Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions:
This paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auction every unit was hammered down, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell through. Prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiati...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
NBER
1992
|
Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
4036 |
Zusammenfassung: | This paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auction every unit was hammered down, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell through. Prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiations resulted in identical units selling for 13% less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units hammered down early in the auction. These results are inconsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of common value auctions and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a "winner's curse" which generated considerable profit for the seller. |
Beschreibung: | 8 Bl. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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100 | 1 | |a Ashenfelter, Orley |d 1942- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124081886 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |c Orley Ashenfelter ; David Genesove |
264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b NBER |c 1992 | |
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490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 4036 | |
520 | |a This paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auction every unit was hammered down, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell through. Prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiations resulted in identical units selling for 13% less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units hammered down early in the auction. These results are inconsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of common value auctions and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a "winner's curse" which generated considerable profit for the seller. | ||
700 | 1 | |a Genesove, David |d 1963- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)129671037 |4 aut | |
810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 4036 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 4036 | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016904722 |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:25Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:06Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
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spelling | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Verfasser (DE-588)124081886 aut Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions Orley Ashenfelter ; David Genesove Cambridge, Mass. NBER 1992 8 Bl. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 4036 This paper reports on the results of an auction sale of 83 condominium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auction every unit was hammered down, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell through. Prices in the subsequent sale of condominium units in face to face negotiations resulted in identical units selling for 13% less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units hammered down early in the auction. These results are inconsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of common value auctions and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a "winner's curse" which generated considerable profit for the seller. Genesove, David 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)129671037 aut National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 4036 (DE-604)BV002801238 4036 |
spellingShingle | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Genesove, David 1963- Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title_auth | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title_exact_search | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title_exact_search_txtP | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title_full | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions Orley Ashenfelter ; David Genesove |
title_fullStr | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions Orley Ashenfelter ; David Genesove |
title_full_unstemmed | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions Orley Ashenfelter ; David Genesove |
title_short | Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
title_sort | testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ashenfelterorley testingforpriceanomaliesinrealestateauctions AT genesovedavid testingforpriceanomaliesinrealestateauctions |