Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | Slovenian |
| Published: |
Ljubljana
Inšt. za Novejšo Zgodovino
2006
|
| Series: | Zbirka Razpoznavanja
2 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Item Description: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Physical Description: | 416 S. |
| ISBN: | 9616386085 9789616386081 |
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Record in the Search Index
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| adam_text | Pregled vsebine
PREDGOVOR
9
OSVOBODILNA FRONTA, REVOLUCIJA
IN
NACIONALNO VPRAŠANJE
15
Príprave
na revolucijo
17
Ustanovitev Slovenskega
narodnoosvobodilnega odbora
45
Dolomitska izjava
65
Izza
kočevskega zbora
-
med pričakovanji
in stvarnostjo
126
Kocbekova misija
v
Rimu poleti
1944 138
PRIMORSKA
-
SLOVENSKI KOMUNISTI MED
NACIONALIZMOM
IN
INTERNACIONALIZMOM
159
Naš odnos do Italijanov
naj bo
miren
in
dostojen, toda
nič
več . Slovenski komunisti
in
Itaüjani na
Přímořském
161
Primorska sredina
in predvojni
primorski
protifašizem
v očeh
slovenskih
komunistov
med drugo svetovno vojno
185
KATOLIŠKI TABOR MED BALKANOM
IN SREDNJO
EVROPO
199
Slovenska ljudska stranka
in
vprašanje
državnopravnega položaja Slovenije
po napadu
sil osi
na Jugoslaviju
201
Pobuda
patra
Kazimirja Zakrajška
za ustanovitev slovenske države poleti
1941
v
Združenih državah Amerike
245
Ehrlich in zasnova
slovenske države
268
ŠkofRožman
in
vprašanje državnega
okvira med drugo svetovno vojno
306
New York
Times
о
načrtih za samostojno
slovensko državo med drugo svetovno vojno
315
Srednjeevropski integracijski nacrti
med letoma
1918 in 1945
ter
Slovenci
335
POVZETEK
355
SUMMARY
369
VIRI IN
LITERATURA
383
OSEBNO KAZALO
403
Summary
On April
17, 1941,
only a few days after the King¬
dom of Yugoslavia had been attacked by the Axis Pow¬
ers, the Yugoslav Royal Army signed the unconditional
capitulation. As a result of this April catastrophe, Yugo¬
slavia was occupied and parcelled out. Most of its ter¬
ritory was appropriated by the neighbouring aggressor
states: Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. At its
centre, the Independent State of Croatia was founded.
Serbia, whose pre-1912 borders had been enlarged with
the inclusion of
Banat
and
Kosovska Mitrovica,
was
placed under direct German military command, enjoy¬
ing a limited autonomy under Milan
Ačimović
in Milan
Nedić.
Thus the Yugoslav state, which was only a Ver¬
sailles creation in the eyes of the Axis Powers and the
promoters of the New Order,
de
facto ceased to exist.
During the distribution of its state assets, they only re¬
ferred to it as the former Yugoslav territory . For them,
Yugoslavia s military defeat also meant its debellation.
From the outset, this situation of occupation and par¬
celling out was opposed by the Allies, with the exception
of the Soviet Union which, due to its pact with Ger¬
many, expelled the Yugoslav ambassador in May
1941.
It only re-established diplomatic links with the by then
exiled Yugoslav royal government in September
1941.
Like other exiled governments (such as the Polish and
Czechoslovak) the Allies continued to acknowledge the
royal Yugoslav government in London as a legitimate
and lawful representative of its nation. In this respect,
SUMMARY
369
the formal
(de
hire) continuity of the Yugoslav state was
preserved in the international Allied community.
After the April war the Slovenes found themselves
in a particularly difficult situation, with their territory
not only occupied but also distributed between several
occupiers. Germans occupied
Styria
(Štajerska)
and
Upper Carniola (Gorenjska). Italians established the
Province of Ljubljana on the territory of Lower (Dolen-
jska) and Inner Carniola (Notranjska). Prekmurje was
occupied by Hungary. The smallest portion (five vil¬
lages around Bregana) was allotted to the Independent
State of Croatia in the wake of the frontier demarca¬
tion between it and Nazi Germany. After the occupa¬
tion, the ethnic territory of the Slovenes who, before
the Second World War, had lived in four states
-
Italy,
Germany (Austria) and Hungary
-
as well as in their
wider, Yugoslav motherland, was divided into eleven
administrative units. Out of these, only the Province of
Ljubljana had its centre located on the territory of the
present Republic of Slovenia. The future the Axis Pow¬
ers had in mind for the Slovene people was evident not
only from the occupiers assimilation measures, but
also from the succession treaty in which Slovenia, un¬
like Croatia and Serbia, was not even mentioned, thus
additionally strengthening the opinion that there was
no room for Slovenes as an ethnic unit in the new
European order.
In this difficult situation of the occupation, Slo¬
venes found themselves in a completely new position,
the long-term consequences of which, however, were
not only negative. Whilst all were aware that the de¬
mise of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which, as predicted
by
Dr
Anton
Korošec,
collapsed like a house made of
cards , also meant the end of the pre-war political and
general value systems, not everyone necessarily desired
the change in the balance of political power. Not only
did Yugoslavia disintegrate as a result of the occupa¬
tion, but the establishment of the Independent State of
Croatia also interrupted any physical contacts between
Slovenes and other Yugoslav peoples, leaving them iso¬
lated and abandoned to their own devices. This, on the
other hand, also prompted the reflections over the na-
370
tion s future and statehood. Under the circumstances,
a remote possibility emerged that the Slovenes could
decide on possible future associations on the basis of
their national interests. At the same time, plans for the
future fate of the Slovene nation, that had been kept
secret and concealed for various reasons, came to light,
opening new perspectives for its development.
The wartime events in Slovenia can be described
as a combination of often contradictory processes,
contained in the terms, such as occupation, libera¬
tion struggle, revolution, civil war and collaboration.
In these complex circumstances, two mutually hostile
camps developed: the Communist led National Libera¬
tion Movement (hereafter the NLM) on one side, and the
counter-revolutionary camp, on the other. In spite of
their differences, the two camps developed similar po¬
litical programmes, envisaging a unified Slovenia in a
restored, extended and federal Yugoslav state. It goes
without saying that such programmes also envisaged
the victory of the anti-Fascist coalition. The key differ¬
ence was that the NLM, for revolutionary reasons, strove
for a republic arrangement, while the counter-revolu¬
tionary movement, given its legalist principle, most of
the time insisted on a monarchy. Although legalism
suited counter-revolutionaries for the best part of the
war, they renounced it in its final stages, after an agree¬
ment between
Josip Broz-Tito,
the NLM leader, and Ivan
Šubašić,
the Prime Minister of the exiled royal govern¬
ment, was reached. During the war, the NLM, for tactical
reasons, avoided addressing the question of monarchy.
In a specific manner, the NLM succeeded in legitimising
its status in front of the Allies, as part of the anti-Hitler
coalition. Due to the agreements between
Šubašić
and
Tito, who had been appointed prime minister of the pro¬
visional Yugoslav government by the royal regency in
March
1945,
the international Allied community did not
consider that, in Yugoslavia, power had been usurped
by means of a revolution. This, of course, did not mean
that the new regime refrained from introducing changes
in domestic politics which broke with the pre-war social
order. On the other hand, it is also true that the most
fervent supporters of the monarchy were Slovene Lib-
37 ]_
erais,
while those from the Catholic camp were, at the
end of the day, even prepared to adapt to a republic.
Besides, the Liberation Front (hereafter LF) gave much
more emphasis to the right of self-determination and
the statehood attributes Slovenia was supposed to gain
as a federal unit in the new Yugoslav community than
the opposite side which looked at Slovenia s autonomy
from a very pragmatic viewpoint, without major ambi¬
tions regarding statehood symbols. It should also be
mentioned that, in the new state, the trialist federal ar¬
rangement by the Yugoslav monarchy (the Serbian dy¬
nasty of
Karadjordjević),
defended from the outset by
the counter-revolutionary side, would present a much
greater danger of Serbian hegemony in a new state than
the federalist concept of five or six units proposed by
the NLM. The influence exerted by the Slovenes on the
shaping of new relations within Yugoslavia was also very
different.
Edvard Kardelj,
who played a very important
role in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereafter the
CPY), had a decisive influence on the policy making at
the Yugoslav level, being also the theoretical founder of
the
AVNOJ
declarations. The opposite camp, however,
after the death of
Korošec
had no Slovene politician ca¬
pable of shaping the Yugoslav politics.
Apart from the publicly declared political pro¬
gramme, common to all key political protagonists, some
significant and interesting exceptions emerged during
the war. The development and, in some aspects, the
concept of the programme, especially with regards to
the degree of federalism, was somewhat different in the
two camps. Above all, throughout the occupation, a se¬
ries of dilemmas and questions arose with regards to
the national political objectives.
The Liberation Front of the Slovene People, founded
at the end of April
1941
as an anti-imperialist front, was
composed of basic groups, such as the CPS, Catholic
groups, the Slovene orientated
Sokol
(Falcon) members
and cultural workers, and plenary groups which num¬
bered around ten. In the Executive Committee of the
LF there were only representatives of the basic groups,
which shows that these represented the nucleus of the
organisation and played a more important role than the
372
plenary groups. Although, prior to the
Dolomiti
Dec¬
laration, the LF bore certain coalition traits, this was
never a coalition of equal partners. The CPS indeed
played the leading role from the very beginning of or¬
ganised resistance, ensuring for itself the monopoly in
the partisan army, propaganda and in the security in¬
telligence service. As a result, its position regarding the
Slovene national question eventually prevailed in the
LF. Throughout, the Slovene Communists insisted on a
nation s right to self-determination and on the Unified
Slovenia programme.
At the beginning of the occupation, the Slovene
Communists, along with many other Slovene politicians,
did not believe in the possibility of Yugoslavia s restora¬
tion. They based their doubts on the pre-war hypothesis
that the Second World War would trigger a worldwide
revolution which would start in Nazi Germany, and al¬
so on the Soviet plans for the arrangement of Europe,
which held no room for Yugoslavia, considered as an
artificial creation of the Versailles Treaty. The Slovene
Communists were further strengthened in such convic¬
tion by the expulsion of the Yugoslav ambassador from
Moscow in May
1941,
when the Hitler-Stalin pact was
still in force, by which the Soviets were
defacto
endors¬
ing the parcelling out of Yugoslavia. At the third session
of the LF Supreme Plenary on September
16, 1941,
the
Slovene National Liberation Committee (hereafter the
SNLC) was founded as the Slovene people s only rep¬
resentative, organiser and leader during the liberation
struggle in order to prepare for a national revolution.
In fact, it played no significant role and, after its Fourth
Session on November
1, 1941,
when the fundamental
points of the Liberation Front were accepted, it only re¬
convened again in October
1943.
At the founding of the
SNLC, four resolutions were also adopted which, due to
loose definition by the then relatively weak NLM, failed
to make any major impact on Slovene society although,
to some extent, they indicated the future flow of events.
An attempt to implement fully the SNLC resolutions
was made only after the news of the engagements be¬
tween the partisans and chetniks in Serbia. This, to¬
gether with the letters by the CPY Central Committee
summary
373
of January
1942,
proved fatal in the already strained
relations.
The attitude towards the Yugoslav state is ambigu¬
ous also in the fundamental points of the LF, which
were relevant to its programme. In early
1942,
at the
initiative of
Edvard Kardelj,
who was in Bosnia at the
time, the LF again started speaking more adamantly
about self-determination, with an explicit emphasis on
the right of the Slovene nation to secede, without men¬
tion of Yugoslavia. In doing so, the Slovene Commu¬
nists defended the view that the Slovene nation should
first gain sovereignty and only then discuss any asso¬
ciations. Those advocating the Yugoslav solution were
branded as supporters of the Great Serbian hegemony
and unitarianism. On the other hand, the counter-rev¬
olutionary side accused the LF of opposing the Yugo¬
slav idea and supporting, in its stead, an alliance of
the Central European, Soviet republics and, thereby
(supposedly) selling out the Slovene soil to Italians and
Germans.
After the
AVNOJ
session in
Bihač
at the end of
1942,
the CPS finally opted for the Yugoslav state frame¬
work. This did not mean that it had ever opposed it, but,
rather, that it had never made itself clear on this issue.
It is known that, between the mid 1920 s and the mid
1930 s, the CPY strove for the breakup of Yugoslavia. In
the second half of the 1930 s, during the people s front
policy period, it gradually changed its attitude, howev¬
er without completely abandoning its original idea. The
Slovene and also Yugoslav Communists viewed their
attitude towards Yugoslavia through the prism of the
primary strategic goal
-
the seizure of power and the es¬
tablishment of the Bolshevik system. In Autumn
1942,
following a warning by the Comintern, they finally re¬
alised that, before the end of the war and the crushing
of the Axis powers, the military conflict would not turn
into a revolutionary war in Europe, and that, conse¬
quently, the anti-Hitler coalition would not disintegrate.
This realisation was one of the key turning points in the
shaping of the strategy of the NLM, which allowed it, in
the context of a general European struggle against the
occupiers and Hitler, to seize power in Yugoslavia and,
374
at the same time, execute the revolution. With this, all
Communist plans for the Soviet arrangement of Europe
fell through. One of the post-war aims of the anti-Hitler
coalition was also the restoration of the Yugoslav state.
In mid December
1942,
Kardelj s made the comment to
this change in his letter to Tito that it is now obvious
that the easiest way for us to become internationally
established will be through Yugoslavia .
In Autumn
1942,
the tendency towards the cen¬
tralisation of the liberation movements in individual
Yugoslav regions grew increasingly among the CPY
leadership. Until then, these regional movements de¬
veloped quite independently and specifically, in compli¬
ance with the general orientations of the central Yu¬
goslav leadership. Suddenly, there was no more room
for diversity and particularities. This first became clear
after the arrival in Slovenia of
Arso
Jovanović,
Head of
the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav partisan forc¬
es, who by the end of
1942
started applying Bosnian
models to the Slovene environment, thereby violating
its sovereignty represented by the Executive Commit¬
tee of the LF. The tendencies for uniformity were most
strongly shown with the arrival of
Ivo Lola Ribar
from
the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav partisan forces
to Slovenia, where he remained from January to April
1943.
On the basis of his remarks, the Slovene Com¬
munist leaders decided to oblige their allies in the LF to
sign the
Dolomiti
Declaration on March
1, 1943.
This
act formally secured the CPS a leading role in the Liber¬
ation Front (which, in practice, it had held even before),
while the Christian Socialists and the
Sokol
members
renounced the plans for their own organisation. In this
way, the Liberation Front became a monolithic organi¬
sation, which operated in concert with the Communists
in other Yugoslav regions. The abolition of the Slovene
particularity was also the main reason for passing the
Dolomiti
Declaration. As the causes for this act violated
Slovene sovereignty, about which the non-Communist
allies in the LF were very sensitive, the Slovene Com¬
munists concealed the true reasons for its signature,
casting the responsibility on the Christian Socialists.
After the Communists had irrevocably opted for a
SUMMARY
375
Yugoslav state framework, it became immediately clear
that the new state would be built on different foundations
than the pre-war kingdom. Nevertheless, the juridical
and formal solution of the Yugoslav national question
remained open. At the
AVNOJ
session in
Bihač,
in the
absence of the delegates from Slovenia and Macedonia,
these issues did not receive much attention. However,
Edvard Kardelj,
who was in Slovenia during the
Bihać
session and was fully aware of the exceptional impor¬
tance of these issues, went out of his way to stress that
the entry of the Yugoslav peoples into a new community
should be formally and juridically executed in accor¬
dance with the principle of national self-determination.
In his view, the very issue of national self-determination
was the strongest weapon against the Greater Serbian
hegemony in which he saw the greatest danger for the
NLM. At the second
AVNOJ
session in
Jajce,
the de¬
cree on the federal arrangement of the new state was
passed, on the basis of the right to self-determination,
which meant that Kardelj s concept prevailed. He can,
therefore, be considered the ideological and theoretical
founder of the second Yugoslavia. In this context, the
Kočevje
assembly at the beginning of October
1943
was
only a manifestation confirming the Slovene decision
to live in a common Yugoslav state. At the
Kočevje
as¬
sembly, the Slovenes were given no advance assurance
about their position in the new state, leaving it to the
future turn of events.
The issues concerning the foundations of the fu¬
ture state were more than just formal and juridical.
Already at the time of their shaping, various views ex¬
isted on the post-war internal arrangement. The
AVNOJ
resolutions in
Jajce,
in Autumn
1943,
were thus only
a compromise which brought no significant change to
the processes of centralisation and uniformity of indi¬
vidual movements, ongoing since Autumn
1942.
These
processes only gained strength towards the end of the
war and in the first years after it. The monistic nature
of the post-war regime, based on the Communist Party
and the army as the bonding tissue, meant that, to a
significant degree, federalism existed only as an appear¬
ance. Nevertheless, the formal and juridical attributes
376
of statehood had their weight in the shaping of the rela¬
tions in the country.
A peculiar feature of the Slovene Communists was
their activity in
Primorska,
caught between nationalism
and internationalism. In
Primorska,
which belonged to
the Kingdom of Italy before the war, the autochtonous
Italian population lived on the edge of the Slovene eth¬
nic territory
(Triest, Gorizia).
Despite attempts, at least
in principle, at international cooperation between the
Slovenes and Italians, this rarely materialised. In Tri¬
este, however, there was some cooperation between the
Italian and Slovene workers and also partisans. The
Slovene Communists were obliged to adapt to this situ¬
ation and, influenced by the general anti-Italian feel¬
ing among the Slovene population in
Primorska,
take
a clear nationalist stand towards the Italian Commu¬
nists. Furthermore, the Slovene Communists had to
alter their totally negative attitude to the pre-war anti-
Fascist movement in
Primorska,
to the point of accept¬
ing some of its aspects as positive. This, however, was
done in such a way as to not jeopardise their leading
role in the NLM.
The term Slovene counter-revolution designates
all those political groups whose common characteristic
was the opposition of the Liberation Front and the par¬
tisans. It displayed a variegated image, both in terms
of its groups and activities. The most important were
the pre-war traditional parties, especially the Catholic
oriented Slovene People s Party (hereafter the SPP) and
the groups which constituted the Liberal bloc. The op¬
ponents of the partisan movement were characterised
by organisational disunity and geographic dispersion.
Among them were also the political emigrants in Great
Britain and the United States who had left their home¬
land after the occupation. Another important aspect of
the counter-revolutionary camp, apart from disunity
and dispersion, was that some of its members, in their
opposition to the Communist revolution, publicly col¬
laborated with the occupiers. This, naturally, provoked
differences in the public attitude towards the national
political objectives. The clandestine members of the
counter-revolution and those abroad were in a different
summary
377
position,
in that they had no such difficulties with the
shaping of the national political objectives, except for
the fact that they had to do it clandestinely.
Throughout the occupation, the Slovene Liberals
insisted on the legalistic principle, according to which
the Yugoslav kingdom would be restored as a federa¬
tion. Hence, the research on the national question in
the counter-revolutionary camp focused mainly on the
views by the Catholic side.
On March
30, 1941,
the SPP leadership defined
the strategy for the imminent wartime circumstances,
which included the decision for its bodies not to coop¬
erate with the authorities of hostile countries. In spite
of this decision, on April
5, 1941,
a day before Yugo¬
slavia was attacked, Fran Kulovec and Miha
Krek,
the
SPP leaders, through the Slovak delegate in Belgrade,
sought to secure from the German authorities there
the establishment of a joint Slovene-Croat state or an
independent Slovene state under German protection.
The most plausible reason for such a radical change
in position was the discovery of the German plans re¬
garding Yugoslavia, which were extremely unfavourable
for Slovenia. Besides, Kulovec strongly doubted that
Yugoslavia could ever be restored. Given that the new
circumstances were the most promising for the Croats
(envisaging an independent state), the initiative was di¬
rected towards a similar solution for the Slovenes. For
the Catholic leaders at the time, the Croat example rep¬
resented a model to be followed. In Ljubljana, in accor¬
dance with this initiative,
Marko Natlačen,
Civil Gover¬
nor of
Dravska banovina,
attempted to realise the idea
of an independent Slovene state under German protec¬
tion. These attempts were unsuccessful as the Germans
showed no interest. Later on,
Natlačen
turned to the
Italians in an attempt to unify the Slovene ethnic ter¬
ritory under Italy. He formed
a consulta
which visited
the Pope and Mussolini, and made another attempt to
contact Hitler. Thereby he continued the initiative by
Kulovec and
Krek,
which was based on the conviction
of the long-term dominance of the Axis Powers and that
the restoration of Yugoslavia under such circumstances
was unlikely.
Natlačen
only gave up his attempts to gain
378
the support of the Axis after his visit to Rome in June
1941,
not so much because he considered his policy a
failure but because there was no positive answer from
the other side. Slovenia s fate was sealed even before
Yugoslavia was attacked, when Hitler, during his prepa¬
rations for the occupation, pointed out that the Slovenes
(and Serbs) were never the friends of Germany. The at¬
tempts by Kulovec and
Natlačen
were therefore doomed
in advance. Their problematic activity, therefore, opens
a series of moral, ethic, formal and juridical issues.
After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the cer¬
tainty about the Allied victory became widespread.
Nevertheless, the Catholic camp was still unconvinced
about the restoration of Yugoslavia, also due to the ex¬
istence of the Independent State of Croatia and the vio¬
lence exercised by the
Ustaša
regime against the Serbs.
The main dilemma in the Catholic camp in Summer
1941
was, therefore, whether Slovenia as an indepen¬
dent country should associate with the Central Euro¬
pean countries, or, as a part of the restored Yugoslav
state, with the Balkan states. A typical illustration of
the then mood in the Catholic camp is the initiative of
Father
Kazimir Zakrajšek
who went to the United States
of America, at the request of the former ban
Natlačen
and Ljubljana bishop
Rožman,
to advocate for an inde¬
pendent Slovene state with the American authorities.
Natlačen,
the leading figure in the Catholic camp, had
been more inclined towards an independent Slovene
state until September
1941
when he opted for a Yu¬
goslavia, one of whose federal units would be Unified
Slovenia. At that time discussions began for the shap¬
ing of the national programme between
Natlačen,
the
SPP leader, and Kramer, the head of the Slovene Liber¬
als, who foresaw:
1)
A restored and extended Kingdom
of Yugoslavia
2)
A free Slovenia as an autonomous an
equal constituent of Yugoslavia, with all the pertaining
economic and transportation territory, based on the
ethnic principle
3)
The internal arrangement of the re¬
stored Yugoslavia to be executed with the consent of
all its constituent members on the basis of equal rights
and responsibilities in the federation. In emphasising
the federal principle,
Natlačen
continued the pre-war
SUMMARY
379
politics,
although he yielded to Kramer to the extent of
mentioning Yugoslavia in the first place. For the Liber¬
als, however, the acceptance of the federalist principle
meant a great turning point, especially with regards
to their pre-war standpoints on the national question
and internal state organisation (unitarianism and cen¬
tralism). Such a compromise displeased many in the
Catholic camp, so that a consensus was only reached
in Spring
1942,
after an intervention by some emigrant
politicians and the death of Lambert
Ehrlich. In
any
case, the national political programme of the Slovene
counter-revolution became a constant thereafter and
can be detected in all subsequent political statements.
On November
23, 1941,
the programme was presented
on a London radio station by
Alojzij Kuhar
(hence the
title the London points ). The same position was evi¬
dent in Spring
1942,
in the programme of the Slovene
Alliance and, then again, in the national statement is¬
sued by the National Committee for Slovenia in Autumn
1944.
Finally, it appears in the last subversive act of the
Slovene counter-revolution, at the historical session of
the first Slovene parliament at Tabor, on May
3, 1945.
Notwithstanding these repetitive statements, one
can still detect many burning questions, concerning
the national political programme, which kept emerging
in the Catholic camp, although the weight of the di¬
lemmas shifted from the homeland to emigration. While
trust in the restoration of the Yugoslav state gradually
grew at home, a doubt soon occurred among the emi¬
grants abroad as to whether the Yugoslav state could
be restored at all. The most significant was the quar¬
rel between the Serb and Croat emigrants over the
border demarcation and the constitutional character
(the question of internal arrangement), which further
escalated after the news from the homeland about the
Ustaša
massacres of the Serbian population. The con¬
cerns of the Slovene politicians strengthened further in
the London environment, which also provided asylum
for various political emigrants and where all possible
combinations on the post-war arrangement of Europe
were much discussed. They even began considering
non-Yugoslav solutions, such as an independent Slo-
380
vene state in
the
Trieste
hinterland or a joint Slovene-
Croat
state.
These options were not publicly divulged
until Autumn
1942,
when Miha
Krek
decided to inform
the international public also about
non-
Yugoslav solu¬
tions. In January
1943,
the New York Times published
an article by Cyrus Leo Sulzberger, a prominent jour¬
nalist, expressing the view that, should the restoration
of Yugoslavia fail, the Slovenes were prepared to found
an independent Slovene state with Trieste and interna¬
tional guarantees. The idea was not new. It revived the
thoughts of
Korošec
in Spring
1940,
when the plans for
the future arrangement of Europe envisaging the estab¬
lishment of a Danube federation emerged. As a counter¬
balance to the Austrian role in the new federation, the
idea by Arnold
Toynbee
from
1915
on an independent
Slovene state in the Trieste hinterland was reawakened.
Even before that,
Krek
presented this option to Bishop
Rožman
and the leadership of the Slovene Alliance, as
a possible solution, topical in the international milieu.
In Autumn
1943,
Krek
introduced this idea to the Brit¬
ish who, however, discouraged him from contemplat¬
ing it, as the British official political objective was the
restoration of Yugoslavia. The politicians in the Slovene
Alliance also disagreed with the said initiative and, with
extensive argumentation, insisted on the Yugoslav solu¬
tion of the Slovene national question.
During the occupation, solutions to the Slovene na¬
tional question emerged which at no point envisaged
the inclusion of Slovenia in Yugoslavia. Those propos¬
ing such solutions were mainly individuals or those
from politically less important groups. The reasons and
ideas were very different. There was also a highly ideo¬
logical (anti-Communist) idea of a free Slovenia in the
Trieste hinterland proposed by the informant Colonel
Vladimir Vauhnik. After his withdrawal to Switzerland
in Summer
1944,
he submitted the idea in a special
memorandum to Allan Dulles, the American represen¬
tative in Switzerland.
Noteworthy as a rival alternative to the national po¬
litical programme of the SPP, was the plan by Lambert
Ehrlich,
the leader of the so-called Guards, entitled the
Slovene issue which was clandestinely sent to London,
SUMMARY
381
to Slovene representatives who were then supposed to
submit it to the relevant Allied representatives. The
Guards gave much consideration to the Slovene nation¬
al question in various brochures and programme texts.
During the occupation, they clandestinely published the
journal Slovenia and Europe which was supposed to
reflect their position that the Slovene national question
should not be considered a priori in the framework of
Yugoslavia, but by the Slovenes in Europe. The Guards
defended the principle that the Slovene people should
first achieve sovereignty and only then decide on pos¬
sible associations. Their view was, therefore, identical
with that defended by the Slovene Communists. They
based their reasoning on the supposition that, for a last¬
ing solution to the Slovene question, German influence
should be pushed out from Central Europe. A territorial
link with the northern Slavs could then be established
and together they would dominate this part of Europe.
Should this initiative regarding Central Europe, in
which Catholicism was the common trait, materialise,
they did not exclude association with the southern Slav¬
ic people, although this was not greatly favoured, given
that it could jeopardise the prevalence of Catholicism.
From this initiative, the idea of Intermarium was born,
i.e. a federation of the nations between the Baltic and
Aegean Seas, which was supposed to protect small Cen¬
tral European nations from German and Soviet danger.
Erlich s proposals, unsupported by the SPP leadership,
were not welcomed in Allied diplomatic circles either.
On the whole, during the Second World War there
was no particular interest among the Slovenes for the
post-war associations within the Central European area.
This was not unusual, given their historical experience of
being attacked from this very region, and the concept of
Central Europe, especially in the sense of Mitteleurope,
could even carry a negative connotation. In the search
for the statehood status of Slovenia, the Yugoslav option
eventually prevailed in both camps as the most realis¬
tic (for both international reasons and those of internal
politics). While Slovenia s position in the new Yugoslav
community was more favourable than that in the first
Yugoslavia, it did not fulfil all expectations.
382
|
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| author_facet | Godeša, Bojan |
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| callnumber-sort | D 3802 S67 |
| callnumber-subject | D - General History |
| classification_rvk | NQ 4640 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)263064404 (DE-599)BVBBV035310641 |
| discipline | Geschichte |
| era | Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1941-1945 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Slovenia Politics and government 1918-1945 Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Slovenia Politics and government 1918-1945 Slowenien |
| id | DE-604.BV035310641 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:31:00Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9616386085 9789616386081 |
| language | Slovenian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017115393 |
| oclc_num | 263064404 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 416 S. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Inšt. za Novejšo Zgodovino |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Zbirka Razpoznavanja |
| series2 | Zbirka Razpoznavanja |
| spelling | Godeša, Bojan Verfasser aut Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno Bojan Godeša Ljubljana Inšt. za Novejšo Zgodovino 2006 416 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zbirka Razpoznavanja 2 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd rswk-swf Nationalismus Politik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Nationalism World War, 1939-1945 Slovenia Nationalitätenfrage (DE-588)4126113-6 gnd rswk-swf Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd rswk-swf Slovenia Politics and government 1918-1945 Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd rswk-swf Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 g Nationalitätenfrage (DE-588)4126113-6 s Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 s Geschichte 1941-1945 z DE-604 Zbirka Razpoznavanja 2 (DE-604)BV022867517 2 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017115393&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017115393&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Godeša, Bojan Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno Zbirka Razpoznavanja Nationalismus Politik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Nationalism World War, 1939-1945 Slovenia Nationalitätenfrage (DE-588)4126113-6 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4126113-6 (DE-588)4079167-1 (DE-588)4055302-4 |
| title | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno |
| title_auth | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno |
| title_exact_search | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno |
| title_full | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno Bojan Godeša |
| title_fullStr | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno Bojan Godeša |
| title_full_unstemmed | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno Bojan Godeša |
| title_short | Slovensko nacionalno vprašanje med drugo svetovno vojno |
| title_sort | slovensko nacionalno vprasanje med drugo svetovno vojno |
| topic | Nationalismus Politik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Nationalism World War, 1939-1945 Slovenia Nationalitätenfrage (DE-588)4126113-6 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Nationalismus Politik Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Nationalism World War, 1939-1945 Slovenia Nationalitätenfrage Zweiter Weltkrieg Slovenia Politics and government 1918-1945 Slowenien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017115393&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017115393&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV022867517 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT godesabojan slovenskonacionalnovprasanjemeddrugosvetovnovojno |