The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation, and politics
Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where "...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Series: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13028 |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices", regulation of markets and tax rates, are constrained by "economic institutions", which in turn reflect past investments in legal and fiscal state capacity. We study the economic and political determinants of these investments. The analysis shows that common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Preliminary empirical evidence based on cross-country data find a number of correlations consistent with the theory. |
| Physical Description: | 38, [3] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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| spelling | Besley, Timothy 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128383178 aut The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics Timothy Besley ; Torsten Persson Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 38, [3] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13028 Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices", regulation of markets and tax rates, are constrained by "economic institutions", which in turn reflect past investments in legal and fiscal state capacity. We study the economic and political determinants of these investments. The analysis shows that common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Preliminary empirical evidence based on cross-country data find a number of correlations consistent with the theory. Persson, Torsten 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)128862904 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13028 (DE-604)BV002801238 13028 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13028.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Besley, Timothy 1960- Persson, Torsten 1954- The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics |
| title | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics |
| title_auth | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics |
| title_exact_search | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics |
| title_full | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics Timothy Besley ; Torsten Persson |
| title_fullStr | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics Timothy Besley ; Torsten Persson |
| title_full_unstemmed | The origins of state capacity property rights, taxation, and politics Timothy Besley ; Torsten Persson |
| title_short | The origins of state capacity |
| title_sort | the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics |
| title_sub | property rights, taxation, and politics |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13028.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT besleytimothy theoriginsofstatecapacitypropertyrightstaxationandpolitics AT perssontorsten theoriginsofstatecapacitypropertyrightstaxationandpolitics |