Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause:
"We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the ag...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
10987 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | "We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if they are self-enforcing. We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among governments that acquire private information over time. In this context, we provide equilibrium interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and GATT/WTO escape clauses. We find that governments achieve greater welfare when they negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs rather than precise tariff levels; furthermore, when governments negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs, the observed applied tariffs often fall strictly below the bound. Our analysis also provides a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in the same industry for a time period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic usage constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Physical Description: | 39, 4, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591141 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:27Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-31T00:41:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 39, 4, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Bagwell, Kyle 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)128796464 aut Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause Kyle Bagwell ; Robert W. Staiger Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 39, 4, [6] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10987 "We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if they are self-enforcing. We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among governments that acquire private information over time. In this context, we provide equilibrium interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and GATT/WTO escape clauses. We find that governments achieve greater welfare when they negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs rather than precise tariff levels; furthermore, when governments negotiate the optimal upper bound on tariffs, the observed applied tariffs often fall strictly below the bound. Our analysis also provides a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in the same industry for a time period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic usage constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) World Trade Organization Politik Commercial treaties Political aspects Staiger, Robert W. Verfasser (DE-588)128796499 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10987 (DE-604)BV002801238 10987 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10987.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bagwell, Kyle 1961- Staiger, Robert W. Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) World Trade Organization Politik Commercial treaties Political aspects |
| title | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause |
| title_auth | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause |
| title_exact_search | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause |
| title_full | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause Kyle Bagwell ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_fullStr | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause Kyle Bagwell ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_full_unstemmed | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause Kyle Bagwell ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_short | Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause |
| title_sort | enforcement private political pressure and the gatt wto escape clause |
| topic | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) World Trade Organization Politik Commercial treaties Political aspects |
| topic_facet | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) World Trade Organization Politik Commercial treaties Political aspects |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10987.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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