The economic approach to law:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Stanford, Calif.
Stanford Economics and Finance
2009
|
| Edition: | 2. ed. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Physical Description: | XXV, 390 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780804756709 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The economic approach to law |c Thomas J. Miceli |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Stanford, Calif. |b Stanford Economics and Finance |c 2009 | |
| 300 | |a XXV, 390 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804137914608648192 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Titel: The economic approach to law
Autor: Miceli, Thomas J
Jahr: 2009
CONTENTS
List of Tables and Figures xvii
Preface xxi
Chapter 1 Introductory Concepts 1
What Is Law and Economics? 1
Positive and Normative Analysis 2
Is Efficiency a Valid Norm for Evaluating Law? 3
Efficiency Concepts 4
Pareto Efficiency 4
Potential Pareto Efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 5
Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Exchange 6
The Coase Theorem 7
The Law in Law and Economics 10
The Nature of the Common Law 10
The Court System in the United States 11
Conclusion 12
Discussion Questions 12
Problems 13
Chapter 2 An Economic Model ofTort Law 15
What Is a Tort? 15
The Social Function of Tort Law 16
Elements of a Tort Claim 16
Cause-in-Fact 17
Proximate Cause 18
Liability Rules 18
VII
viii Contents
An Economic Model of Accidents: The Model of Precaution 19
The Unilateral Care Model 19
Social Optimum 20
Actual Care Choice by the Injurer 20
Comparison of Strict Liability and Negligence 22
Bilateral Care Model 23
No Liability and Strict Liability 24
Negligence 25
The Hand Rule 25
The Reasonable-Person Standard 28
Contributory Negligence 30
Negligence with Contributory Negligence 30
Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence 32
Further Topics 32
Sequential Care Accidents* 32
The Injurer Moves First 33
The Victim Moves First 33
Last Clear Chance 34
Comparative Negligence 34
Causation and Liability* 36
Cause-in-Fact 37
Proximate Cause 38
Res Ipsa Loquitur 41
Uncertainty over Causation 41
Activity Levels 43
Punitive Damages 46
The Judgment Proof Problem 48
The Impact of Liability Insurance 49
Litigation Costs 50
Legal Error* 51
The Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits 51
Intentional Torts 52
Valuing Human Life and Safety 53
Conclusion 54
Discussion Questions 55
Problems 56
Chapter 3 Applying the Economic Model ofTort Law 58
Products Liability 58
A Brief History of Products Liability Law 59
An Economic Model of Products Liability 62
Equilibrium Price and Output for a Dangerous Product 63
Contents ix
Care Choices by Manufacturers and Consumers 66
Consumer Perceptions of Risk 67
A Note on Custom as a Defense 69
Recent Trends 70
Evidence on the Impact of Products Liability Laws 71
Concluding Remarks 71
Workplace Accidents 72
Respondeat Superior 72
Accidents in Which the Victim Is an Employee 72
Workers Compensation Laws 73
Liability for Environmental Damages 75
Characteristics of Environmental Accidents 75
Multiple Victims 75
Causal Uncertainty 76
Superfund 78
Case Study: Asbestos 80
Medical Malpractice 82
Customary Practice and Informed Consent 83
Do Physicians Practice Defensive Medicine? 84
Conclusion 84
Discussion Questions 85
Problems 85
Chapter 4 The Economics of Contract Law I:
The Elements of a Valid Contract 88
Contracts and Efficient Exchange 88
The Elements of a Valid Contract 91
Reasons for Invalidating Contracts 92
Mental Incapacity or Incompetence 93
Coercion or Duress 93
Mistake and the Duty to Disclose Private Information 95
Purely Distributive Information 97
Socially Valuable Information 100
Casual Versus Deliberate Acquisition of Information 101
Disclosure of Unfavorable Information 102
Unconscionability 103
Conclusion 104
Discussion Questions 105
Problems 105
Contents
Chapter 5 The Economics of Contract Law II: Remedies for Breach 107
The Efficient Breach Model 108
Money Damages and Efficient Breach 109
Incentives for Efficient Reliance 112
Mitigation of Damages 117
Impossibility and Related Excuses 117
Efficient Risk Sharing 118
Commercial Impracticability 121
Specific Performance 123
Transaction Costs 124
Subjective Value and Efficient Breach 125
The Value of Consent 127
Self-Enforcement of Contracts 128
Liquidated Damage Clauses 128
Product Warranties* 130
Express Warranties 130
Implied Warranties 133
Long-Term Contracts* 134
Conclusion 137
Discussion Questions 13 7
Problems 138
Chapter 6 The Economics of Property Law: Fundamentals 140
The Nature and Function of Property Rights 141
The Definition of Property Rights 141
Property Rights and Incentives 142
The Emergence of Property Rights 143
Enforcement of Property Rights 145
Fundamentals of the Economics of Property Law 147
The Coase Theorem 147
The Assignment of Rights and the Distribution of Wealth 150
Examples of the Coase Theorem 151
The Role of Transaction Costs 154
Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect 155
Enforcement Rules 15 5
Property Rules and Liability Rules 156
The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules 157
Trespass and Nuisance 159
A Note on Inalienability of Property Rights 161
The General Transaction Structure 162
Contents xi
Consensual Transfers of Property 166
The Legal Protection of Ownership 166
Should the Law Protect the Possessor or the Claimant? An Analysis of
Land Title Systems* 167
Land Title Systems: Recording Versus Registration 167
Land Title Systems in the United States 170
Title Protection and Economic Development 171
Limited and Divided Ownership 172
Leasing 173
The Lease: A Contract or Conveyance? 173
Mitigation in Leases 174
The Law of Waste 175
Sharecropping 176
Private Versus Group Ownership 177
The Optimal Scale of Ownership 177
Public Goods 179
The Anticommons Problem and the Right to Partition* 179
Intellectual Property 180
Patents 180
Trade Secrets 183
Copyrights 183
Trademarks 184
Remedies 185
Conclusion 185
Discussion Questions 186
Problems 187
Chapter 7 Involuntary Transfers and Regulation of Property 189
Involuntary Transfers and Restrictions on Transfers Between
Private Parties 190
Adverse Possession 190
The Mistaken Improver Problem* 192
Inheritance Rules 195
Primogeniture 195
The Rule Against Perpetuities 196
Government Acquisition of Property Under Eminent Domain 196
The Eminent Domain Clause 197
Public Use and the Scope of the Takings Power 197
The Meaning of Just Compensation 202
Case Study on the Determination of Just Compensation:
The Assassin s Bequest 204
xii Contents
Eminent Domain and Land Use Incentives 204
The No-Compensation Result 205
Arguments Against the No-Compensation Result 206
Government Regulation of Property 208
The Compensation Question 208
Tests for Compensation 209
An Economic Model of Regulatory Takings 212
Implications of the Efficient Compensation Rule 215
Investment-Backed Expectations: Does the Market Eliminate the Need
for Compensation?* 216
Compensation and the Timing of Development* 218
Regulation Versus the Common Law 219
Conclusion 222
Discussion Questions 222
Problems 223
Chapter 8 The Economics of Dispute Resolution 226
The Litigation Process 227
Why Do Trials Occur? 229
The Differing Perceptions, or Optimism Model 230
The Asymmetric Information Model 233
The Social Versus Private Incentive to Sue 234
Procedural Rules and Litigation Costs 236
Discovery 236
The English Versus American Rule 237
The English Rule and Settlement 238
The English Rule and the Incentive to File Suit 239
Evidence on the Impact of the English Rule 240
Rule 68* 241
Contingent Fees* 243
The Benefits of Contingent Fees 243
Contingent Fees and Settlement 245
Do Contingent Fees Promote Frivolous Suits? 246
Frivolous Suits 246
Court Delay* 248
Alternative Dispute Resolution 249
Evolution of the Law 251
Selection of Disputes for Trial 251
Is the Common Law Efficient? 252
Empirical Evidence on Legal Change 254
Contents xiii
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Change 255
Decision by Precedent 255
An Economic Model of Precedent 256
Precedents as a Stock of Knowledge 258
Procedural Responses to Legal Errors* 259
The Standard of Proof 259
Appeals as a Means of Error Correction 260
What Do Judges Maximize? 261
Judicial Self-interest and the Law 262
The Optimal Level of Judicial Independence 263
Pragmatism and the Economic Approach to Law 264
Conclusion 265
Discussion Questions 265
Problems 266
Chapter 9 The Economics of Crime 268
Distinguishing Crimes and Torts 269
Crimes Are Intentional 269
Other Reasons for Public Enforcement 270
Examples of Private Enforcement 271
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Sanctions 272
The Economic Model of Crime 273
The Offender s Decision to Commit a Crime and the Supply of
Offenses 274
Optimal Punishment 275
The Optimal Fine 276
Gain Versus Harm-Based Fines 276
Fines and Imprisonment 278
Prison, Probation, and Parole 279
The Probability of Apprehension Is Variable 280
Why Are Fines Not Equal to Offenders Wealth? 282
Repeat Offenders 286
Incapacitation 287
Empirical Evidence on the Economic Model of Crime 288
The Death Penalty 289
Economics of the Death Penalty 289
Constitutional Issues 291
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 291
The Bail System* 292
Private Protection* 294
xiv Contents
Plea Bargaining 295
Economic Models of Plea Bargaining 296
Plea Bargaining and Deterrence 298
A Comparative Perspective 299
Topics 300
Crime and the Business Cycle* 301
Gun Laws and Crime 302
Primitive Law Enforcement 304
Some Constitutional Issues 305
Free Speech 305
The Rule Against Self-incrimination 307
The Right of Privacy 3 09
Conclusion 311
Discussion Questions 311
Problems 312
Chapter 10 The Economics of Antitrust Law 315
Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly 316
Competitive Markets and Welfare 316
Monopoly 317
Cartels 318
Antitrust Law 320
Enforcement and Remedies 321
The Per Se Rule Versus the Rule of Reason 321
Optimal Fines 322
The New Antitrust Law and Economics 324
Contestable Markets 324
Transaction Cost Economics 325
Network Effects 327
Imperfect Information 328
Natural Monopoly 330
Price Regulation 331
Public Enterprise 332
Conclusion 332
Discussion Questions 333
Problems 333
Contents xv
Answers to In-Chapter Exercises 335
Notes 345
Works Cited 363
Index 385
|
| adam_txt |
Titel: The economic approach to law
Autor: Miceli, Thomas J
Jahr: 2009
CONTENTS
List of Tables and Figures xvii
Preface xxi
Chapter 1 Introductory Concepts 1
What Is Law and Economics? 1
Positive and Normative Analysis 2
Is Efficiency a Valid Norm for Evaluating Law? 3
Efficiency Concepts 4
Pareto Efficiency 4
Potential Pareto Efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 5
Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Exchange 6
The Coase Theorem 7
The Law in "Law and Economics" 10
The Nature of the Common Law 10
The Court System in the United States 11
Conclusion 12
Discussion Questions 12
Problems 13
Chapter 2 An Economic Model ofTort Law 15
What Is a Tort? 15
The Social Function of Tort Law 16
Elements of a Tort Claim 16
Cause-in-Fact 17
Proximate Cause 18
Liability Rules 18
VII
viii Contents
An Economic Model of Accidents: The Model of Precaution 19
The Unilateral Care Model 19
Social Optimum 20
Actual Care Choice by the Injurer 20
Comparison of Strict Liability and Negligence 22
Bilateral Care Model 23
No Liability and Strict Liability 24
Negligence 25
The Hand Rule 25
The Reasonable-Person Standard 28
Contributory Negligence 30
Negligence with Contributory Negligence 30
Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence 32
Further Topics 32
Sequential Care Accidents* 32
The Injurer Moves First 33
The Victim Moves First 33
Last Clear Chance 34
Comparative Negligence 34
Causation and Liability* 36
Cause-in-Fact 37
Proximate Cause 38
Res Ipsa Loquitur 41
Uncertainty over Causation 41
Activity Levels 43
Punitive Damages 46
The Judgment Proof Problem 48
The Impact of Liability Insurance 49
Litigation Costs 50
Legal Error* 51
The Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits 51
Intentional Torts 52
Valuing Human Life and Safety 53
Conclusion 54
Discussion Questions 55
Problems 56
Chapter 3 Applying the Economic Model ofTort Law 58
Products Liability 58
A Brief History of Products Liability Law 59
An Economic Model of Products Liability 62
Equilibrium Price and Output for a Dangerous Product 63
Contents ix
Care Choices by Manufacturers and Consumers 66
Consumer Perceptions of Risk 67
A Note on Custom as a Defense 69
Recent Trends 70
Evidence on the Impact of Products Liability Laws 71
Concluding Remarks 71
Workplace Accidents 72
Respondeat Superior 72
Accidents in Which the Victim Is an Employee 72
Workers' Compensation Laws 73
Liability for Environmental Damages 75
Characteristics of Environmental Accidents 75
Multiple Victims 75
Causal Uncertainty 76
Superfund 78
Case Study: Asbestos 80
Medical Malpractice 82
Customary Practice and Informed Consent 83
Do Physicians Practice Defensive Medicine? 84
Conclusion 84
Discussion Questions 85
Problems 85
Chapter 4 The Economics of Contract Law I:
The Elements of a Valid Contract 88
Contracts and Efficient Exchange 88
The Elements of a Valid Contract 91
Reasons for Invalidating Contracts 92
Mental Incapacity or Incompetence 93
Coercion or Duress 93
Mistake and the Duty to Disclose Private Information 95
Purely Distributive Information 97
Socially Valuable Information 100
Casual Versus Deliberate Acquisition of Information 101
Disclosure of Unfavorable Information 102
Unconscionability 103
Conclusion 104
Discussion Questions 105
Problems 105
Contents
Chapter 5 The Economics of Contract Law II: Remedies for Breach 107
The Efficient Breach Model 108
Money Damages and Efficient Breach 109
Incentives for Efficient Reliance 112
Mitigation of Damages 117
Impossibility and Related Excuses 117
Efficient Risk Sharing 118
Commercial Impracticability 121
Specific Performance 123
Transaction Costs 124
Subjective Value and Efficient Breach 125
The Value of Consent 127
Self-Enforcement of Contracts 128
Liquidated Damage Clauses 128
Product Warranties* 130
Express Warranties 130
Implied Warranties 133
Long-Term Contracts* 134
Conclusion 137
Discussion Questions 13 7
Problems 138
Chapter 6 The Economics of Property Law: Fundamentals 140
The Nature and Function of Property Rights 141
The Definition of Property Rights 141
Property Rights and Incentives 142
The Emergence of Property Rights 143
Enforcement of Property Rights 145
Fundamentals of the Economics of Property Law 147
The Coase Theorem 147
The Assignment of Rights and the Distribution of Wealth 150
Examples of the Coase Theorem 151
The Role of Transaction Costs 154
Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect 155
Enforcement Rules 15 5
Property Rules and Liability Rules 156
The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules 157
Trespass and Nuisance 159
A Note on Inalienability of Property Rights 161
The General Transaction Structure 162
Contents xi
Consensual Transfers of Property 166
The Legal Protection of Ownership 166
Should the Law Protect the Possessor or the Claimant? An Analysis of
Land Title Systems* 167
Land Title Systems: Recording Versus Registration 167
Land Title Systems in the United States 170
Title Protection and Economic Development 171
Limited and Divided Ownership 172
Leasing 173
The Lease: A Contract or Conveyance? 173
Mitigation in Leases 174
The Law of Waste 175
Sharecropping 176
Private Versus Group Ownership 177
The Optimal Scale of Ownership 177
Public Goods 179
The Anticommons Problem and the Right to Partition* 179
Intellectual Property 180
Patents 180
Trade Secrets 183
Copyrights 183
Trademarks 184
Remedies 185
Conclusion 185
Discussion Questions 186
Problems 187
Chapter 7 Involuntary Transfers and Regulation of Property 189
Involuntary Transfers and Restrictions on Transfers Between
Private Parties 190
Adverse Possession 190
The Mistaken Improver Problem* 192
Inheritance Rules 195
Primogeniture 195
The Rule Against Perpetuities 196
Government Acquisition of Property Under Eminent Domain 196
The Eminent Domain Clause 197
Public Use and the Scope of the Takings Power 197
The Meaning of Just Compensation 202
Case Study on the Determination of Just Compensation:
"The Assassin's Bequest" 204
xii Contents
Eminent Domain and Land Use Incentives 204
The No-Compensation Result 205
Arguments Against the No-Compensation Result 206
Government Regulation of Property 208
The Compensation Question 208
Tests for Compensation 209
An Economic Model of Regulatory Takings 212
Implications of the Efficient Compensation Rule 215
Investment-Backed Expectations: Does the Market Eliminate the Need
for Compensation?* 216
Compensation and the Timing of Development* 218
Regulation Versus the Common Law 219
Conclusion 222
Discussion Questions 222
Problems 223
Chapter 8 The Economics of Dispute Resolution 226
The Litigation Process 227
Why Do Trials Occur? 229
The Differing Perceptions, or Optimism Model 230
The Asymmetric Information Model 233
The Social Versus Private Incentive to Sue 234
Procedural Rules and Litigation Costs 236
Discovery 236
The English Versus American Rule 237
The English Rule and Settlement 238
The English Rule and the Incentive to File Suit 239
Evidence on the Impact of the English Rule 240
Rule 68* 241
Contingent Fees* 243
The Benefits of Contingent Fees 243
Contingent Fees and Settlement 245
Do Contingent Fees Promote Frivolous Suits? 246
Frivolous Suits 246
Court Delay* 248
Alternative Dispute Resolution 249
Evolution of the Law 251
Selection of Disputes for Trial 251
Is the Common Law Efficient? 252
Empirical Evidence on Legal Change 254
Contents xiii
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Change 255
Decision by Precedent 255
An Economic Model of Precedent 256
Precedents as a Stock of Knowledge 258
Procedural Responses to Legal Errors* 259
The Standard of Proof 259
Appeals as a Means of Error Correction 260
What Do Judges Maximize? 261
Judicial Self-interest and the Law 262
The Optimal Level of Judicial Independence 263
Pragmatism and the Economic Approach to Law 264
Conclusion 265
Discussion Questions 265
Problems 266
Chapter 9 The Economics of Crime 268
Distinguishing Crimes and Torts 269
Crimes Are Intentional 269
Other Reasons for Public Enforcement 270
Examples of Private Enforcement 271
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Sanctions 272
The Economic Model of Crime 273
The Offender's Decision to Commit a Crime and the Supply of
Offenses 274
Optimal Punishment 275
The Optimal Fine 276
Gain Versus Harm-Based Fines 276
Fines and Imprisonment 278
Prison, Probation, and Parole 279
The Probability of Apprehension Is Variable 280
Why Are Fines Not Equal to Offenders' Wealth? 282
Repeat Offenders 286
Incapacitation 287
Empirical Evidence on the Economic Model of Crime 288
The Death Penalty 289
Economics of the Death Penalty 289
Constitutional Issues 291
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 291
The Bail System* 292
Private Protection* 294
xiv Contents
Plea Bargaining 295
Economic Models of Plea Bargaining 296
Plea Bargaining and Deterrence 298
A Comparative Perspective 299
Topics 300
Crime and the Business Cycle* 301
Gun Laws and Crime 302
Primitive Law Enforcement 304
Some Constitutional Issues 305
Free Speech 305
The Rule Against Self-incrimination 307
The Right of Privacy 3 09
Conclusion 311
Discussion Questions 311
Problems 312
Chapter 10 The Economics of Antitrust Law 315
Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly 316
Competitive Markets and Welfare 316
Monopoly 317
Cartels 318
Antitrust Law 320
Enforcement and Remedies 321
The Per Se Rule Versus the Rule of Reason 321
Optimal Fines 322
The "New" Antitrust Law and Economics 324
Contestable Markets 324
Transaction Cost Economics 325
Network Effects 327
Imperfect Information 328
Natural Monopoly 330
Price Regulation 331
Public Enterprise 332
Conclusion 332
Discussion Questions 333
Problems 333
Contents xv
Answers to In-Chapter Exercises 335
Notes 345
Works Cited 363
Index 385 |
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| id | DE-604.BV023486465 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:39:48Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:19:52Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780804756709 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2008011548 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016668501 |
| oclc_num | 213407438 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-945 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-29 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-945 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-29 |
| physical | XXV, 390 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Stanford Economics and Finance |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Miceli, Thomas J. Verfasser aut The economic approach to law Thomas J. Miceli 2. ed. Stanford, Calif. Stanford Economics and Finance 2009 XXV, 390 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Law and economics Rechtswissenschaft (DE-588)4076570-2 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4066510-0 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd rswk-swf Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd rswk-swf Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 s DE-604 Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4066510-0 s Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 s Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 s 1\p DE-604 Rechtswissenschaft (DE-588)4076570-2 s Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 s 2\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016668501&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Miceli, Thomas J. The economic approach to law Law and economics Rechtswissenschaft (DE-588)4076570-2 gnd Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4066510-0 gnd Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4076570-2 (DE-588)4066510-0 (DE-588)4066528-8 (DE-588)4066399-1 (DE-588)4048737-4 (DE-588)4135492-8 |
| title | The economic approach to law |
| title_auth | The economic approach to law |
| title_exact_search | The economic approach to law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The economic approach to law |
| title_full | The economic approach to law Thomas J. Miceli |
| title_fullStr | The economic approach to law Thomas J. Miceli |
| title_full_unstemmed | The economic approach to law Thomas J. Miceli |
| title_short | The economic approach to law |
| title_sort | the economic approach to law |
| topic | Law and economics Rechtswissenschaft (DE-588)4076570-2 gnd Wirtschaftsrecht (DE-588)4066510-0 gnd Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Recht (DE-588)4048737-4 gnd Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts (DE-588)4135492-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Law and economics Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftsrecht Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaft Recht Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016668501&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT micelithomasj theeconomicapproachtolaw |