Hendricks, K. 1., Pinkse, J., & Porter, R. H. (2001). Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chicago-Zitierstil (17. Ausg.)Hendricks, Kenneth 195X-, Joris Pinkse, und Robert H. Porter. Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.
MLA-Zitierstil (9. Ausg.)Hendricks, Kenneth 195X-, et al. Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.
Achtung: Diese Zitate sind unter Umständen nicht zu 100% korrekt.