-051
(m) New markets 3-052
(n) Innovation markets 3-053
(o) Technology 3-054
(P) Procurement markets 3-055
(q) Exploration, production and supply 3-056
(r) Spot and long-term contracts 3-057
(s) Physical and paper trading 3-058
(t) Wholesale markets 3-059
00 Use of demand- and supply-side analysis 3-060
(v) Programme and catalogue sales 3-061
3.6 Get eranhic Market Definition: Introduction 3-062
CONTENTS
3.7 Geographic Market Definition: Demand-Side Substitution
(a) The SSNIP test
(b) Evidence: introduction
(c) Pricing
(d) Trade flows and buying patterns
(e) Transport and other transaction costs
(0 Legal restrictions and capacity constraints
(g) Customer requirements for local support services
(h) Conditions of competition
(i) Customers' procurement policies
(j) EU harmonisation and procurement legislation
(k) Other harmonisation of product standards
(1) National preferences, language and culture
3.8 Geographic Market Definition: Supply-Side Substitution
3.9 Specific Issues in Geographic Market Definition
(a) "One-way" markets 3-086
(b) Continuous chains of substitution 3-087
(c) "Route by route" markets 3-088
(d) Suppliers competing in both national and local markets 3-089
(e) Smaller member states 3-090
(f) Multi-plant operations 3-091
(g) Competitive tenders and inplants 3-094
3.10 Temporal Market Definition 3-095
4. MARKET SHARES AND CONCENTRATION LEVELS
4.1 Introduction 4-001
4.2 Market Share Data
(a) Units for measuring market shares 4-002
(b) Calculating market shares 4-015
(c) The use by the Commission of market share data 4-026
(d) Interpreting market share data 4-029
4.3 Concentration Data 4-036
5. THE COUNTERFACTUAL
5.1 Introduction 5-001
5.2 The Counterfactual 5-002
5.3 Other Transactions
(a) Parallel mergers 5-005
(b) Overlapping mergers 5-006
(c) Applying the counterfactual to parallel and overlapping
mergers 5-007
CONTENTS
6. MARKET OPERATION
6.1 Introduction 6-001
6.2 Principal Economic Models of Market Operation 6-002
(a) The Stackelberg leader-follower model 6-O03
(b) Limit pricing theory 6-004
(c) Game theory 6-005
6.3 Dynamic Effects: Changes in the Market over Time
(a) Expanding markets 6-007
(b) Static or declining markets 6-O08
(c) New markets 6-009
(d) Innovation 6-011
(e) Naturally concentrated markets 6-012
6.4 Competitive Interaction 6-013
(a) Pricing 6-014
(b) Costs 6-022
(c) Products 6-023
(d) Contractual terms 6-025
(e) Network effects 6-026
(f) Two-sided markets 6-028
(g) Tender or bidding markets 6-029
(h) Derived demand 6-031
(i) Connected markets 6-032
(j) Not-for-profit organizations 6-033
6.5 EU Procurement and Harmonising Legislation 6-034
6.6 National Champions 6-035
7. HORIZONTAL MERGERS: NON-COORDINATED EFFECTS
7.1 Introduction 7_~?l
7.2 Merging Firms Have Large Market Shares 7-002
7.3 Differentiated Products 7~°°3
7.4 Competitors are Unlikely to Increase Supply if Price
Increases
7.5 Other Factors Which May Give Rise to Non-Coordinated
Effects J?
(a) Limited possibilities of switching supplier 7-010
(b) Merged group's ability to hinder expansion 7-012
(c) Loss of an important competitive force or a "maverick" 7-013
7.6 Efficiencies Generated by the Merger and Other Aspects of the
Merged Group's Market Position
(a) Whether efficiencies resulting from the merger may
contribute to a prohibition decision 7-016
(b) The merged group's financial resources 7-020
CONTENTS
8. COORDINATED EFFECTS
8.1 Introduction 8-001
8.2 The Test for Identifying Coordinated Effects 8-004
8.3 Methodology in Analysing Coordinated Effects 8-007
8.4 The Nature of Coordination 8-008
8.5 Whether Coordination is Present Prior to the Merger
(a) The Airtours decision 8-009
(b) The practical importance of a finding of pre-merger
coordination 8-010
(c) Evidence 8-012
8.6 The Members of the Candidate Oligopoly 8-016
8.7 Reaching Terms of Coordination
(a) Introduction 8-017
(b) Terms of coordination will only emerge if they are
profitable 8-018
(c) Type of product 8-019
(d) Facilitating practices 8-021
(e) Similarity in costs structures 8-022
(f) Complexity of the terms of coordination 8-024
(g) Transparency of the reference point 8-025
(h) Other factors affecting the ability to reach terms of
coordination 8-027
8.8 Monitoring Deviations 8-036
8.9 Deterrent Mechanisms
(a) Generally 8-041
(b) The scope of the obligation to identify a deterrent
mechanism 8-042
(c) The incentives to comply with the coordinated outcome 8-044
(d) Chances of detection and speed of punishment 8-046
(e) The deterrent mechanism must eliminate the gains from
cheating 8-047
(f) The credibility of the retaliatory threat 8-048
(g) Market operation 8-049
(h) Evidence that retaliatory measures have been employed
in the past 8-050
8.10 Reactions of Outsiders
(a) Introduction 8-051
(b) The competitive fringe 8-052
(c) New entry 8-054
(d) Countervailing buyer power 8-055
8.11 Causation 8-057
8.12 Capacity
(a) Introduction 8-060
(b) Symmetry in over-capacity 8-061
(c) Actual capacity 8-062
CONTENTS
(d) Tacit coordination on capacity
8.13 Structural Links and Other Forms of Cooperation
8.14 Evidence of Historic Cartel Activity
8-063
8-064
8-066
LOSS OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND MERGERS IN
NEIGHBOURING MARKETS
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Loss of Potential Competition
(a) General
(b) The Commission's decision in Air Liquide/BOC
(c) The Commission's other decisions
(d) The approach of the US agencies
9.3 Mergers in Neighbouring Markets
9-001
9-002
9-004
9-005
9-006
9-007
10. THE MERGED GROUP'S BUYER POWER
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Conditions for the Exercise of Buyer Power
10.3 Decisions of the Commission
10-001
10-003
10-004
11. VERTICAL ISSUES
11.1 Introduction
(a) Definition
(b) Ambiguous effects of vertical integration on consumer
welfare
(c) Decisions of the Community Courts
(d) Notice on non-horizontal mergers
(e) Consistent application of antitrust law
(0 Vertical effects flow-chart
11.2 Possible Efficiencies in Vertical Mergers
(a) Introduction
(b) Transaction costs
(c) Double margmalisation
11.3 Input Foreclosure
(a) Introduction
(b) Market share and concentration levels
(c) The framework for analysing input foreclosure issues
(d) Identify the leveraging conduct
(e) Ability to foreclose access to inputs
(f) Incentive to pursue an input foreclosure strategy
(g) Impact on competition in the downstream market
(h) Causation
11-001
11-002
11-003
11-004
11-005
11-006
11-007
11-008
11-009
11-011
11-012
11-013
11-014
11-015
11-024
11-029
11-031
CONTENTS
(i) Efficiencies
11.4 Customer Foreclosure
(a) Introduction
(b) Market share and concentration levels
(c) The framework for analysing customer foreclosure
issues
(d) Identify the leveraging conduct
(e) Ability to foreclose access to customers
(f) Incentive to pursue a customer foreclosure strategy
(g) Impact on competition
(h) Causation
(i) Efficiencies
11.5 Foreclosure of New Entry
11.6 Other Concerns Arising from Vertical Integration
(a) Coordinated effects and express collusion
(b) Price discrimination
(c) Information
(d) Avoidance of regulatory constraints
(e) Reduced incentive to engage in research and
development
(f) "Diagonal" overlaps
(g) Loss of liquidity on the input market
12. CONGLOMERATE ISSUES
12.1 Introduction
(a) General
(b) Ambiguous effects of conglomerate mergers on
consumer welfare
(c) Decisions of the Community Courts
(d) Notice on non-horizontal mergers
(e) Grounds for intervention in conglomerate mergers
(0 Organisation of the Chapter
12.2 Generic Treatment of Conglomerate Issues?Leveraging
(a) Market share and concentration levels
(b) The framework for analysing conglomerate leveraging
issues
(c) Identify the leveraging conduct
(d) Ability to pursue the leveraging conduct
(e) Incentive to pursue the leveraging conduct
(0 Foreclosure
(g) Causation
(h) Efficiencies
12.3 Tying, Pure Bundling and Mixed Bundling
(a) Introduction
CONTENTS
12.4
12.5
12.6
(b) The Chicago school
(c) Ability and incentive to tie or bundle
(d) The exclusionary effects of tying or bundling
Other Theories of Leverage
Portfolio Power or Range Effects
(a) The scope of portfolio power theories
(b) Applying leveraging theory to portfolio power cases
Reduced Incentive to Engage in Research and
Development
12-025
12-026
12-028
12-029
12-030
12-033
12-035
13. COORDINATION IN JOINT VENTURES
13.1 Introduction
(a) The effects of joint ventures on competition
(b) The relationship between arts 2(4) and 2(5) of the
ECMR and coordinated effects
13.2 Coordination of Behaviour
(a) General
(b) Identifying the markets for analysis
(c) Identifying the mechanism for coordination
(d) Assessing the parents' incentive and ability to engage
in coordination
(e) Appreciability
(f) Causation
(g) Art.81(3) analysis
13-001
13-002
13-003
13-005
13-006
13-007
13-010
13-011
13-012
14. COMPETITION FROM ACTUAL RIVALS
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Assessing the Strength of Competition from Rivals
(a) General
(b) Market shares
(c) Concentration data
(d) Bidding studies
14.3 Viability of Alternative Sources of Supply
(a) General
(b) Incentive to expand output
(c) Ability to expand output
(d) Credible alternatives for customers
(e) Sufficiency of competitor activity
(f) Competition from outside the market
14.4 Links between the Merged Group and its Competitors
(a) General
(b) Can the C^rnmission take account of links which do
confer control?
14-001
14-002
14-003
14-004
14-005
14-006
14-007
14-008
14-011
14-012
14-013
14-014
not
14-015
CONTENTS
(c) The weight to be placed on links conferring control 14-017
(d) The weight to be placed on links which do not confer
control 14-018
15. COUNTERVAILING BUYER POWER
15.1 Introduction 15-001
15.2 Assessing Buyer Power
(a) General 15-003
(b) Existence of viable alternatives or credible threats 15-004
(c) Whether buyers have an incentive to act 15-006
(d) Whether buyers' power is counterbalanced by similar or
greater power of the merged group 15-008
(e) The role of smaller customers 15-009
15.3 Leading Decisions on Buyer Power
(a) Commission decisions 15-010
(b) The BaByliss decision 15-012
16. NEW ENTRY
16.1 16.2 Introduction Relevant Principles 16-001
(a) Test of likely, timely and sufficient 16-002
(b) Likelihood of entry 16-003
(c) Timeliness 16-004
(d) Sufficiency 16-005
(e) New entry as a "trump" 16-006
16.3 Barriers to Entry
(a) Definition 16-007
(b) Technical and strategic advantages 16-008
(c) Entry impediments 16-014
(d) Analysis of barriers to entry in practice 16-015
(e) Barriers to expansion 16-017
(f) Barriers to exit and contestable markets 16-018
17. THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE
17.1 Introduction 17-001
17.2 The Current Test 17-002
17.3 The Evolution of the Test
(a) The Commission's approach prior to BASF 17-003
(b) The BASF decision 17-004
17.4 Decisions Applying the Test
(a) NewsCorp/Telepiu 17-006
CONTENTS
(b) BLU
(c) JCI/FIAMM
(d) Deterioration in competitive strength falling short of
failure
17.5 Application of the Test in an Economic Downturn
17.6 Whether the Failing Firm Test is Drawn Too Narrowly
17-010
17-011
17-016
17-017
17-018
18. EFFICIENCY GAINS
18.1
18.2
18.3
18.4
Introduction
(a) General
(b) Rationale for treating efficiency gains as a positive
factor in merger appraisal
(c) Options for giving positive effect to efficiency gains
The Historic Treatment of Efficiency Arguments under the
ECMR
(a) Legislative history
(b) Early treatment of efficiency issues under the ECMR
(c) Evolution of the Commission's thinking
(d) Reform of the ECMR
(e) Input from academic economists
The Treatment of Efficiency Gains Under the Revised
ECMR
Specific Issues in Analysing Efficiency Gains
(a) Benefit to consumers
(b) Merger-specific efficiencies
(c) Verifiable
(d) Substantial efficiencies
(e) Timely
(f) Disregarding anti-competitive strategies
(g) A preference for reductions in marginal or variable
costs
(h) Extent of remaining competition
(i) Efficiencies arising in markets other than the one in
which market power is created or strengthened
0) Types of efficiencies
18-001
18-002
18-003
18-004
18-005
18-007
18-008
18-010
18-012
18-014
18-015
18-016
18-017
18-018
18-019
18-020
18-021
18-022
18-023
19. OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE
MERGER ON CONSUMERS
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Categories of Evidence
19-001
19-002
CONTENTS
20. REMEDIES
20.1 Introduction
(a) General
(b) Burden of proof
(c) Remedies in phases I and II
(d) Structure of this Chapter
20.2 General Principles Relevant to the Selection of an
Appropriate Remedy
(a) Comprehensive solution
Effective implementation
Proportionality
The benefits of the transaction for consumers
The overall effect of the remedies package on
consumers
The effect of the remedies on technical and economic
progress
Compatibility with the competition rules
No power to "over-remedy"
Behavioural and structural remedies
Selection of Remedies by Theory of Competitive Harm
(a) Non-coordinated effects (horizontal overlaps)
Coordinated effects
Loss of potential competition
Procurement power
Vertical issues
Conglomerate issues
Coordination in joint ventures
Empirical Studies of the Effectiveness of Remedies
(a) The FTC Divestiture Study
(b) The Merger Remedies Study
Transferring a Market Position?Transfer of a Busines
(a) Introduction
Model texts
Clear identification of the divestment business
A viable business
AH necessary assets should be included in the
divestment package
Divestment of "more than the overlap"
Divestment of "less than the overlap"
Retention by the divesting party of an interest in the
divested business
The purchaser of the divestment business
When it is necessary to sell the business to a single
purchaser
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(0
(g)
(h)
(0
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(0
(g)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(0
(g)
(b)
(0
0)
20-001
20-003
20-004
20-005
20-006
20-007
20-010
20-012
20-013
20-014
20-015
20-016
20-017
20-021
20-022
20-023
20-025
20-026
20-027
20-028
20-029
20-030
20-031
20-032
20-034
20-035
20-036
20-044
20-049
20-051
20-054
20-055
20-066
CONTENTS
(k) Whether it is necessary to sell the business to the
purchaser offering the highest price
(1) Time limits
(m) Interim preservation and carving out of the business
(n) Post-completion transitional support for the purchaser
(o) Prohibition on buying back the assets
20.6 Transferring a Market Position?Transfer of Intellectual
Property Rights
(a) When the transfer of intellectual property rights will
provide an appropriate remedy
(b) Pharmaceuticals mergers
(c) Consumer goods mergers
20.7 Removal of Links with Competitors
20.8 Access Remedies
(a) Introduction
(b) Circumstances in which an access remedy may be
appropriate
(c) General issues relating to remedies designed to
facilitate entry
(d) General issues relating to remedies designed to
prevent foreclosure
(e) Monitoring
(f) Duration
(g) Examples of remedies granting access to infrastructure
or technical platforms
(h) Examples of remedies granting access to technology or
intellectual property
20.9 Amendments to Long Term Exclusive Agreements
(a) Introduction
(b) Examples of remedies terminating exclusive vertical
agreements
20.10 Other Remedies
(a) Introduction
General principles
Transfer of specific assets (other than intellectual
property rights) to transfer a market position
Termination of distribution agreements
The supply of goods or services to eliminate vertical
foreclosure concerns or facilitate entry
The creation of "product space" to facilitate new entry
Other remedies designed to "sponsor" new entry
(not falling within the "access" category)
(h) Assurance of purchases from third parties
(i) Correction of market flaws
(j) Other remedies
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
20-069
20-070
20-072
20-075
20-078
20-079
20-081
20-083
20-091
20-093
20-096
20-097
20-102
20-104
20-105
20-106
20-107
20-108
20-110
20-111
20-112
20-113
20-115
20-116
20-117
20-118
20-119
20-120
20-121
CONTENTS
20.11 Crown Jewels, Up-Front Buyer, Fix it First and Conditional
Remedies
(a) Alternative and "crown jewel" remedies 20-124
(b) "Up-front buyer" and "fix it first" remedies 20-127
(c) Conditional remedies 20-130
20.12 Other Aspects of the Remedies Process
(a) Legal status of the Notice on Remedies 20-131
(b) The roles of the trustees 20-132
(c) The "review clause" 20-133
(d) Third party consents 20-137
(e) Commitments given in earlier cases 20-142
(f) Commitments to resolve two or more cases 20-143
(g) Clearance without accepting the commitments
(or all of them) 20-144
(h) Status of different types of commitments and
consequences of breach 20-145
(i) Declarations from the competent authorities of
Member States 20-146
(j) International cooperation 20-147
20.13 Structuring Transactions when Remedies Issues are
Expected 20-148
PAGE
Index 721 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Lindsay, Alistair Berridge, Alison |
| author_facet | Lindsay, Alistair Berridge, Alison |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Lindsay, Alistair |
| author_variant | a l al a b ab |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035460207 |
| classification_rvk | PS 3380 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)600124139 (DE-599)BVBBV035460207 |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | 3. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035460207 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-02T11:26:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781847038692 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017380066 |
| oclc_num | 600124139 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | LXIX, 733 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Sweet & Maxwell [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Lindsay, Alistair Verfasser aut The EC merger regulation substantive issues Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge 3. ed. London Sweet & Maxwell [u.a.] 2009 LXIX, 733 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd rswk-swf Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd rswk-swf Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 b Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 s Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 s DE-604 Berridge, Alison Verfasser aut Ab 4. Aufl. u.d.T. Lindsay, Alistair The EU merger regulation (DE-604)BV040536765 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017380066&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Lindsay, Alistair Berridge, Alison The EC merger regulation substantive issues Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5098525-5 (DE-588)4071521-8 (DE-588)4121924-7 |
| title | The EC merger regulation substantive issues |
| title_auth | The EC merger regulation substantive issues |
| title_exact_search | The EC merger regulation substantive issues |
| title_full | The EC merger regulation substantive issues Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge |
| title_fullStr | The EC merger regulation substantive issues Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge |
| title_full_unstemmed | The EC merger regulation substantive issues Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge |
| title_new | Lindsay, Alistair The EU merger regulation |
| title_short | The EC merger regulation |
| title_sort | the ec merger regulation substantive issues |
| title_sub | substantive issues |
| topic | Europäische Union (DE-588)5098525-5 gnd Fusionskontrolle (DE-588)4071521-8 gnd Wettbewerbsrecht (DE-588)4121924-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Fusionskontrolle Wettbewerbsrecht |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017380066&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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