Trade implies law: the power of the weak
Without the rule of law, traders who incur trading costs can be held up by counter-parties who are stronger in anarchic bargaining. The favourable terms which the latter extract can overcrowd that side of the market, dissipating the benefits. We establish plausible necessary and sufficient condition...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2000
|
| Series: | NBER working paper series
7702 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | Without the rule of law, traders who incur trading costs can be held up by counter-parties who are stronger in anarchic bargaining. The favourable terms which the latter extract can overcrowd that side of the market, dissipating the benefits. We establish plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for a move from anarchy toward the rule of law to benefit all traders. The rule of law might be delayed, not only by the difficulties of setting up legal institutions, but by monopolistic traders that have meantime emerged to address the inefficiencies of anarchic trade. These monopolistic traders must also guarantee atomistic traders against holdup. |
| Physical Description: | 30 S. |
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| id | DE-604.BV035020351 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:46:18Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:20:22Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 30 S. |
| publishDate | 2000 |
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| series | NBER working paper series |
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| spelling | Anderson, James E. 1943- Verfasser (DE-588)124786278 aut Trade implies law the power of the weak James E. Anderson ; Leslie Young Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2000 30 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 7702 Without the rule of law, traders who incur trading costs can be held up by counter-parties who are stronger in anarchic bargaining. The favourable terms which the latter extract can overcrowd that side of the market, dissipating the benefits. We establish plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for a move from anarchy toward the rule of law to benefit all traders. The rule of law might be delayed, not only by the difficulties of setting up legal institutions, but by monopolistic traders that have meantime emerged to address the inefficiencies of anarchic trade. These monopolistic traders must also guarantee atomistic traders against holdup. Ökonometrisches Modell Commercial treaties Econometric models Foreign trade regulation Econometric models International trade Econometric models Rule of law Economic aspects Econometric models Young, Leslie Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe NBER working paper series 7702 (DE-604)BV002801238 7702 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7702.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Anderson, James E. 1943- Young, Leslie Trade implies law the power of the weak NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Commercial treaties Econometric models Foreign trade regulation Econometric models International trade Econometric models Rule of law Economic aspects Econometric models |
| title | Trade implies law the power of the weak |
| title_auth | Trade implies law the power of the weak |
| title_exact_search | Trade implies law the power of the weak |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Trade implies law the power of the weak |
| title_full | Trade implies law the power of the weak James E. Anderson ; Leslie Young |
| title_fullStr | Trade implies law the power of the weak James E. Anderson ; Leslie Young |
| title_full_unstemmed | Trade implies law the power of the weak James E. Anderson ; Leslie Young |
| title_short | Trade implies law |
| title_sort | trade implies law the power of the weak |
| title_sub | the power of the weak |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Commercial treaties Econometric models Foreign trade regulation Econometric models International trade Econometric models Rule of law Economic aspects Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Commercial treaties Econometric models Foreign trade regulation Econometric models International trade Econometric models Rule of law Economic aspects Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7702.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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