Optimal capital income taxation:
In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Series: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13354 |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Importantly, even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income--just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd. |
| Item Description: | Literaturverz. S. 38 |
| Physical Description: | 38 S. 22 cm |
Staff View
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593255 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080327000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 071218s2007 xxu |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)254142360 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV545889952 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Abel, Andrew B. |d 1952- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124189334 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Optimal capital income taxation |c Andrew B. Abel |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 38 S. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13354 | |
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 38 | ||
| 520 | |a In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Importantly, even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income--just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd. | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13354 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13354 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13354.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908585 | ||
Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804138252588810240 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Abel, Andrew B. 1952- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124189334 |
| author_facet | Abel, Andrew B. 1952- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Abel, Andrew B. 1952- |
| author_variant | a b a ab aba |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593255 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254142360 (DE-599)GBV545889952 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02164nam a2200325zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593255</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080327000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">071218s2007 xxu |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)254142360</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV545889952</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abel, Andrew B.</subfield><subfield code="d">1952-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124189334</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Optimal capital income taxation</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew B. Abel</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">38 S.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">13354</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturverz. S. 38</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Importantly, even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income--just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">13354</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">13354</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13354.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908585</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593255 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908585 |
| oclc_num | 254142360 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 38 S. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Abel, Andrew B. 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)124189334 aut Optimal capital income taxation Andrew B. Abel Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 38 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13354 Literaturverz. S. 38 In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Importantly, even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases do not exceed gross capital income less gross investment, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income--just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd. Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13354 (DE-604)BV002801238 13354 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13354.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Abel, Andrew B. 1952- Optimal capital income taxation |
| title | Optimal capital income taxation |
| title_auth | Optimal capital income taxation |
| title_exact_search | Optimal capital income taxation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Optimal capital income taxation |
| title_full | Optimal capital income taxation Andrew B. Abel |
| title_fullStr | Optimal capital income taxation Andrew B. Abel |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal capital income taxation Andrew B. Abel |
| title_short | Optimal capital income taxation |
| title_sort | optimal capital income taxation |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13354.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT abelandrewb optimalcapitalincometaxation |