Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction: evidence from a firm-level panel
The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host coun...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13332 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 20 - 21 |
| Beschreibung: | 21, [6] S. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor. | ||
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
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| spelling | McMillan, Margaret 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)124083978 aut Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel Margaret S. McMillan ; Andrew R. Waxman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 21, [6] S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13332 Literaturverz. S. 20 - 21 The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor. Waxman, Andrew R. Verfasser (DE-588)133777588 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13332 (DE-604)BV002801238 13332 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13332.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | McMillan, Margaret 1959- Waxman, Andrew R. Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel |
| title | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel |
| title_auth | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel |
| title_exact_search | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel |
| title_full | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel Margaret S. McMillan ; Andrew R. Waxman |
| title_fullStr | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel Margaret S. McMillan ; Andrew R. Waxman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm-level panel Margaret S. McMillan ; Andrew R. Waxman |
| title_short | Profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction |
| title_sort | profit sharing between governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction evidence from a firm level panel |
| title_sub | evidence from a firm-level panel |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13332.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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