Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CES
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
1131 : Category 1, Public finance |
| Beschreibung: | Auch im Internet unter den Adresse www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S. |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |c Gregory S. Amacher ; Erkki Koskela ; Markku Ollikainen. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Ollikainen, Markku |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Amacher, Gregory S. Koskela, Erkki Ollikainen, Markku |
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| id | DE-604.BV026956740 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:03:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-021617810 |
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| publishDate | 2004 |
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| series2 | CESifo working papers |
| spelling | Amacher, Gregory S. Verfasser aut Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes Gregory S. Amacher ; Erkki Koskela ; Markku Ollikainen. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research Munich CES 2004 30 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 1131 : Category 1, Public finance Auch im Internet unter den Adresse www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar Koskela, Erkki Verfasser aut Ollikainen, Markku Verfasser aut CESifo GmbH <München> CESifo working paper series 1131 (DE-604)BV013978326 1131 |
| spellingShingle | Amacher, Gregory S. Koskela, Erkki Ollikainen, Markku Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| title | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| title_auth | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| title_exact_search | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| title_full | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes Gregory S. Amacher ; Erkki Koskela ; Markku Ollikainen. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_fullStr | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes Gregory S. Amacher ; Erkki Koskela ; Markku Ollikainen. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_full_unstemmed | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes Gregory S. Amacher ; Erkki Koskela ; Markku Ollikainen. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_short | Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| title_sort | socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
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