Corporate tax avoidance and firm value:
"How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary syste...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11241 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary systematically with the strength of firm governance institutions. The empirical results indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero; however, the effect is positive for well-governed firms as predicted. Coefficient estimates are consistent with an expected life of five years for the devices that generate these tax savings for well-governed firms. Alternative explanations for the dependence of the valuation of the tax avoidance measure on firm governance do not appear to be consistent with the empirical results. The findings indicate that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete, given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 25, [5] S. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11241 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary systematically with the strength of firm governance institutions. The empirical results indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero; however, the effect is positive for well-governed firms as predicted. Coefficient estimates are consistent with an expected life of five years for the devices that generate these tax savings for well-governed firms. Alternative explanations for the dependence of the valuation of the tax avoidance measure on firm governance do not appear to be consistent with the empirical results. The findings indicate that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete, given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591408 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906738 |
| oclc_num | 59006689 |
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| physical | 25, [5] S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)128956798 aut Corporate tax avoidance and firm value Mihir A. Desai ; Dhammika Dharmapala Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 25, [5] S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11241 "How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary systematically with the strength of firm governance institutions. The empirical results indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero; however, the effect is positive for well-governed firms as predicted. Coefficient estimates are consistent with an expected life of five years for the devices that generate these tax savings for well-governed firms. Alternative explanations for the dependence of the valuation of the tax avoidance measure on firm governance do not appear to be consistent with the empirical results. The findings indicate that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete, given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Steuer Corporations Taxation Tax planning Dharmapala, Dhammika Verfasser (DE-588)13048847X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11241 (DE-604)BV002801238 11241 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11241.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Dharmapala, Dhammika Corporate tax avoidance and firm value National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Steuer Corporations Taxation Tax planning |
| title | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| title_auth | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| title_exact_search | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| title_full | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value Mihir A. Desai ; Dhammika Dharmapala |
| title_fullStr | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value Mihir A. Desai ; Dhammika Dharmapala |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value Mihir A. Desai ; Dhammika Dharmapala |
| title_short | Corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| title_sort | corporate tax avoidance and firm value |
| topic | Steuer Corporations Taxation Tax planning |
| topic_facet | Steuer Corporations Taxation Tax planning |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11241.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT desaimihira corporatetaxavoidanceandfirmvalue AT dharmapaladhammika corporatetaxavoidanceandfirmvalue |