Mašina za legitimnost: roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Bulgarian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sofija
Siela
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Legitimacy machine |
| Beschreibung: | 303 S. |
| ISBN: | 9789542802372 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text |
СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
Използвани съкращения
.7.
Убод
.9
Глаба пърба
СЪЗДАВАНЕ НА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ
(1947-1954
Г.)
.21
1.
Общи принципи
6
дейността на ДС
.25
2.
формиране на комунистическото разузнаване
.31
3.
Контраразузнаване и политическа полиция
.40
4.
Техническо управление на ДС
.42
5.
Отдел за привилегии на висшата номенклатура на БКП
.45
6.
Следствен отдел
.50
7.
Досиета и лустрация
.60
8.
ДърЯсавна сигурност в средата на 50-те години
-
„очите и ушите на партията"
.63
Глаба Втора
КЛАСИЧЕСКАТА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ:
СТРУКТУРА И ОСНОВНИ ЗАДАЧИ
. 70
1.
Структура и личен състав
.77
2.
Основни задачи и права
.89
Глаба трета
СТРУКТУРА И ФУНКЦИИ
НА КОМУНИСТИЧЕСКОТО РАЗУЗНАВАНЕ
.98
1.
Задачи, географски обхват и структура на
политическото разузнаване
.102
2.
Научно-техническо разузнаване
.113
3.
Културно-историческо разузнаване
.120
4.
Военно разузнаване
.128
5.
Организация на разузнавателната дейност.
Легални и нелегални резидентури
.131
6.
Набиране
и обучение на
разузнавачите.
Права и привилегии
.142
7.
Личен състав
.■····.
Глава
четвърта
КОНТРАРАЗУЗНАВ АТЕЛНИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ
НА
ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ.
158
1.
Второ
главно управление
. 160
2.
Трето
управление
-
Военно контраразузнаване
.167
3.
Шесто управление
. 179
4.
Управление за контраразузнавателно
обслуасване на икономиката
.189
5.
Методи и средства на контраразузнаването
.194
Глаба пета
НЕОПЕРАТИВНИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ НА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ
. 209
1.
Управление за безопасност и охрана (УБО)
.210
2.
Научно-техническо управление
.215
3.
Следствието на Дърасавна сигурност
.220
4.
Картотека и архив
. 228
5.
Информационно-аналитичнаслуЖба.
.,.230
6.
Висша школа „Георги Димитров"
.233
Глаба щеста
ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ И КОМУНИСТИЧЕСКАТА ДЪРЖАВА.
235
1.
ДС и комунистическата партия
.236
2.
ДС чрез другите дърасавни
учреждения
.252
3.
ДС и българската емиграция
.,.268
Заключение
Дързкавна сигурност
-
инструмент за осигуряване на
политическа легитимност на комунистическия
резким
.289
Momchil Metodiev
LEGITIMACY MACHINE
State Security in the Power Strategy
of the Bulgarian. Communist Party
(Summary)
State Security services are usually referred to as the political police of the
communist regime
—
the institution aiming to hush up dissidents or non-con¬
formist voices in the era of communism. Such an approach towards the State
Security annals could hardly be considered inaccurate. However, it does not
encompass the whole information about the essence and mission of the State
Security in that period of history. Parallel to its repressive functions, this sys¬
tem is conferred with a much more extensive task
—
to procure the missing
political legitimacy of the regime. At the end of the
1950s
newly adopted regu¬
lations assigned to the Secret Service a role of a mediator between the Com¬
munist Party leadership and the society as a whole. Thus this institution was
supposed to bridge the gap between the Party nomenclature and the citizens,
to „provide information" about already made political decisions, to control their
implementation and to further update political leaders on the way various reso¬
lutions had been accepted. This applied to all structures of the system
-
the
Intelligence and Counter
-
intelligence Head Directorates were required not
only to prevent the emergence of political opposition, but also to actively pro¬
mote the Tightness of the Party's decisions among the general public.
The classic State Security was established in the beginning of the
1960s,
when it was shaped along a scheme, which remained more or less unchanged
until the fall of the communist rale. However, certain modifications were in¬
troduced, which, though few in number, held great importance
—
the forma¬
tion of the Sixth Directorate in
1967;
the transformation of the State Security
Investigations Department into a Head Directorates for Investigations in the
framework of the Ministry of Interior in
1979
and finally
-
setting up of the
Directorate for
Economie
Counter-intelligence in
1986.
As a result of these re¬
forms by the end of the communist regime the State Security operated within
the following format:
Operative Directorates:
First Head Directorate
-
International intelligence work (including Sci¬
ence and Technology as well as Culture and History intelligence)
Second Head Directorate
-
Counter-intelligence
Third Directorate
-
Military counter-intelligence
296
Fourth Directorate
—
Economic counter
-
intelligence
Fifth Directorate
-
Security and protection
Sixth Directorate
-
Combating ideological diversion, counter-revolution¬
ary, nationalistic and other activities against the state
Regional Departments of the Ministry of Interior, which include State
Security divisions
Non-operative structures:
Directorate for technical support (which until
1986
was known as Fourth
Directorate)
Seventh Directorate
-
Central Directorate for Information (created in
1969
and known as such since
1979)
Head Directorate for investigations in the Ministry of Interior (until
1979 -
the Investigations Department in State Security)
Archives and Information Directorate (until
1986 -
Department „Regis¬
try and Archives")
The distinction between operative and non-operative Directorates was
based on the importance of the State Security agents' activity for their func¬
tioning. Among the above listed structures there were some, whose activity
still remains barely known to the public. There is a lot of ambiguity in regard
with the tasks, performed by the Fourth Directorate. Until
1986
this was the
Directorate for technical support, whose responsibility was to ensure the nec¬
essary technical assistance for the microphone and telephone tapping, check¬
ing of the correspondence, issuing of false identity documents or carrying out
graphological analyses. In
1986
the number Fourth was given to the newly
established Directorate for Economic counter-intelligence, which exercised
monitoring and control over the activity of foreign companies operating in
Bulgaria and dealt with the euphemistically called „secret transit commerce"
—
i. e. smuggling in favour of the state. Quite contradictory remains the place of
the Investigation as well ~ an institution, which could be justly described as
one of the most macabre among the Secret Services. It was authorized to re¬
cruit the so called „chamber agents", i. e. prisoners, who were supposed to
provide
information
about other detainees. Initially the Investigation depart¬
ment was positioned as a body within the State Security, but later in
1979
it
was transferred to the Ministry of Interior as Head Directorate for Investiga¬
tion.
The data about the number of officers, employed by State Security as well
as the number of agents they worked with, is rather scarce too.
ït
is known
that in
1962
the staff members of State Security were approximately
6200,
while in the next
27
years the system multiplied several times. On the basis of
indirect evidence one could rather safely conclude that by the end of the com¬
munism the number of employees in the State Security structures amounted
297
up to
15 000.
According to one of the few officially available statistics the number
of annually recruited secret agents since the mid
1950s
to the end of the re¬
gime varied between
50 000
and
65 000.
The political loyalty towards the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) re¬
mained always the cornerstone of State Security diverse activities. Nearly all
documents issued by its various Directorates consistently included the magic
formula, that their staff members ought to be „boundlessly faithful to the Party".
Another expression of the same philosophy was the BCP Secretary General
Válko ChervenkoVs
declaration to State Security chiefs in
1954,
in which he
described the Security Service as „the eyes and the ears of the Party". Approxi¬
mately at this time BCP leadership took a course towards clear and unambigu¬
ous partition between the Party nomenclature and the political police, restric¬
tion of opportunities for the State Security to take part in the decision-making
process and administrating of constant control over its divisions.
The Party made use of different mechanisms to exercise such a control.
The most powerful one was the direct monitoring of the overall activity of the
State Service by a specially designated for this purpose Department in the
Central Committee of BCP, whose work on its turn was scrutinized by one of
the Secretaries of the Committee. After
1965
this supervision was persistently
in Todor ZhivkoVs hands. Another control instrument was the figure of the
Minister of Interior, who always came from the Party highest echelon
-
from
the central executive body (Angel Tsanev),
Comsomol
activist (Angel Solakov)
or from the Party regional offices (Dimitar Stoyanov and
Georgi
Tanev).
An expert from the power structures of the Ministry of Interior was never ap¬
pointed Minister. Some former employees of State Security expressed later on
in their memoirs subdued discontent over the issue, which comes as an indica¬
tion of a certain tension between the „professionals" and the „politicians" in
the Ministry.
In the prolonged situation of immovability of once appointed Ministers,
the Party designed another mechanism for control
—
the Collegium of the Min¬
istry of Interior. The overt mission of this structure was to prevent the concen¬
tration of too much power in the hands of the Minister. The Collegium was
authorized to direct all controversial matters straight to the Central Commit¬
tee. That was also the body that took responsibility for the most important
resolutions concerning the work of the Ministry of Interior and ensured the
necessary level of anonymity for making unpopular decisions.
The cut out distinction between Party nomenclature and the State Secu¬
rity substantially restricted the opportunities for „political career" open to of¬
ficers in the system, who had to put up with only second-rate positions. Most
examples of State Security officers, who received limited access to the political
power, date from the
1980s.
These were mostly Intelligence officers, who suc¬
ceeded to advance in their careers and become Deputy Ministers or ambassa¬
dors, after formally retiring from the State Security system. Such were the
298
cases
with Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zhivko Popov and Luben Gotsev.
In
1979
Petar
Bashikarov resigned from the position of Deputy chief of Depart¬
ment at First Head Directorate of State Security and started working for the
Ministry of International Commerce, where later on he was entrusted the post
of First Deputy Minister.
The recruiting of BCP members as secret agents was one of the most
sensitive issues throughout the years in view with the dividing line between
the State Security and the Party elite. The approach had undergone changes
in time, but nevertheless there was always a steady tendency for the party
members to have privileges compared to other citizens. The general rule,
introduced in
1960,
read that State Security might employ Party members
only in exceptional cases. This highly restrictive regulation was obviously
unacceptable to the State Security and was revised no later than
1965.
In the
spirit of the new instructions the employment restriction was valid only for
the BCP and
Comsomol
nomenclature and did not prevent regular commu¬
nists being recruited mainly in the Intelligence sector. Other Directorates
kept theoretically their right to hire secret agents from the Party, but only
„by exception".
All these proscriptions aimed at nothing, but the definite separation of
the political leadership and the political police, so that State Security did not
have any instruments for direct or indirect influence over the political decision
making process. Until the archives of State security remain closed, there is no
reliable way one could assess how far these instructions
wers
applied and to
what
estent
the Party members benefited from the privileges, they were
awarded. We could safely assume, however, that towards the end of the regime
State Security and its Sixth Directorate in particular focused much more their
attention on Party leadership and for that purpose they must have needed
enough agents among the Party members.
In its activity the State Security used a couple of major tools, which could
be generally grouped into three main categories
—
direct repression, the agents'
work and the consequent „active" or „acute measures".
Different
periods within
the history of the communist state demanded a more pronounced preference
towards different categories. No doabfc, -until the beginning of
1950s
a leading
role was attributed to the direct repression, while in the years of destalinization
the emphasis was put on agents' doings. The two major lines of work in State
security
-
Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, applied thoroughly identical
methods of action.
în
support of this statement
-
the hierarchy of their em¬
ployees and agents was also practically the same:
299
INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
Operatíve
officers
-
officers, who
are staff members of State security
Operative officers- officers, who
are staff members of State Security
Resident
-
an operative officer, who
manages the Intelligence structure in
a particular state (called
residenture)
Resident
-
a secret agent, who
manages a so called residentare
group in a major state institution, or
public organization
Agents
-
officially enrolled foreign
citizens
Agents
-
secret agents, who are
officially hired to collect information
regarding public opinion
Secret agents
-
officially enlisted
Bulgarian citizens, who could help the
Intelligence
Operative (confidential) links
-
foreign citizens, who present a
reliable source of information, without
being officially enrolled.
Confidentials- citizens, who may
not be formally enlisted, but provide
reliable information
Providers of meeting point
premises
-
citizens, who voluntarily
provide premises for secret meetings
of agents
Providers of cover
(conspiratorial) premises
-
citizens, who serve as a cover for
premises that are being used by the
State Security bodies.
The only difference in this hierarchy was purely terminological
-
while
the term „secret agent" in the Intelligence unit is designated only to officially
enrolled Bulgarian citizens, in the structure of the Counter-intelligence the
term was applied to all collaborators to the system (residents, agents,
confidentials, providers of meeting point and conspiratorial premises).
Both Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Directions in the State secu¬
rity had. completely identical methods of recruitment of agents, which were
based either on political allegiance, or some form of dependence -material or
other. There was a preference for people, who shared the communist beliefs
and were convinced in the Tightness of their actions, as these agents were
most reliable and cost effective. However, the defeat in the Cold War propa¬
ganda war after
1968
led to a rapid decrease in the number of those, willing to
cooperate only on the basis of political allegiance and by the end of the regime
300
the number of people enrolled through dependence and blackmailing was in¬
creasing. Most often that happened through some discrediting material, pro¬
cured in various ways, including the usage of special technical means.
The aim of the Bulgarian Intelligence was to collect information about
states and regions, which were located in geographical proximity and there¬
fore Bulgarian Intelligence Services had better opportunities for field work
than their Soviet colleagues. This was valid for all three major spheres of Intel¬
ligence activity, which were managed by the First Head Directorate of State
Security
-
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Culture and History. In the
first Cold War years priority was given to Greece and Turkey, the so called
„less developed Arab and African states" and the Middle-East countries in
particular. After
1966
China and Albania were also added to this list.
The three above mentioned departments in the Intelligence Directorate
were also assigned the task to ensure the political legitimacy of the regime
either through invention of good „propaganda" news, or through acquiring of
technological innovations data from the West. This justified the existence of
the seemingly unnecessary department „Culture and History Intelligence" (CHI),
whose main objective was to gather and promote information about the Bul¬
garian culture and history. CHI aimed at providing the party leadership with
historical facts, that would enhance the international prestige of the country
and hence
-
that of the ruling regime.
In the wide spectrum of methods, used by the Intelligence officers in their
work, a very special place was reserved for various forms of repression. In the
majority of the cases the victims were representatives of the Bulgarian emi¬
gration abroad. The BCP Political Bureau Decisions dated
27
December
1966,
altered significantly the comparatively tolerant policy towards emigrants
adopted in the mid
1950s.
The new strategy required firm control and restraint
of contacts between Bulgarian citizens and expatriates. A special State Secu¬
rity report from the same year authorized the Secret Services to forcefully
kidnap and bring back to the
country
active members of the hostile emigra¬
tion. Since the mid
1970s
the whole operative work regarding Bulgarian emi¬
gration was entirely concentrated in the Intelligence Directorate, which alone
could exercise control over the agents, sent abroad. Two more documents
marked further the general policy for countering the emigration and restrict¬
ing the opportunities for Bulgarian citizens to travel abroad
—
the BCP Politi¬
cal Bureau Decision
(1977),
which was expanded in the directive of the Minis¬
ter of Interior (March,
1978).
Another initiative of the Intelligence to legitimize the communist regime
focused on integration of agents in international organizations with Bulgarian
participation. This scheme was widely used since the beginning of the
1970s,
although most probably it had existed even before that. With its consolidated
vote, dictated by the USSR, the Eastern European Bloc could substantially
influence the activities of those organizations and enjoy the benefits of such
301
an advantage. In this way the Intelligence had the chance to „produce" posi¬
tive news, which by themselves were events of considerable importance for the
general public within the frame of a strictly closed totalitarian system. Each
media success also opened ways for boosting communist propaganda in other
countries as well.
The practice of „inventing" biographies was yet another tool, used by
State Security in its efforts to justify the regime before and after its fall. This
practice was once again initiated by the Intelligence and later on widely ap¬
plied within the country as well. In professional slang, this was known as the
„agent's legend", but technically that meant the elaboration of an acceptable
and convincing biography of the respective officer. One of the dilemmas of the
transition period from communism to democracy was that many former State
Security officers used later on their legends as an evidence for their successful
and compelling professional careers. A good example in that respect is the
„invented" biography of Ivan Gaitanjiev
-
an Intelligence officer in the period
1974-1991,
who worked under the cover of a Bulgarian Telegraph Agency cor¬
respondent in China and the US. Being a well-known journalist, he was elected
Member of Parliament (in the
36
and
37
National Assembly) and is currently
an ambassador, although his career during the communist rule was clearly
directed by the Intelligence. Another name to be mentioned is that of Raiko
Nikolov, who in the last years of communism changed several ambassador
posts and recently published three biographical books about his rich diplo¬
matic career. In the BCP archives, however, one could still find his first profes¬
sional assessment, made by State Security in
1950,
immediately before he started
working as an agent in the Bulgarian Embassy in Paris. This is actually a
credible illustration of the way the fall of the communist regime and the end of
State Security made it possible for former employees of the system to attain
publicity through their parallel life stories.
The task of providing political legitimacy to the communist governmen¬
tal system within the country was performed jointly with the Second Head
Directorate (Counter-intelligence), Third Directorate (Military Counter-intel¬
ligence), Sixth Directorate (Combating ideological diversion) and Fourth Di¬
rectorate (Economic counter -intelligence). These units pursued their goals in
ways very similar to those of the Intelligence. Direct repression had once again
a leading role. The individual rights of „suspects" were brutally violated
-
their
correspondence was checked, telephones and homes
-
bugged, and they them¬
selves were under constant surveillance for a certain period of time. In case
this operation accumulated enough data for „hostile to the regime" activity,
the next step of the „realization" would be the person in question to be turned
to the Investigation bodies and eventually sued for political crimes.
The legitimacy of the regime was supported with the help of
Counter-intelligence agents as well, who among other things had to „exert a
positive influence over a wider range of citizens". According to the State Secu-
302
rity
rules the number of agents in a public or state institution could be consid¬
ered sufficient only when „the situation is under full control and could be di¬
rected, in accordance with the State Security discretion". The availability of
such network of officers and agents made possible its mobilization for spread¬
ing rumours and manipulating public opinion in any preferred by the regime
direction.
The „invention of biographies" was unquestionably a major instrument
in the arsenal of the Counter-intelligence too. Although the Second Head Di¬
rectorate did not make use of other state institutions to cover its activity, it
also had certain mechanisms to motivate its employees. A number of docu¬
ments from that period prove that Counter-intelligence agents were awarded
various incentives, whose importance and value depended on those of the agent
himself. In this sense those State Security officers, who were more diligent,
could rely on the „discreet" support of the system, when it was necessary for
their professional advancement.
Within the system of the communist regime the Committee for State Se¬
curity held an intermediate position between the ruling party, all other state
institutions and components (administrative bodies, conventional public or¬
ganizations), and citizens' privacy or associations of Bulgarian emigrants. The
relations between these three levels were strictly hierarchical. At the very top
of the pyramid was placed the communist party, which made all political deci¬
sions regarding the ruling of the country. Immediately under it was State se¬
curity, which, roughly speaking, was authorized to control the implementa¬
tion of these decisions. In this sense State Security played, figuratively said,
the role of auto suspension for the regime. On one hand it had to reduce the
vibrations by repressing those who expressed discontent from the government,
on the other hand
-
to actively provide the missing political legitimacy to the
Party leadership. Therefore it would be quite oversimplified to look at State
Security only as a mechanism for repression or as a political police. Its role
was much more extensive
-
it was the keeper of the status-quo, who had to
guarantee the stability of the regime.
303 |
| adam_txt |
СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
Използвани съкращения
.7.
Убод
.9
Глаба пърба
СЪЗДАВАНЕ НА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ
(1947-1954
Г.)
.21
1.
Общи принципи
6
дейността на ДС
.25
2.
формиране на комунистическото разузнаване
.31
3.
Контраразузнаване и политическа полиция
.40
4.
Техническо управление на ДС
.42
5.
Отдел за привилегии на висшата номенклатура на БКП
.45
6.
Следствен отдел
.50
7.
Досиета и лустрация
.60
8.
ДърЯсавна сигурност в средата на 50-те години
-
„очите и ушите на партията"
.63
Глаба Втора
КЛАСИЧЕСКАТА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ:
СТРУКТУРА И ОСНОВНИ ЗАДАЧИ
. 70
1.
Структура и личен състав
.77
2.
Основни задачи и права
.89
Глаба трета
СТРУКТУРА И ФУНКЦИИ
НА КОМУНИСТИЧЕСКОТО РАЗУЗНАВАНЕ
.98
1.
Задачи, географски обхват и структура на
политическото разузнаване
.102
2.
Научно-техническо разузнаване
.113
3.
Културно-историческо разузнаване
.120
4.
Военно разузнаване
.128
5.
Организация на разузнавателната дейност.
Легални и нелегални резидентури
.131
6.
Набиране
и обучение на
разузнавачите.
Права и привилегии
.142
7.
Личен състав
.■····.
Глава
четвърта
КОНТРАРАЗУЗНАВ АТЕЛНИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ
НА
ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ.
158
1.
Второ
главно управление
. 160
2.
Трето
управление
-
Военно контраразузнаване
.167
3.
Шесто управление
. 179
4.
Управление за контраразузнавателно
обслуасване на икономиката
.189
5.
Методи и средства на контраразузнаването
.194
Глаба пета
НЕОПЕРАТИВНИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ НА ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ
. 209
1.
Управление за безопасност и охрана (УБО)
.210
2.
Научно-техническо управление
.215
3.
Следствието на Дърасавна сигурност
.220
4.
Картотека и архив
. 228
5.
Информационно-аналитичнаслуЖба.
.,.230
6.
Висша школа „Георги Димитров"
.233
Глаба щеста
ДЪРЖАВНА СИГУРНОСТ И КОМУНИСТИЧЕСКАТА ДЪРЖАВА.
235
1.
ДС и комунистическата партия
.236
2.
ДС чрез другите дърасавни
учреждения
.252
3.
ДС и българската емиграция
.,.268
Заключение
Дързкавна сигурност
-
инструмент за осигуряване на
политическа легитимност на комунистическия
резким
.289
Momchil Metodiev
LEGITIMACY MACHINE
State Security in the Power Strategy
of the Bulgarian. Communist Party
(Summary)
State Security services are usually referred to as the political police of the
communist regime
—
the institution aiming to hush up dissidents or non-con¬
formist voices in the era of communism. Such an approach towards the State
Security annals could hardly be considered inaccurate. However, it does not
encompass the whole information about the essence and mission of the State
Security in that period of history. Parallel to its repressive functions, this sys¬
tem is conferred with a much more extensive task
—
to procure the missing
political legitimacy of the regime. At the end of the
1950s
newly adopted regu¬
lations assigned to the Secret Service a role of a mediator between the Com¬
munist Party leadership and the society as a whole. Thus this institution was
supposed to bridge the gap between the Party nomenclature and the citizens,
to „provide information" about already made political decisions, to control their
implementation and to further update political leaders on the way various reso¬
lutions had been accepted. This applied to all structures of the system
-
the
Intelligence and Counter
-
intelligence Head Directorates were required not
only to prevent the emergence of political opposition, but also to actively pro¬
mote the Tightness of the Party's decisions among the general public.
The classic State Security was established in the beginning of the
1960s,
when it was shaped along a scheme, which remained more or less unchanged
until the fall of the communist rale. However, certain modifications were in¬
troduced, which, though few in number, held great importance
—
the forma¬
tion of the Sixth Directorate in
1967;
the transformation of the State Security
Investigations Department into a Head Directorates for Investigations in the
framework of the Ministry of Interior in
1979
and finally
-
setting up of the
Directorate for
Economie
Counter-intelligence in
1986.
As a result of these re¬
forms by the end of the communist regime the State Security operated within
the following format:
Operative Directorates:
First Head Directorate
-
International intelligence work (including Sci¬
ence and Technology as well as Culture and History intelligence)
Second Head Directorate
-
Counter-intelligence
Third Directorate
-
Military counter-intelligence
296
Fourth Directorate
—
Economic counter
-
intelligence
Fifth Directorate
-
Security and protection
Sixth Directorate
-
Combating ideological diversion, counter-revolution¬
ary, nationalistic and other activities against the state
Regional Departments of the Ministry of Interior, which include State
Security divisions
Non-operative structures:
Directorate for technical support (which until
1986
was known as Fourth
Directorate)
Seventh Directorate
-
Central Directorate for Information (created in
1969
and known as such since
1979)
Head Directorate for investigations in the Ministry of Interior (until
1979 -
the Investigations Department in State Security)
Archives and Information Directorate (until
1986 -
Department „Regis¬
try and Archives")
The distinction between operative and non-operative Directorates was
based on the importance of the State Security agents' activity for their func¬
tioning. Among the above listed structures there were some, whose activity
still remains barely known to the public. There is a lot of ambiguity in regard
with the tasks, performed by the Fourth Directorate. Until
1986
this was the
Directorate for technical support, whose responsibility was to ensure the nec¬
essary technical assistance for the microphone and telephone tapping, check¬
ing of the correspondence, issuing of false identity documents or carrying out
graphological analyses. In
1986
the number Fourth was given to the newly
established Directorate for Economic counter-intelligence, which exercised
monitoring and control over the activity of foreign companies operating in
Bulgaria and dealt with the euphemistically called „secret transit commerce"
—
i. e. smuggling in favour of the state. Quite contradictory remains the place of
the Investigation as well ~ an institution, which could be justly described as
one of the most macabre among the Secret Services. It was authorized to re¬
cruit the so called „chamber agents", i. e. prisoners, who were supposed to
provide
information
about other detainees. Initially the Investigation depart¬
ment was positioned as a body within the State Security, but later in
1979
it
was transferred to the Ministry of Interior as Head Directorate for Investiga¬
tion.
The data about the number of officers, employed by State Security as well
as the number of agents they worked with, is rather scarce too.
ït
is known
that in
1962
the staff members of State Security were approximately
6200,
while in the next
27
years the system multiplied several times. On the basis of
indirect evidence one could rather safely conclude that by the end of the com¬
munism the number of employees in the State Security structures amounted
297
up to
15 000.
According to one of the few officially available statistics the number
of annually recruited secret agents since the mid
1950s
to the end of the re¬
gime varied between
50 000
and
65 000.
The political loyalty towards the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) re¬
mained always the cornerstone of State Security diverse activities. Nearly all
documents issued by its various Directorates consistently included the magic
formula, that their staff members ought to be „boundlessly faithful to the Party".
Another expression of the same philosophy was the BCP Secretary General
Válko ChervenkoVs
declaration to State Security chiefs in
1954,
in which he
described the Security Service as „the eyes and the ears of the Party". Approxi¬
mately at this time BCP leadership took a course towards clear and unambigu¬
ous partition between the Party nomenclature and the political police, restric¬
tion of opportunities for the State Security to take part in the decision-making
process and administrating of constant control over its divisions.
The Party made use of different mechanisms to exercise such a control.
The most powerful one was the direct monitoring of the overall activity of the
State Service by a specially designated for this purpose Department in the
Central Committee of BCP, whose work on its turn was scrutinized by one of
the Secretaries of the Committee. After
1965
this supervision was persistently
in Todor ZhivkoVs hands. Another control instrument was the figure of the
Minister of Interior, who always came from the Party highest echelon
-
from
the central executive body (Angel Tsanev),
Comsomol
activist (Angel Solakov)
or from the Party regional offices (Dimitar Stoyanov and
Georgi
Tanev).
An expert from the power structures of the Ministry of Interior was never ap¬
pointed Minister. Some former employees of State Security expressed later on
in their memoirs subdued discontent over the issue, which comes as an indica¬
tion of a certain tension between the „professionals" and the „politicians" in
the Ministry.
In the prolonged situation of immovability of once appointed Ministers,
the Party designed another mechanism for control
—
the Collegium of the Min¬
istry of Interior. The overt mission of this structure was to prevent the concen¬
tration of too much power in the hands of the Minister. The Collegium was
authorized to direct all controversial matters straight to the Central Commit¬
tee. That was also the body that took responsibility for the most important
resolutions concerning the work of the Ministry of Interior and ensured the
necessary level of anonymity for making unpopular decisions.
The cut out distinction between Party nomenclature and the State Secu¬
rity substantially restricted the opportunities for „political career" open to of¬
ficers in the system, who had to put up with only second-rate positions. Most
examples of State Security officers, who received limited access to the political
power, date from the
1980s.
These were mostly Intelligence officers, who suc¬
ceeded to advance in their careers and become Deputy Ministers or ambassa¬
dors, after formally retiring from the State Security system. Such were the
298
cases
with Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zhivko Popov and Luben Gotsev.
In
1979
Petar
Bashikarov resigned from the position of Deputy chief of Depart¬
ment at First Head Directorate of State Security and started working for the
Ministry of International Commerce, where later on he was entrusted the post
of First Deputy Minister.
The recruiting of BCP members as secret agents was one of the most
sensitive issues throughout the years in view with the dividing line between
the State Security and the Party elite. The approach had undergone changes
in time, but nevertheless there was always a steady tendency for the party
members to have privileges compared to other citizens. The general rule,
introduced in
1960,
read that State Security might employ Party members
only in exceptional cases. This highly restrictive regulation was obviously
unacceptable to the State Security and was revised no later than
1965.
In the
spirit of the new instructions the employment restriction was valid only for
the BCP and
Comsomol
nomenclature and did not prevent regular commu¬
nists being recruited mainly in the Intelligence sector. Other Directorates
kept theoretically their right to hire secret agents from the Party, but only
„by exception".
All these proscriptions aimed at nothing, but the definite separation of
the political leadership and the political police, so that State Security did not
have any instruments for direct or indirect influence over the political decision
making process. Until the archives of State security remain closed, there is no
reliable way one could assess how far these instructions
wers
applied and to
what
estent
the Party members benefited from the privileges, they were
awarded. We could safely assume, however, that towards the end of the regime
State Security and its Sixth Directorate in particular focused much more their
attention on Party leadership and for that purpose they must have needed
enough agents among the Party members.
In its activity the State Security used a couple of major tools, which could
be generally grouped into three main categories
—
direct repression, the agents'
work and the consequent „active" or „acute measures".
Different
periods within
the history of the communist state demanded a more pronounced preference
towards different categories. No doabfc, -until the beginning of
1950s
a leading
role was attributed to the direct repression, while in the years of destalinization
the emphasis was put on agents' doings. The two major lines of work in State
security
-
Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, applied thoroughly identical
methods of action.
în
support of this statement
-
the hierarchy of their em¬
ployees and agents was also practically the same:
299
INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
Operatíve
officers
-
officers, who
are staff members of State security
Operative officers- officers, who
are staff members of State Security
Resident
-
an operative officer, who
manages the Intelligence structure in
a particular state (called
residenture)
Resident
-
a secret agent, who
manages a so called residentare
group in a major state institution, or
public organization
Agents
-
officially enrolled foreign
citizens
Agents
-
secret agents, who are
officially hired to collect information
regarding public opinion
Secret agents
-
officially enlisted
Bulgarian citizens, who could help the
Intelligence
Operative (confidential) links
-
foreign citizens, who present a
reliable source of information, without
being officially enrolled.
Confidentials- citizens, who may
not be formally enlisted, but provide
reliable information
Providers of meeting point
premises
-
citizens, who voluntarily
provide premises for secret meetings
of agents
Providers of cover
(conspiratorial) premises
-
citizens, who serve as a cover for
premises that are being used by the
State Security bodies.
The only difference in this hierarchy was purely terminological
-
while
the term „secret agent" in the Intelligence unit is designated only to officially
enrolled Bulgarian citizens, in the structure of the Counter-intelligence the
term was applied to all collaborators to the system (residents, agents,
confidentials, providers of meeting point and conspiratorial premises).
Both Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Directions in the State secu¬
rity had. completely identical methods of recruitment of agents, which were
based either on political allegiance, or some form of dependence -material or
other. There was a preference for people, who shared the communist beliefs
and were convinced in the Tightness of their actions, as these agents were
most reliable and cost effective. However, the defeat in the Cold War propa¬
ganda war after
1968
led to a rapid decrease in the number of those, willing to
cooperate only on the basis of political allegiance and by the end of the regime
300
the number of people enrolled through dependence and blackmailing was in¬
creasing. Most often that happened through some discrediting material, pro¬
cured in various ways, including the usage of special technical means.
The aim of the Bulgarian Intelligence was to collect information about
states and regions, which were located in geographical proximity and there¬
fore Bulgarian Intelligence Services had better opportunities for field work
than their Soviet colleagues. This was valid for all three major spheres of Intel¬
ligence activity, which were managed by the First Head Directorate of State
Security
-
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Culture and History. In the
first Cold War years priority was given to Greece and Turkey, the so called
„less developed Arab and African states" and the Middle-East countries in
particular. After
1966
China and Albania were also added to this list.
The three above mentioned departments in the Intelligence Directorate
were also assigned the task to ensure the political legitimacy of the regime
either through invention of good „propaganda" news, or through acquiring of
technological innovations data from the West. This justified the existence of
the seemingly unnecessary department „Culture and History Intelligence" (CHI),
whose main objective was to gather and promote information about the Bul¬
garian culture and history. CHI aimed at providing the party leadership with
historical facts, that would enhance the international prestige of the country
and hence
-
that of the ruling regime.
In the wide spectrum of methods, used by the Intelligence officers in their
work, a very special place was reserved for various forms of repression. In the
majority of the cases the victims were representatives of the Bulgarian emi¬
gration abroad. The BCP Political Bureau Decisions dated
27
December
1966,
altered significantly the comparatively tolerant policy towards emigrants
adopted in the mid
1950s.
The new strategy required firm control and restraint
of contacts between Bulgarian citizens and expatriates. A special State Secu¬
rity report from the same year authorized the Secret Services to forcefully
kidnap and bring back to the
country
active members of the hostile emigra¬
tion. Since the mid
1970s
the whole operative work regarding Bulgarian emi¬
gration was entirely concentrated in the Intelligence Directorate, which alone
could exercise control over the agents, sent abroad. Two more documents
marked further the general policy for countering the emigration and restrict¬
ing the opportunities for Bulgarian citizens to travel abroad
—
the BCP Politi¬
cal Bureau Decision
(1977),
which was expanded in the directive of the Minis¬
ter of Interior (March,
1978).
Another initiative of the Intelligence to legitimize the communist regime
focused on integration of agents in international organizations with Bulgarian
participation. This scheme was widely used since the beginning of the
1970s,
although most probably it had existed even before that. With its consolidated
vote, dictated by the USSR, the Eastern European Bloc could substantially
influence the activities of those organizations and enjoy the benefits of such
301
an advantage. In this way the Intelligence had the chance to „produce" posi¬
tive news, which by themselves were events of considerable importance for the
general public within the frame of a strictly closed totalitarian system. Each
media success also opened ways for boosting communist propaganda in other
countries as well.
The practice of „inventing" biographies was yet another tool, used by
State Security in its efforts to justify the regime before and after its fall. This
practice was once again initiated by the Intelligence and later on widely ap¬
plied within the country as well. In professional slang, this was known as the
„agent's legend", but technically that meant the elaboration of an acceptable
and convincing biography of the respective officer. One of the dilemmas of the
transition period from communism to democracy was that many former State
Security officers used later on their legends as an evidence for their successful
and compelling professional careers. A good example in that respect is the
„invented" biography of Ivan Gaitanjiev
-
an Intelligence officer in the period
1974-1991,
who worked under the cover of a Bulgarian Telegraph Agency cor¬
respondent in China and the US. Being a well-known journalist, he was elected
Member of Parliament (in the
36
and
37
National Assembly) and is currently
an ambassador, although his career during the communist rule was clearly
directed by the Intelligence. Another name to be mentioned is that of Raiko
Nikolov, who in the last years of communism changed several ambassador
posts and recently published three biographical books about his rich diplo¬
matic career. In the BCP archives, however, one could still find his first profes¬
sional assessment, made by State Security in
1950,
immediately before he started
working as an agent in the Bulgarian Embassy in Paris. This is actually a
credible illustration of the way the fall of the communist regime and the end of
State Security made it possible for former employees of the system to attain
publicity through their parallel life stories.
The task of providing political legitimacy to the communist governmen¬
tal system within the country was performed jointly with the Second Head
Directorate (Counter-intelligence), Third Directorate (Military Counter-intel¬
ligence), Sixth Directorate (Combating ideological diversion) and Fourth Di¬
rectorate (Economic counter -intelligence). These units pursued their goals in
ways very similar to those of the Intelligence. Direct repression had once again
a leading role. The individual rights of „suspects" were brutally violated
-
their
correspondence was checked, telephones and homes
-
bugged, and they them¬
selves were under constant surveillance for a certain period of time. In case
this operation accumulated enough data for „hostile to the regime" activity,
the next step of the „realization" would be the person in question to be turned
to the Investigation bodies and eventually sued for political crimes.
The legitimacy of the regime was supported with the help of
Counter-intelligence agents as well, who among other things had to „exert a
positive influence over a wider range of citizens". According to the State Secu-
302
rity
rules the number of agents in a public or state institution could be consid¬
ered sufficient only when „the situation is under full control and could be di¬
rected, in accordance with the State Security discretion". The availability of
such network of officers and agents made possible its mobilization for spread¬
ing rumours and manipulating public opinion in any preferred by the regime
direction.
The „invention of biographies" was unquestionably a major instrument
in the arsenal of the Counter-intelligence too. Although the Second Head Di¬
rectorate did not make use of other state institutions to cover its activity, it
also had certain mechanisms to motivate its employees. A number of docu¬
ments from that period prove that Counter-intelligence agents were awarded
various incentives, whose importance and value depended on those of the agent
himself. In this sense those State Security officers, who were more diligent,
could rely on the „discreet" support of the system, when it was necessary for
their professional advancement.
Within the system of the communist regime the Committee for State Se¬
curity held an intermediate position between the ruling party, all other state
institutions and components (administrative bodies, conventional public or¬
ganizations), and citizens' privacy or associations of Bulgarian emigrants. The
relations between these three levels were strictly hierarchical. At the very top
of the pyramid was placed the communist party, which made all political deci¬
sions regarding the ruling of the country. Immediately under it was State se¬
curity, which, roughly speaking, was authorized to control the implementa¬
tion of these decisions. In this sense State Security played, figuratively said,
the role of auto suspension for the regime. On one hand it had to reduce the
vibrations by repressing those who expressed discontent from the government,
on the other hand
-
to actively provide the missing political legitimacy to the
Party leadership. Therefore it would be quite oversimplified to look at State
Security only as a mechanism for repression or as a political police. Its role
was much more extensive
-
it was the keeper of the status-quo, who had to
guarantee the stability of the regime.
303 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)136557562 |
| author_facet | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- |
| author_variant | m m mm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035134938 |
| classification_rvk | KZ 1015 MG 88950 NQ 8250 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)316044473 (DE-599)BVBBV035134938 |
| discipline | Politologie Geschichte Slavistik |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie Geschichte Slavistik |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1944-1989 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1944-1989 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Bulgarien |
| id | DE-604.BV035134938 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:25:40Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:06:26Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789542802372 |
| language | Bulgarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016802397 |
| oclc_num | 316044473 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-11 |
| physical | 303 S. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Siela |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno |
| spelling | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)136557562 aut Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava Momčil Metodiev 1. izd. Sofija Siela 2008 303 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Legitimacy machine Bălgarska komunističeska partija (DE-588)2006180-8 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1944-1989 gnd rswk-swf Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd rswk-swf Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd rswk-swf Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 g Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 s Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 s Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 s Bălgarska komunističeska partija (DE-588)2006180-8 b Geschichte 1944-1989 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016802397&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016802397&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Metodiev, Momčil 1969- Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava Bălgarska komunističeska partija (DE-588)2006180-8 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)2006180-8 (DE-588)4114382-6 (DE-588)4019737-2 (DE-588)4168427-8 (DE-588)4008866-2 |
| title | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava |
| title_auth | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava |
| title_exact_search | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava |
| title_full | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava Momčil Metodiev |
| title_fullStr | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava Momčil Metodiev |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mašina za legitimnost roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava Momčil Metodiev |
| title_short | Mašina za legitimnost |
| title_sort | masina za legitimnost roljata na darzavna sigurnost v komunisticeskata darzava |
| title_sub | roljata na Dăržavna sigurnost v komunističeskata dăržava |
| topic | Bălgarska komunističeska partija (DE-588)2006180-8 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd Geheimdienst (DE-588)4019737-2 gnd Machtpolitik (DE-588)4168427-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Bălgarska komunističeska partija Legitimation Geheimdienst Machtpolitik Bulgarien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016802397&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016802397&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT metodievmomcil masinazalegitimnostroljatanadarzavnasigurnostvkomunisticeskatadarzava |