Why do firms become widely held?: an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership
"We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership overtime to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, amajority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock m...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11505 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | "We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership overtime to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, amajority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock marketperformance and trading play an extremely important role in its insider ownership dynamics. Firmsthat experience large decreases in insider ownership and/or become widely held are firms with highvaluations, good recent stock market performance, and liquid markets for their stocks. In contrastand surprisingly, variables suggested by agency theory have limited success in explaining theevolution of insider ownership"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Physical Description: | 43 S. graph. Darst. |
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| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV023591599 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 43 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Helwege, Jean Verfasser (DE-588)130590975 aut Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership Jean Helwege ; Christo Pirinsky ; René M. Stulz Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 43 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11505 "We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership overtime to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, amajority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock marketperformance and trading play an extremely important role in its insider ownership dynamics. Firmsthat experience large decreases in insider ownership and/or become widely held are firms with highvaluations, good recent stock market performance, and liquid markets for their stocks. In contrastand surprisingly, variables suggested by agency theory have limited success in explaining theevolution of insider ownership"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Stock ownership United States Econometric models USA Pirinsky, Christo Verfasser (DE-588)130590991 aut Stulz, René M. 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)12857884X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11505 (DE-604)BV002801238 11505 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11505.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Helwege, Jean Pirinsky, Christo Stulz, René M. 1952- Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Stock ownership United States Econometric models |
| title | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| title_auth | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| title_exact_search | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| title_full | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership Jean Helwege ; Christo Pirinsky ; René M. Stulz |
| title_fullStr | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership Jean Helwege ; Christo Pirinsky ; René M. Stulz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why do firms become widely held? an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership Jean Helwege ; Christo Pirinsky ; René M. Stulz |
| title_short | Why do firms become widely held? |
| title_sort | why do firms become widely held an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| title_sub | an analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Stock ownership United States Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Stock ownership United States Econometric models USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11505.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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