The basic public finance of public-private partnerships:
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum rev...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13284 |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization. |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 39 - 41 |
Beschreibung: | 54 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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520 | 8 | |a Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization. | |
700 | 1 | |a Fischer, Ronald |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124083498 |4 aut | |
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author | Engel, Eduardo Fischer, Ronald 1957- Galetovic P., Alexander 1965- |
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id | DE-604.BV023593187 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
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physical | 54 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
publishDate | 2007 |
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publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
spelling | Engel, Eduardo Verfasser (DE-588)128736526 aut The basic public finance of public-private partnerships Eduardo Engel ; Ronald Fischer ; Alexander Galetovic Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 54 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13284 Literaturverz. S. 39 - 41 Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization. Fischer, Ronald 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)124083498 aut Galetovic P., Alexander 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)124083536 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13284 (DE-604)BV002801238 13284 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13284.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Engel, Eduardo Fischer, Ronald 1957- Galetovic P., Alexander 1965- The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title_auth | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title_exact_search | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title_exact_search_txtP | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title_full | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships Eduardo Engel ; Ronald Fischer ; Alexander Galetovic |
title_fullStr | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships Eduardo Engel ; Ronald Fischer ; Alexander Galetovic |
title_full_unstemmed | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships Eduardo Engel ; Ronald Fischer ; Alexander Galetovic |
title_short | The basic public finance of public-private partnerships |
title_sort | the basic public finance of public private partnerships |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13284.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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