The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders: empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | German |
| Published: |
2006
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XVII, 235 S. graph. Darst |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders |b empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |c vorgelegt von Roland Rott |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a XVII, 235 S. |b graph. Darst | ||
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| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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| 502 | |a Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss., 2007 | ||
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Record in the Search Index
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Contents
Contents V
Figures X
Tables XI
Symbols XIII
abbreviations xiv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem Statement • 1
1.2 Structure of the Analysis 4
1.3 Summaries of four Essays on Corporate Governance in Germany 6
1.3.1 A Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code 6
1.3.2 Those who dare not comply with the Code shall be punished by the capital
market (Wer den Kodex nicht einhalt, den bestraft der Kapitalmarkt?) g
1.3.3 The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with Corporate
Governance Codes 9
1.3.4 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany 9
References 10
2 The Theoretical Framework 12
2.1 From the Neo classical Economy to the New Institutional Economics 12
2.1.1 Team Production 13
2.1.2 The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts 14
2.1.3 Governance Structure Theory 14
2.1.4 Property Rights Theory of the Firm 15
2.2 Economic Contract Theory 17
2.2.1 Principal Agent Theory 17
2.2.2 Incomplete Contracts Theory 19
2.3 Corporate Governance and the Law 20
2.3.1 The Rationale for Rules and Regulations 20
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Reform 21
2.3.3 Enforcement via Norms and Self Regulation 23
2.4 Comparative Corporate Governance 24
2.4.1 Distinguishing between Corporate Governance Systems 25
2.4.2 The Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems 27
References 28
Contents VI
3 A Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code:
The Battle between Inconsistency and Persistence 33
3.1 Introduction 33
3.2 Framework of the Analysis 36
3.2.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 36
3.2.2 Development of Corporate Governance Systems 37
3.3 The German Insider Control System 39
3.3.1 Theoretical Background 40
3.3.2 Empirical Assessment 42
3.4 A Systemic Perspective of the German Corporate Governance Code 43
3.4.1 Interest Groups influencing the Development of the Code 43
3.4.2 Assigning the Code Provisions According to Agency Theory 47
3.4.3 Complementarities of the Code Elements 49
3.4.3.1 Shareholder Rights 51
3.4.3.2 Board of Directors 52
3.4.3.3 Incentive Compensation 54
3.4.3.4 Transparency 55
3.4.4 Interim Result: Inconsistency of the Code 56
3.4.5 Derivation of Testable Hypotheses 57
3.4.5.1 Interest Group Effects (Hypothesis HI) 57
3.4.5.2 Comply or Explain Principle (Hypothesis H2) 58
3.4.5.3 Change and Continuity (Hypothesis H3) 59
3.5 Assessing the Impact of the Code after Three Years of Experience 59
3.5.1 Univariate Analysis 59
3.5.1.1 Sample Selection 59
3.5.1.2 Data Description 60
3.5.1.3 Construction of Code Acceptance Indices 62
3.5.1.4 Empirical Results for HI 62
3.5.2 Cross sectional Determinants of Code Acceptance 65
3.5.2.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 65
3.5.2.2 Regression Methodology 66
3.5.2.3 Empirical Results for H2 68
3.5.2.4 Robustness Checks 72
3.5.3 Time series of Code Acceptance 74
3.5.3.1 Empirical Results for H3 75
3.5.3.2 Evidence for Persistence 76
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 77
Appendix 80
References 85
Contents VH
4 Wer den Kodex nicht einhält, den bestraft der Kapitalmarkt? Eine
empirische Analyse der Selbstregulierung und Kapitalmarktrelevanz
des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex 90
4.1 Einleitung 90
4.2 Deutscher Corporate Govemance Kodex 91
4.2.1 Überblick 91
4.2.2 Comply or Explain: Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG 92
4.2.3 Kodex im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Kapitalmarkt 93
4.3 Hypothesen zur freiwilligen Selbstregulierung 96
4.3.1 Herrschende Annahmen zum Kodex Enforcement 96
4.3.2 Ökonomische Grundlagen 98
4.3.3 Empirische Evidenz in Europa 101
4.4 Erkenntnisbedarf zum Kodex Enforcement und Lösungsansatz der
empirischen Kapitalmarktforschung 102
4.4.1 Einführung 102
4.4.2 Methodische Erläuterungen zu Ereignisstudien 103
4.4.2.1 Definition des Ereignisses und der erstmaligen öffentlichen
Ankündigung 103
4.4.2.2 Berechnung der tatsächlichen Renditen am Ereignistag 104
4.4.2.3 Berechnung der erwarteten Renditen und der so genannten
abnormalen bzw. Überrenditen 104
4.4.2.4 Überprüfung der statistischen Signifikanz von Überrenditen 105
4.4.3 Hypothesenbildung zur empirischen Überprüfung der Kursrelevanz
von Entsprechenserklärungen 107
4.5 Ereignisstudie zur Bestimmung von Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei
Veröffentlichung der Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG 109
4.5.1 Datenerhebung und Stichprobenumfang 109
4.5.2 Empirische Ergebnisse (Hi): Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei Abgabe der
Entsprechenserklärung 110
4.5.3 Empirische Ergebnisse (H2): Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei Kodex
Abweichungen 112
4.6 Zusammenfassung und Implikationen 114
5 The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with Corporate
Governance Codes Evtdence from the German Stock Market 116
5.1 Introduction 116
5.2 Literature Review 119
5.3 The German Corporate Governance Code an Overview 123
5.3.1 The Baums Commission 123
5.3.2 The Cromme Commission and the Code 124
5.3.3 The Declaration of Conformity in Accordance with Article 161 of the
Stock Corporation Act 125
5.3.4 The Role of the Capital Market in Code Enforcement 126
Contents VIII
5.4 Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics and Code Compliance 127
5.4.1 Data Description 127
5.4.2 Analysis of Compliance Behaviour 130
5.4.3 Critical Code Recommendations 135
5.5 Event Study Analysis of the Declaration of Conformity 136
5.5.1 Hypotheses on the Stock Price Impact of the Declaration of
Conformity 136
5.5.2 Sample Selection 138
5.5.3 Event Study Design 139
5.5.4 Results 140
5.5.5 Robustness Checks 144
5.5.5.1 Alternative Return Generating Process 144
5.5.5.2 Portfolio Approach 145
5.5.5.3 Index Proxy for Market Portfolio 146
5.5.5.4 Capital Market Reactions to Regulatory Events 148
5.6 Test of Code Compliance and Long Run Abnormal Stock Returns 150
5.6.1 Hypotheses on the Long Run Performance of Code Compliance
Portfolios 150
5.6.2 Sample Selection 151
5.6.3 Portfolio Method 152
5.6.4 Results 154
5.6.5 Robustness Checks 159
5.7 Discussion 159
Appendix 162
References 167
6 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany Evidence
from Panel Data 173
6.1 Introduction 173
6.2 The German Corporate Governance Rating 175
6.2.1 Construction of the Corporate Governance Rating 175
6.2.2 Distribution of the Corporate Governance Rating 177
6.3 Descriptive Statistics and Hypotheses 178
6.3.1 Sample Selection 178
6.3.2 Definition of Variables and Development of Hypotheses 178
6.3.2.1 Ownership Variables 178
6.3.2.1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Background 178
6.3.2.1.2 Ownership Type Variables 180
6.3.2.1.3 Ownership Concentration Variables 184
6.3.2.2 Independent Control Variables 185
6.3.2.3 Tobin sq 191
6.3.2.4 Additional Internal Governance Variables 192
Contents IX
6.4 Determinants of the Corporate Governance Rating 194
6.4.1 Methodology 194
6.4.2 Results 195
6.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany 198
6.5.1 Methodology 198
6.5.1.1 Cross sectional Analysis 198
6.5.1.1.1 Introduction 198
6.5.1.1.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimator 199
6.5.1.1.3 Simultaneous Equations Model with Three stage
Least Squares (3SLS) Estimator 200
6.5.1.2 Panel Data Analysis 202
6.5.1.2.1 Introduction 202
6.5.1.2.2 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Robust
Cluster Estimator 203
6.5.1.2.3 Fixed Effects and Random Effects Regression
Estimators 203
6.5.1.2.4 Hausman Taylor Estimator 206
6.5.2 Results 207
6.5.2.1 Cross sectional Analysis 207
6.5.2.2 Panel Data Analysis 212
6.6 Summary and Conclusion 215
Appendix 217
A1 Extant Literature 217
A2 Questionnaire 225
References 229
Curriculum Vitae 236
Ehrenwortliche Erklarung 237
X
Figures
3.1 Distribution of Code Acceptance 61
4.1 Schematische Darstellung des zeitlichen Ablaufs einer Ereignisstudie 104
4.2 DurchschnittlicheURfurdiegesamteStichprobe(n=145) 112
4.3 Durchschnittliche UR fiir zwei Stichproben mit hoher bzw. niedriger Kodex
Entsprechung (n=46 bzw. n=42) 114
5.1 Frequency Distribution of Deviations from Code Recommendations 131
5.2 Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for all Sample Firms and
Firms with High and Low Code Compliance 142
5.A. 1 Declaration of Conformity 2002 by ThyssenKrupp AG 165
6.1 Distribution of the German Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) 177
XI
Tables
3.1 Stylised Characteristic of Insider and Outsider Systems of Corporate
Governance 41
3.2 Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code 48
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 64
3.4 Tobit Regression of Code Acceptance on Dependent Variables 68
3.5 Tobit Regression of Sub Indices of Code Acceptance on Dependent
Variables 70
3.6 Average Code Acceptance by Industry 71
3.7 Robustness Checks: Alternative Model Specifications and Estimation
Methods 73
3.8 Mean Comparison Tests of Time Variance in Code Acceptance between
2002 and 2004 75
3.A.1 Acceptance of the German Corporate Governance Code 80
4.1 Untersuchungsgruppe 110
4.2 Kumulierte Uberrenditen (KUR) und Signifikanzniveaus fur alle Ereignisse
(n=145) 111
4.3 Kumulierte Uberrenditen (KUR) und Signifikanzniveaus in zwei
Stichproben, die nach hoher bzw. niedriger Kodex Akzeptanz differenziert
sind (n=46 bzw. n=42) 113
5.1 Deviations from Code Recommendations for all Firms in the Sample and by
Index Membership 128
5.2 Summary Statistics 129
5.3 Deviations from Code Recommendations by Industry 133
5.4 Most frequent Deviations from Code Recommendations by all Companies in
the Sample 135
5.5 Sample Selection for the Event Study 138
5.6 Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the whole Sample using OLS
Market Model Returns 141
5.7 Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the High and Low Code
Compliance Portfolio using Market Model Returns 143
Tables XII
5.8 Robustness Check: Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the whole
Sample using Constant Mean Returns 145
5.9 Robustness Check: Portfolio Approach 147
5.10 Robustness Check: Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns using Market
Model Returns for DAX companies 148
5.11 Robustness Check: Capital Market Reactions to Regulatory Events 149
5.12 Performance Attribution Regressions for Code Compliance Portfolios 155
5.13 Performance Attribution Regressions for Change in Code Compliance
Portfolios 157
5.14 Robustness Checks: Performance Attribution Regressions under Alternative
Portfolio Constructions 158
5.A. 1 Chronological Overview of Events before and after the Introduction of the
German Corporate Governance Code of 2002 166
6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Type Variables for 2005 182
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 186
6.3 Pairwise Correlations of Main Variables 187
6.4 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of CGR on Ownership Type and Control
Variables 195
6.5 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of CGR on Ownership Concentration and
Control Variables 197
6.6 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of Tobin s q on CGR and Simultaneous
equations Model in Structural Form (SEM) 208
6.7 Panel Data Analysis Results from Alternative Estimation Models with
Tobin s q as Dependent Variable 213
6.A.I Definition of Main Variables 228
|
| adam_txt |
y
Contents
Contents V
Figures X
Tables XI
Symbols XIII
abbreviations xiv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem Statement • 1
1.2 Structure of the Analysis 4
1.3 Summaries of four Essays on Corporate Governance in Germany 6
1.3.1 A Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code 6
1.3.2 Those who dare not comply with the Code shall be punished by the capital
market (Wer den Kodex nicht einhalt, den bestraft der Kapitalmarkt?) g
1.3.3 The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with Corporate
Governance Codes 9
1.3.4 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany 9
References 10
2 The Theoretical Framework 12
2.1 From the Neo classical Economy to the New Institutional Economics 12
2.1.1 Team Production 13
2.1.2 The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts 14
2.1.3 Governance Structure Theory 14
2.1.4 Property Rights Theory of the Firm 15
2.2 Economic Contract Theory 17
2.2.1 Principal Agent Theory 17
2.2.2 Incomplete Contracts Theory 19
2.3 Corporate Governance and the Law 20
2.3.1 The Rationale for Rules and Regulations 20
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Reform 21
2.3.3 Enforcement via Norms and Self Regulation 23
2.4 Comparative Corporate Governance 24
2.4.1 Distinguishing between Corporate Governance Systems 25
2.4.2 The Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems 27
References 28
Contents VI
3 A Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code:
The Battle between Inconsistency and Persistence 33
3.1 Introduction 33
3.2 Framework of the Analysis 36
3.2.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 36
3.2.2 Development of Corporate Governance Systems 37
3.3 The German Insider Control System 39
3.3.1 Theoretical Background 40
3.3.2 Empirical Assessment 42
3.4 A Systemic Perspective of the German Corporate Governance Code 43
3.4.1 Interest Groups influencing the Development of the Code 43
3.4.2 Assigning the Code Provisions According to Agency Theory 47
3.4.3 Complementarities of the Code Elements 49
3.4.3.1 Shareholder Rights 51
3.4.3.2 Board of Directors 52
3.4.3.3 Incentive Compensation 54
3.4.3.4 Transparency 55
3.4.4 Interim Result: Inconsistency of the Code 56
3.4.5 Derivation of Testable Hypotheses 57
3.4.5.1 Interest Group Effects (Hypothesis HI) 57
3.4.5.2 Comply or Explain Principle (Hypothesis H2) 58
3.4.5.3 Change and Continuity (Hypothesis H3) 59
3.5 Assessing the Impact of the Code after Three Years of Experience 59
3.5.1 Univariate Analysis 59
3.5.1.1 Sample Selection 59
3.5.1.2 Data Description 60
3.5.1.3 Construction of Code Acceptance Indices 62
3.5.1.4 Empirical Results for HI 62
3.5.2 Cross sectional Determinants of Code Acceptance 65
3.5.2.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 65
3.5.2.2 Regression Methodology 66
3.5.2.3 Empirical Results for H2 68
3.5.2.4 Robustness Checks 72
3.5.3 Time series of Code Acceptance 74
3.5.3.1 Empirical Results for H3 75
3.5.3.2 Evidence for Persistence 76
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 77
Appendix 80
References 85
Contents VH
4 Wer den Kodex nicht einhält, den bestraft der Kapitalmarkt? Eine
empirische Analyse der Selbstregulierung und Kapitalmarktrelevanz
des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex 90
4.1 Einleitung 90
4.2 Deutscher Corporate Govemance Kodex 91
4.2.1 Überblick 91
4.2.2 Comply or Explain: Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG 92
4.2.3 Kodex im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Kapitalmarkt 93
4.3 Hypothesen zur freiwilligen Selbstregulierung 96
4.3.1 Herrschende Annahmen zum Kodex Enforcement 96
4.3.2 Ökonomische Grundlagen 98
4.3.3 Empirische Evidenz in Europa 101
4.4 Erkenntnisbedarf zum Kodex Enforcement und Lösungsansatz der
empirischen Kapitalmarktforschung 102
4.4.1 Einführung 102
4.4.2 Methodische Erläuterungen zu Ereignisstudien 103
4.4.2.1 Definition des Ereignisses und der erstmaligen öffentlichen
Ankündigung 103
4.4.2.2 Berechnung der tatsächlichen Renditen am Ereignistag 104
4.4.2.3 Berechnung der erwarteten Renditen und der so genannten
abnormalen bzw. Überrenditen 104
4.4.2.4 Überprüfung der statistischen Signifikanz von Überrenditen 105
4.4.3 Hypothesenbildung zur empirischen Überprüfung der Kursrelevanz
von Entsprechenserklärungen 107
4.5 Ereignisstudie zur Bestimmung von Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei
Veröffentlichung der Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG 109
4.5.1 Datenerhebung und Stichprobenumfang 109
4.5.2 Empirische Ergebnisse (Hi): Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei Abgabe der
Entsprechenserklärung 110
4.5.3 Empirische Ergebnisse (H2): Kapitalmarktreaktionen bei Kodex
Abweichungen 112
4.6 Zusammenfassung und Implikationen 114
5 The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of Compliance with Corporate
Governance Codes Evtdence from the German Stock Market 116
5.1 Introduction 116
5.2 Literature Review 119
5.3 The German Corporate Governance Code an Overview 123
5.3.1 The Baums Commission 123
5.3.2 The Cromme Commission and the Code 124
5.3.3 The Declaration of Conformity in Accordance with Article 161 of the
Stock Corporation Act 125
5.3.4 The Role of the Capital Market in Code Enforcement 126
Contents VIII
5.4 Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics and Code Compliance 127
5.4.1 Data Description 127
5.4.2 Analysis of Compliance Behaviour 130
5.4.3 Critical Code Recommendations 135
5.5 Event Study Analysis of the Declaration of Conformity 136
5.5.1 Hypotheses on the Stock Price Impact of the Declaration of
Conformity 136
5.5.2 Sample Selection 138
5.5.3 Event Study Design 139
5.5.4 Results 140
5.5.5 Robustness Checks 144
5.5.5.1 Alternative Return Generating Process 144
5.5.5.2 Portfolio Approach 145
5.5.5.3 Index Proxy for Market Portfolio 146
5.5.5.4 Capital Market Reactions to Regulatory Events 148
5.6 Test of Code Compliance and Long Run Abnormal Stock Returns 150
5.6.1 Hypotheses on the Long Run Performance of Code Compliance
Portfolios 150
5.6.2 Sample Selection 151
5.6.3 Portfolio Method 152
5.6.4 Results 154
5.6.5 Robustness Checks 159
5.7 Discussion 159
Appendix 162
References 167
6 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany Evidence
from Panel Data 173
6.1 Introduction 173
6.2 The German Corporate Governance Rating 175
6.2.1 Construction of the Corporate Governance Rating 175
6.2.2 Distribution of the Corporate Governance Rating 177
6.3 Descriptive Statistics and Hypotheses 178
6.3.1 Sample Selection 178
6.3.2 Definition of Variables and Development of Hypotheses 178
6.3.2.1 Ownership Variables 178
6.3.2.1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Background 178
6.3.2.1.2 Ownership Type Variables 180
6.3.2.1.3 Ownership Concentration Variables 184
6.3.2.2 Independent Control Variables 185
6.3.2.3 Tobin'sq 191
6.3.2.4 Additional Internal Governance Variables 192
Contents IX
6.4 Determinants of the Corporate Governance Rating 194
6.4.1 Methodology 194
6.4.2 Results 195
6.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Germany 198
6.5.1 Methodology 198
6.5.1.1 Cross sectional Analysis 198
6.5.1.1.1 Introduction 198
6.5.1.1.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimator 199
6.5.1.1.3 Simultaneous Equations Model with Three stage
Least Squares (3SLS) Estimator 200
6.5.1.2 Panel Data Analysis 202
6.5.1.2.1 Introduction 202
6.5.1.2.2 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Robust
Cluster Estimator 203
6.5.1.2.3 Fixed Effects and Random Effects Regression
Estimators 203
6.5.1.2.4 Hausman Taylor Estimator 206
6.5.2 Results 207
6.5.2.1 Cross sectional Analysis 207
6.5.2.2 Panel Data Analysis 212
6.6 Summary and Conclusion 215
Appendix 217
A1 Extant Literature 217
A2 Questionnaire 225
References 229
Curriculum Vitae 236
Ehrenwortliche Erklarung 237
X
Figures
3.1 Distribution of Code Acceptance 61
4.1 Schematische Darstellung des zeitlichen Ablaufs einer Ereignisstudie 104
4.2 DurchschnittlicheURfurdiegesamteStichprobe(n=145) 112
4.3 Durchschnittliche UR fiir zwei Stichproben mit hoher bzw. niedriger Kodex
Entsprechung (n=46 bzw. n=42) 114
5.1 Frequency Distribution of Deviations from Code Recommendations 131
5.2 Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for all Sample Firms and
Firms with High and Low Code Compliance 142
5.A. 1 Declaration of Conformity 2002 by ThyssenKrupp AG 165
6.1 Distribution of the German Corporate Governance Rating (CGR) 177
XI
Tables
3.1 Stylised Characteristic of Insider and Outsider Systems of Corporate
Governance 41
3.2 Systemic Evaluation of the German Corporate Governance Code 48
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 64
3.4 Tobit Regression of Code Acceptance on Dependent Variables 68
3.5 Tobit Regression of Sub Indices of Code Acceptance on Dependent
Variables 70
3.6 Average Code Acceptance by Industry 71
3.7 Robustness Checks: Alternative Model Specifications and Estimation
Methods 73
3.8 Mean Comparison Tests of Time Variance in Code Acceptance between
2002 and 2004 75
3.A.1 Acceptance of the German Corporate Governance Code 80
4.1 Untersuchungsgruppe 110
4.2 Kumulierte Uberrenditen (KUR) und Signifikanzniveaus fur alle Ereignisse
(n=145) 111
4.3 Kumulierte Uberrenditen (KUR) und Signifikanzniveaus in zwei
Stichproben, die nach hoher bzw. niedriger Kodex Akzeptanz differenziert
sind (n=46 bzw. n=42) 113
5.1 Deviations from Code Recommendations for all Firms in the Sample and by
Index Membership 128
5.2 Summary Statistics 129
5.3 Deviations from Code Recommendations by Industry 133
5.4 Most frequent Deviations from Code Recommendations by all Companies in
the Sample 135
5.5 Sample Selection for the Event Study 138
5.6 Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the whole Sample using OLS
Market Model Returns 141
5.7 Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the High and Low Code
Compliance Portfolio using Market Model Returns 143
Tables XII
5.8 Robustness Check: Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns in the whole
Sample using Constant Mean Returns 145
5.9 Robustness Check: Portfolio Approach 147
5.10 Robustness Check: Average (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns using Market
Model Returns for DAX companies 148
5.11 Robustness Check: Capital Market Reactions to Regulatory Events 149
5.12 Performance Attribution Regressions for "Code Compliance" Portfolios 155
5.13 Performance Attribution Regressions for "Change in Code Compliance"
Portfolios 157
5.14 Robustness Checks: Performance Attribution Regressions under Alternative
Portfolio Constructions 158
5.A. 1 Chronological Overview of Events before and after the Introduction of the
German Corporate Governance Code of 2002 166
6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Type Variables for 2005 182
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 186
6.3 Pairwise Correlations of Main Variables 187
6.4 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of CGR on Ownership Type and Control
Variables 195
6.5 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of CGR on Ownership Concentration and
Control Variables 197
6.6 Cross sectional OLS Regressions of Tobin's q on CGR and Simultaneous
equations Model in Structural Form (SEM) 208
6.7 Panel Data Analysis Results from Alternative Estimation Models with
Tobin's q as Dependent Variable 213
6.A.I Definition of Main Variables 228 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Rott, Roland 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)132977133 |
| author_facet | Rott, Roland 1969- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Rott, Roland 1969- |
| author_variant | r r rr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023061658 |
| classification_rvk | QP 341 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255470900 (DE-599)BVBBV023061658 |
| dewey-full | 658.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4 |
| dewey-search | 658.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| geographic | Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Deutschland |
| id | DE-604.BV023061658 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T19:29:07Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:10:05Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | German |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016264899 |
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| physical | XVII, 235 S. graph. Darst |
| publishDate | 2006 |
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| spelling | Rott, Roland 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)132977133 aut The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code vorgelegt von Roland Rott 2006 XVII, 235 S. graph. Darst txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Frankfurt am Main, Univ., Diss., 2007 Deutschland Regierungskommission Corporate Governance Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DE-588)7569493-1 gnd rswk-swf Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd rswk-swf Aktiengesellschaft (DE-588)4000937-3 gnd rswk-swf Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 s Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 s DE-604 Deutschland Regierungskommission Corporate Governance Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DE-588)7569493-1 u Aktiengesellschaft (DE-588)4000937-3 s 1\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016264899&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Rott, Roland 1969- The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code Deutschland Regierungskommission Corporate Governance Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DE-588)7569493-1 gnd Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd Aktiengesellschaft (DE-588)4000937-3 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)7569493-1 (DE-588)4000947-6 (DE-588)4000937-3 (DE-588)4419850-4 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |
| title_auth | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |
| title_exact_search | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |
| title_full | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code vorgelegt von Roland Rott |
| title_fullStr | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code vorgelegt von Roland Rott |
| title_full_unstemmed | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code vorgelegt von Roland Rott |
| title_short | The acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders |
| title_sort | the acceptance of corporate governance principles by listed companies and their relevance for shareholders empirical evidence from the german corporate governance code |
| title_sub | empirical evidence from the German Corporate Governance Code |
| topic | Deutschland Regierungskommission Corporate Governance Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DE-588)7569493-1 gnd Aktionär (DE-588)4000947-6 gnd Aktiengesellschaft (DE-588)4000937-3 gnd Corporate Governance (DE-588)4419850-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Deutschland Regierungskommission Corporate Governance Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex Aktionär Aktiengesellschaft Corporate Governance Deutschland Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016264899&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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