Game theory evolving: a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Princeton [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
2009
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| Edition: | 2. ed. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Physical Description: | XVII, 390 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780691140506 9780691140513 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game theory evolving |b a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |c Herbert Gintis |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Princeton [u.a.] |b Princeton Univ. Press |c 2009 | |
| 300 | |a XVII, 390 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804138691680010240 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
XV
1
Probability Theory
1
1.1
Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation
1
1.2
Probability Spaces
2
1.3
De
Morgan s Laws
3
1.4
Interocitors
3
1.5
The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities
3
1.6
Probability as Frequency
4
1.7
Craps
5
1.8
A Marksman Contest
5
1.9
Sampling
5
1.10
Aces Up
6
1.11
Permutations
6
1.12
Combinations and Sampling
7
1.13
Mechanical Defects
7
1.14
Mass Defection
7
1.15
House Rules
7
1.16
The Addition Rule for Probabilities
8
1.17
A Guessing Game
8
1.18
North Island, South Island
8
1.19
Conditional Probability
9
1.20
Bayes
Rule
9
1.21
Extrasensory Perception
10
1.22
Les Cinq Tiroirs
10
1.23
Drug Testing
10
1.24
Color Blindness
11
1.25
Urns
11
1.26
The Monty Hall Game
11
.27
The Logic of Murder and Abuse
11
.28
The Principle of Insufficient Reason
12
.29
The Greens and the Blacks
12
.30
The Brain and Kidney Problem
12
.31
The Value of Eyewitness Testimony
13
viii Contents
1.32
When Weakness Is Strength
13
1.33
The Uniform Distribution
16
1.34
Laplace s Law of Succession
17
1.35
From Uniform to Exponential
17
2
Bayesian Decision Theory
18
2.1
The Rational Actor Model
18
2.2
Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting
20
2.3
The Expected Utility Principle
22
2.4
Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function
26
2.5
The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model
30
3
Game Theory: Basic Concepts
32
3.1
Big John and Little John
32
3.2
The Extensive Form
38
3.3
The Normal Form
41
3.4
Mixed Strategies
42
3.5
Nash Equilibrium
43
3.6
The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory
44
3.7
Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
45
3.8
Throwing Fingers
46
3.9
Battle of the Sexes
46
3.10
The Hawk-Dove Game
48
3.11
The Prisoner s Dilemma
50
4
Eliminating Dominated Strategies
52
4.1
Dominated Strategies
52
4.2
Backward Induction
54
4.3
Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies
55
4.4
Subgame
Perfection
57
4.5
Stackelberg Leadership
59
4.6
The Second-Price Auction
59
4.7
The Mystery of Kidnapping
60
4.8
The Eviction Notice
62
4.9
Hagar s Battles
62
4.10
Military Strategy
63
4.11
The Dr. Strangelove Game
64
Contents ix
4.12 Strategie
Voting
64
4.13
Nuisance Suits
65
4.14
An Armaments Game
67
4.15
Football Strategy
67
4.16
Poker with Bluffing
68
4.17
The Little
Miss Muffet Game 69
4.18
Cooperation with Overlapping Generations
70
4.19
Dominance-Solvable Games
71
4.20
Agent-based Modeling
72
4.21
Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?
75
4.22
Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
77
4.23
Review of Basic Concepts
79
5
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
80
5.1
Price Matching as Tacit Collusion
80
5.2
Competition on Main Street
81
5.3
Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets
81
5.4
The Tobacco Market
87
5.5
The
Klingons
and the Snarks
87
5.6
Chess: The Trivial Pastime
88
5.7
No-Draw, High-Low Poker
89
5.8
An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker
91
5.9
The Truth Game
92
5.10
The Rubinstein Bargaining Model
94
5.11
Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience
96
5.12
Bargaining with One Outside Option
97
5.13
Bargaining with Dual Outside Options
98
5.14
Huey,
Dewey,
and Louie Split a Dollar
102
5.15
Twin Sisters
104
5.16
The Samaritan s Dilemma
104
5.17
The Rotten Kid Theorem
106
5.18
The Shopper and the Fish Merchant
107
5.19
Pure Coordination Games
109
5.20
Pick Any Number
109
5.21
Pure Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence
110
5.22
Introductory Offers
111
5.23
Web Sites (for Spiders)
112
Contents
6
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
Π
6
6.1
The Algebra of Mixed Strategies
116
6.2
Lions and Antelope
П7
6.3
A Patent Race
118
6.4
Tennis Strategy
119
6.5
Preservation of Ecology Game
119
6.6
Hard Love
120
6.7
Advertising Game
120
6.8
Robin Hood and Little John
122
6.9
The Motorist s Dilemma
122
6.10
Family Politics
123
6.11
Frankié
and Johnny
123
6.12
A Card Game
124
6.13
Cheater-Inspector
126
6.14
The Vindication of the Hawk
126
6.15
Characterizing
2
χ
2
Normal Form Games I
127
6.16
Big John and Little John Revisited
128
6.17
Dominance Revisited
128
6.18
Competition on Main Street Revisited
128
6.19
Twin Sisters Revisited
129
6.20
Twin Sisters: An Agent-Based Model
129
6.21
One-Card, Two-Round Poker with Bluffing
131
6.22
An Agent-Based Model of Poker with Bluffing
132
6.23
Trust in Networks
133
6.24
El Farol
134
6.25
Decorated Lizards
135
6.26
Sex Ratios as Nash Equilibria
137
6.27
A Mating Game
140
6.28
Coordination Failure
141
6.29
Colonel Blotto Game
141
6.30
Number Guessing Game
142
6.31
Target Selection
142
6.32
A Reconnaissance Game
142
6.33
Attack on Hidden Object
143
6.34
Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games
143
6.35
Mutual Monitoring in a Partnership
145
6.36
Mutual Monitoring in Teams
145
Contents xi
6.37
Altruismi?) in
Bird Flocks
146
6.38
The Groucho Marx Game
147
6.39
Games of Perfect Information
151
6.40
Correlated Equilibria
151
6.41
Territoriality as a Correlated Equilibrium
153
6.42
Haggling at the Bazaar
154
6.43
Poker with Bluffing Revisited
156
6.44
Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria
157
6.45
Why Play Mixed Strategies?
160
6.46
Reviewing of Basic Concepts
161
7
Principal-Agent Models
162
7.1
Gift Exchange
162
7.2
Contract Monitoring
163
7.3
Profit Signaling
164
7.4
Properties of the Employment Relationship
168
7.5
Peasant and Landlord
169
7.6
Bob s Car Insurance
173
7.7
A Generic Principal-Agent Model
174
8
Signaling Games
179
8.1
Signaling as a Coevolutionary Process
179
8.2
A Generic Signaling Game
180
8.3
Sex and Piety: The Darwin-Fisher Model
182
8.4
Biological Signals as Handicaps
187
8.5
The Shepherds Who Never Cry Wolf
189
8.6
My Brother s Keeper
190
8.7
Honest Signaling among Partial Altruists
193
8.8
Educational Signaling
195
8.9
Education as a Screening Device
197
8.10
Capital as a Signaling Device
199
9
Repeated Games
201
9.1
Death and Discount Rates in Repeated Games
202
9.2
Big Fish and Little Fish
202
9.3
Alice and Bob Cooperate
204
9.4
The Strategy of an Oil Cartel
205
xii Contents
9.5 Reputational
Equilibrium
205
9.6
Tacit Collusion
206
9.7
The One-Stage Deviation Principle
208
9.8
Tit for Tat
209
9.9
I d Rather Switch Than Fight
210
9.10
The Folk Theorem
213
9.11
The Folk Theorem and the Nature of Signaling
216
9.12
The Folk Theorem Fails in Large Groups
217
9.13
Contingent Renewal Markets Do Not Clear
219
9.14
Short-Side Power in Contingent Renewal Markets
222
9.15
Money Confers Power in Contingent Renewal Markets
223
9.16
The Economy Is Controlled by the Wealthy
223
9.17
Contingent Renewal Labor Markets
224
10
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
229
10.1
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies: Definition
230
10.2
Properties of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
232
10.3
Characterizing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
233
10.4
A Symmetric Coordination Game
236
10.5
A Dynamic Battle of the Sexes
236
10.6
Symmetrical Throwing Fingers
237
10.7
Hawks, Doves, and Bourgeois
238
10.8
Trust in Networks II
238
10.9
Cooperative Fishing
238
10.10
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Are Not Unbeatable
240
10.11
A Nash Equilibrium That Is Not an
EES
240
10.12
Rock, Paper, and Scissors Has No ESS
241
10.13
Invasion of the Pure-Strategy Mutants
241
10.14
Multiple Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
242
10.15
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Finite Populations
242
10.16
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Games
244
11
Dynamical Systems
247
11.1
Dynamical Systems: Definition
247
11.2
Population Growth
248
11.3
Population Growth with Limited Carrying Capacity
249
11.4
The
Lotka-
Volteira
Predator-Prey Model
251
Contents xiii
11.5
Dynamical
Systems
Theory
255
11.6
Existence and Uniqueness
256
11.7
The Linearization Theorem
257
11.8
Dynamical Systems in One Dimension
258
11.9
Dynamical Systems in Two Dimensions
260
11.10
Exercises in Two-Dimensional Linear Systems
264
11.11
Lotka-
Volteira
with Limited Carrying Capacity
266
11.12
Take No Prisoners
266
11.13
The Hartman-Grobman Theorem
267
11.14
Features of Two-Dimensional Dynamical Systems
268
12
Evolutionary Dynamics
270
12.1
The Origins of Evolutionary Dynamics
271
12.2
Strategies as Replicators
272
12.3
A Dynamic Hawk-Dove Game
274
12.4
Sexual Reproduction and the Replicator Dynamic
276
12.5
Properties of the Replicator System
278
12.6
The Replicator Dynamic in Two Dimensions
279
12.7
Dominated Strategies and the Replicator Dynamic
280
12.8
Equilibrium and Stability with a Replicator Dynamic
282
12.9
Evolutionary Stability and Asymptotically Stability
284
12.10
Trust in Networks III
284
12.11
Characterizing
2x2
Normal Form Games II
285
12.12
Invasion of the Pure-Strategy Nash Mutants II
286
12.13
A Generalization of Rock, Paper, and Scissors
287
12.14 Uta stansburiana
in Motion
287
12.15
The Dynamics of Rock, Paper, and Scissors
288
12.16
The
Lotka-
Volteira
Model and Biodiversity
288
12.17
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
290
12.18
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games II
295
12.19
The Evolution of Trust and Honesty
295
13
Markov Economies and Stochastic Dynamical Systems
297
13.1
Markov Chains
297
13.2
The Ergodic Theorem for Markov Chains
305
13.3
The Infinite Random Walk
307
13.4
The Sisyphean Markov Chain
308
xiv Contents
13.5 Andrei Andreyevich s Two-Urn Problem
309
13.6
Solving
Linear
Recursion Equations
310
13.7
Good Vibrations
311
13.8
Adaptive Learning
312
13.9
The Steady State of a Markov Chain
314
13.10
Adaptive Learning II
315
13.11
Adaptive Learning with Errors
316
13.12
Stochastic Stability
317
14
Table of Symbols
319
15
Answers
321
Sources for Problems
373
References
375
Index
385
|
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| id | DE-604.BV035365660 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:32:13Z |
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| isbn | 9780691140506 9780691140513 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Gintis, Herbert 1940-2023 Verfasser (DE-588)109325370 aut Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction Herbert Gintis 2. ed. Princeton [u.a.] Princeton Univ. Press 2009 XVII, 390 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017169637&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Gintis, Herbert 1940-2023 Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |
| title_auth | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |
| title_exact_search | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |
| title_full | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction Herbert Gintis |
| title_fullStr | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction Herbert Gintis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory evolving a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction Herbert Gintis |
| title_short | Game theory evolving |
| title_sort | game theory evolving a problem centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |
| title_sub | a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction |
| topic | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017169637&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gintisherbert gametheoryevolvingaproblemcenteredintroductiontomodelingstrategicinteraction |