Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting:
This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13708 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements. |
| Beschreibung: | 55 S. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593603 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080711000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 080710s2007 xxu |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)254587746 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV558069347 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Graham, John R. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)129349690 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |c John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 55 S. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13708 | |
| 520 | |a This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Li, Si |d 1975- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)135853656 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Qui, Jiaping |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)13585377X |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13708 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13708 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13708.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908933 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138253333299200 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Graham, John R. Li, Si 1975- Qui, Jiaping |
| author_GND | (DE-588)129349690 (DE-588)135853656 (DE-588)13585377X |
| author_facet | Graham, John R. Li, Si 1975- Qui, Jiaping |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Graham, John R. |
| author_variant | j r g jr jrg s l sl j q jq |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593603 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254587746 (DE-599)GBV558069347 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01946nam a2200337zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593603</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080711000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080710s2007 xxu |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)254587746</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV558069347</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Graham, John R.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)129349690</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting</subfield><subfield code="c">John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">55 S.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">13708</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Li, Si</subfield><subfield code="d">1975-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)135853656</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qui, Jiaping</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)13585377X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">13708</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">13708</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13708.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908933</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593603 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:32Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908933 |
| oclc_num | 254587746 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 55 S. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Graham, John R. Verfasser (DE-588)129349690 aut Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 55 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13708 This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements. Li, Si 1975- Verfasser (DE-588)135853656 aut Qui, Jiaping Verfasser (DE-588)13585377X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13708 (DE-604)BV002801238 13708 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13708.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Graham, John R. Li, Si 1975- Qui, Jiaping Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title_auth | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title_exact_search | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title_full | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui |
| title_fullStr | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting John R. Graham ; Si Li ; Jiaping Qui |
| title_short | Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| title_sort | corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13708.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grahamjohnr corporatemisreportingandbankloancontracting AT lisi corporatemisreportingandbankloancontracting AT quijiaping corporatemisreportingandbankloancontracting |