Holdings: On law and reason :: THWS Bibkatalog

On law and reason:

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005 (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English Swedish
Published:	[Dordrecht u.a.] Springer 2009
Edition:	2. ed.
Series:	Law and philosophy library 8
Subjects:	Rechtsinterpretatie Rechtstheorie Rechtsvinding Philosophie Recht Law > Methodology Law > Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie
Online Access:	Inhaltsverzeichnis
Physical Description:	XVII, 364 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:	9781402087295 9781402087301 9781402097065

Staff View

MARC


LEADER	00000nam a2200000 cb4500
001	BV023178951
003	DE-604
005	20230711
007	t
008	080222s2009 d\|\|\| \|\|\|\| 00\|\|\| eng d
020			\|a 9781402087295 \|9 978-1-4020-8729-5
020			\|a 9781402087301 \|9 978-1-4020-8730-1
020			\|a 9781402097065 \|c ISBN nicht im Buch \|9 978-1-4020-9706-5
035			\|a (OCoLC)321016613
035			\|a (DE-599)BVBBV023178951
040			\|a DE-604 \|b ger \|e rakddb
041	1		\|a eng \|h swe
049			\|a DE-M382 \|a DE-355 \|a DE-19 \|a DE-20 \|a DE-703 \|a DE-29 \|a DE-739 \|a DE-12 \|a DE-384
050		0	\|a K212
082	0		\|a 340.1 \|2 22
084			\|a PI 2260 \|0 (DE-625)136543: \|2 rvk
084			\|a PI 3020 \|0 (DE-625)136586: \|2 rvk
100	1		\|a Peczenik, Aleksander \|d 1937-2005 \|e Verfasser \|0 (DE-588)142249645 \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a On law and reason \|c Aleksander Peczenik
250			\|a 2. ed.
264		1	\|a [Dordrecht u.a.] \|b Springer \|c 2009
300			\|a XVII, 364 S. \|b graph. Darst.
336			\|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|b n \|2 rdamedia
338			\|b nc \|2 rdacarrier
490	1		\|a Law and philosophy library \|v 8
650		7	\|a Rechtsinterpretatie \|2 gtt
650		7	\|a Rechtstheorie \|2 gtt
650		7	\|a Rechtsvinding \|2 gtt
650		4	\|a Philosophie
650		4	\|a Recht
650		4	\|a Law \|x Methodology
650		4	\|a Law \|x Philosophy
650	0	7	\|a Rechtstheorie \|0 (DE-588)4126505-1 \|2 gnd \|9 rswk-swf
650	0	7	\|a Rechtsphilosophie \|0 (DE-588)4048821-4 \|2 gnd \|9 rswk-swf
689	0	0	\|a Rechtstheorie \|0 (DE-588)4126505-1 \|D s
689	0		\|5 DE-604
689	1	0	\|a Rechtsphilosophie \|0 (DE-588)4048821-4 \|D s
689	1		\|8 1\p \|5 DE-604
830		0	\|a Law and philosophy library \|v 8 \|w (DE-604)BV000019168 \|9 8
856	4	2	\|m Digitalisierung UB Passau \|q application/pdf \|u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016365513&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA \|3 Inhaltsverzeichnis
999			\|a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016365513
883	1		\|8 1\p \|a cgwrk \|d 20201028 \|q DE-101 \|u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk

Record in the Search Index

_version_	1804137445323702272
adam_text	Contents Introduction by Aulis Aarnio ......................................................................... 1 1 The Dilema of Legal Reasoning: Moral Evaluation or Description of the Law? ....................................................................... 13 1.Í A Theory of Legal Reasoning ............................................................ 13 1.2 Legal Decision-Making and Evaluations ........................................... 14 1.2.1 Introduction. Subsumption in Clear and Hard Cases ............. 14 1.2.2 Interpretative Problems - Ambiguity, Vagueness and Value-Openess ................................................................. 16 1.2.3 Gaps in the Law ..................................................................... 18 1.2.4 Evidence of Facts ................................................................... 20 1.2.5 Choice of a Legal Norm ......................................................... 20 1.2.6 Choice of aLegal Consequence ............................................. 21 1.2.7 Obsolete Laws and Desuetudo ............................................... 22 1.3 The Concept Legal Decision-Making ............................................. 22 1.4 Why do the Lawyers Need Special Interpretation Methods? ............. 24 1.4.1 Expectation of Legal Certainty .............................................. 24 1.4.2 The Law and Democracy ....................................................... 27 1.5 Legal Knowledge? .............................................................................. 33 1.5.1 Introductory Remarks on Theoretical and Practical Statements ........................................................ 33 1.5.2 Legal Interpretatory Statements ............................................. 34 1.5.3 The Main Problem: Knowledge, Truth and Rightness In Legal Reasoning ................................................ 35 2 Rationality of Moral Judgments .............................................................. 39 2.1 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism .................................................... 39 2.2 Practical and Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements ............... 42 2.2.1 Practical Meaning ................................................................... 42 2.2.2 More About Practical Meaning. Norms and the Will ............ 43 2.2.3 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements: Justifiability ............................................................................ 44 2.2.4 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements: L-, S- and D-rationality .......................................................... 45 2.3 More About Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements Prima-facie Moral Statements ........................................................... 47 2.3.1 Criteria of Moral Goodness .................................................... 47 2.3.2 General Theories of the Morally Good .................................. 48 2.3.3 Prima-facie Character of Moral Theories and Criteria .......... 49 2.3.4 The Step From Theoretical Propositions to Prima-facie Practical Conclusions ............................................................. 53 2.3.5 Permissibility-Making Facts .................................................. 55 2.3.6 Claim-Making Facts ............................................................... 57 2.3.7 Competence-Making Facts ..................................................... 59 2.3.8 Complex Right-Making Facts ................................................ 60 2.4 Weighing and Balancing .................................................................... 61 2.4.1 Principles and Values ............................................................. 61 2.4.2 All-Things-Considered Practical Statements ......................... 62 2.4.3 Weighing and Balancing of Principles ................................... 63 2.4.4 Weighing Rules ...................................................................... 66 2.4.5 Final Act of Weighing and Balancing .................................... 67 2.4.6 A Step From Theoretical Propositions to Definitive Practical Statements? ............................................................. 69 2.4.7 The Step From Practical Statements To Theoretical Conclusions ............................................................................ 75 2.4.8 Concluding Remarks Concerning Logical Relations Between Theoretical and Practical Statements ...... 76 2.5 Some Examples of the Role of Weighing in Moral Theories ............ 77 2.5.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 77 2.5.2 Weighing Preferences: Hare s Utilitarianism ......................... 77 2.5.3 Weighing Practices: Maclntyre s Theory of Virtue ................ 81 2.6 Examples of Weighing in Theories of Justice .................................... 83 2.6.1 Justice, Equality and Weighing .............................................. 83 2.6.2 The Role of Weighing In John Rawls s Theory of Justice .................................................................... 86 2.6.3 The Role of Weighing In Robert Nozick s Theory of Justice .................................................................... 90 2.6.4 Some Concluding Remarks on Justice ................................... 93 2.7 Support in Moral Reasoning .............................................................. 95 2.7.1 Gaps and Jumps in Moral Reasoning ..................................... 95 2.7.2 The Concept of a Jump .......................................................... 96 2.7.3 The Concept of a Reasonable Premise ................................... 96 2.7.4 The Concept of Reasonable Support ...................................... 97 3 Rationality of Legal Reasoning ................................................................ 99 3.1 Support of Legal Reasoning. Introduction and an Example .............. 99 3.1.1 Fixity of Law. Extensive Support of Legal Reasoning ........... 99 3.1.2 An Example of Extensively Supported Legal Reasoning ..................................................................... 100 3.1.3 An Example of Analysis of Legal Concepts - the Concept of Adequacy ....................................................... 100 3.1.4 An Example of Substantive Reasons in the Law. The Purpose of Protection. Influence of Moral Theories and Criteria .............................................................. 103 3.1.5 An Example of Legal Authority Reasons. Brief Remarks on Precedents ................................................. 104 3.2 Analysis of Support in Legal Reasoning ............................................ 105 3.2.1 Legal Reasoning As a Dialogue. Reflective Equilibrium and Hermeneutical Circle .................................. 105 3.2.2 Legal Reasoning As an Inference. An Example .................... 107 3.2.3 Legal Reasoning As a Reasonable Jump ............................... 109 3.2.4 Strong Support ....................................................................... 110 3.2.5 Depth of Reasoning ................................................................ 113 3.3 Legal Rationality and Legal Paradigm ............................................... 115 3.3.1 Introductory Remarks on Legal Paradigm ............................. 115 3.3.2 Some Theories of Science ...................................................... 115 3.3.3 Theory of Science and Legal Reasoning ................................ 117 3.3.4 Certain Premises ..................................................................... 121 3.3.5 Presupposed Premises ............................................................ 124 3.3.6 Proved Premises of Legal Reasoning ..................................... 126 3.3.7 Other Reasonable Premises of Legal Reasoning .................... 126 3.3.8 Reasonableness and Falsification ........................................... 128 3.3.9 The Problem of Fundamental Justification of Legal Reasoning ..................................................................... 129 4 The Ultimate Justification of Moral and Legal Reasoning ................... 131 4.1 Coherence ........................................................................................... 131 4.1.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 131 4.1.2 The Concept and Criteria of Coherence ................................. 132 4.1.3 Properties of the Supportive Structure ................................... 133 4.1.4 Properties of Concepts ........................................................... 140 4.1.5 Properties of the Objects the Theory Deals With ................... 143 4.1.6 Weighing and Balancing of Criteria of Coherence ................ 144 4.2 Coherence, Correctness and Truth ..................................................... 145 4.2.1 Coherence and Rational Thinking .......................................... 145 4.2.2 Coherence, Data, Presuppositions and Correctness ............... 146 4.2.3 Theories of Truth .................................................................... 147 4.2.4 More About the Correspondence Theory of Truth ................. 149 4.2.5 Conclusions About Truth and Coherence .............................. 150 4.2.6 Truth and Correctness of Practical Statements ...................... 152 4.3 Rational Discourse ............................................................................. 152 4.3.1 Introductory Remarks on D-Rationality ................................. 152 4.3.2 Robert Alexy s Rules for Rational Practical Discourse ................................................................. 154 4.3.3 Robert Alexy s Principles of Rationality ............................... 157 4.3.4 Robert Alexy s Rules For Rational Legal Discourse ...................................................................... 158 4.4 Why Shall Legal Reasoning be Rational? .......................................... 160 4.4.1 Introduction. Why Shall Theoretical Propositions Be Consistent and Highly Coherent? ..................................... 160 4.4.2 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Logically Consistent? ............................................................. 161 4.4.3 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Conceptual Reasons .................................... 164 4.4.4 Some Conceptual Reasons for Rationality of a Practical Discourse .......................................................... 165 4.4.5 Why Shall Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning Be Rational? Some Conceptual Reasons ............................................................... 166 4.4.6 The Concepts and Life ........................................................... 167 4.4.7 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Empirical and Technical Reasons ............... 168 4.4.8 Why Should a Discourse be Rational? Empirical, Technical and Universally-Pragmatic Reasons ...................... 170 4.4.9 Why Should Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning be Rational? Some Further Reasons ...................................................................... 171 5 What is Valid Law? ................................................................................... 173 5.1 What is a Valid Law? - Introductory Remarks .................................. 173 5.1.1 Starting Point: Rationality and Fixity .................................... 173 5.1.2 The Purpose of our Theory of Valid Law ............................... 174 5.1.3 Normative Character of the Concept Valid Law ................. 175 5.2 Law and Morality - On Natural Law ................................................. 176 5.2.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 176 5.2.2 An Example of Empirical Theory of Natural Law ................. 178 5.2.3 Some Critical Remarks on Natural-Law Theories ................. 180 5.3 Law and Morality - Legal Positivism ................................................ 180 5.3.1 Hans Kelsen s Pure Theory of Law .................................... 180 5.3.2 Herbert Hart s Theory of Law ................................................ 186 5.3.3 The Institutionalist Legal Positivism ...................................... 190 5.3.4 Limitations of Classical Theories of Valid Law ..................... 194 5.4 More about Law and Morality ........................................................... 195 5.4.1 Prima-facie Law and its Relation to Prima-facie Morality .................................................................................. 195 5.4.2 The Justification of the Relation Between the Law and Prima-facie Moral Norms. Why Ought One to Follow the Law? ..................................................................... 198 5.4.3 Weighing Legal Rules ............................................................ 203 5.4.4 All-Things-Considered Law as Interpreted Law .................... 203 5.4.5 The Relation Between the All-Things-Considered Legal Norms and All-Things-Considered Moral Norms .......................................................................... 205 5.4.6 Gaps in Interpreted Law. Legal Interpretation and Moral Criticism ............................................................... 206 5.4.7 The Right to Resist Oppression .............................................. 207 5.5 The Question of Existence of the Law. Legal Realism ...................... 210 5.5.1 Introductory Remarks. Axel Hägerström s Philosophical Starting Points ................................................. 210 5.5.2 Karl Olivecrona On Independent Imperatives and Their Functions ................................................................ 211 5.5.3 Tore Strömberg s Conventionalism ........................................ 213 5.5.4 Alf Ross s Predictionism ........................................................ 214 5.5.5 Some Critical Remarks On Legal Realism ............................ 216 5.5.6 The Three Worlds ................................................................... 218 5.5.7 Components of Valid Law ...................................................... 219 5.6 Norms as a Component of Valid Law ................................................ 220 5.6.1 Introductory Remarks On Legal Norms ................................. 220 5.6.2 Internal Validity of Legal Norms ........................................... 222 5.6.3 External Validity of Legal System. Criteria Concerning the Content of Norms ......................................... 224 5.6.4 Regulative Norms ................................................................... 225 5.6.5 Constitutive Norms ................................................................ 226 5.7 More About External Validity of Legal System. Action as a Component of Valid Law ................................................ 231 5.8 Fact and Values in the Law ................................................................ 232 5.8.1 More About External Validity of Legal System: Law-Making Facts .................................................................. 232 5.8.2 Ought-Making Facts As Law-Making Facts .......................... 234 5.8.3 Evaluative Openness of Valid Law ......................................... 236 5.8.4 The Basic Norm For the Law ................................................. 239 5.8.5 A Classification of Jumps and Transformations in Legal Reasoning ................................................................. 244 5.9 One Right Answer to all Legal Questions? ........................................ 245 5.9.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 245 5.9.2 The Right Thesis .................................................................... 246 5.9.3 The Right Answer Thesis ....................................................... 249 5.9.4 The Incommensurability Thesis ............................................. 251 5.9.5 Existence of All-Things-Considered Law .............................. 253 5.9.6 Some Remarks on External Scepticism .............................. 254 5.9.7 Alexy on the Right Answer .................................................... 255 6 The Doctrine of the Sources of the Law .................................................. 257 6.1 Substantive Reasons and Authority Reasons. The Sources of the Law ...................................................................... 257 6.1.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 257 6.1.2 Substantive Reasons and Rationality ..................................... 257 6.1.3 Authority Reasons and Fixity ................................................. 259 6.1.4 Sources of Law ....................................................................... 260 6.2 Must-Sources, Should-Sources and May-Sources of the Law ........... 261 6.2.1 Why Three Categories of Sources of Law? ........................... 261 6.2.2 Concepts of Must-, Should- and May-Source ...................... 262 6.3 Norms Concerning the Sources of the Law ....................................... 264 6.3.1 The Character of Source-Norms ............................................ 264 6.3.2 Complexity of the Swedish Doctrine of the Sources of Law ....................................................................... 266 6.3.3 Are Substantive Reasons Sources of the Law? ...................... 269 6.4 Custom ............................................................................................... 270 6.5 Precedent ............................................................................................ 272 6.5.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 272 6.5.2 Ratio Decidendi and Rationality ............................................ 273 6.5.3 Why and To What Extent Ought One to Follow Precedents? ............................................................................. 274 6.5.4 Methods of Justifying Judicial Decisions .............................. 275 6.5.5 Coherence of Judicial Decisions ............................................ 278 6.5.6 The Role of Precedents in Swedish Law ................................ 280 6.6 Legislative Preparatory Materials ...................................................... 282 6.6.1 Introductory Remarks ............................................................. 282 6.6.2 Ratio Legis .............................................................................. 282 6.6.3 Is Subjective Interpretation of Statutes Possible? .................. 283 6.6.4 Is Ratio-Legis Compatible with Democracy? ........................ 285 6.6.5 Should One Pay Attention to Preparatory Materials? ............ 287 6.6.6 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law. General Remarks ........................................................... 289 6.6.7 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law. Some Source-Norms ...................................................... 292 6.7 Professional Juristic Literature ........................................................... 295 6.8 Foreign Laws ...................................................................................... 298 6.9 Draft Statutes and Formerly Valid Law .............................................. 301 7 The Methods of Legal Reasoning ............................................................ 305 7.1 Reasoning Norms ............................................................................... 305 7.1.1 Construction of Statutes in Hard Cases .................................. 305 7.1.2 Reasoning Norms ................................................................... 307 7.2 Logical, Literal and Systematic Interpretation ................................... 310 7.2.1 Logical and Quasi-Logical Interpretation .............................. 310 Contents xvii 7.2.2 Literal Interpretation.............................................................. 312 7.2.3 Systematic Interpretation....................................................... 314 7.3 Reduction, Restrictive Interpretation, Extensive Interpretation and Creation of New Norms ........................................ 317 7.4 Conclusion by Analogy ...................................................................... 320 7.4.1 Introductory Remarks on Statutory Analogy ......................... 320 7.4.2 The Origin and Justification of Statutory Analogy ................ 321 7.4.3 Law-Analogy and Legal Induction ........................................ 321 7.4.4 Argumentum e contrario ........................................................ 322 7.4.5 The Choice Between Analogy and Argumentum e contrario .............................................................................. 323 7.4.6 Argumentum a fortiori ............................................................ 328 7.5 Teleological Construction of Statutes ................................................ 329 7.5.1 The Basic Structure ................................................................ 329 7.5.2 Subjective and Objective Teleological Interpretation of Statutes ........................................................ 330 7.5.3 Radical Teleological Interpretation of Statutes ...................... 331 7.5.4 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Introductory Remarks ............................................ 333 7.5.5 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. The Problem of Preciseness .................................. 334 7.5.6 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Multiple Goals ....................................................... 337 7.5.7 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Restricted List of Interpretatory Methods and Sources of Law ................................................................ 337 7.5.8 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Conclusions ........................................................... 339 7.6 Solution of Collisions Between Legal Norms .................................... 340 7.6.1 Collisions of Rules and Principles ......................................... 340 7.6.2 Collision Norms ..................................................................... 342 Bibliography .................................................................................................... 347 Index ................................................................................................................. 357
adam_txt	Contents Introduction by Aulis Aarnio . 1 1 The Dilema of Legal Reasoning: Moral Evaluation or Description of the Law? . 13 1.Í A Theory of Legal Reasoning . 13 1.2 Legal Decision-Making and Evaluations . 14 1.2.1 Introduction. Subsumption in Clear and Hard Cases . 14 1.2.2 Interpretative Problems - Ambiguity, Vagueness and Value-Openess . 16 1.2.3 Gaps in the Law . 18 1.2.4 Evidence of Facts . 20 1.2.5 Choice of a Legal Norm . 20 1.2.6 Choice of aLegal Consequence . 21 1.2.7 Obsolete Laws and Desuetudo . 22 1.3 The Concept "Legal Decision-Making" . 22 1.4 Why do the Lawyers Need Special Interpretation Methods? . 24 1.4.1 Expectation of Legal Certainty . 24 1.4.2 The Law and Democracy . 27 1.5 Legal Knowledge? . 33 1.5.1 Introductory Remarks on Theoretical and Practical Statements . 33 1.5.2 Legal Interpretatory Statements . 34 1.5.3 The Main Problem: Knowledge, Truth and Rightness In Legal Reasoning . 35 2 Rationality of Moral Judgments . 39 2.1 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism . 39 2.2 Practical and Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements . 42 2.2.1 Practical Meaning . 42 2.2.2 More About Practical Meaning. Norms and the Will . 43 2.2.3 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements: Justifiability . 44 2.2.4 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements: L-, S- and D-rationality . 45 2.3 More About Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements Prima-facie Moral Statements . 47 2.3.1 Criteria of Moral Goodness . 47 2.3.2 General Theories of the Morally Good . 48 2.3.3 Prima-facie Character of Moral Theories and Criteria . 49 2.3.4 The Step From Theoretical Propositions to Prima-facie Practical Conclusions . 53 2.3.5 Permissibility-Making Facts . 55 2.3.6 Claim-Making Facts . 57 2.3.7 Competence-Making Facts . 59 2.3.8 Complex Right-Making Facts . 60 2.4 Weighing and Balancing . 61 2.4.1 Principles and Values . 61 2.4.2 All-Things-Considered Practical Statements . 62 2.4.3 Weighing and Balancing of Principles . 63 2.4.4 Weighing Rules . 66 2.4.5 Final Act of Weighing and Balancing . 67 2.4.6 A Step From Theoretical Propositions to Definitive Practical Statements? . 69 2.4.7 The Step From Practical Statements To Theoretical Conclusions . 75 2.4.8 Concluding Remarks Concerning Logical Relations Between Theoretical and Practical Statements . 76 2.5 Some Examples of the Role of Weighing in Moral Theories . 77 2.5.1 Introductory Remarks . 77 2.5.2 Weighing Preferences: Hare's Utilitarianism . 77 2.5.3 Weighing Practices: Maclntyre's Theory of Virtue . 81 2.6 Examples of Weighing in Theories of Justice . 83 2.6.1 Justice, Equality and Weighing . 83 2.6.2 The Role of Weighing In John Rawls's Theory of Justice . 86 2.6.3 The Role of Weighing In Robert Nozick's Theory of Justice . 90 2.6.4 Some Concluding Remarks on Justice . 93 2.7 Support in Moral Reasoning . 95 2.7.1 Gaps and Jumps in Moral Reasoning . 95 2.7.2 The Concept of a Jump . 96 2.7.3 The Concept of a Reasonable Premise . 96 2.7.4 The Concept of Reasonable Support . 97 3 Rationality of Legal Reasoning . 99 3.1 Support of Legal Reasoning. Introduction and an Example . 99 3.1.1 Fixity of Law. Extensive Support of Legal Reasoning . 99 3.1.2 An Example of Extensively Supported Legal Reasoning . 100 3.1.3 An Example of Analysis of Legal Concepts - the Concept of Adequacy . 100 3.1.4 An Example of Substantive Reasons in the Law. The Purpose of Protection. Influence of Moral Theories and Criteria . 103 3.1.5 An Example of Legal Authority Reasons. Brief Remarks on Precedents . 104 3.2 Analysis of Support in Legal Reasoning . 105 3.2.1 Legal Reasoning As a Dialogue. Reflective Equilibrium and Hermeneutical Circle . 105 3.2.2 Legal Reasoning As an Inference. An Example . 107 3.2.3 Legal Reasoning As a Reasonable Jump . 109 3.2.4 Strong Support . 110 3.2.5 Depth of Reasoning . 113 3.3 Legal Rationality and Legal Paradigm . 115 3.3.1 Introductory Remarks on Legal Paradigm . 115 3.3.2 Some Theories of Science . 115 3.3.3 Theory of Science and Legal Reasoning . 117 3.3.4 Certain Premises . 121 3.3.5 Presupposed Premises . 124 3.3.6 Proved Premises of Legal Reasoning . 126 3.3.7 Other Reasonable Premises of Legal Reasoning . 126 3.3.8 Reasonableness and Falsification . 128 3.3.9 The Problem of Fundamental Justification of Legal Reasoning . 129 4 The Ultimate Justification of Moral and Legal Reasoning . 131 4.1 Coherence . 131 4.1.1 Introductory Remarks . 131 4.1.2 The Concept and Criteria of Coherence . 132 4.1.3 Properties of the Supportive Structure . 133 4.1.4 Properties of Concepts . 140 4.1.5 Properties of the Objects the Theory Deals With . 143 4.1.6 Weighing and Balancing of Criteria of Coherence . 144 4.2 Coherence, Correctness and Truth . 145 4.2.1 Coherence and Rational Thinking . 145 4.2.2 Coherence, Data, Presuppositions and Correctness . 146 4.2.3 Theories of Truth . 147 4.2.4 More About the Correspondence Theory of Truth . 149 4.2.5 Conclusions About Truth and Coherence . 150 4.2.6 Truth and Correctness of Practical Statements . 152 4.3 Rational Discourse . 152 4.3.1 Introductory Remarks on D-Rationality . 152 4.3.2 Robert Alexy 's Rules for Rational Practical Discourse . 154 4.3.3 Robert Alexy's Principles of Rationality . 157 4.3.4 Robert Alexy's Rules For Rational Legal Discourse . 158 4.4 Why Shall Legal Reasoning be Rational? . 160 4.4.1 Introduction. Why Shall Theoretical Propositions Be Consistent and Highly Coherent? . 160 4.4.2 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Logically Consistent? . 161 4.4.3 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Conceptual Reasons . 164 4.4.4 Some Conceptual Reasons for Rationality of a Practical Discourse . 165 4.4.5 Why Shall Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning Be Rational? Some Conceptual Reasons . 166 4.4.6 The Concepts and Life . 167 4.4.7 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Empirical and Technical Reasons . 168 4.4.8 Why Should a Discourse be Rational? Empirical, Technical and Universally-Pragmatic Reasons . 170 4.4.9 Why Should Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning be Rational? Some Further Reasons . 171 5 What is Valid Law? . 173 5.1 What is a Valid Law? - Introductory Remarks . 173 5.1.1 Starting Point: Rationality and Fixity . 173 5.1.2 The Purpose of our Theory of Valid Law . 174 5.1.3 Normative Character of the Concept "Valid Law" . 175 5.2 Law and Morality - On Natural Law . 176 5.2.1 Introductory Remarks . 176 5.2.2 An Example of Empirical Theory of Natural Law . 178 5.2.3 Some Critical Remarks on Natural-Law Theories . 180 5.3 Law and Morality - Legal Positivism . 180 5.3.1 Hans Kelsen's "Pure" Theory of Law . 180 5.3.2 Herbert Hart's Theory of Law . 186 5.3.3 The Institutionalist Legal Positivism . 190 5.3.4 Limitations of Classical Theories of Valid Law . 194 5.4 More about Law and Morality . 195 5.4.1 Prima-facie Law and its Relation to Prima-facie Morality . 195 5.4.2 The Justification of the Relation Between the Law and Prima-facie Moral Norms. Why Ought One to Follow the Law? . 198 5.4.3 Weighing Legal Rules . 203 5.4.4 All-Things-Considered Law as Interpreted Law . 203 5.4.5 The Relation Between the All-Things-Considered Legal Norms and All-Things-Considered Moral Norms . 205 5.4.6 Gaps in Interpreted Law. Legal Interpretation and Moral Criticism . 206 5.4.7 The Right to Resist Oppression . 207 5.5 The Question of Existence of the Law. Legal Realism . 210 5.5.1 Introductory Remarks. Axel Hägerström's Philosophical Starting Points . 210 5.5.2 Karl Olivecrona On Independent Imperatives and Their Functions . 211 5.5.3 Tore Strömberg's Conventionalism . 213 5.5.4 Alf Ross's Predictionism . 214 5.5.5 Some Critical Remarks On Legal Realism . 216 5.5.6 The Three Worlds . 218 5.5.7 Components of Valid Law . 219 5.6 Norms as a Component of Valid Law . 220 5.6.1 Introductory Remarks On Legal Norms . 220 5.6.2 Internal Validity of Legal Norms . 222 5.6.3 External Validity of Legal System. Criteria Concerning the Content of Norms . 224 5.6.4 Regulative Norms . 225 5.6.5 Constitutive Norms . 226 5.7 More About External Validity of Legal System. Action as a Component of Valid Law . 231 5.8 Fact and Values in the Law . 232 5.8.1 More About External Validity of Legal System: Law-Making Facts . 232 5.8.2 Ought-Making Facts As Law-Making Facts . 234 5.8.3 Evaluative Openness of Valid Law . 236 5.8.4 The Basic Norm For the Law . 239 5.8.5 A Classification of Jumps and Transformations in Legal Reasoning . 244 5.9 One Right Answer to all Legal Questions? . 245 5.9.1 Introductory Remarks . 245 5.9.2 The Right Thesis . 246 5.9.3 The Right Answer Thesis . 249 5.9.4 The Incommensurability Thesis . 251 5.9.5 Existence of All-Things-Considered Law . 253 5.9.6 Some Remarks on "External Scepticism" . 254 5.9.7 Alexy on the Right Answer . 255 6 The Doctrine of the Sources of the Law . 257 6.1 Substantive Reasons and Authority Reasons. The Sources of the Law . 257 6.1.1 Introductory Remarks . 257 6.1.2 Substantive Reasons and Rationality . 257 6.1.3 Authority Reasons and Fixity . 259 6.1.4 Sources of Law . 260 6.2 Must-Sources, Should-Sources and May-Sources of the Law . 261 6.2.1 Why Three Categories of Sources of Law? . 261 6.2.2 Concepts of Must-, Should- and May-Source . 262 6.3 Norms Concerning the Sources of the Law . 264 6.3.1 The Character of Source-Norms . 264 6.3.2 Complexity of the Swedish Doctrine of the Sources of Law . 266 6.3.3 Are Substantive Reasons Sources of the Law? . 269 6.4 Custom . 270 6.5 Precedent . 272 6.5.1 Introductory Remarks . 272 6.5.2 Ratio Decidendi and Rationality . 273 6.5.3 Why and To What Extent Ought One to Follow Precedents? . 274 6.5.4 Methods of Justifying Judicial Decisions . 275 6.5.5 Coherence of Judicial Decisions . 278 6.5.6 The Role of Precedents in Swedish Law . 280 6.6 Legislative Preparatory Materials . 282 6.6.1 Introductory Remarks . 282 6.6.2 Ratio Legis . 282 6.6.3 Is Subjective Interpretation of Statutes Possible? . 283 6.6.4 Is Ratio-Legis Compatible with Democracy? . 285 6.6.5 Should One Pay Attention to Preparatory Materials? . 287 6.6.6 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law. General Remarks . 289 6.6.7 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law. Some Source-Norms . 292 6.7 Professional Juristic Literature . 295 6.8 Foreign Laws . 298 6.9 Draft Statutes and Formerly Valid Law . 301 7 The Methods of Legal Reasoning . 305 7.1 Reasoning Norms . 305 7.1.1 Construction of Statutes in Hard Cases . 305 7.1.2 Reasoning Norms . 307 7.2 Logical, Literal and Systematic Interpretation . 310 7.2.1 Logical and Quasi-Logical Interpretation . 310 Contents xvii 7.2.2 Literal Interpretation. 312 7.2.3 Systematic Interpretation. 314 7.3 Reduction, Restrictive Interpretation, Extensive Interpretation and Creation of New Norms . 317 7.4 Conclusion by Analogy . 320 7.4.1 Introductory Remarks on Statutory Analogy . 320 7.4.2 The Origin and Justification of Statutory Analogy . 321 7.4.3 Law-Analogy and Legal Induction . 321 7.4.4 Argumentum e contrario . 322 7.4.5 The Choice Between Analogy and Argumentum e contrario . 323 7.4.6 Argumentum a fortiori . 328 7.5 Teleological Construction of Statutes . 329 7.5.1 The Basic Structure . 329 7.5.2 Subjective and Objective Teleological Interpretation of Statutes . 330 7.5.3 Radical Teleological Interpretation of Statutes . 331 7.5.4 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Introductory Remarks . 333 7.5.5 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. The Problem of Preciseness . 334 7.5.6 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Multiple Goals . 337 7.5.7 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Restricted List of Interpretatory Methods and Sources of Law . 337 7.5.8 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelöf. Conclusions . 339 7.6 Solution of Collisions Between Legal Norms . 340 7.6.1 Collisions of Rules and Principles . 340 7.6.2 Collision Norms . 342 Bibliography . 347 Index . 357
any_adam_object	1
any_adam_object_boolean	1
author	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005
author_GND	(DE-588)142249645
author_facet	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005
author_role	aut
author_sort	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005
author_variant	a p ap
building	Verbundindex
bvnumber	BV023178951
callnumber-first	K - Law
callnumber-label	K212
callnumber-raw	K212
callnumber-search	K212
callnumber-sort	K 3212
callnumber-subject	K - General Law
classification_rvk	PI 2260 PI 3020
ctrlnum	(OCoLC)321016613 (DE-599)BVBBV023178951
dewey-full	340.1
dewey-hundreds	300 - Social sciences
dewey-ones	340 - Law
dewey-raw	340.1
dewey-search	340.1
dewey-sort	3340.1
dewey-tens	340 - Law
discipline	Rechtswissenschaft
discipline_str_mv	Rechtswissenschaft
edition	2. ed.
format	Book
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02057nam a2200541 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023178951</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230711 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080222s2009 d\|\|\| \|\|\|\| 00\|\|\| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781402087295</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4020-8729-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781402087301</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4020-8730-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781402097065</subfield><subfield code="c">ISBN nicht im Buch</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4020-9706-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)321016613</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023178951</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield><subfield code="h">swe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">K212</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">340.1</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PI 2260</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)136543:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PI 3020</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)136586:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Peczenik, Aleksander</subfield><subfield code="d">1937-2005</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)142249645</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On law and reason</subfield><subfield code="c">Aleksander Peczenik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2. ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Dordrecht u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer</subfield><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XVII, 364 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Law and philosophy library</subfield><subfield code="v">8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsinterpretatie</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsvinding</subfield><subfield code="2">gtt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Philosophie</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Recht</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law</subfield><subfield code="x">Methodology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law</subfield><subfield code="x">Philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126505-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048821-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4126505-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rechtsphilosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4048821-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Law and philosophy library</subfield><subfield code="v">8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV000019168</subfield><subfield code="9">8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Passau</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016365513&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016365513</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
id	DE-604.BV023178951
illustrated	Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-02T20:00:50Z
indexdate	2024-07-09T21:12:24Z
institution	BVB
isbn	9781402087295 9781402087301 9781402097065
language	English Swedish
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016365513
oclc_num	321016613
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-M382 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-20 DE-703 DE-29 DE-739 DE-12 DE-384
owner_facet	DE-M382 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-20 DE-703 DE-29 DE-739 DE-12 DE-384
physical	XVII, 364 S. graph. Darst.
publishDate	2009
publishDateSearch	2009
publishDateSort	2009
publisher	Springer
record_format	marc
series	Law and philosophy library
series2	Law and philosophy library
spelling	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005 Verfasser (DE-588)142249645 aut On law and reason Aleksander Peczenik 2. ed. [Dordrecht u.a.] Springer 2009 XVII, 364 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Law and philosophy library 8 Rechtsinterpretatie gtt Rechtstheorie gtt Rechtsvinding gtt Philosophie Recht Law Methodology Law Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd rswk-swf Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd rswk-swf Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 s DE-604 Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 s 1\p DE-604 Law and philosophy library 8 (DE-604)BV000019168 8 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016365513&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
spellingShingle	Peczenik, Aleksander 1937-2005 On law and reason Law and philosophy library Rechtsinterpretatie gtt Rechtstheorie gtt Rechtsvinding gtt Philosophie Recht Law Methodology Law Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4126505-1 (DE-588)4048821-4
title	On law and reason
title_auth	On law and reason
title_exact_search	On law and reason
title_exact_search_txtP	On law and reason
title_full	On law and reason Aleksander Peczenik
title_fullStr	On law and reason Aleksander Peczenik
title_full_unstemmed	On law and reason Aleksander Peczenik
title_short	On law and reason
title_sort	on law and reason
topic	Rechtsinterpretatie gtt Rechtstheorie gtt Rechtsvinding gtt Philosophie Recht Law Methodology Law Philosophy Rechtstheorie (DE-588)4126505-1 gnd Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd
topic_facet	Rechtsinterpretatie Rechtstheorie Rechtsvinding Philosophie Recht Law Methodology Law Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016365513&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
volume_link	(DE-604)BV000019168
work_keys_str_mv	AT peczenikaleksander onlawandreason

Holdings

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Indexes

MARC

Record in the Search Index

There is no print copy available.

Similar Items