Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law:
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Alphen an den Rijn
Kluwer Law International
2007
|
| Series: | International competition law series
30 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Teilw. zugl.: European Univ. Inst., Diss., 2006 |
| Physical Description: | XXVII, 266 S. |
| ISBN: | 9789041125750 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |c by Jurian Langer |
| 264 | 1 | |a Alphen an den Rijn |b Kluwer Law International |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XXVII, 266 S. | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a International competition law series |v 30 | |
| 500 | |a Teilw. zugl.: European Univ. Inst., Diss., 2006 | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Concurrence - Droit européen |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Europees recht |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Kartelrecht |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Europarecht | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Antitrust law |z European Union countries | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition |z Europe | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition, Unfair |z European Union countries | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Restraint of trade |z European Union countries | |
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|---|---|
| adam_text | TYING AND BUNDLING AS A LEVERAGING CONCERN UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW BY
JURIAN LANGER KLUWER LAW NTERNATIONAL TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V INTRODUCTION VII 1. THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNIZATION
VII 2. THE OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK XIII 3. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
XV PARTI GENERAL ASPECTS OF TYING AND BUNDLING CHAPTER 1 THE ECONOMICS
OF TYING AND BUNDLING 3 1. INTRODUCTION 3 2. CATEGORIZATION OF TYING AND
BUNDLING 4 3. EFFICIENCY MOTIVATIONS 7 3.1 COST SAVINGS 7 3.1.1
CONSUMPTION EFFICIENCIES 7 3.1.2 PRODUCTIONRSIDE EFFICIENCIES 8 3.2
QUALITY ASSURANCE 9 3.3 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENTS 11 3.4 AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
MARGINALIZATION 12 3.5 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 14 3.6 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
17 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS 4. ANTI-COMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS 17 4.1
SHORT-TERM LEVERAGING 18 4.1.1 MONOPOLY PROFITS IN BOTH MARKETS 18 4.1.2
THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 19 4.1.3 A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CHICAGO
PREDICTIONS 20 4.2 LONG-TERM LEVERAGING 21 4.2.1 ENTRY DETERRENCE IN
MARKET B 22 4.2.1.1 TYING AND BUNDLING INCREASES THE STAKES OF
COMPETITION: WHINSTON 22 4.2.1.2 TYING AND BUNDLING DEPRIVES ENTRANTS OF
ADEQUATE SCALE: NALEBUFF 23 4.2.1.3 TYING AND BUNDLING AFFECT R&D
INCENTIVES: CHOI 24 4.2.2 FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS OF COMPETITORS IN
MARKET A: CARLTON AND WALDMAN 25 4.3 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 26 5. SPECIAL
TOPICS IN RELATION TO TYING AND BUNDLING 26 5.1 NETWORK EFFECTS 26 5.2
REMEDIES 28 6. WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS
LITERATURE? 30 6.1 THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE 30 6.1.1 THE PER SE (MODIFIED)
LEGAL RULE 30 6.1.2 THE PER SE (MODIFIED) ILLEGAL RULE 32 6.1.3
EVALUATION OF BOTH APPROACHES 33 6.2 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A
STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 34 6.3 A 4-STEP STRUCTURED EFFECTS-BASED
TEST 36 7. CONCLUSIONS 38 CHAPTER 2 THE LEVERAGING THEORY IN GENERAL
UNDER US AND EC LAW 41 1. INTRODUCTION 41 2. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
DOMINANCE AND ABUSE 42 3. COMPARING THE US AND EC MODELS 44 3.1 THE VERY
CLOSE LINK MODEL UNDER US LAW 45 3.2 THE CLOSE LINK MODEL UNDER EC LAW
49 4. THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE MULTI-MARKET REQUIREMENT 50 5.
DISCUSSION OF THE MULTI-MARKET SCENARIOS UNDER EC LAW 53 5.1 THE ABUSE
OF A DOMINANT POSITION HAS EFFECTS IN ANOTHER MARKET 53 5.2 THE ABUSE IN
ANOTHER MARKET HAS EFFECTS IN THE DOMINATED MARKET 55 5.3 ABUSE AND
EFFECTS ARE IN A MARKET OTHER THAN THE DOMINATED MARKET 57 5.4 THE
MULTI-MARKET SCENARIOS DISCUSSED AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS OF
TYING AND BUNDLING 61 6. CONCLUSIONS 62 TABLE OF CONTENTS VII PART II EX
POST REGULATION 63 CHAPTER 3 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER US LAW 65 1.
INTRODUCTION 65 2. A TRILOGY OF ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 65 3. A CHEQUERED
HISTORY OF ANALYSIS 67 3.1 THE PATENT MISUSE ORIGIN OF THE LEVERAGING
THEORY 67 3.2 THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CLAYTON ACT 69 3.3 THE PER SE
APPROACH OF INTERNATIONAL SALT AND NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY 71 3.4 THE
EVOLUTION TO A MODIFIED PER SE TEST 73 3.5 MICROSOFT AND ITS CALL FOR AN
UNSTRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 76 3.5.1 MICROSOFT I 76 3.5.2 MICROSOFT
II 77 3.5.3 MICROSOFT III 78 3.5.3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 78 3.5.3.2 THE
JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT 79 3.5.3.3 THE JUDGMENT BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS 81 4. THE SEPARATE-PRODUCT ISSUE 82 4.1 THE SIMPLE-PRODUCT TEST
83 4.2 THE CONSUMER-DEMAND TEST 84 4.3 THE TECHNOLOGICAL-INTEGRATION
TEST 87 4.4 THE MARKET-PRACTICES TEST 92 4.5 THE ECONOMIC-MEASUREMENT
TEST 93 4.6 THE MULTI-FACTOR TEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TEST 95 4.6.1 THE
FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW TEST 95 4.6.2 THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS 96 4.6.3 THE
ELEMENTS OF THE NEW TEST 98 5. DISCUSSION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR
TYING AND BUNDLING 99 5.1 THE APPLICATION OF A COMPETITION TEST 99 5.2
LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOME SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 101 5.3
CLARIFYING THE LAW ON TYING AND BUNDLING 104 6. EFFICIENCIES DUE TO
TYING AND BUNDLING 107 6.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 107 6.2 EFFICIENCY
JUSTIFICATIONS IN DETAIL 107 6.2.1 THE JUSTIFICATION PROMOTES
COMPETITION 107 6.2.2 THE JUSTIFICATION FAVOURS INTENT OVER POSSIBLE
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 108 6.2.2.1 GOODWILL PROTECTION 108 6.2.2.2 TRADEMARK
PROTECTION 110 6.2.3 SOME REMAINING JUSTIFICATIONS 112 7. CONCLUSIONS
113 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 4 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER EC LAW 115
1. A DUAL SYSTEM OF EX POST RULES 115 2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
TYING AND BUNDLING 117 3. A CRITICAL-HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 120 3.1 THE
EARLY CASES ON TYING AND BUNDLING 120 3.2 THE PER SE TEST OF THE 1980S
123 3.3 THE MODIFIED PER SE APPROACH OF THE 1990S 126 3.4 AN
EFFECT-BASED ANALYSIS FROM 2000 132 3.5 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 141 4. THE
SEPARATE-PRODUCT ISSUE 142 4.1 THE SIMPLE-PRODUCT TEST 143 4.2 THE
INTERCHANGEABILITY TEST 144 4.3 THE CONSUMER-DEMAND TEST 146 4.4 THE
INHERENT-LINK TEST 150 4.5 THE HISTORICAL-PRACTICES TEST 152 4.6 THE
CUSTOMARY-PRACTICES TEST 153 4.7 THE MULTI-FACTOR TEST 155 4.7.1 THE
OUTLINE OF THE NEW TEST 155 4.7.2 APPLYING THE NEW TEST TO MICROSOFT 156
5. A LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY TRILOGY 160 5.1 HILTI 160
5.2 TETRA PAK II 162 5.3 MICROSOFT 163 5.3.1 THE EFFECT ON COMPETITION
OF THE WINDOWS-WMP BUNDLE 163 5.3.2 THE REMEDY FAILS TO ADDRESS ALL
COMPETITION CONCERNS 167 6. CHOOSING A LEGAL STANDARD FOR TYING AND
BUNDLING 169 6.1 THE SOFTWARE-SPECIFIC TEST 170 6.2 THE PREDATION TEST
170 6.3 THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY TEST 171 6.4 THE MODIFIED PER SE LEGAL
TEST 174 6.5 A STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 176 7. CONCLUSIONS 178
PART III EX ANTE REGULATION 181 CHAPTER 5 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER US
AND EC MERGER CONTROL 183 1. INTRODUCTION 183 2. AN OUTLINE OF THE US
AND EC MERGER RULES 183 TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 2.1 US MERGER CONTROL 183
2.2 EC MERGER CONTROL SYSTEM 185 3. TYING AND BUNDLING CONCERNS UNDER US
LAW 186 3.1 THE EARLY CASE LAW 186 3.2 THE ENTRENCHMENT THEORY OF THE
1970S 187 3.3 THE DECLINE OF MERGER ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1980S 190 3.4
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 192 4. THE EC APPROACH TOWARDS TYING AND BUNDLING
CONCERNS 192 4.1 THE EARLY STATEMENTS AND CASES 192 4.2 AN INCOHERENT
THEORY OF LEVERAGING HARM DURING THE 1990S 195 4.3 REFINEMENT OF THE
THEORY OF LEVERAGING HARM FROM 2000 202 5. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY OF
LEVERAGING HARM 216 5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 216 5.2 THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK IN DETAIL 218 5.3 US CRITICISM 222 5.4 DISCUSSION OF THE
NECESSITY OF EX ANTE CONTROL 224 6. CONCLUSIONS 226 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS 229 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 229 2. CONVERGENCES AND
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN US AND EC LAW 230 3. ECONOMICS AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF TYING AND BUNDLING 231 4. A STRUCTURED EFFECTS-BASED
RULE OF REASON TEST 232 5. PREFERENCE FOR EX POST CONTROL 234 6. A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE TYING AND BUNDLING TRILOGY 235 7. THE
COMMISSION S DISCUSSION PAPER ON ARTICLE 82 236 7.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
236 7.2 THE COMMISSION S PAPER 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY 241 TABLE OF CASES 257
INDEX 263
|
| adam_txt |
TYING AND BUNDLING AS A LEVERAGING CONCERN UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW BY
JURIAN LANGER KLUWER LAW NTERNATIONAL TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V INTRODUCTION VII 1. THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNIZATION
VII 2. THE OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK XIII 3. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
XV PARTI GENERAL ASPECTS OF TYING AND BUNDLING CHAPTER 1 THE ECONOMICS
OF TYING AND BUNDLING 3 1. INTRODUCTION 3 2. CATEGORIZATION OF TYING AND
BUNDLING 4 3. EFFICIENCY MOTIVATIONS 7 3.1 COST SAVINGS 7 3.1.1
CONSUMPTION EFFICIENCIES 7 3.1.2 PRODUCTIONRSIDE EFFICIENCIES 8 3.2
QUALITY ASSURANCE 9 3.3 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENTS 11 3.4 AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
MARGINALIZATION 12 3.5 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 14 3.6 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
17 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS 4. ANTI-COMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS 17 4.1
SHORT-TERM LEVERAGING 18 4.1.1 MONOPOLY PROFITS IN BOTH MARKETS 18 4.1.2
THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE 19 4.1.3 A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CHICAGO
PREDICTIONS 20 4.2 LONG-TERM LEVERAGING 21 4.2.1 ENTRY DETERRENCE IN
MARKET B 22 4.2.1.1 TYING AND BUNDLING INCREASES THE STAKES OF
COMPETITION: WHINSTON 22 4.2.1.2 TYING AND BUNDLING DEPRIVES ENTRANTS OF
ADEQUATE SCALE: NALEBUFF 23 4.2.1.3 TYING AND BUNDLING AFFECT R&D
INCENTIVES: CHOI 24 4.2.2 FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS OF COMPETITORS IN
MARKET A: CARLTON AND WALDMAN 25 4.3 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 26 5. SPECIAL
TOPICS IN RELATION TO TYING AND BUNDLING 26 5.1 NETWORK EFFECTS 26 5.2
REMEDIES 28 6. WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS
LITERATURE? 30 6.1 THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE 30 6.1.1 THE PER SE (MODIFIED)
LEGAL RULE 30 6.1.2 THE PER SE (MODIFIED) ILLEGAL RULE 32 6.1.3
EVALUATION OF BOTH APPROACHES 33 6.2 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A
STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 34 6.3 A 4-STEP STRUCTURED EFFECTS-BASED
TEST 36 7. CONCLUSIONS 38 CHAPTER 2 THE LEVERAGING THEORY IN GENERAL
UNDER US AND EC LAW 41 1. INTRODUCTION 41 2. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
DOMINANCE AND ABUSE 42 3. COMPARING THE US AND EC MODELS 44 3.1 THE VERY
CLOSE LINK MODEL UNDER US LAW 45 3.2 THE CLOSE LINK MODEL UNDER EC LAW
49 4. THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE MULTI-MARKET REQUIREMENT 50 5.
DISCUSSION OF THE MULTI-MARKET SCENARIOS UNDER EC LAW 53 5.1 THE ABUSE
OF A DOMINANT POSITION HAS EFFECTS IN ANOTHER MARKET 53 5.2 THE ABUSE IN
ANOTHER MARKET HAS EFFECTS IN THE DOMINATED MARKET 55 5.3 ABUSE AND
EFFECTS ARE IN A MARKET OTHER THAN THE DOMINATED MARKET 57 5.4 THE
MULTI-MARKET SCENARIOS DISCUSSED AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS OF
TYING AND BUNDLING 61 6. CONCLUSIONS 62 TABLE OF CONTENTS VII PART II EX
POST REGULATION 63 CHAPTER 3 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER US LAW 65 1.
INTRODUCTION 65 2. A TRILOGY OF ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 65 3. A CHEQUERED
HISTORY'OF ANALYSIS 67 3.1 THE PATENT MISUSE ORIGIN OF THE LEVERAGING
THEORY 67 3.2 THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CLAYTON ACT 69 3.3 THE PER SE
APPROACH OF INTERNATIONAL SALT AND NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY 71 3.4 THE
EVOLUTION TO A MODIFIED PER SE TEST 73 3.5 MICROSOFT AND ITS CALL FOR AN
UNSTRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 76 3.5.1 MICROSOFT I 76 3.5.2 MICROSOFT
II 77 3.5.3 MICROSOFT III 78 3.5.3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 78 3.5.3.2 THE
JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT 79 3.5.3.3 THE JUDGMENT BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS 81 4. THE SEPARATE-PRODUCT ISSUE 82 4.1 THE SIMPLE-PRODUCT TEST
83 4.2 THE CONSUMER-DEMAND TEST 84 4.3 THE TECHNOLOGICAL-INTEGRATION
TEST 87 4.4 THE MARKET-PRACTICES TEST 92 4.5 THE ECONOMIC-MEASUREMENT
TEST 93 4.6 THE MULTI-FACTOR TEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TEST 95 4.6.1 THE
FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW TEST 95 4.6.2 THE LEGAL PRECEDENTS 96 4.6.3 THE
ELEMENTS OF THE NEW TEST 98 5. DISCUSSION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR
TYING AND BUNDLING 99 5.1 THE APPLICATION OF A COMPETITION TEST 99 5.2
LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOME SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 101 5.3
CLARIFYING THE LAW ON TYING AND BUNDLING 104 6. EFFICIENCIES DUE TO
TYING AND BUNDLING 107 6.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 107 6.2 EFFICIENCY
JUSTIFICATIONS IN DETAIL 107 6.2.1 THE JUSTIFICATION PROMOTES
COMPETITION 107 6.2.2 THE JUSTIFICATION FAVOURS INTENT OVER POSSIBLE
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 108 6.2.2.1 GOODWILL PROTECTION 108 6.2.2.2 TRADEMARK
PROTECTION 110 6.2.3 SOME REMAINING JUSTIFICATIONS 112 7. CONCLUSIONS
113 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 4 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER EC LAW 115
1. A DUAL SYSTEM OF EX POST RULES 115 2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
TYING AND BUNDLING 117 3. A CRITICAL-HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 120 3.1 THE
EARLY CASES ON TYING AND BUNDLING 120 3.2 THE PER SE TEST OF THE 1980S
123 3.3 THE MODIFIED PER SE APPROACH OF THE 1990S 126 3.4 AN
EFFECT-BASED ANALYSIS FROM 2000 132 3.5 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 141 4. THE
SEPARATE-PRODUCT ISSUE 142 4.1 THE SIMPLE-PRODUCT TEST 143 4.2 THE
INTERCHANGEABILITY TEST 144 4.3 THE CONSUMER-DEMAND TEST 146 4.4 THE
INHERENT-LINK TEST 150 4.5 THE HISTORICAL-PRACTICES TEST 152 4.6 THE
CUSTOMARY-PRACTICES TEST 153 4.7 THE MULTI-FACTOR TEST 155 4.7.1 THE
OUTLINE OF THE NEW TEST 155 4.7.2 APPLYING THE NEW TEST TO MICROSOFT 156
5. A LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY TRILOGY 160 5.1 HILTI 160
5.2 TETRA PAK II 162 5.3 MICROSOFT 163 5.3.1 THE EFFECT ON COMPETITION
OF THE WINDOWS-WMP BUNDLE 163 5.3.2 THE REMEDY FAILS TO ADDRESS ALL
COMPETITION CONCERNS 167 6. CHOOSING A LEGAL STANDARD FOR TYING AND
BUNDLING 169 6.1 THE SOFTWARE-SPECIFIC TEST 170 6.2 THE PREDATION TEST
170 6.3 THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY TEST 171 6.4 THE MODIFIED PER SE LEGAL
TEST 174 6.5 A STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON TEST 176 7. CONCLUSIONS 178
PART III EX ANTE REGULATION 181 CHAPTER 5 TYING AND BUNDLING UNDER US
AND EC MERGER CONTROL 183 1. INTRODUCTION 183 2. AN OUTLINE OF THE US
AND EC MERGER RULES 183 TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 2.1 US MERGER CONTROL 183
2.2 EC MERGER CONTROL SYSTEM 185 3. TYING AND BUNDLING CONCERNS UNDER US
LAW 186 3.1 THE EARLY CASE LAW 186 3.2 THE ENTRENCHMENT THEORY OF THE
1970S 187 3.3 THE DECLINE OF MERGER ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1980S 190 3.4
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 192 4. THE EC APPROACH TOWARDS TYING AND BUNDLING
CONCERNS 192 4.1 THE EARLY STATEMENTS AND CASES 192 4.2 AN INCOHERENT
THEORY OF LEVERAGING HARM DURING THE 1990S 195 4.3 REFINEMENT OF THE
THEORY OF LEVERAGING HARM FROM 2000 202 5. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY OF
LEVERAGING HARM 216 5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 216 5.2 THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK IN DETAIL 218 5.3 US CRITICISM 222 5.4 DISCUSSION OF THE
NECESSITY OF EX ANTE CONTROL 224 6. CONCLUSIONS 226 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS 229 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 229 2. CONVERGENCES AND
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN US AND EC LAW 230 3. ECONOMICS AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF TYING AND BUNDLING 231 4. A STRUCTURED EFFECTS-BASED
RULE OF REASON TEST 232 5. PREFERENCE FOR EX POST CONTROL 234 6. A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE TYING AND BUNDLING TRILOGY 235 7. THE
COMMISSION'S DISCUSSION PAPER ON ARTICLE 82 236 7.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
236 7.2 THE COMMISSION'S PAPER 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY 241 TABLE OF CASES 257
INDEX 263 |
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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| geographic | Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten |
| geographic_facet | Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten |
| id | DE-604.BV022873406 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:48:11Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:07:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789041125750 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016078475 |
| oclc_num | 181656476 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | XXVII, 266 S. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Kluwer Law International |
| record_format | marc |
| series | International competition law series |
| series2 | International competition law series |
| spelling | Langer, Jurian Verfasser aut Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law by Jurian Langer Alphen an den Rijn Kluwer Law International 2007 XXVII, 266 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier International competition law series 30 Teilw. zugl.: European Univ. Inst., Diss., 2006 Concurrence - Droit européen ram Europees recht gtt Kartelrecht gtt Europarecht Antitrust law European Union countries Competition Europe Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content International competition law series 30 (DE-604)BV014209489 30 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016078475&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Langer, Jurian Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law International competition law series Concurrence - Droit européen ram Europees recht gtt Kartelrecht gtt Europarecht Antitrust law European Union countries Competition Europe Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |
| title_auth | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |
| title_exact_search | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |
| title_full | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law by Jurian Langer |
| title_fullStr | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law by Jurian Langer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law by Jurian Langer |
| title_short | Tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under EC competition law |
| title_sort | tying and bundling as a leveraging concern under ec competition law |
| topic | Concurrence - Droit européen ram Europees recht gtt Kartelrecht gtt Europarecht Antitrust law European Union countries Competition Europe Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries |
| topic_facet | Concurrence - Droit européen Europees recht Kartelrecht Europarecht Antitrust law European Union countries Competition Europe Competition, Unfair European Union countries Restraint of trade European Union countries Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016078475&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV014209489 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT langerjurian tyingandbundlingasaleveragingconcernundereccompetitionlaw |