Holdings: Risk takers :: THWS Bibkatalog

Risk takers: uses and abuses of financial derivatives

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Marthinsen, John E. (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	Boston [u.a.] Pearson Prentice Hall 2009
Edition:	2. ed.
Series:	The Prentice-Hall series in finance
Subjects:	aDerivative securities aRisk management aInvestment analysis Kreditmarkt Risikomanagement Fallstudiensammlung
Online Access:	Inhaltsverzeichnis
Item Description:	Includes bibliographical references and index
Physical Description:	XX, 332 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:	9780321542564 0321542568

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adam_text	Contents Preface xv PARTI Chapter 1 Primer on Derivatives l Introduction 1 What Are Derivatives? 3 Who Buys and Sells Derivatives? 4 Where Are Derivatives Bought and Sold? 4 Two Major Types of Derivatives 5 Terminology That Is Common To All Derivatives 5 Forward Contracts 5 Options 9 Risk Notepad 1 .1 : OTC-Traded Versus Exchange-Traded Derivatives 13 Conclusion 16 Review Questions 16 Bibliography 18 PART II Chapter 2 Employee Stock Options: What Every MBA Should Know 19 Introduction 19 Employee Stock Options: A Major Pillar of Executive Compensation 21 Why Do Companies Use Employee Stock Options? 22 Aligning Incentives 22 Hiring and Retention 23 Adjusting Compensation to Employee Risk Tolerance Levels 24 Employee Tax Optimization 24 Cash Flow Optimization for Companies 25 Option Valuation Differences and Human Resource Management 26 Risk Notepad 2.1: What Effect Do Employee Stock Options Have on Profits? Should They Be Recorded as Expenses? 27 Problems with Employee Stock Options 43 Employee Motivation 44 The Share Price of Good Companies 45 Motivating Undesired Behavior 45 Improving Performance 46 Absolute Versus Relative Performance 47 Some Innovative Solutions to Employee Stock Option Problems 47 Premium-Priced Stock Options 47 Index Options 48 Restricted Shares 51 Omnibus Plans 51 Conclusion 52 Review Questions 52 Further Reading 54 Bibliography 54 Chapter 3 Roche Holding: The Company, Its Financial Strategy, and Bull Spread Warrants 59 Introduction 59 Roche Holding AG: Transition from a Lender to a Borrower 61 Loss of the Valium Patent in the United States 61 Rapid Increase in R&D Costs, Market Growth, and Industry Consolidation 61 Roche s Unique Capital Structure 62 Roche Brings in a New Leader and Replaces Its Management Committee 64 A New Financial Strategy 64 Roche s 1991 Bull Spread Issue 67 Why Did Roche Choose Long-Term, Dollar-Denominated Debt? 67 Details of the Bull Spread Issue 68 Target Investor Group 68 Risk Notepad 3.1: What Are the Differences Between Options and Warrants? 69 Analysis of the Bull Spread s Return to Investors 70 Analyzing the Bull Spread Issue from Roche s Side 80 Risk Notepad 3.2: Calculation of the Weighted Average Return on Roche s Bond Cum Warrants 80 Roche s Bull Spread Issue: The Result 86 Conclusion 87 Review Questions 89 Further Reading 91 Bibliography 91 PART III Chapter 4 Metallgesellschaft AG: Illusion of Profits and Losses, Reality of Cash Flows 92 Introduction 92 Metallgesellschaft: Evolution of the Company and Its Product Lines 93 Energy Derivatives at MGRM 94 Energy Markets on a Roller-Coaster Ride 94 Risk Notepad 4.1 : What Is the Difference Between Contango and Backwardation? 96 MGRM s Innovative Energy Derivative Products 98 Understanding How MGRM Hedged Its Forward Exposures 100 Payoff Profile of Short Forward Positions 100 The Ideal Hedge Was Not Available 101 Stack-and-Roll Hedge 102 How Effective Is a Stack-and-Roll Hedge? 104 MGRM s Large Positions Create Problems 114 MGRM Butts Heads with NYMEX and the CFTC 115 MGRM s Profitability: It s All in How You Account for It 116 MGRM s Credit Rating 117 The Effects of an Itchy Trigger Finger 117 Was MGRM Hedging or Speculating? 118 Corporate Governance Issues 118 Conclusion 120 Epilogue: What Happened to the Key Players in the MGRM/MGAG Disaster? 121 Review Questions 123 Further Reading 124 Bibliography 124 Chapter 5 Swaps That Shook an Industry: Procter & Gamble versus Bankers Trust 1 26 Introduction 126 P&G s Motivation for the Swaps 128 Motives for the U.S. Dollar-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 129 Motives for the German Mark-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 129 Motives for Using the Over-the-Counter Market 130 The U.S. Dollar-Denominated Swap 131 Plain Vanilla Swap 131 P&G s Gamble: The Speculative Side-Bet 132 Risk Notepad 5.1: Security Yield versus Price 135 Losses on P&G s U.S. Dollar Interest Rate Swap 140 German Mark-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 142 The Suit Against Banker s Trust 144 Risk Notepad 5.2: Value at Risk 146 The P&G-BT Settlement 147 How Did ВТ Fare After the Swaps? 147 P&G-BT from an Investor s Perspective 148 The Landmark P&G-BT Court Opinion 149 Major Legal Issues 149 An Unusual Court Opinion 150 Summary of the Court Opinion 151 Disclosure Reform After P&G-BT 151 Should Corporate Treasuries Be Profit Centers? 152 Conclusions 153 Epilogue: What Happened to the Players in P&G-BT? 154 Review Questions 155 Further Reading 1 56 Bibliography 156 Chapter 6 Orange County: The Largest Municipal Failure in U.S. History 158 Introduction 158 Robert Citron and the Orange County Board of Supervisors 159 The Orange County Investment Pool 162 The Major Risks Facing Assets in the OCIP Portfolio 164 Credit Risk 165 Market Risk 165 Liquidity Risk 166 OCIP s Assets and Funding Sources 166 Structured Notes 167 Risk Notepad 6.1 : Other Assets in the OCIP Portfolio 168 Fixed-Income Securities 170 OCIP s Funding Sources 170 Leveraging the OCIP Portfolio 172 Effects of Leverage on OCIP s Return 175 OCIP s Rising Returns: Effects of Falling Interest Rates 175 OCIP s Return Stabilizes: 1993 177 OCIP s Returns Plummet: 1994— Effects of Rising Interest Rates 177 The Consequences 179 Market Risk Causes Liquidity Risk 179 Government Paralysis 180 Citron Resigns 181 Lack of Liquidity Leads to Bankruptcy 181 Fire Sale of the О CIP Portfolio 181 Monday-Morning Quarterbacking 182 Was Orange County Truly a Derivative-Related Failure? 182 Was Orange County Really Bankrupt? 183 Was It a Mistake to Liquidate the OCIP Portfolio? 184 Could the Debacle Have Been Predicted? 186 Sentences, Blame, and Reform 186 Robert Citron 187 Other Players: Matthew Raabe and Merrill Lynch 188 Stealth Supervision: Shared Blame 189 Governance Reforms 189 Lessons Learned from Orange County 190 Safety, Liquidity, and High Yield Are an Impossible Combination 190 If You Can t Explain It, Then Don t Do It 190 Conclusion 191 Review Questions 192 Further Reading 193 Bibliography 193 Chapter 7 Barings Bank PLC: Leeson s Lessons 194 Introduction 194 Barings Bank PLC 195 Nick Leeson: From London to Jakarta to Singapore 196 What Was Leeson Supposed to Be Doing at BFS? 197 Five Eights Account 199 Risk Notepad 7. 1 : Error Accounts 200 Leeson s Trading Strategy: Doubling 202 Funding Margin Calls 203 Risk Notepad 7.2: Doubling 204 Increasing Commission Income by Offering Deals at Non-Market Prices 205 Using the Financial Resources of Barings as His Cash Cow 205 Booking Fictitious Trades and Falsifying Records 207 Risk Notepad 7.3: Leeson s Most Flagrant Falsification Scheme 208 Net Profit/Loss Profile of Leeson s Exposures 209 Leeson s Long Futures Positions 209 Leeson s Short Straddles 210 Profit/Loss Profile: Combining One Short Straddle and One Long Futures Contract 211 Profit/Loss Profile: Combining a Long Futures Position and Numerous Short Straddles 214 Massive Purchases of Nikkei 225 Futures Contracts 215 Beyond Irony: The Barings Failure in a Broader Time Frame 216 A Bank for a Pound 217 Aftermath of the Barings Failure 218 How Could Barings Have Caught Leeson Sooner? 219 Conclusions: Leeson s Lessons 222 Epilogue: What Happened to the Key Players in the Barings Financial Fiasco? 224 Review Questions 229 Bibliography 230 Chapter 8 Long-Term Capital Mismanagement: JM and the Arb Boys 23 1 Introduction 231 Risk Notepad 8. 1 : What Is a Hedge Fund? 232 LTCM: The Company 234 The LTCM Business 234 The Principals 234 LTCM s Strategy 236 Identifying Small Market Imperfections 237 Using a Minimum of Equity Capital 237 Securing Long-Term Funding 242 Charging Hefty Fees 243 LTCM s Impressive Performance: 1994-1997 243 LTCM s Contributions to Efficient Markets 246 Why and How LTCM Failed 246 Exogenous Macroeconomic Shocks: U.S. and Global Spreads Widen 247 Risk Notepad 8.2: What Is Contagion? 250 Endogenous Shocks: Spreads Go Heiter Skelter and VAR Gets Twisted 250 Feedback Shocks 253 The Fed, Warren Buffett, and the Rescue of LTCM 256 Risk Notepad 8.3: Another Look at Warren Buffett s Offer for LTCM 258 Conclusions and Lessons to Be Learned 260 Be Careful What You Wish For 261 Beware of Model Risk 261 All for One and 1 for All 261 Leverage Is a Fair-Weather Friend 262 Financial Transparency Is the First Step in Meaningful Reform 262 In the Long Run, Bet on Global Financial Markets Being Efficient 263 You Can t Float Without Liquidity 263 Some Things Are Worth Doing for the Greater Good 263 Epilogue: What Happened to the Principals, Creditors, Investors, and Consortium? 264 The Principals and Employees 264 Creditors and Investors 265 The Consortium 266 Review Questions 266 Further Reading 267 Bibliography 267 Chapter 9 Amaranth Advisors LLC: Using Natural Gas Derivatives to Bet on the Weather 270 Introduction 270 Amaranth Advisors LLC 271 Natural Gas Markets 273 Amaranth s Natural Gas Trading Strategy and Performance: 2005 to 2006 275 2005: Using Long Call Options to Bet on the Weather 276 2006: Using Futures and Spreads to Bet on the Weather 277 Risk Notepad 9. 1 : Measuring Natural Gas and Putting Amaranath s Positions into Perspective 280 Risk Notepad 9.2: Understanding How Profits Are Earned on Spread Trades 281 What Caused Amaranth s Catastrophic Losses? 287 Inadequate Risk Management Practices 287 Lack of Liquidity 290 Extraordinarily Large Movements in Market Prices 291 Explosion or Implosion? Who Got Hurt? 292 Aftermath 293 Did the Futures Markets Function Effectively? 294 Did Amaranth Dominate Futures Markets, Engage in Excessive Speculation, and/or Conduct Regulatory Arbitrage? 294 Did Amaranth Manipulate Prices? 300 Risk Notepad 9.3: A Tale of Two Hedge Funds 302 Conclusion 308 Epilogue: What Happened to the Amaranth s Traders and Managers? 309 Brian Hunter: Chief Trader at Amaranth 309 Nick Maounis: CEO and Founder of Amaranth 310 Harry Arora: Trader and Former Head (and Later Co-head) of Amaranth s Commodity Group; Brian Hunter s Former Boss 310 Matthew Donohoe: Trader at Amaranth Who Was Also Charged by FERC with Price Manipulation 310 xiv Contents Assorted Other Things That Happened 311 JPMorgan Chase & Co.: Amaranth s Clearing Agent: Purchased Part of Amaranth s Energy Book in September 2006 311 Citadel: Hedge Fund That Purchased Part of Amaranth s Energy Book in September 2006 311 Paloma Partners Management Company: Hedge Fund That Nick Maounis Left Before Starting Amaranth and Which Provided Much of Amaranth s Initial Funding 311 Review Questions 311 Further Reading 312 Bibliography 313 Glossary 315 Index 321
adam_txt	Contents Preface xv PARTI Chapter 1 Primer on Derivatives l Introduction 1 What Are Derivatives? 3 Who Buys and Sells Derivatives? 4 Where Are Derivatives Bought and Sold? 4 Two Major Types of Derivatives 5 Terminology That Is Common To All Derivatives 5 Forward Contracts 5 Options 9 Risk Notepad 1 .1 : OTC-Traded Versus Exchange-Traded Derivatives 13 Conclusion 16 Review Questions 16 Bibliography 18 PART II Chapter 2 Employee Stock Options: What Every MBA Should Know 19 Introduction 19 Employee Stock Options: A Major Pillar of Executive Compensation 21 Why Do Companies Use Employee Stock Options? 22 Aligning Incentives 22 Hiring and Retention 23 Adjusting Compensation to Employee Risk Tolerance Levels 24 Employee Tax Optimization 24 Cash Flow Optimization for Companies 25 Option Valuation Differences and Human Resource Management 26 Risk Notepad 2.1: What Effect Do Employee Stock Options Have on Profits? Should They Be Recorded as Expenses? 27 Problems with Employee Stock Options 43 Employee Motivation 44 The Share Price of "Good" Companies 45 Motivating Undesired Behavior 45 Improving Performance 46 Absolute Versus Relative Performance 47 Some Innovative Solutions to Employee Stock Option Problems 47 Premium-Priced Stock Options 47 Index Options 48 Restricted Shares 51 Omnibus Plans 51 Conclusion 52 Review Questions 52 Further Reading 54 Bibliography 54 Chapter 3 Roche Holding: The Company, Its Financial Strategy, and Bull Spread Warrants 59 Introduction 59 Roche Holding AG: Transition from a Lender to a Borrower 61 Loss of the Valium Patent in the United States 61 Rapid Increase in R&D Costs, Market Growth, and Industry Consolidation 61 Roche's Unique Capital Structure 62 Roche Brings in a New Leader and Replaces Its Management Committee 64 A New Financial Strategy 64 Roche's 1991 Bull Spread Issue 67 Why Did Roche Choose Long-Term, Dollar-Denominated Debt? 67 Details of the Bull Spread Issue 68 Target Investor Group 68 Risk Notepad 3.1: What Are the Differences Between Options and Warrants? 69 Analysis of the Bull Spread's Return to Investors 70 Analyzing the Bull Spread Issue from Roche's Side 80 Risk Notepad 3.2: Calculation of the Weighted Average Return on Roche's Bond Cum Warrants 80 Roche's Bull Spread Issue: The Result 86 Conclusion 87 Review Questions 89 Further Reading 91 Bibliography 91 PART III Chapter 4 Metallgesellschaft AG: Illusion of Profits and Losses, Reality of Cash Flows 92 Introduction 92 Metallgesellschaft: Evolution of the Company and Its Product Lines 93 Energy Derivatives at MGRM 94 Energy Markets on a Roller-Coaster Ride 94 Risk Notepad 4.1 : What Is the Difference Between Contango and Backwardation? 96 MGRM's Innovative Energy Derivative Products 98 Understanding How MGRM Hedged Its Forward Exposures 100 Payoff Profile of Short Forward Positions 100 The Ideal Hedge Was Not Available 101 Stack-and-Roll Hedge 102 How Effective Is a Stack-and-Roll Hedge? 104 MGRM's Large Positions Create Problems 114 MGRM Butts Heads with NYMEX and the CFTC 115 MGRM's Profitability: It's All in How You Account for It 116 MGRM's Credit Rating 117 The Effects of an Itchy Trigger Finger 117 Was MGRM Hedging or Speculating? 118 Corporate Governance Issues 118 Conclusion 120 Epilogue: What Happened to the Key Players in the MGRM/MGAG Disaster? 121 Review Questions 123 Further Reading 124 Bibliography 124 Chapter 5 Swaps That Shook an Industry: Procter & Gamble versus Bankers Trust 1 26 Introduction 126 P&G's Motivation for the Swaps 128 Motives for the U.S. Dollar-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 129 Motives for the German Mark-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 129 Motives for Using the Over-the-Counter Market 130 The U.S. Dollar-Denominated Swap 131 Plain Vanilla Swap 131 P&G's Gamble: The Speculative Side-Bet 132 Risk Notepad 5.1: Security Yield versus Price 135 Losses on P&G's U.S. Dollar Interest Rate Swap 140 German Mark-Denominated Interest Rate Swap 142 The Suit Against Banker's Trust 144 Risk Notepad 5.2: Value at Risk 146 The P&G-BT Settlement 147 How Did ВТ Fare After the Swaps? 147 P&G-BT from an Investor's Perspective 148 The Landmark P&G-BT Court Opinion 149 Major Legal Issues 149 An Unusual Court Opinion 150 Summary of the Court Opinion 151 Disclosure Reform After P&G-BT 151 Should Corporate Treasuries Be Profit Centers? 152 Conclusions 153 Epilogue: What Happened to the Players in P&G-BT? 154 Review Questions 155 Further Reading 1 56 Bibliography 156 Chapter 6 Orange County: The Largest Municipal Failure in U.S. History 158 Introduction 158 Robert Citron and the Orange County Board of Supervisors 159 The Orange County Investment Pool 162 The Major Risks Facing Assets in the OCIP Portfolio 164 Credit Risk 165 Market Risk 165 Liquidity Risk 166 OCIP's Assets and Funding Sources 166 Structured Notes 167 Risk Notepad 6.1 : Other Assets in the OCIP Portfolio 168 Fixed-Income Securities 170 OCIP's Funding Sources 170 Leveraging the OCIP Portfolio 172 Effects of Leverage on OCIP's Return 175 OCIP's Rising Returns: Effects of Falling Interest Rates 175 OCIP's Return Stabilizes: 1993 177 OCIP's Returns Plummet: 1994— Effects of Rising Interest Rates 177 The Consequences 179 Market Risk Causes Liquidity Risk 179 Government Paralysis 180 Citron Resigns 181 Lack of Liquidity Leads to Bankruptcy 181 Fire Sale of the О CIP Portfolio 181 Monday-Morning Quarterbacking 182 Was Orange County Truly a Derivative-Related Failure? 182 Was Orange County Really Bankrupt? 183 Was It a Mistake to Liquidate the OCIP Portfolio? 184 Could the Debacle Have Been Predicted? 186 Sentences, Blame, and Reform 186 Robert Citron 187 Other Players: Matthew Raabe and Merrill Lynch 188 Stealth Supervision: Shared Blame 189 Governance Reforms 189 Lessons Learned from Orange County 190 Safety, Liquidity, and High Yield Are an Impossible Combination 190 If You Can't Explain It, Then Don't Do It 190 Conclusion 191 Review Questions 192 Further Reading 193 Bibliography 193 Chapter 7 Barings Bank PLC: Leeson's Lessons 194 Introduction 194 Barings Bank PLC 195 Nick Leeson: From London to Jakarta to Singapore 196 What Was Leeson Supposed to Be Doing at BFS? 197 Five Eights Account 199 Risk Notepad 7. 1 : Error Accounts 200 Leeson's Trading Strategy: Doubling 202 Funding Margin Calls 203 Risk Notepad 7.2: Doubling 204 Increasing Commission Income by Offering Deals at Non-Market Prices 205 Using the Financial Resources of Barings as His Cash Cow 205 Booking Fictitious Trades and Falsifying Records 207 Risk Notepad 7.3: Leeson's Most Flagrant Falsification Scheme 208 Net Profit/Loss Profile of Leeson's Exposures 209 Leeson's Long Futures Positions 209 Leeson's Short Straddles 210 Profit/Loss Profile: Combining One Short Straddle and One Long Futures Contract 211 Profit/Loss Profile: Combining a Long Futures Position and "Numerous" Short Straddles 214 Massive Purchases of Nikkei 225 Futures Contracts 215 Beyond Irony: The Barings Failure in a Broader Time Frame 216 A Bank for a Pound 217 Aftermath of the Barings Failure 218 How Could Barings Have Caught Leeson Sooner? 219 Conclusions: Leeson's Lessons 222 Epilogue: What Happened to the Key Players in the Barings Financial Fiasco? 224 Review Questions 229 Bibliography 230 Chapter 8 Long-Term Capital Mismanagement: "JM and the Arb Boys" 23 1 Introduction 231 Risk Notepad 8. 1 : What Is a Hedge Fund? 232 LTCM: The Company 234 The LTCM Business 234 The Principals 234 LTCM's Strategy 236 Identifying Small Market Imperfections 237 Using a Minimum of Equity Capital 237 Securing Long-Term Funding 242 Charging Hefty Fees 243 LTCM's Impressive Performance: 1994-1997 243 LTCM's Contributions to Efficient Markets 246 Why and How LTCM Failed 246 Exogenous Macroeconomic Shocks: U.S. and Global Spreads Widen 247 Risk Notepad 8.2: What Is Contagion? 250 Endogenous Shocks: Spreads Go Heiter Skelter and VAR Gets Twisted 250 Feedback Shocks 253 The Fed, Warren Buffett, and the Rescue of LTCM 256 Risk Notepad 8.3: Another Look at Warren Buffett's Offer for LTCM 258 Conclusions and Lessons to Be Learned 260 Be Careful What You Wish For 261 Beware of Model Risk 261 All for One and "1" for All 261 Leverage Is a Fair-Weather Friend 262 Financial Transparency Is the First Step in Meaningful Reform 262 In the Long Run, Bet on Global Financial Markets Being Efficient 263 You Can't Float Without Liquidity 263 Some Things Are Worth Doing for the Greater Good 263 Epilogue: What Happened to the Principals, Creditors, Investors, and Consortium? 264 The Principals and Employees 264 Creditors and Investors 265 The Consortium 266 Review Questions 266 Further Reading 267 Bibliography 267 Chapter 9 Amaranth Advisors LLC: Using Natural Gas Derivatives to Bet on the Weather 270 Introduction 270 Amaranth Advisors LLC 271 Natural Gas Markets 273 Amaranth's Natural Gas Trading Strategy and Performance: 2005 to 2006 275 2005: Using Long Call Options to Bet on the Weather 276 2006: Using Futures and Spreads to Bet on the Weather 277 Risk Notepad 9. 1 : Measuring Natural Gas and Putting Amaranath's Positions into Perspective 280 Risk Notepad 9.2: Understanding How Profits Are Earned on Spread Trades 281 What Caused Amaranth's Catastrophic Losses? 287 Inadequate Risk Management Practices 287 Lack of Liquidity 290 Extraordinarily Large Movements in Market Prices 291 Explosion or Implosion? Who Got Hurt? 292 Aftermath 293 Did the Futures Markets Function Effectively? 294 Did Amaranth Dominate Futures Markets, Engage in Excessive Speculation, and/or Conduct Regulatory Arbitrage? 294 Did Amaranth Manipulate Prices? 300 Risk Notepad 9.3: A Tale of Two Hedge Funds 302 Conclusion 308 Epilogue: What Happened to the Amaranth's Traders and Managers? 309 Brian Hunter: Chief Trader at Amaranth 309 Nick Maounis: CEO and Founder of Amaranth 310 Harry Arora: Trader and Former Head (and Later Co-head) of Amaranth's Commodity Group; Brian Hunter's Former Boss 310 Matthew Donohoe: Trader at Amaranth Who Was Also Charged by FERC with Price Manipulation 310 xiv Contents Assorted Other Things That Happened 311 JPMorgan Chase & Co.: Amaranth's Clearing Agent: Purchased Part of Amaranth's Energy Book in September 2006 311 Citadel: Hedge Fund That Purchased Part of Amaranth's Energy Book in September 2006 311 Paloma Partners Management Company: Hedge Fund That Nick Maounis Left Before Starting Amaranth and Which Provided Much of Amaranth's Initial Funding 311 Review Questions 311 Further Reading 312 Bibliography 313 Glossary 315 Index 321
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illustrated	Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-02T19:43:24Z
indexdate	2024-07-09T21:10:56Z
institution	BVB
isbn	9780321542564 0321542568
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016299923
oclc_num	190843469
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owner	DE-703
owner_facet	DE-703
physical	XX, 332 S. graph. Darst.
publishDate	2009
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publishDateSort	2009
publisher	Pearson Prentice Hall
record_format	marc
series2	The Prentice-Hall series in finance
spelling	Marthinsen, John E. Verfasser aut Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives John E. Marthinsen 2. ed. Boston [u.a.] Pearson Prentice Hall 2009 XX, 332 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The Prentice-Hall series in finance Includes bibliographical references and index aDerivative securities aRisk management aInvestment analysis Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd rswk-swf Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 s Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016299923&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis
spellingShingle	Marthinsen, John E. Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives aDerivative securities aRisk management aInvestment analysis Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4073788-3 (DE-588)4121590-4 (DE-588)4522595-3
title	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives
title_auth	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives
title_exact_search	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives
title_exact_search_txtP	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives
title_full	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives John E. Marthinsen
title_fullStr	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives John E. Marthinsen
title_full_unstemmed	Risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives John E. Marthinsen
title_short	Risk takers
title_sort	risk takers uses and abuses of financial derivatives
title_sub	uses and abuses of financial derivatives
topic	aDerivative securities aRisk management aInvestment analysis Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd
topic_facet	aDerivative securities aRisk management aInvestment analysis Kreditmarkt Risikomanagement Fallstudiensammlung
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016299923&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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