Public finance and public policy:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York, NY
Worth
2007
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| Edition: | 2. ed. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXXVIII, 756 S. Ill., graph. Darst. 27 cm |
| ISBN: | 0716766310 9780716766315 9780716799054 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Public finance and public policy |c Jonathan Gruber |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Worth |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XXXVIII, 756 S. |b Ill., graph. Darst. |c 27 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Aide sociale - Finances | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Collectieve goederen |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finances publiques | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finances publiques - Problèmes et exercices | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Finanzpolitik |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Finanzwissenschaft |2 stw | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Impôt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Openbare financiën |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politique fiscale | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Steuerpolitik |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Theorie |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a USA |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft |2 stw | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finanzwirtschaft | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Steuer | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance, Public | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Fiscal policy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Public welfare |x Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Taxation | |
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804137949342728192 |
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| adam_text | SECOND EDITION PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY WORTH PUBLISHERS PREFACE XXVII FART I INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND 1 WHY STUDY, PUBLIC FINANCE? 1 2 THEORETICAL TOBLIFOF PUBLIC
FINANCE 25 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 60 3
EMPIRICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62 APPENDIX: CROSS-SECTIONAL
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 87 4 TOOLS OF JBUDGET ANALYSIS 90 ?* PART II
EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS 5 EXTERNALITIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
120 6 EXTERNALITIES IN ACTION: ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EXTERNALITIES
150 7 PUBLIC GOODS 177 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF PUBLIC GOODS
PROVISION 198 8 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 201 9 POLITICAL ECONOMY * 223 10
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 256 11 EDUCATION 285 PART III
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND REDISTRIBUTION 12 SOCIAL INSURANCE: THE NEW
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT 314 APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF EXPECTED
UTILITY 345 13 SOCIAL SECURITY 348 14 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY
INSURANCE, AND WORKERS COMPENSATION . 384 APPENDIX: ADVANCED
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 411 15 HEALTH INSURANCE I: HEALTH ECONOMICS
AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE . . . .413 16 HEALTH INSURANCE II:
MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 443 17 INCOME DISTRIBUTION
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS 478 PART IV TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 18
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 512 19 THE EQUITY
IMPLICATIONS OF TAXATION: TAX INCIDENCE 545 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF
TAX INCIDENCE 575 20 TAX INEFFICIENCIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPTIMAL TAXATION 577 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF OPTIMAL TAXATION 608
21 TAXES ON LABOR SUPPLY 611 22 TAXES ON SAVINGS 635 23 TAXES ON RISK
TAKING AND WEALTH 663 24 CORPORATE TAXATION 689 25 FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 724 GLOSSARY G-L NAME INDEX NI-1 VI REFERENCES R-L SUBJECT INDEX
SI-1 CONTENTS PREFACE XXVII CHAPTER 1 WHY STUDY PUBLIC FINANCE? . . , 1
HPART I 1.1 THE FOUR QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 3 INTRODUCTION WHEN
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENE IN THE ECONOMY? 4 AND APPLICATION: THE
MEASLES EPIDEMIC OF 1989-1991* 5 RARKFIRNIINH HOW MIGHT THE GOVERNMENT
INTERVENE? 7 * WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE INTERVENTIONS? 8
APPLICATION: THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: GOVERNMENT SCOREKEEPERS 9
WHY DO GOVERNMENTS DO WHAT THEY DO? 10 1 . 2 WHY STUDY PUBLIC FINANCE?
FACTS ON GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 11 THE
SIZE AND GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 11 DECENTRALIZATION 12 * SPENDING, TAXES,
DEFICITS, AND DEBTS 13 DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING 15 DISTRIBUTION OF
REVENUE SOURCES 18 REGULATORY ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 18 1.3 WHY STUDY
PUBLIC FINANCE NOW? POLICY DEBATES OVER SOCIAL SECURITY, HEALTH CARE,
AND EDUCATION 20 SOCIAL SECURITY 20 HEALTHCARE 21 EDUCATION 22 1.4
CONCLUSION 23 HIGHLIGHTS 23 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 23 ADVANCED QUESTIONS
24 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 25 2.1 CONSTRAINED
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 26 PREFERENCES AND INDIFFERENCE CURVES 27 UTILITY
MAPPING OF PREFERENCES 29 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 31 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER:
CONSTRAINED CHOICE 33 THE EFFECTS OF PRICE CHANGES: SUBSTITUTION AND
INCOME EFFECTS 35 VII 2.2 PUTTING THE TOOLS TO WORK: TANF AND LABOR
SUPPLY AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS 37 IDENTIFYING THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 38 THE
EFFECT OF TANF ON THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 39 2.3 EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 43 DEMAND CURVES 44 SUPPLY CURVES 46 EQUILIBRIUM 48 SOCIAL
EFFICIENCY 49 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM MAXIMIZES SOCIAL EFFICIENCY 50
FROM SOCIAL EFFICIENCY TO SOCIAL WELFARE: THE ROLE OF EQUITY 52 CHOOSING
AN EQUITY CRITERION 54 2 . 4 WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF BENEFIT REDUCTIONS:
THE TANF EXAMPLE CONTINUED 55 2.5 CONCLUSION 57 HIGHLIGHTS 57 QUESTIONS
AND PROBLEMS *. 58 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 59 APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 60 CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62
3.1 THE IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN CORRELATION AND CAUSALITY 63 THE
PROBLEM 64 3.2 MEASURING CAUSATION WITH DATA WE D LIKE TO HAVE:
RANDOMIZED TRIALS 65 RANDOMIZED TRIALS AS A SOLUTION 66 THE PROBLEM OF
BIAS 66 RANDOMIZED TRIALS OF ERT 68 RANDOMIZED TRIALS IN THE TANF
CONTEXT 68 WHY WE NEED TO GO BEYOND RANDOMIZED TRIALS 69 3 . 3
ESTIMATING CAUSATION WITH DATA WE ACTUALLY GET: OBSERVATIONAL DATA 70
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 71 CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 74
QUASI-EXPERIMENTS 79 STRUCTURAL MODELING 82 VIII 3.4 CONCLUSION 84
HIGHLIGHTS 84 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 84 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 85 RPPENDIX
CROSS-SECTIONA L REGRESSION ANALYSIS ^ 87 CHAPTER 4 TOOLS OF
BUDGET*ANALYSIS ; 90 4.1 GOVERNMENT BUDGETING 92 THE BUDGET DEFICIT IN
RECENT YEARS 92 * THE BUDGET PROCESS 93 APPLICATION: EFFORTS TO CONTROL
THE DEFICIT 94 BUDGET POLICIES AND DEFICITS AT THE STATE LEVEL 96 4.2
MEASURING THE BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT: ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES 96 REAL VS. NOMINAL 97 THE STANDARDIZED DEFICIT 98 CASH VS.
CAPITAL ACCOUNTING 100 STATIC VS. DYNAMIC SCORING 101 4.3 DO CURRENT
DEBTS AND DEFICITS MEAN ANYTHING? A LONG-RUN PERSPECTIVE 102 BACKGROUND:
PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE 102 WHY CURRENT LABELS MAY BE MEANINGLESS 103
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF LONG-RUN GOVERNMENT BUDGETS 104 WHAT DOES THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT DO? 108 APPLICATION: THE FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS OF 2001
111 4.4 WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT S FISCAL POSITION? . 1 1 2
SHORT-RUN VS. LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MACROECONOMY 112
BACKGROUND: SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 113 THE FEDERAL BUDGET, INTEREST
RATES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 11 4 INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 116 4.5
CONCLUSION 117 HIGHLIGHTS 118 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 118 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 119 IX PART II H EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS CHAPTER 5
EXTERNALITIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 120 5.1 EXTERNALITY THEORY 122
ECONOMICS OF NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES 122 NEGATIVE CONSUMPTION
EXTERNALITIES 125 APPLICATION: THE EXTERNALITY OF SUVS 126 POSITIVE
EXTERNALITIES 127 5.2 PRIVATE-SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
129 THE SOLUTION 129 THE PROBLEMS WITH COASIAN SOLUTIONS 131 5 . 3
PUBLIC-SECTOR REMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 133 CORRECTIVE TAXATION 134
SUBSIDIES 135 REGULATION 136 APPLICATION: TAXES AND REGULATION IN
PRACTICE: THE CASE OF THE BALTIC SEA 136 5.4 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRICE
AND QUANTITY APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING EXTERNALITIES 138 BASIC MODEL 138
PRICE REGULATION (TAXES) VS. QUANTITY REGULATION IN THIS MODEL 14 0 *
MULTIPLE PLANTS WITH DIFFERENT REDUCTION COSTS 140 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
COSTS OF REDUCTION 143 5.5 CONCLUSION 147 HIGHLIGHTS 147 QUESTIONS AND
PROBLEMS 148 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 149 CHAPTER 6 EXTERNALITIES IN ACTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EXTERNALITIES 150 6.1 ADD RAIN 151 THE DAMAGE
OF ACID RAIN 151 HISTORY OF ACID RAIN REGULATION 152 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
ESTIMATING THE ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS OF PARTICULATES 154 HAS THE CLEAN
AIR ACT BEEN A SUCCESS? 155 6.2 GLOBAL WARMING 156 THE KYOTO TREATY 158
CAN TRADING MAKE KYOTO MORE COST-EFFECTIVE? 159 WHAT DOES THE FUTURE
HOLD? 162 APPLICATION: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 162 6.3 THE ECONOMICS OF
SMOKING 163 THE EXTERNALITIES OF SMOKING 165 SHOULD WE CARE ONLY ABOUT
EXTERNALITIES, ORDO INTERNALIZES MATTER ALSO? 168 6.4 THE ECONOMICS OF
OTHER ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 171 DRINKING 171 ILLICIT DRUGS 172 OBESITY 173
; SUMMARY 174 V 6.5 CONCLUSION . 174 HIGHLIGHTS * 174 QUESTIONS AND
PROBLEMS * 175 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 175 CHAPTER 7 PUBLIC GOODS 177 7.1
OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 178 OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PRIVATE GOODS
179 OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 181 7.2 PRIVATE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC GOODS 183 PRIVATE-SECTOR UNDERPROVISION 184 APPLICATION: THE FREE
RIDER PROBLEM IN PRACTICE 185 CAN PRIVATE PROVIDERS OVERCOME THE FREE
RIDER PROBLEM? 186 APPLICATION: BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 186 WHEN
IS PRIVATE PROVISION LIKELY TO OVERCOME THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM? 188 7.3
PUBLIC PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 190 PRIVATE RESPONSES TO PUBLIC
PROVISION: THE PROBLEM OF CROWD-OUT 191 MEASURING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF PUBLIC GOODS 193 HOW CAN WE MEASURE PREFERENCES FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD?
193 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MEASURING CROWD-OUT 194 7.4 CONCLUSION 195
HIGHLIGHTS 195 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 196 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 196
APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 198 XI CHAPTER 8
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 201 8.1 MEASURING THE COSTS OF PUBLIC PROJECTS 202
THE EXAMPLE 203 MEASURING CURRENT COSTS 204 MEASURING FUTURE COSTS 205
8.2 MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PROJECTS 206 VALUING DRIVING TIME
SAVED 206 APPLICATION: THE PROBLEMS OF CONTINGENT VALUATION 209
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: VALUING TIME SAVINGS 210 VALUING SAVED LIVES 211
APPLICATION: VALUING LIFE 211 DISCOUNTING FUTURE BENEFITS 216
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 216 8.3 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 217 OTHER
ISSUES IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 217 8.4 CONCLUSION 219 HIGHLIGHTS 219
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 220 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 221 CHAPTER 9 POLITICAL
ECONOMY 223 9.1 UNANIMOUS CONSENT ON PUBLIC GOODS LEVELS 225 LINDAHL
PRICING 225 PROBLEMS WITH LINDAHL PRICING 227 9.2 MECHANISMS FOR
AGGREGATING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES 228 APPLICATION: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 228 MAJORITY VOTING: WHEN IT WORKS 230 MAJORITY
VOTING: WHEN IT DOESN T WORK 232 ARROW S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 233
RESTRICTING PREFERENCES TO SOLVE THE IMPOSSIBILITY PROBLEM 233 MEDIAN
VOTER THEORY 235 THE POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCY OF THE MEDIAN VOTER OUTCOME
235 SUMMARY 236 9 . 3 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 237 VOTE-MAXIMIZING
POLITICIANS REPRESENT THE MEDIAN VOTER 237 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MEDIAN
VOTER MODEL 238 XII LOBBYING 240 APPLICATION: FARM POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 241 EVIDENCE ON THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL FOR REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY 242 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: TESTING THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 243 9.4
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE 244
SIZE-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRACY 244 PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZATION 245 I _
APPLICATION: CONTRACTING OUT WITH NON-COMPETITIVE BIDDING 24 7 LEVIATHAN
THEORY 248 CORRUPTION 249 ^ APPLICATION: GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION 249 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE 251 * EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: GOVERNMENT
FAILURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 252 9.5 CONCLUSION .253 HIGHLIGHTS 253
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 254 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 255 CHAPTER 10 STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES . . 256 10.1 FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 258 SPENDING AND REVENUE OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 259 FISCAL FEDERALISM ABROAD 260 10.2 OPTIMAL FISCAL
FEDERALISM 262 THE TIEBOUT MODEL 262 PROBLEMS WITH THE TIEBOUT MODEL 264
EVIDENCE ON THE TIEBOUT MODEL 266 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE FOR
CAPITALIZATION FROM CALIFORNIA S PROPOSITION 13 268 OPTIMAL FISCAL
FEDERALISM 268 10.3 REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS COMMUNITIES 270 SHOULD WE
CARE? 271 TOOLS OF REDISTRIBUTION: GRANTS 272 REDISTRIBUTION IN ACTION:
SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION 277 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE FLYPAPER EFFECT
278 APPLICATION: SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION AND PROPERTY TAX
LIMITATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 280 XIII 10.4 CONCLUSION 280 HIGHLIGHTS 281
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 282 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 283 CHAPTER 11 EDUCATION
285 11.1 WHY SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT BE INVOLVED IN EDUCATION? . . . 287
PRODUCTIVITY 287 CITIZENSHIP 288 CREDIT MARKET FAILURES 288 FAILURE TO
MAXIMIZE FAMILY UTILITY 288 REDISTRIBUTION 289 11.2 HOW IS THE
GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN EDUCATION? 289 FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION AND CROWDING
OUT 290 SOLVING THE CROWD-OUT PROBLEM: VOUCHERS 292 PROBLEMS WITH
EDUCATION VOUCHERS 295 11.3 EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN EDUCATION MARKETS
299 DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH VOUCHERS 299 EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE 299 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF VOUCHER
PROGRAMS 300 EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SCHOOL INCENTIVES 301 BOTTOM LINE ON
VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL CHOICE 302 11.4 MEASURING THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
302 EFFECTS OF EDUCATION LEVELS ON PRODUCTIVITY 303 EDUCATION AS HUMAN
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 303 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE RETURN TO
EDUCATION AND EVIDENCE FOR SCREENING 304 EFFECT OF EDUCATION LEVELS ON
OTHER OUTCOMES 306 THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL QUALITY 306 11.5 THE ROLE OF THE
GOVERNMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 306 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL QUALITY 307 CURRENT GOVERNMENT ROLE 308 WHAT IS THE
MARKET FAILURE AND HOW SHOULD IT BE ADDRESSED? 309 11.6 CONCLUSION 310
HIGHLIGHTS 311 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 311 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 312 XIV
CHAPTER 12 SOCIAL INSURANCE: THE NEW FUNCTION OF M PA RT III GOVERNMENT
314 SOCIAL 12.1 WHAT IS INSURANCE AND WHY DO INDIVIDUALS VALUE IT? 316
INSURANCE AND WHAT IS INSURANCE? 316 REDISTRIBUTION WHY DO INDIVIDUALS
VALUE INSURANCE? 317 FORMALIZING THIS INTUITION: EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL
318 12.2 WHY HAVE SOCIAL INSURANCE? ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND ADVERSE
SELECTION 321 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 321 EXAMPLE WITH FULL INFORMATION
322 * - EXAMPLE WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 322 THE PROBLEM OF ADVERSE
SELECTION 324 DOES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION NECESSARILY LEAD TO MARKET
FAILURE? 325 APPLICATION: ADVERSE SELECTION AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEATH
SPIRALS 326 HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT ADDRESS ADVERSE SELECTION? 327 12.3
OTHER REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 328
EXTERNALITIES 328 W ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 328 REDISTRIBUTION 329
PATERNALISM 329 APPLICATION: FLOOD INSURANCE AND THE SAMARITAN S DILEMMA
329 12.4 SOCIAL INSURANCE VS. SELF-INSURANCE: HOW MUCH CONSUMPTION
SMOOTHING? 332 EXAMPLE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 332 LESSONS FOR
CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING ROLE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 336 12.5 THE PROBLEM WITH
INSURANCE: MORAL HAZARD 337 APPLICATION: THE PROBLEMS WITH ASSESSING
WORKERS COMPENSATION INJURIES 338 WHAT DETERMINES MORAL HAZARD? 339
MORAL HAZARD IS MULTIDIMENSIONAL 33 9 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORAL HAZARD
339 12.6 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: OPTIMAL SOCIAL INSURANCE 340 12.7
CONCLUSION 341 HIGHLIGHTS 342 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 342 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 343 APPENDIX MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF EXPECTED UTILITY 345 XV
CHAPTER 13 SOCIAL SECURITY 348 13.1 WHAT IS SOCIAL SECURITY AND HOW DOES
IT WORK? 349 PROGRAM DETAILS 350 APPLICATION: WHY CHOOSE 35 YEARS? 350
HOW DOES SOCIAL SECURITY WORK OVER TIME? 354 APPLICATION: IDA MAY FULLER
355 HOW DOES SOCIAL SECURITY REDISTRIBUTE IN PRACTICE? 357 13.2
CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF SOCIAL SECURITY . . . .359 RATIONALES
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 359 DOES SOCIAL SECURITY SMOOTH CONSUMPTION? 360
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SAVINGS 361 LIVING STANDARDS OF THE ELDERLY
361 13.3 SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT 362 THEORY 362 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE: MEASURING THE CROWD-OUT EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON SAVINGS
363 EVIDENCE 364 APPLICATION: IMPLICIT SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AND
RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR 367 IMPLICATIONS 369 13.4 SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 369
REFORM ROUND I: THE GREENSPAN COMMISSION 370 APPLICATION: THE SOCIAL
SECURITY TRUST FUND AND NATIONAL SAVINGS 371 INCREMENTAL REFORMS 372
FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS 374 APPLICATION: COMPANY STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS 378
APPLICATION: MIXED PROPOSALS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 379 13.5
CONCLUSION 380 HIGHLIGHTS 380 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 381 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 382 CHAPTER 14 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE,
AND WORKERS COMPENSATION 384 14.1 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE, AND WORKERS COMPENSATION
385 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 385 INSTITUTIONAL
FEATURES OF DISABILITY INSURANCE 387 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION 388 XVI COMPARISON OF THE FEATURES OF UL, DL, AND WC 390
APPLICATION: THE DURATION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE BENEFITS AROUND THE WORLD
39 1 14.2 CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS
392 14.3 MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS 393 MORAL
HAZARD EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 393 EVIDENCE FOR MORAL HAZARD
IN DL 395 ^ EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 396 EVIDENCE FOR MORAL HAZARD IN WC 398 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF DI-399 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: KRUEGER S STUDY OF
WORKERS COMPENSATION 400 T 14.4 THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SOCIAL
INSURANCE TO FIRMS . . . .400 THE EFFECTS OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING
IN UL ON LAYOFFS 401 THE BENEFITS OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING 403
APPLICATION: THE CASH COW OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING 403 WORKERS
COMPENSATION AND FIRMS 404 14.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM REFORM 405
BENEFITS GENEROSITY 4*05 TARGETING 405 EXPERIENCE RATING 406 WORKER
SELF-INSURANCE? 406 APPLICATION: REFORMING U L 407 14.6 CONCLUSION 408
HIGHLIGHTS 408 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 409 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 409
HPPENDIX ADVANCED QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 411 CHAPTER 15 HEALTH
INSURANCE I: HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 413 15.1 AN
OVERVIEW OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 415 HOW HEALTH INSURANCE
WORKS: THE BASICS 415 PRIVATE INSURANCE 416 MEDICARE 420 MEDICAID 421
TRICARE/CHAMPVA 421 THE UNINSURED 421 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HEALTH
INSURANCE AND MOBILITY 423 XVII 15.2 HOW GENEROUS SHOULD INSURANCE BE TO
PATIENTS? 424 CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR
PATIENTS 425 MORAL HAZARD COSTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PATIENTS 426 HOW
ELASTIC IS THE DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE? THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 429 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
FOR MEDICAL CARE 430 OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE 431 WHY IS INSURANCE SO
GENEROUS IN THE UNITED STATES? 432 APPLICATION: HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
433 15.3 HOW GENEROUS SHOULD INSURANCE BE TO MEDICAL PROVIDERS? . ; 436
MANAGED CARE AND PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT 436 THE IMPACTS OF MANAGED
CARE 438 HOW SHOULD PROVIDERS BE REIMBURSED? 439 15.4 CONCLUSION 439
HIGHLIGHTS 440 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 440 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 442 CHAPTER
16 HEALTH INSURANCE II: MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 443
16.1 THE MEDICAID PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS AND CHILDREN 445 HOW
MEDICAID WORKS 445 WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID? 446 WHAT HEALTH
SERVICES DOES MEDICAID COVER? 446 HOW DO PROVIDERS GET PAID? 447 16.2
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM? 447 HOW DOES MEDICAID
AFFECT HEALTH? A FRAMEWORK 447 HOW DOES MEDICAID AFFECT HEALTH? EVIDENCE
448 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: USING STATE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS TO ESTIMATE
PROGRAM EFFECTS 451 16.3 THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 452 HOW MEDICARE WORKS 452
APPLICATION: THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DEBATE 453 16.4 WHAT ARE THE
EFFECTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM? 456 THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 457
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE MOVE TO THE PPS 457 XVIII PROBLEMS WITH PPS
458 LESSON: THE DIFFICULTY OF PARTIAL REFORM 459 MEDICARE MANAGED CARE
460 SHOULD MEDICARE MOVE TO A FULL-CHOICE PLAN? PREMIUM SUPPORT 462
APPLICATION: A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 462 GAPS IN MEDICARE
COVERAGE 464 16.5 LONG-TERM CARE 465 FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE 465 V .
_.. 16.6 LESSONS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES . . . .466
RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 466 * ^ THE UNINSURED 468 INCREMENTAL REFORMS
469 * FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: PUBLIC NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 471
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: PRIVATE-SECTOR SOLUTIONS 472 16.7 CONCLUSION 474
HIGHLIGHTS 474 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 475 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 476 CHAPTER
17 INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND WELFARE PROGRAMS . . .478 17.1 FACTS ON
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 480 RELATIVE INCOME INEQUALITY
480 ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION AND POVERTY RATES 481 APPLICATION: PROBLEMS IN
POVERTY LINE MEASUREMENT 483 WHAT MATTERS*RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE
DEPRIVATION? 484 17.2 WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 485 CASH
WELFARE PROGRAMS 486 IN-KIND PROGRAMS 487 17.3 THE MORAL HAZARD COSTS OF
WELFARE POLICY 488 MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF A MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER
SYSTEM 489 SOLVING MORAL HAZARD BY LOWERING THE BENEFIT REDUCTION RATE
492 THE IRON TRIANGLE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE PROGRAMS 494 17.4 REDUCING THE
MORAL HAZARD OF WELFARE 494 MOVING TO CATEGORICAL WELFARE PAYMENTS 494
USING ORDEAL MECHANISMS 497 APPLICATION: AN EXAMPLE OF ORDEAL
MECHANISMS 499 INCREASING OUTSIDE OPTIONS 500 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE
CANADIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROJECT 502 XIX PART IV TAXATION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE V 17.5 WELFARE REFORM 506 CHANGES DUE TO WELFARE REFORM 50 6
EFFECTS OF THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM 506 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING
THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM 507 17.6 CONCLUSION 508 HIGHLIGHTS 509
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 509 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 510 CHAPTER IS TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 512 18.1 TYPES OF TAXATION 513
TAXES ON EARNINGS 513 TAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME 514 TAXES ON CORPORATE
INCOME 514 TAXES ON WEALTH 514 TAXES ON CONSUMPTION 514 TAXATION AROUND
THE WORLD 514 18.2 STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN THE UNITED
STATES 516 COMPUTING THE TAX BASE 517 TAX RATES AND TAXES PAID 518
APPLICATION: THE COMING AMT TIME BOMB 520 18.3 MEASURING THE FAIRNESS OF
TAX SYSTEMS 521 AVERAGE AND MARGINAL TAX RATES 521 VERTICAL AND
HORIZONTAL EQUITY 522 MEASURING VERTICAL EQUITY 523 APPLICATION: THE
POLITICAL PROCESS OF MEASURING TAX FAIRNESS 523 18.4 DEFINING THE INCOME
TAX BASE 525 THE HAIG-SIMONS COMPREHENSIVE INCOME DEFINITION 525
DEVIATIONS DUE TO ABILITY-TO-PAY CONSIDERATIONS 526 DEVIATIONS DUE TO
COSTS OF EARNING INCOME 527 APPLICATION: WHAT ARE APPROPRIATE BUSINESS
DEDUCTIONS? 527 18.5 EXTERNALITY/PUBLIC GOODS RATIONALES FOR DEVIATING
FROM HAIG-SIMONS . 528 CHARITABLE GIVING 529 SPENDING CROWD-OUT VS. TAX
SUBSIDY CROWD-IN 529 CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY VS. IMPERFECT INFORMATION 531
XX HOUSING 532 TAX DEDUCTIONS VS. TAX CREDITS 534 APPLICATION: THE
REFUNDABILITY DEBATE 535 BOTTOM LINE: TAX EXPENDITURES 537 18.6 THE
APPROPRIATE UNIT OF TAXATION 538 THE PROBLEM OF THE MARRIAGE TAX 538
MARRIAGE TAXES IN PRACTICE 540 18.7 CONCLUSION . ~ 542 HIGHLIGHTS & 542
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 543 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 544 CHAPTER 19 THE
EQUITY IMPLICATIONS OF TAXATION: TAX INCIDENCE 545 19.1 THE THREE RULES
OF TAX INCIDENCE 547 THE STATUTORY BURDEN OF A TAX DOES NOT DESCRIBE WHO
REALLY BEARS THE TAX 547 THE SIDE OF THE MARKET ON WHICH THE TAX IS
IMPOSED IS IRRELEVANT TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDENS 549 PARTIES
WITH INELASTIC SUPPLY OR DEMAND BEAR TAXES; PARTIES WITH ELASTIC SUPPLY
OR DEMAND AVOID THEM 552 REMINDER: TAX INCIDENCE IS ABOUT PRICES, NOT
QUANTITIES 555 19.2 TAX INCIDENCE EXTENSIONS 556 TAX INCIDENCE IN FACTOR
MARKETS 556 TAX INCIDENCE IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS 560
BALANCED BUDGET TAX INCIDENCE 562 19.3 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX INCIDENCE
563 EFFECTS OF A RESTAURANT TAX: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXAMPLE 563
ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 565 19.4
THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 568 CBO INCIDENCE
ASSUMPTIONS 568 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE INCIDENCE OF EXCISE TAXATION 569
RESULTS OF CBO INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 569 CURRENT VS. LIFETIME INCOME
INCIDENCE 572 19.5 CONCLUSION 572 HIGHLIGHTS 573 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
573 XXI ADVANCED QUESTIONS 574 FLPPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF TAX
INCIDENCE 575 CHAPTER 20 TAX INEFFICIENCIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPTIMAL TAXATION 577 20.1 TAXATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 578 GRAPHICAL
APPROACH 578 ELASTICITIES DETERMINE TAX INEFFICIENCY 580 APPLICATION:;
TAX AVOIDANCE IN PRACTICE 581 DETERMINANTS OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS 582
DEADWEIGHT LOS,S AND THE DESIGN OF EFFICIENT TAX SYSTEMS 584
APPLICATION: THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF TAXING WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 586
20.2 OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION : 586 RAMSEY TAXATION: THE THEORY OF
OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION 586 INVERSE ELASTICITY RULE 588 EQUITY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RAMSEY MODEL 588 APPLICATION: PRICE REFORM IN
PAKISTAN 589 20.3 OPTIMAL INCOME TAXES 592 A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 593 GENERAL
MODEL WITH BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS 593 AN EXAMPLE 596 THE STRUCTURE OF
OPTIMAL INCOME TAX RATES: A SIMULATION EXERCISE 597 20.4 TAX-BENEFIT
LINKAGES AND THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS 600 THE MODEL
600 ISSUES RAISED BY TAX-BENEFIT LINKAGE ANALYSIS 60 2 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE: A GROUP-SPECIFIC EMPLOYER MANDATE 604 20.5 CONCLUSION 605
HIGHLIGHTS 605 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 606 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 606
APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF OPTIMAL TAXATION 608 CHAPTER 21 TAXES ON
LABOR SUPPLY 611 21.1 TAXATION AND LABOR SUPPLY*THEORY 613 XXII BASIC
THEORY 613 LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORY: CONSTRAINTS ON HOURS WORKED AND
OVERTIME PAY RULES 615 21.2 TAXATION AND LABOR SUPPLY*EVIDENCE 616
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY 617
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING STUDIES 618 21.3 TAX POLICY TO PROMOTE LABOR
SUPPLY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 619 BACKGROUND ON THE EITC 619
IMPACT OF EITC ON LABOR SUPPLY: THEORY 621 * IMPACT OF EITC ON LABOR
SUPPLY: EVIDENCE 622 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE EFFECT OF THE EITC ON
SINGLE MOTHER LABOR SUPPLY 624 SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 625 APPLICATION:
EITC REFORM 625 21.4 THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE AND ITS IMPACT ON
LABOR SUPPLY 627 THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE 627 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
THEJIFFECT OF CHILD CARE COSTS ON MATERNAL LABOR SUPPLY 628 OPTIONS FOR
RESOLVING TAX WEDGES 630 COMPARING THE OPTIONS 631 21.5 CONCLUSION 631
HIGHLIGHTS 632 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 632 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 633 CHAPTER
22 TAXES ON SAVINGS 635 22.1 TAXATION AND SAVINGS*THEORY AND EVIDENCE .
636 TRADITIONAL THEORY 636 EVIDENCE: HOW DOES THE AFTER-TAX INTEREST
RATE AFFECT SAVINGS? 641 INFLATION AND THE TAXATION OF SAVINGS 641 22.2
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SAVINGS 643 PRECAUTIONARY SAVING MODELS 643
SELF-CONTROL MODELS 644 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
PERSONAL SAVINGS 645 22.3 TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS 646
AVAILABLE TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS 647 WHY DO TAX SUBSIDIES
RAISE THE RETURN TO SAVINGS? 648 XXM THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF
TAX-SUBSIDIZED RETIREMENT SAVINGS 650 APPLICATION: THE ROTH IRA 65 4
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS 656 PRIVATE VS. NATIONAL SAVINGS 657
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR SAVINGS
ON SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 658 EVIDENCE ON TAX INCENTIVES AND SAVINGS 660 22.4
CONCLUSION _ 660 HIGHLIGHTS 660 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 661 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 662 CHAPTER 23 TAXES ON RISK TAKING AND WEALTH 663 23.1
TAXATION AND RISK TAKING 665 BASIC FINANCIAL INVESTMENT MODEL 665
REAL-WORLD COMPLICATIONS 666 EVIDENCE ON TAXATION AND RISK TAKING 668
LABOR INVESTMENT APPLICATIONS 668 23.2 CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 669
CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS 669 WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS FOR
TAX PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL GAINS? 671 WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
TAX PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL GAINS? 676 23.3 TRANSFER TAXATION 676 WHY
TAX WEALTH? ARGUMENTS FOR THE ESTATE TAX 678 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
ESTATE TAX 679 23.4 PROPERTY TAXATION 682 WHO BEARS THE PROPERTY TAX?
683 TYPES OF PROPERTY TAXATION 684 APPLICATION: PROPERTY TAX BREAKS TO
BUSINESSES 684 23.6 CONCLUSION 686 HIGHLIGHTS 687 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
687 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 688 XXIV CHAPTER 24 CORPORATE TAXATION 689 24.1
WHAT ARE CORPORATIONS AND WHY DO WE TAX THEM? 691 OWNERSHIP VS. CONTROL
691 APPLICATION: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 692 FIRM
FINANCING 694 WHY DO WE HAVE A CORPORATE TAX? 695 24.2 THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATE TAX . . : . . _ = 696 REVENUES 696 EXPENSES 696
APPLICATION: WHAT IS ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION? THE CASE OF PERSONAL
COMPUTERS 698 CORPORATE TAX RATE 699 INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 699 24.3
THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE TAX 700 24.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CORPORATE TAX FOR INVESTMENT . . .701 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
TAX AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 701 NEGATIVE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 706 POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE TAX ON INVESTMENT 70 6
APPLICATION: THE IMPACT OF THE 1981 AND 1986 TAX REFORMS ON INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES 707 EVIDENCE ON TAXES AND INVESTMENT 708 2 4 . 5 THE
CONSEQUENCES OF T H E CORPORATE TAX FOR FINANCING . . . . 7 0 9 THE
IMPACT OF TAXES ON FINANCING 709 WHY NOT ALL DEBT? 710 THE DIVIDEND
PARADOX 713 HOW SHOULD DIVIDENDS BE TAXED? 714 APPLICATION: THE 2003
DIVIDEND TAX CUT 715 CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 716 24.6 TREATMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME 717 HOW TO TAX INTERNATIONAL INCOME 717
APPLICATION: A TAX HOLIDAY FOR FOREIGN PROFITS 718 24.7 CONCLUSION 721
HIGHLIGHTS 721 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 722 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 723 XXV
CHAPTER 25 FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 724 25.1 WHY FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM?
725 IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 726 APPLICATION: TAX EVASION 72 6
APPLICATION: THE 1997 IRS HEARINGS AND THEIR FALLOUT FOR TAX COLLECTION
729 MAKING THE TAX CODE SIMPLER 730 IMPROVING TAX EFFICIENCY 732
SUMMARY: THE BENEFITS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 735 25.2 THE POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS OF TAX REFORM 735 POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR A COMPLICATED
TAX CODE 736 ECONOMIC PRESSURES AGAINST BROADENING THE TAX BASE 736
APPLICATION: GRANDFATHERING IN VIRGINIA 739 THE CONUNDRUM 739
APPLICATION: TRA 86 AND TAX SHELTERS 740 25.3 CONSUMPTION TAXATION 741
WHY MIGHT CONSUMPTION MAKE A BETTER TAX BASE? 741 WHY MIGHT CONSUMPTION
BE A WORSE TAX BASE? 744 DESIGNING A CONSUMPTION TAX 747 BACKING INTO
CONSUMPTION TAXATION: CASH-FLOW TAXATION 749 25.4 THE FLAT TAX 750
ADVANTAGES OF A FLAT TAX 750 PROBLEMS WITH THE FLAT TAX 751 APPLICATION:
THE 2005 PANEL ON TAX REFORM 752 25.5 CONCLUSION 754 HIGHLIGHTS 754
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 755 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 755 GLOSSARY G- L
REFERENCES R-L NAME INDEX NL-L SUBJECT INDEX . . ., SL-L XXVI
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SECOND EDITION PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY WORTH PUBLISHERS PREFACE XXVII FART I INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND 1 WHY STUDY, PUBLIC FINANCE? 1 2 THEORETICAL TOBLIFOF PUBLIC
FINANCE 25 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 60 3
EMPIRICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62 APPENDIX: CROSS-SECTIONAL
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 87 4 TOOLS OF'JBUDGET ANALYSIS 90 ?* PART II
EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS 5 EXTERNALITIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS'
120 6 EXTERNALITIES IN ACTION: ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EXTERNALITIES
150 7 PUBLIC GOODS 177 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF PUBLIC GOODS
PROVISION 198 8 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 201 9 POLITICAL ECONOMY * 223 10
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 256 11 EDUCATION 285 PART III
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND REDISTRIBUTION 12 SOCIAL INSURANCE: THE NEW
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT 314 APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF EXPECTED
UTILITY 345 13 SOCIAL SECURITY 348 14 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY
INSURANCE, AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION . 384 APPENDIX: ADVANCED
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 411 15 HEALTH INSURANCE I: HEALTH ECONOMICS
AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE . . . .413 16 HEALTH INSURANCE II:
MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 443 17 INCOME DISTRIBUTION
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS 478 PART IV TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 18
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 512 19 THE EQUITY
IMPLICATIONS OF TAXATION: TAX INCIDENCE 545 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF
TAX INCIDENCE 575 20 TAX INEFFICIENCIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPTIMAL TAXATION 577 APPENDIX: THE MATHEMATICS OF OPTIMAL TAXATION 608
21 TAXES ON LABOR SUPPLY 611 22 TAXES ON SAVINGS 635 23 TAXES ON RISK
TAKING AND WEALTH 663 24 CORPORATE TAXATION 689 25 FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 724 GLOSSARY G-L NAME INDEX NI-1 VI REFERENCES R-L SUBJECT INDEX
SI-1 CONTENTS PREFACE XXVII CHAPTER 1 WHY STUDY PUBLIC FINANCE? . . , 1
HPART I 1.1 THE FOUR QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 3 INTRODUCTION WHEN
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENE IN THE ECONOMY? 4 AND APPLICATION: THE
MEASLES EPIDEMIC OF 1989-1991* 5 RARKFIRNIINH HOW MIGHT THE GOVERNMENT
INTERVENE? 7 * WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE INTERVENTIONS? 8 \
APPLICATION: THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: GOVERNMENT SCOREKEEPERS 9
WHY DO GOVERNMENTS DO WHAT THEY DO? 10 1 . 2 WHY STUDY PUBLIC FINANCE?
FACTS ON GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 11 THE
SIZE AND GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 11 DECENTRALIZATION 12 * SPENDING, TAXES,
DEFICITS, AND DEBTS 13 DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING 15 DISTRIBUTION OF
REVENUE SOURCES 18 REGULATORY ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 18 1.3 WHY STUDY
PUBLIC FINANCE NOW? POLICY DEBATES OVER SOCIAL SECURITY, HEALTH CARE,
AND EDUCATION 20 SOCIAL SECURITY 20 HEALTHCARE 21 EDUCATION 22 1.4
CONCLUSION 23 HIGHLIGHTS 23 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 23 ADVANCED QUESTIONS
24 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 25 2.1 CONSTRAINED
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 26 PREFERENCES AND INDIFFERENCE CURVES 27 UTILITY
MAPPING OF PREFERENCES 29 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 31 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER:
CONSTRAINED CHOICE 33 THE EFFECTS OF PRICE CHANGES: SUBSTITUTION AND
INCOME EFFECTS 35 VII 2.2 PUTTING THE TOOLS TO WORK: TANF AND LABOR
SUPPLY AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS 37 IDENTIFYING THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 38 THE
EFFECT OF TANF ON THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT 39 2.3 EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 43 DEMAND CURVES 44 SUPPLY CURVES 46 EQUILIBRIUM 48 SOCIAL
EFFICIENCY 49 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM MAXIMIZES SOCIAL EFFICIENCY 50
FROM SOCIAL EFFICIENCY TO SOCIAL WELFARE: THE ROLE OF EQUITY 52 CHOOSING
AN EQUITY CRITERION 54 2 . 4 WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF BENEFIT REDUCTIONS:
THE TANF EXAMPLE CONTINUED 55 2.5 CONCLUSION 57 HIGHLIGHTS 57 QUESTIONS
AND PROBLEMS *. 58 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 59 APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 60 CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62
3.1 THE IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN CORRELATION AND CAUSALITY 63 THE
PROBLEM 64 3.2 MEASURING CAUSATION WITH DATA WE'D LIKE TO HAVE:
RANDOMIZED TRIALS 65 RANDOMIZED TRIALS AS A SOLUTION 66 THE PROBLEM OF
BIAS 66 RANDOMIZED TRIALS OF ERT 68 RANDOMIZED TRIALS IN THE TANF
CONTEXT 68 WHY WE NEED TO GO BEYOND RANDOMIZED TRIALS 69 3 . 3
ESTIMATING CAUSATION WITH DATA WE ACTUALLY GET: OBSERVATIONAL DATA 70
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 71 CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 74
QUASI-EXPERIMENTS 79 STRUCTURAL MODELING 82 VIII 3.4 CONCLUSION 84
HIGHLIGHTS ' 84 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 84 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 85 RPPENDIX
CROSS-SECTIONA L REGRESSION ANALYSIS ^ 87 CHAPTER 4 TOOLS OF
BUDGET*ANALYSIS ; 90 4.1 GOVERNMENT BUDGETING \ 92 THE BUDGET DEFICIT IN
RECENT YEARS 92 * THE BUDGET PROCESS 93 APPLICATION: EFFORTS TO CONTROL
THE DEFICIT 94 BUDGET POLICIES AND DEFICITS AT THE STATE LEVEL 96 4.2
MEASURING THE BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT: ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES 96 REAL VS. NOMINAL 97 THE STANDARDIZED DEFICIT 98 CASH VS.
CAPITAL ACCOUNTING 100 STATIC VS. DYNAMIC SCORING 101 4.3 DO CURRENT
DEBTS AND DEFICITS MEAN ANYTHING? A LONG-RUN PERSPECTIVE 102 BACKGROUND:
PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE 102 WHY CURRENT LABELS MAY BE MEANINGLESS 103
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF LONG-RUN GOVERNMENT BUDGETS 104 WHAT DOES THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT DO? 108 APPLICATION: THE FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS OF 2001
111 4.4 WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL POSITION? . 1 1 2
SHORT-RUN VS. LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MACROECONOMY 112
BACKGROUND: SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 113 THE FEDERAL BUDGET, INTEREST
RATES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 11 4 INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 116 4.5
CONCLUSION 117 HIGHLIGHTS 118 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 118 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 119 IX PART II H EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS CHAPTER 5
EXTERNALITIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 120 5.1 EXTERNALITY THEORY 122
ECONOMICS OF NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES 122 NEGATIVE CONSUMPTION
EXTERNALITIES 125 APPLICATION: THE EXTERNALITY OF SUVS 126 POSITIVE
EXTERNALITIES 127 5.2 PRIVATE-SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
129 THE SOLUTION 129 THE PROBLEMS WITH COASIAN SOLUTIONS 131 5 . 3
PUBLIC-SECTOR REMEDIES FOR EXTERNALITIES 133 CORRECTIVE TAXATION 134
SUBSIDIES 135 REGULATION 136 APPLICATION: TAXES AND REGULATION IN
PRACTICE: THE CASE OF THE BALTIC SEA 136 5.4 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRICE
AND QUANTITY APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING EXTERNALITIES 138 BASIC MODEL 138
PRICE REGULATION (TAXES) VS. QUANTITY REGULATION IN THIS MODEL 14 0 *
MULTIPLE PLANTS WITH DIFFERENT REDUCTION COSTS 140 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
COSTS OF REDUCTION 143 5.5 CONCLUSION 147 HIGHLIGHTS 147 QUESTIONS AND
PROBLEMS 148 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 149 CHAPTER 6 EXTERNALITIES IN ACTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH EXTERNALITIES 150 6.1 ADD RAIN 151 THE DAMAGE
OF ACID RAIN 151 HISTORY OF ACID RAIN REGULATION 152 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
ESTIMATING THE ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS OF PARTICULATES 154 HAS THE CLEAN
AIR ACT BEEN A SUCCESS? 155 6.2 GLOBAL WARMING 156 THE KYOTO TREATY 158
CAN TRADING MAKE KYOTO MORE COST-EFFECTIVE? 159 WHAT DOES THE FUTURE
HOLD? 162 APPLICATION: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 162 6.3 THE ECONOMICS OF
SMOKING 163 THE EXTERNALITIES OF SMOKING 165 SHOULD WE CARE ONLY ABOUT
EXTERNALITIES, ORDO "INTERNALIZES" MATTER ALSO? 168 6.4 THE ECONOMICS OF
OTHER ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 171 DRINKING 171 ILLICIT DRUGS 172 OBESITY 173
; SUMMARY 174 V 6.5 CONCLUSION ". 174 HIGHLIGHTS * 174 QUESTIONS AND
PROBLEMS * 175 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 175 CHAPTER 7 PUBLIC GOODS 177 7.1
OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 178 OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PRIVATE GOODS
179 OPTIMAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 181 7.2 PRIVATE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC GOODS 183 PRIVATE-SECTOR UNDERPROVISION 184 APPLICATION: THE FREE
RIDER PROBLEM IN PRACTICE 185 CAN PRIVATE PROVIDERS OVERCOME THE FREE
RIDER PROBLEM? 186 APPLICATION: BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 186 WHEN
IS PRIVATE PROVISION LIKELY TO OVERCOME THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM? 188 7.3
PUBLIC PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 190 PRIVATE RESPONSES TO PUBLIC
PROVISION: THE PROBLEM OF CROWD-OUT 191 MEASURING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF PUBLIC GOODS 193 HOW CAN WE MEASURE PREFERENCES FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD?
193 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MEASURING CROWD-OUT 194 7.4 CONCLUSION 195
HIGHLIGHTS 195 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 196 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 196
APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 198 XI CHAPTER 8
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 201 8.1 MEASURING THE COSTS OF PUBLIC PROJECTS 202
THE EXAMPLE 203 MEASURING CURRENT COSTS 204 MEASURING FUTURE COSTS 205
8.2 MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PROJECTS 206 VALUING DRIVING TIME
SAVED 206 APPLICATION: THE PROBLEMS OF CONTINGENT VALUATION 209
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: VALUING TIME SAVINGS 210 VALUING SAVED LIVES 211
APPLICATION: VALUING LIFE 211 DISCOUNTING FUTURE BENEFITS 216
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 216 8.3 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 217 OTHER
ISSUES IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 217 8.4 CONCLUSION 219 HIGHLIGHTS 219
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 220 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 221 CHAPTER 9 POLITICAL
ECONOMY 223 9.1 UNANIMOUS CONSENT ON PUBLIC GOODS LEVELS 225 LINDAHL
PRICING 225 PROBLEMS WITH LINDAHL PRICING 227 9.2 MECHANISMS FOR
AGGREGATING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES 228 APPLICATION: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 228 MAJORITY VOTING: WHEN'IT WORKS 230 MAJORITY
VOTING: WHEN IT DOESN'T WORK 232 ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 233
RESTRICTING PREFERENCES TO SOLVE THE IMPOSSIBILITY PROBLEM 233 MEDIAN
VOTER THEORY 235 THE POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCY OF THE MEDIAN VOTER OUTCOME
235 SUMMARY 236 9 . 3 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 237 VOTE-MAXIMIZING
POLITICIANS REPRESENT THE MEDIAN VOTER 237 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MEDIAN
VOTER MODEL 238 XII LOBBYING 240 APPLICATION: FARM POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 241 EVIDENCE ON THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL FOR REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY 242 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: TESTING THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 243 9.4
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE 244
SIZE-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRACY 244 PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZATION 245 I _
APPLICATION: CONTRACTING OUT WITH NON-COMPETITIVE BIDDING 24 7 LEVIATHAN
THEORY 248 CORRUPTION 249 " ^ APPLICATION: GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION 249 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE 251 * EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: GOVERNMENT
FAILURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 252 9.5 CONCLUSION .253 HIGHLIGHTS 253
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 254 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 255 CHAPTER 10 STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES . . 256 10.1 FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 258 SPENDING AND REVENUE OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 259 FISCAL FEDERALISM ABROAD 260 10.2 OPTIMAL FISCAL
FEDERALISM 262 THE TIEBOUT MODEL 262 PROBLEMS WITH THE TIEBOUT MODEL 264
EVIDENCE ON THE TIEBOUT MODEL 266 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE FOR
CAPITALIZATION FROM CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 13 268 OPTIMAL FISCAL
FEDERALISM 268 10.3 REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS COMMUNITIES 270 SHOULD WE
CARE? 271 TOOLS OF REDISTRIBUTION: GRANTS 272 REDISTRIBUTION IN ACTION:
SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION 277 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE FLYPAPER EFFECT
278 APPLICATION: SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION AND PROPERTY TAX
LIMITATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 280 XIII 10.4 CONCLUSION 280 HIGHLIGHTS 281
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 282 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 283 CHAPTER 11 EDUCATION
285 11.1 WHY SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT BE INVOLVED IN EDUCATION? . . . 287
PRODUCTIVITY 287 CITIZENSHIP 288 CREDIT MARKET FAILURES 288 FAILURE TO
MAXIMIZE FAMILY UTILITY 288 REDISTRIBUTION 289 11.2 HOW IS THE
GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN EDUCATION? 289 FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION AND CROWDING
OUT 290 SOLVING THE CROWD-OUT PROBLEM: VOUCHERS 292 PROBLEMS WITH
EDUCATION VOUCHERS 295 11.3 EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN EDUCATION MARKETS
299 DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH VOUCHERS 299 EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE 299 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF VOUCHER
PROGRAMS 300 EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SCHOOL INCENTIVES 301 BOTTOM LINE ON
VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL CHOICE 302 11.4 MEASURING THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
302 EFFECTS OF EDUCATION LEVELS ON PRODUCTIVITY 303 EDUCATION AS HUMAN
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 303 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE RETURN TO
EDUCATION AND EVIDENCE FOR SCREENING 304 EFFECT OF EDUCATION LEVELS ON
OTHER OUTCOMES 306 THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL QUALITY 306 11.5 THE ROLE OF THE
GOVERNMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 306 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL QUALITY 307 CURRENT GOVERNMENT ROLE 308 WHAT IS THE
MARKET FAILURE AND HOW SHOULD IT BE ADDRESSED? 309 11.6 CONCLUSION 310
HIGHLIGHTS 311 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 311 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 312 XIV
CHAPTER 12 SOCIAL INSURANCE: THE NEW FUNCTION OF M PA RT III GOVERNMENT
314 SOCIAL 12.1 WHAT IS INSURANCE AND WHY DO INDIVIDUALS VALUE IT? 316
INSURANCE AND WHAT IS INSURANCE? 316 REDISTRIBUTION WHY DO INDIVIDUALS
VALUE INSURANCE? 317 FORMALIZING THIS INTUITION: EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL
318 12.2 WHY HAVE SOCIAL INSURANCE? ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND ADVERSE
SELECTION 321 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 321 EXAMPLE WITH FULL INFORMATION
322 * - EXAMPLE WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 322 THE PROBLEM OF ADVERSE
SELECTION 324 \ DOES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION NECESSARILY LEAD TO MARKET
FAILURE? 325 APPLICATION: ADVERSE SELECTION AND HEALTH INSURANCE "DEATH
SPIRALS" 326 HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT ADDRESS ADVERSE SELECTION? 327 12.3
OTHER REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 328
EXTERNALITIES 328 W ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 328 REDISTRIBUTION 329
PATERNALISM 329 APPLICATION: FLOOD INSURANCE AND THE SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA
329 12.4 SOCIAL INSURANCE VS. SELF-INSURANCE: HOW MUCH CONSUMPTION
SMOOTHING? 332 EXAMPLE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 332 LESSONS FOR
CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING ROLE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 336 12.5 THE PROBLEM WITH
INSURANCE: MORAL HAZARD 337 APPLICATION: THE PROBLEMS WITH ASSESSING
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INJURIES 338 WHAT DETERMINES MORAL HAZARD? 339
MORAL HAZARD IS MULTIDIMENSIONAL 33 9 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORAL HAZARD
339 12.6 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: OPTIMAL SOCIAL INSURANCE 340 12.7
CONCLUSION 341 HIGHLIGHTS 342 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 342 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 343 APPENDIX MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF EXPECTED UTILITY 345 XV
CHAPTER 13 SOCIAL SECURITY 348 13.1 WHAT IS SOCIAL SECURITY AND HOW DOES
IT WORK? 349 PROGRAM DETAILS 350 APPLICATION: WHY CHOOSE 35 YEARS? 350
HOW DOES SOCIAL SECURITY WORK OVER TIME? 354 APPLICATION: IDA MAY FULLER
355 HOW DOES SOCIAL SECURITY REDISTRIBUTE IN PRACTICE? 357 13.2
CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF SOCIAL SECURITY . . . .359 RATIONALES
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 359 DOES SOCIAL SECURITY SMOOTH CONSUMPTION? 360
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SAVINGS 361 LIVING STANDARDS OF THE ELDERLY
361 13.3 SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT 362 THEORY 362 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE: MEASURING THE CROWD-OUT EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON SAVINGS
363 EVIDENCE 364 APPLICATION: IMPLICIT SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AND
RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR 367 IMPLICATIONS 369 13.4 SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 369
REFORM ROUND I: THE GREENSPAN COMMISSION 370 APPLICATION: THE SOCIAL
SECURITY TRUST FUND AND NATIONAL SAVINGS 371 INCREMENTAL REFORMS 372
FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS 374 APPLICATION: COMPANY STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS 378
APPLICATION: MIXED PROPOSALS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 379 13.5
CONCLUSION 380 HIGHLIGHTS 380 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 381 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 382 CHAPTER 14 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE,
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 384 14.1 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE, AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
385 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 385 INSTITUTIONAL
FEATURES OF DISABILITY INSURANCE 387 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION 388 XVI COMPARISON OF THE FEATURES OF UL, DL, AND WC 390
APPLICATION: THE DURATION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE BENEFITS AROUND THE WORLD
39 1 14.2 CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS
392 14.3 MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS 393 MORAL
HAZARD EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 393 EVIDENCE FOR MORAL HAZARD
IN DL 395 ^ EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 396 EVIDENCE FOR MORAL HAZARD IN WC 398 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF DI-399 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: KRUEGER'S STUDY OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 400 T 14.4 THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SOCIAL
INSURANCE TO FIRMS . . . .400 THE EFFECTS OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING
IN UL ON LAYOFFS 401 THE "BENEFITS" OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING 403
APPLICATION: THE "CASH COW" OF PARTIAL EXPERIENCE RATING 403 WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND FIRMS 404 14.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM REFORM 405
BENEFITS GENEROSITY 4*05 TARGETING 405 EXPERIENCE RATING 406 WORKER
SELF-INSURANCE? 406 APPLICATION: REFORMING U L 407 14.6 CONCLUSION 408
HIGHLIGHTS 408 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 409 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 409
HPPENDIX ADVANCED QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 411 CHAPTER 15 HEALTH
INSURANCE I: HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 413 15.1 AN
OVERVIEW OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 415 HOW HEALTH INSURANCE
WORKS: THE BASICS 415 PRIVATE INSURANCE 416 MEDICARE 420 MEDICAID 421
TRICARE/CHAMPVA 421 THE UNINSURED 421 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HEALTH
INSURANCE AND MOBILITY 423 XVII 15.2 HOW GENEROUS SHOULD INSURANCE BE TO
PATIENTS? 424 CONSUMPTION-SMOOTHING BENEFITS OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR
PATIENTS 425 MORAL HAZARD COSTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PATIENTS 426 HOW
ELASTIC IS THE DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE? THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 429 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
FOR MEDICAL CARE 430 OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE 431 WHY IS INSURANCE SO
GENEROUS IN THE UNITED STATES? 432 APPLICATION: HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
433 15.3 HOW GENEROUS SHOULD INSURANCE BE TO MEDICAL 'PROVIDERS? . ; 436
MANAGED CARE AND PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT 436 THE IMPACTS OF MANAGED
CARE 438 HOW SHOULD PROVIDERS BE REIMBURSED? 439 15.4 CONCLUSION ' 439
HIGHLIGHTS 440 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 440 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 442 CHAPTER
16 HEALTH INSURANCE II: MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 443
16.1 THE MEDICAID PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME MOTHERS AND CHILDREN 445 HOW
MEDICAID WORKS 445 WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID? 446 WHAT HEALTH
SERVICES DOES MEDICAID COVER? 446 HOW DO PROVIDERS GET PAID? 447 16.2
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM? 447 HOW DOES MEDICAID
AFFECT HEALTH? A FRAMEWORK 447 HOW DOES MEDICAID AFFECT HEALTH? EVIDENCE
448 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: USING STATE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS TO ESTIMATE
PROGRAM EFFECTS 451 16.3 THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 452 HOW MEDICARE WORKS 452
APPLICATION: THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DEBATE 453 16.4 WHAT ARE THE
EFFECTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM? 456 THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 457
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE MOVE TO THE PPS 457 XVIII PROBLEMS WITH PPS
458 LESSON: THE DIFFICULTY OF PARTIAL REFORM 459 MEDICARE MANAGED CARE
460 SHOULD MEDICARE MOVE TO A FULL-CHOICE PLAN? PREMIUM SUPPORT 462
APPLICATION: A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 462 GAPS IN MEDICARE
COVERAGE 464 16.5 LONG-TERM CARE 465 FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE 465 V .
_. 16.6 LESSONS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES . . . .466
RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 466 * ^ THE UNINSURED 468 INCREMENTAL REFORMS
469 * FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: PUBLIC NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 471
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: PRIVATE-SECTOR SOLUTIONS 472 16.7 CONCLUSION 474
HIGHLIGHTS 474 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 475 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 476 CHAPTER
17 INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND WELFARE PROGRAMS . . .478 17.1 FACTS ON
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 480 RELATIVE INCOME INEQUALITY
480 ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION AND POVERTY RATES 481 APPLICATION: PROBLEMS IN
POVERTY LINE MEASUREMENT 483 WHAT MATTERS*RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE
DEPRIVATION? 484 17.2 WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 485 CASH
WELFARE PROGRAMS 486 IN-KIND PROGRAMS 487 17.3 THE MORAL HAZARD COSTS OF
WELFARE POLICY 488 MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS OF A MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER
SYSTEM 489 SOLVING MORAL HAZARD BY LOWERING THE BENEFIT REDUCTION RATE
492 THE "IRON TRIANGLE" OF REDISTRIBUTIVE PROGRAMS 494 17.4 REDUCING THE
MORAL HAZARD OF WELFARE 494 MOVING TO CATEGORICAL WELFARE PAYMENTS 494
USING "ORDEAL MECHANISMS" 497 APPLICATION: AN EXAMPLE OF ORDEAL
MECHANISMS 499 INCREASING OUTSIDE OPTIONS 500 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE
CANADIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROJECT 502 XIX PART IV TAXATION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE V 17.5 WELFARE REFORM 506 CHANGES DUE TO WELFARE REFORM 50 6
EFFECTS OF THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM 506 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING
THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM 507 17.6 CONCLUSION 508 HIGHLIGHTS 509
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 509 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 510 CHAPTER IS TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 512 18.1 TYPES OF TAXATION 513
TAXES ON EARNINGS 513 TAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME 514 TAXES ON CORPORATE
INCOME 514 TAXES ON WEALTH 514 TAXES ON CONSUMPTION 514 TAXATION AROUND
THE WORLD 514 18.2 STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN THE UNITED
STATES 516 COMPUTING THE TAX BASE 517 TAX RATES AND TAXES PAID 518
APPLICATION: THE COMING AMT TIME BOMB 520 18.3 MEASURING THE FAIRNESS OF
TAX SYSTEMS 521 AVERAGE AND MARGINAL TAX RATES 521 VERTICAL AND
HORIZONTAL EQUITY 522 MEASURING VERTICAL EQUITY 523 APPLICATION: THE
POLITICAL PROCESS OF MEASURING TAX FAIRNESS 523 18.4 DEFINING THE INCOME
TAX BASE 525 THE HAIG-SIMONS COMPREHENSIVE INCOME DEFINITION 525
DEVIATIONS DUE TO ABILITY-TO-PAY CONSIDERATIONS 526 DEVIATIONS DUE TO
COSTS OF EARNING INCOME 527 APPLICATION: WHAT ARE APPROPRIATE BUSINESS
DEDUCTIONS? 527 18.5 EXTERNALITY/PUBLIC GOODS RATIONALES FOR DEVIATING
FROM HAIG-SIMONS . 528 CHARITABLE GIVING 529 SPENDING CROWD-OUT VS. TAX
SUBSIDY CROWD-IN 529 CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY VS. IMPERFECT INFORMATION 531
XX HOUSING 532 TAX DEDUCTIONS VS. TAX CREDITS 534 APPLICATION: THE
REFUNDABILITY DEBATE 535' BOTTOM LINE: TAX EXPENDITURES 537 18.6 THE
APPROPRIATE UNIT OF TAXATION 538 THE PROBLEM OF THE "MARRIAGE TAX" 538
MARRIAGE TAXES IN PRACTICE 540 18.7 CONCLUSION '. ~ 542 HIGHLIGHTS & 542
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS \ 543 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 544 CHAPTER 19 THE
EQUITY IMPLICATIONS OF TAXATION: TAX INCIDENCE 545 19.1 THE THREE RULES
OF TAX INCIDENCE 547 THE STATUTORY BURDEN OF A TAX DOES NOT DESCRIBE WHO
REALLY BEARS THE TAX 547 THE SIDE OF THE MARKET ON WHICH THE TAX IS
IMPOSED IS IRRELEVANT TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDENS 549 PARTIES
WITH INELASTIC SUPPLY OR DEMAND BEAR TAXES; PARTIES WITH ELASTIC SUPPLY
OR DEMAND AVOID THEM 552 REMINDER: TAX INCIDENCE IS ABOUT PRICES, NOT
QUANTITIES 555 19.2 TAX INCIDENCE EXTENSIONS 556 TAX INCIDENCE IN FACTOR
MARKETS 556 TAX INCIDENCE IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS 560
BALANCED BUDGET TAX INCIDENCE 562 19.3 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX INCIDENCE
563 EFFECTS OF A RESTAURANT TAX: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXAMPLE 563
ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 565 19.4
THE INCIDENCE OF TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 568 CBO INCIDENCE
ASSUMPTIONS 568 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE INCIDENCE OF EXCISE TAXATION 569
RESULTS OF CBO INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 569 CURRENT VS. LIFETIME INCOME
INCIDENCE 572 19.5 CONCLUSION 572 HIGHLIGHTS 573 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
573 XXI ADVANCED QUESTIONS 574 FLPPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF TAX
INCIDENCE 575 CHAPTER 20 TAX INEFFICIENCIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPTIMAL TAXATION 577 20.1 TAXATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 578 GRAPHICAL
APPROACH 578 ELASTICITIES DETERMINE TAX INEFFICIENCY 580 APPLICATION:;
TAX AVOIDANCE IN PRACTICE 581 DETERMINANTS OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS 582
DEADWEIGHT LOS,S AND THE DESIGN OF EFFICIENT TAX SYSTEMS 584
APPLICATION: THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF TAXING WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 586
20.2 OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION : 586 RAMSEY TAXATION: THE THEORY OF
OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION 586 INVERSE ELASTICITY RULE 588 EQUITY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RAMSEY MODEL 588 APPLICATION: PRICE REFORM IN
PAKISTAN 589 20.3 OPTIMAL INCOME TAXES 592 A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 593 GENERAL
MODEL WITH BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS 593 AN EXAMPLE 596 THE STRUCTURE OF
OPTIMAL INCOME TAX RATES: A SIMULATION EXERCISE 597 20.4 TAX-BENEFIT
LINKAGES AND THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS 600 THE MODEL
600 ISSUES RAISED BY TAX-BENEFIT LINKAGE ANALYSIS 60 2 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE: A GROUP-SPECIFIC EMPLOYER MANDATE 604 20.5 CONCLUSION 605
HIGHLIGHTS 605 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 606 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 606
APPENDIX THE MATHEMATICS OF OPTIMAL TAXATION 608 CHAPTER 21 TAXES ON
LABOR SUPPLY 611 21.1 TAXATION AND LABOR SUPPLY*THEORY 613 XXII BASIC
THEORY 613 LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORY: CONSTRAINTS ON HOURS WORKED AND
OVERTIME PAY RULES 615 21.2 TAXATION AND LABOR SUPPLY*EVIDENCE 616
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY 617
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING STUDIES 618 21.3 TAX POLICY TO PROMOTE LABOR
SUPPLY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 619 BACKGROUND ON THE EITC 619
IMPACT OF EITC ON LABOR SUPPLY: THEORY 621 * IMPACT OF EITC ON LABOR
SUPPLY: EVIDENCE 622 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE EFFECT OF THE EITC ON
SINGLE MOTHER LABOR SUPPLY 624 SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 625 APPLICATION:
EITC REFORM 625 21.4 THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE AND ITS IMPACT ON
LABOR SUPPLY 627 THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE 627 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
THEJIFFECT OF CHILD CARE COSTS ON MATERNAL LABOR SUPPLY 628 OPTIONS FOR
RESOLVING TAX WEDGES 630 COMPARING THE OPTIONS 631 21.5 CONCLUSION 631
HIGHLIGHTS 632 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 632 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 633 CHAPTER
22 TAXES ON SAVINGS 635 22.1 TAXATION AND SAVINGS*THEORY AND EVIDENCE .
636 TRADITIONAL THEORY 636 EVIDENCE: HOW DOES THE AFTER-TAX INTEREST
RATE AFFECT SAVINGS? 641 INFLATION AND THE TAXATION OF SAVINGS 641 22.2
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SAVINGS 643 PRECAUTIONARY SAVING MODELS 643
SELF-CONTROL MODELS 644 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
PERSONAL SAVINGS 645 22.3 TAX INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS 646
AVAILABLE TAX SUBSIDIES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS 647 WHY DO TAX SUBSIDIES
RAISE THE RETURN TO SAVINGS? 648 XXM THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF
TAX-SUBSIDIZED RETIREMENT SAVINGS 650 APPLICATION: THE ROTH IRA 65 4
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS 656 PRIVATE VS. NATIONAL SAVINGS 657
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR SAVINGS
ON SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 658 EVIDENCE ON TAX INCENTIVES AND SAVINGS 660 22.4
CONCLUSION _ 660 HIGHLIGHTS 660 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 661 ADVANCED
QUESTIONS 662 CHAPTER 23 TAXES ON RISK TAKING AND WEALTH 663 23.1
TAXATION AND RISK TAKING 665 BASIC FINANCIAL INVESTMENT MODEL 665
REAL-WORLD COMPLICATIONS 666 EVIDENCE ON TAXATION AND RISK TAKING 668
LABOR INVESTMENT APPLICATIONS 668 23.2 CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 669
CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS 669 WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS FOR
TAX PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL GAINS? 671 WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
TAX PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL GAINS? 676 23.3 TRANSFER TAXATION 676 WHY
TAX WEALTH? ARGUMENTS FOR THE ESTATE TAX 678 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
ESTATE TAX 679 23.4 PROPERTY TAXATION 682 WHO BEARS THE PROPERTY TAX?
683 TYPES OF PROPERTY TAXATION 684 APPLICATION: PROPERTY TAX BREAKS TO
BUSINESSES 684 23.6 CONCLUSION 686 HIGHLIGHTS 687 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
687 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 688 XXIV CHAPTER 24 CORPORATE TAXATION 689 24.1
WHAT ARE CORPORATIONS AND WHY DO WE TAX THEM? 691 OWNERSHIP VS. CONTROL
691 APPLICATION: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 692 FIRM
FINANCING 694 WHY DO WE HAVE A CORPORATE TAX? 695 24.2 THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATE TAX . . : . . _ = 696 REVENUES 696 EXPENSES 696
APPLICATION: WHAT IS ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION? THE CASE OF PERSONAL
COMPUTERS 698 CORPORATE TAX RATE 699 \ INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 699 24.3
THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE TAX 700 24.4 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CORPORATE TAX FOR INVESTMENT . . .701 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
TAX AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 701 NEGATIVE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 706 POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE TAX ON INVESTMENT 70 6
APPLICATION: THE IMPACT OF THE 1981 AND 1986 TAX REFORMS ON INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES 707 EVIDENCE ON TAXES AND INVESTMENT 708 2 4 . 5 THE
CONSEQUENCES OF T H E CORPORATE TAX FOR FINANCING . . . . 7 0 9 THE
IMPACT OF TAXES ON FINANCING 709 WHY NOT ALL DEBT? 710 THE DIVIDEND
PARADOX 713 HOW SHOULD DIVIDENDS BE TAXED? 714 APPLICATION: THE 2003
DIVIDEND TAX CUT 715 CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 716 24.6 TREATMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME 717 HOW TO TAX INTERNATIONAL INCOME 717
APPLICATION: A TAX HOLIDAY FOR FOREIGN PROFITS 718 24.7 CONCLUSION 721
HIGHLIGHTS 721 QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 722 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 723 XXV
CHAPTER 25 FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 724 25.1 WHY FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM?
725 IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 726 APPLICATION: TAX EVASION 72 6
APPLICATION: THE 1997 IRS HEARINGS AND THEIR FALLOUT FOR TAX COLLECTION
729 MAKING THE TAX CODE SIMPLER 730 IMPROVING TAX EFFICIENCY 732
SUMMARY: THE BENEFITS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 735 25.2 THE POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS OF TAX REFORM 735 POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR A COMPLICATED
TAX CODE 736 ECONOMIC PRESSURES AGAINST BROADENING THE TAX BASE 736
APPLICATION: GRANDFATHERING IN VIRGINIA 739 THE CONUNDRUM 739
APPLICATION: TRA 86 AND TAX SHELTERS 740 25.3 CONSUMPTION TAXATION 741
WHY MIGHT CONSUMPTION MAKE A BETTER TAX BASE? 741 WHY MIGHT CONSUMPTION
BE A WORSE TAX BASE? 744 DESIGNING A CONSUMPTION TAX 747 BACKING INTO
CONSUMPTION TAXATION: CASH-FLOW TAXATION 749 25.4 THE FLAT TAX 750
ADVANTAGES OF A FLAT TAX 750 PROBLEMS WITH THE FLAT TAX 751 APPLICATION:
THE 2005 PANEL ON TAX REFORM 752 25.5 CONCLUSION 754 HIGHLIGHTS 754
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS 755 ADVANCED QUESTIONS 755 GLOSSARY G- L
REFERENCES R-L NAME INDEX NL-L SUBJECT INDEX . . ., SL-L XXVI |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Gruber, Jonathan 1965- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124510345 |
| author_facet | Gruber, Jonathan 1965- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Gruber, Jonathan 1965- |
| author_variant | j g jg |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035022571 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HJ141 |
| callnumber-raw | HJ141 |
| callnumber-search | HJ141 |
| callnumber-sort | HJ 3141 |
| callnumber-subject | HJ - Public Finance |
| classification_rvk | QL 000 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)82145321 (DE-599)BVBBV035022571 |
| dewey-full | 336.73 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 336 - Public finance |
| dewey-raw | 336.73 |
| dewey-search | 336.73 |
| dewey-sort | 3336.73 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 2. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035022571 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:46:51Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:20:25Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0716766310 9780716766315 9780716799054 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016691668 |
| oclc_num | 82145321 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-739 DE-523 DE-M382 DE-11 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-739 DE-523 DE-M382 DE-11 DE-188 |
| physical | XXXVIII, 756 S. Ill., graph. Darst. 27 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Worth |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Gruber, Jonathan 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)124510345 aut Public finance and public policy Jonathan Gruber 2. ed. New York, NY Worth 2007 XXXVIII, 756 S. Ill., graph. Darst. 27 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Aide sociale - Finances Collectieve goederen gtt Finances publiques Finances publiques - Problèmes et exercices Finanzpolitik stw Finanzwissenschaft stw Impôt Openbare financiën gtt Politique fiscale Steuerpolitik stw Theorie stw USA stw Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft stw Finanzwirtschaft Steuer Finance, Public Fiscal policy Public welfare Finance Taxation Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd rswk-swf Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd rswk-swf Finanzpolitik (DE-588)4127795-8 gnd rswk-swf Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 s DE-188 Finanzpolitik (DE-588)4127795-8 s Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 s GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016691668&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Gruber, Jonathan 1965- Public finance and public policy Aide sociale - Finances Collectieve goederen gtt Finances publiques Finances publiques - Problèmes et exercices Finanzpolitik stw Finanzwissenschaft stw Impôt Openbare financiën gtt Politique fiscale Steuerpolitik stw Theorie stw USA stw Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft stw Finanzwirtschaft Steuer Finance, Public Fiscal policy Public welfare Finance Taxation Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd Finanzpolitik (DE-588)4127795-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4017214-4 (DE-588)4121273-3 (DE-588)4127795-8 |
| title | Public finance and public policy |
| title_auth | Public finance and public policy |
| title_exact_search | Public finance and public policy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Public finance and public policy |
| title_full | Public finance and public policy Jonathan Gruber |
| title_fullStr | Public finance and public policy Jonathan Gruber |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public finance and public policy Jonathan Gruber |
| title_short | Public finance and public policy |
| title_sort | public finance and public policy |
| topic | Aide sociale - Finances Collectieve goederen gtt Finances publiques Finances publiques - Problèmes et exercices Finanzpolitik stw Finanzwissenschaft stw Impôt Openbare financiën gtt Politique fiscale Steuerpolitik stw Theorie stw USA stw Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft stw Finanzwirtschaft Steuer Finance, Public Fiscal policy Public welfare Finance Taxation Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Finanzwissenschaft (DE-588)4121273-3 gnd Finanzpolitik (DE-588)4127795-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Aide sociale - Finances Collectieve goederen Finances publiques Finances publiques - Problèmes et exercices Finanzpolitik Finanzwissenschaft Impôt Openbare financiën Politique fiscale Steuerpolitik Theorie USA Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft Finanzwirtschaft Steuer Finance, Public Fiscal policy Public welfare Finance Taxation |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016691668&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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