Does the profit motive make Jack nimble?: ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry
"We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding th...
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11705 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
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| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV023591737 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:29Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016907067 |
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| physical | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry Sujoy Chakravarty ... Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 39 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11705 "We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Economics, Hospital United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals, Proprietary United States Hospitals, Voluntary United States USA Chakravarty, Sujoy Sonstige (DE-588)131451375 oth Gaynor, Martin 1955- Sonstige (DE-588)124571190 oth Klepper, Steven 1949-2013 Sonstige (DE-588)113021143 oth Vogt, William B. Sonstige (DE-588)124571166 oth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11705 (DE-604)BV002801238 11705 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11705.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Economics, Hospital United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals, Proprietary United States Hospitals, Voluntary United States |
| title | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry |
| title_auth | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry |
| title_exact_search | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry |
| title_full | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry Sujoy Chakravarty ... |
| title_fullStr | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry Sujoy Chakravarty ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry Sujoy Chakravarty ... |
| title_short | Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? |
| title_sort | does the profit motive make jack nimble ownership form and the evolution of the u s hospital industry |
| title_sub | ownership form and the evolution of the U.S. hospital industry |
| topic | Economics, Hospital United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals, Proprietary United States Hospitals, Voluntary United States |
| topic_facet | Economics, Hospital United States Hospitals Economic aspects United States Hospitals, Proprietary United States Hospitals, Voluntary United States USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11705.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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