Rules, games, and common-pool resources:
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Ann Arbor
Univ. of Michigan Press
2003
|
Ausgabe: | [Nachdr.] |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 331 - 360 |
Beschreibung: | XVI, 369 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 0472095463 0472065467 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804137238348431360 |
---|---|
adam_text | Contents
Tables
xiii
Figures
xv
Part
1.
Theoretical Background
Chapter
1.
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool
Resource Problems
3
Common-Pool Resource Problems
Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms
Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision
CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas
Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas
The Central Questions to Be Addressed
The Plan for This Book
Chapter
2.
Institutional Analysis and
Common-Pool Resources
23
Models, Theories, and Frameworks
Historical Roots of IAD
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The Action Situation
Actors
Factors Affecting Action Arenas
Linking Action Arenas
Multiple Levels of Analysis
Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas
Conclusions
Chapter
3.
Games Appropriators Play
51
The Use of Formal Models
CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies
Repeated CPR Games
Conclusions
Chapter
4.
Rules and Games
75
How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game
Contents
Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules
Fishing Rules and Fishing Games
Outcome Comparison
Conclusions
Part
2.
Experimental Studies
Chapter
5.
CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments
105
CPR Appropriation
Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory
Conclusions
Appendix
5.1.:
CPR Provision Problems
Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution
Mechanism
Discrete Public Goods and VCM
Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution
Mechanisms
Appendix
5.2.:
Experimental Numbers
Appendix 5.3.: Market
2
Group Investment Decisions
Chapter
6.
Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR
129
Model of a Destructible CPR
Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game
The Experimental Design
Experimental Results
Conclusions
Appendix
6.1.:
Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in
Market
2
Chapter
7.
Communication in the Commons
145
Communication: Theoretical Issues
One-Shot Costless Communication
Repeated Costless Communication
Costly Communication
Conclusions
Chapter
8.
Sanctioning and Communication Institutions
171
Sanctioning in the Constituent Game
The Experimental Setting and Results
Conclusions
Chapter
9.
Regularities from the Laboratory and
Possible Explanations
195
Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments?
Conclusions
Contents
Part
3.
Field Studies
Chapter
10.
Institutions and Performance in
Irrigation Systems
225
by Shui Yan Tang
Comparing Irrigation Systems
Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas
Matching Rules to Physical Domains
Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements
Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements
Conclusions
Appendix
10.1.:
Case Profiles
Chapter
11.
Fishers Institutional Responses to Common-
Pool Resource Dilemmas
247
by Edella
Schlager
Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas
CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries
Fishers Responses to CPR Dilemmas
Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers
Performance of Fishers Organizations
Conclusions
Chapter
12.
Rules, Rule Making, and Rule
Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and
Resource Use
267
by Arun Agrawal
The Historical Context
The Local Context
Authority Rules Related to Allocation
Monitoring
Sanctioning
Arbitration
Conclusions
Chapter
13.
Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence
from Groundwater Systems in Southern California
283
by William Blomquist
Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources
The Levels of Action
Linked Action Arenas
Operational-Level Rule Configurations
Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure
Contents
Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases
Conclusions
Chapter
14.
Regularities from the Field and
Possible Explanations
301
by William Blomquist, Edella
Schlager, Shui
Yan Tang,
and Elinor
Ostrom
Commonalities across Organized CPRs
Differences across Organized CPRs
Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference
Conclusions
Part
4.
Conclusion
Chapter
15.
Cooperation and Social Capital
319
Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis
Surmounting CPR Dilemmas
Bibliography
331
Contributors
361
Index
363
|
adam_txt |
Contents
Tables
xiii
Figures
xv
Part
1.
Theoretical Background
Chapter
1.
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool
Resource Problems
3
Common-Pool Resource Problems
Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms
Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision
CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas
Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas
The Central Questions to Be Addressed
The Plan for This Book
Chapter
2.
Institutional Analysis and
Common-Pool Resources
23
Models, Theories, and Frameworks
Historical Roots of IAD
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The Action Situation
Actors
Factors Affecting Action Arenas
Linking Action Arenas
Multiple Levels of Analysis
Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas
Conclusions
Chapter
3.
Games Appropriators Play
51
The Use of Formal Models
CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies
Repeated CPR Games
Conclusions
Chapter
4.
Rules and Games
75
How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game
Contents
Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules
Fishing Rules and Fishing Games
Outcome Comparison
Conclusions
Part
2.
Experimental Studies
Chapter
5.
CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments
105
CPR Appropriation
Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory
Conclusions
Appendix
5.1.:
CPR Provision Problems
Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution
Mechanism
Discrete Public Goods and VCM
Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution
Mechanisms
Appendix
5.2.:
Experimental Numbers
Appendix 5.3.: Market
2
Group Investment Decisions
Chapter
6.
Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR
129
Model of a Destructible CPR
Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game
The Experimental Design
Experimental Results
Conclusions
Appendix
6.1.:
Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in
Market
2
Chapter
7.
Communication in the Commons
145
Communication: Theoretical Issues
One-Shot Costless Communication
Repeated Costless Communication
Costly Communication
Conclusions
Chapter
8.
Sanctioning and Communication Institutions
171
Sanctioning in the Constituent Game
The Experimental Setting and Results
Conclusions
Chapter
9.
Regularities from the Laboratory and
Possible Explanations
195
Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments?
Conclusions
Contents
Part
3.
Field Studies
Chapter
10.
Institutions and Performance in
Irrigation Systems
225
by Shui Yan Tang
Comparing Irrigation Systems
Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas
Matching Rules to Physical Domains
Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements
Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements
Conclusions
Appendix
10.1.:
Case Profiles
Chapter
11.
Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-
Pool Resource Dilemmas
247
by Edella
Schlager
Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas
CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries
Fishers' Responses to CPR Dilemmas
Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers
Performance of Fishers' Organizations
Conclusions
Chapter
12.
Rules, Rule Making, and Rule
Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and
Resource Use
267
by Arun Agrawal
The Historical Context
The Local Context
Authority Rules Related to Allocation
Monitoring
Sanctioning
Arbitration
Conclusions
Chapter
13.
Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence
from Groundwater Systems in Southern California
283
by William Blomquist
Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources
The Levels of Action
Linked Action Arenas
Operational-Level Rule Configurations
Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure
Contents
Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases
Conclusions
Chapter
14.
Regularities from the Field and
Possible Explanations
301
by William Blomquist, Edella
Schlager, Shui
Yan Tang,
and Elinor
Ostrom
Commonalities across Organized CPRs
Differences across Organized CPRs
Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference
Conclusions
Part
4.
Conclusion
Chapter
15.
Cooperation and Social Capital
319
Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis
Surmounting CPR Dilemmas
Bibliography
331
Contributors
361
Index
363 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
author | Ostrom, Elinor 1933-2012 Gardner, Roy Walker, James 1950- |
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author_role | aut aut aut |
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author_variant | e o eo r g rg j w jw |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV023019397 |
classification_rvk | AR 26100 QT 000 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)248917230 (DE-599)BVBBV023019397 |
dewey-full | 333.7 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 333 - Economics of land and energy |
dewey-raw | 333.7 |
dewey-search | 333.7 |
dewey-sort | 3333.7 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Allgemeines Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Allgemeines Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | [Nachdr.] |
format | Book |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T19:12:28Z |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 0472095463 0472065467 |
language | English |
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spelling | Ostrom, Elinor 1933-2012 Verfasser (DE-588)121145107 aut Rules, games, and common-pool resources Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker [Nachdr.] Ann Arbor Univ. of Michigan Press 2003 XVI, 369 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverz. S. 331 - 360 Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Natürliche Ressourcen (DE-588)4075236-7 gnd rswk-swf Rohstoffpolitik (DE-588)4178388-8 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 s Rohstoffpolitik (DE-588)4178388-8 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Natürliche Ressourcen (DE-588)4075236-7 s Gardner, Roy Verfasser aut Walker, James 1950- Verfasser (DE-588)124569781 aut Digitalisierung UB Bamberg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016223508&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Ostrom, Elinor 1933-2012 Gardner, Roy Walker, James 1950- Rules, games, and common-pool resources Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Natürliche Ressourcen (DE-588)4075236-7 gnd Rohstoffpolitik (DE-588)4178388-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4043179-4 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4075236-7 (DE-588)4178388-8 |
title | Rules, games, and common-pool resources |
title_auth | Rules, games, and common-pool resources |
title_exact_search | Rules, games, and common-pool resources |
title_exact_search_txtP | Rules, games, and common-pool resources |
title_full | Rules, games, and common-pool resources Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker |
title_fullStr | Rules, games, and common-pool resources Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker |
title_full_unstemmed | Rules, games, and common-pool resources Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker |
title_short | Rules, games, and common-pool resources |
title_sort | rules games and common pool resources |
topic | Öffentliches Gut (DE-588)4043179-4 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Natürliche Ressourcen (DE-588)4075236-7 gnd Rohstoffpolitik (DE-588)4178388-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Öffentliches Gut Spieltheorie Natürliche Ressourcen Rohstoffpolitik |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016223508&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ostromelinor rulesgamesandcommonpoolresources AT gardnerroy rulesgamesandcommonpoolresources AT walkerjames rulesgamesandcommonpoolresources |