Contractual frictions and global sourcing:
We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous produ...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
12747 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe equilibria in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations, and then study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by final-good producers have different effects than improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers. |
| Beschreibung: | 36 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023592671 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080327000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070307s2006 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)255397109 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV023592671 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Antràs, Pol |d 1975- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128734566 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Contractual frictions and global sourcing |c Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a 36 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 12747 | |
| 520 | |a We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe equilibria in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations, and then study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by final-good producers have different effects than improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Helpman, Elhanan |d 1946- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)12493563X |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 12747 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 12747 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12747.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908001 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138251359879168 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Antràs, Pol 1975- Helpman, Elhanan 1946- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128734566 (DE-588)12493563X |
| author_facet | Antràs, Pol 1975- Helpman, Elhanan 1946- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Antràs, Pol 1975- |
| author_variant | p a pa e h eh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023592671 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255397109 (DE-599)BVBBV023592671 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02612nam a2200325zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023592671</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080327000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070307s2006 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)255397109</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023592671</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Antràs, Pol</subfield><subfield code="d">1975-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128734566</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Contractual frictions and global sourcing</subfield><subfield code="c">Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">36 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">12747</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe equilibria in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations, and then study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by final-good producers have different effects than improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Helpman, Elhanan</subfield><subfield code="d">1946-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)12493563X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">12747</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">12747</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12747.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908001</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023592671 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:30Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908001 |
| oclc_num | 255397109 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 36 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Antràs, Pol 1975- Verfasser (DE-588)128734566 aut Contractual frictions and global sourcing Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006 36 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 12747 We generalize the Antras and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe equilibria in which firms with different productivity levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations, and then study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by final-good producers have different effects than improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers. Helpman, Elhanan 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)12493563X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 12747 (DE-604)BV002801238 12747 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12747.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Antràs, Pol 1975- Helpman, Elhanan 1946- Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title | Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title_auth | Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title_exact_search | Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title_full | Contractual frictions and global sourcing Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_fullStr | Contractual frictions and global sourcing Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Contractual frictions and global sourcing Pol Antras ; Elhanan Helpman |
| title_short | Contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| title_sort | contractual frictions and global sourcing |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12747.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT antraspol contractualfrictionsandglobalsourcing AT helpmanelhanan contractualfrictionsandglobalsourcing |