Game theory:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
[2007]
|
| Ausgabe: | 12. print. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Beschreibung: | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262061414 9780262061414 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV022652862 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20191114 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070827s2007 d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0262061414 |9 0-262-06141-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780262061414 |9 978-0-262-06141-4 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)552374121 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV022652862 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-91 |a DE-20 |a DE-29T |a DE-739 |a DE-M382 | ||
| 084 | |a QH 430 |0 (DE-625)141581: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a SK 860 |0 (DE-625)143264: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MAT 920f |2 stub | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Fudenberg, Drew |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)170071790 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game theory |c Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| 250 | |a 12. print. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] |b MIT Press |c [2007] | |
| 300 | |a XXIII, 579 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Ökonometrie |0 (DE-588)4132280-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Ökonometrie |0 (DE-588)4132280-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tirole, Jean |d 1953- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)11488014X |4 aut | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Passau |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015858848&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015858848 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136830800494592 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I Static Games of Complete Information
1
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
1.1.1
Strategic-Form Games
1.1.2
Dominated Strategies
1.1.3
Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
1.2
Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1
Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2
Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3
Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4
Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto
Optimality
1.2.5
Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution
1.3
Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1
Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2
The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph
1.3.3
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
2
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium
2.1
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1
Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and
Properties
2.1.2
An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3
Rationalizability
2.1.4
Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5
Discussion
2.2
Correlated Equilibrium
2.3
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References
II
Dynamie
Games of Complete Information
65
3
Extensive-Form Games
67
3.1
Introduction
67
3.2
Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
70
Observed Actions
3.2.1
What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
70
3.2.2
Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
72
3.2.3
The Value of Commitment and Time Consistency
74
3.3
The Extensive Form
77
3.3.1
Definition
77
3.3.2
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
82
3.4
Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
83
3.4.1
Behavior Strategies
83
3.4.2
The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
Form Games
85
3.4.3
The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall
87
3.4.4
Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
90
3.5
Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
92
3.6
Critiques of Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
96
3.6.1
Critiques of Backward Induction
97
3.6.2
Critiques of
Subgame
Perfection
99
Exercises
100
References
105
4
Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Actions
107
4.1
Introduction
4.2
The Principle of Optimality and
Subgame
Perfection
4.3
A First Look at Repeated Games
4.3.1
The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
4.3.2
A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria
4.4
The
Rubinstein-Ståhl
Bargaining Model
4.4.1
A Subgame-
Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2
Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium
4.4.3
Comparative Statics
4.5
Simple Timing Games
4.5.1
Definition of Simple Timing Games
4.5.2
The War of Attrition
4.5.3
Preemption Games
Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game
128
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
130
4.7.1
Definitions
130
4.7.2
A Two-Period Example
132
4.7.3
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players
133
Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria
134
Exercises
138
References
141
Repeated Games
145
Repeated Games with Observable Actions
146
5.1.1
The Model
146
5.1.2
The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games
150
5.1.3
Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
160
Finitely Repeated Games
165
Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
168
5.3.1
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
168
5.3.2
Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
171
5.3.3
Randomly Matched Opponents
172
Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Repeated Games
174
5.4.1
Introduction
174
5.4.2
Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
176
5.4.3
Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games
179
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
182
5.5.1
The Model
183
5.5.2
Trigger-Price Strategies
185
5.5.3
Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
187
5.5.4
Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation
188
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
192
Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
197
Exercises
200
References
203
Static Games of Incomplete Information
207
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
Incomplete Information
209
Example
6.1:
Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Information
211
The Notions of Type and Strategy
213
Bayesian
Equilibrium
215
Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
215
Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
226
6.6.1
Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
226
6.6.2
Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance
228
Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
230
6.7.1
Examples
230
6.7.2
Purification Theorem
233
The Distributional Approach
234
Exercises
237
References
241
Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
243
Examples of Mechanism Design
246
7.1.1
Nonlinear Pricing
246
7.1.2
Auctions
250
Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle
253
Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
258
7.3.1
Implementable Decisions and Allocations
258
7.3.2
Optimal Mechanisms
262
Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations,
Budget Balance, and Efficiency
268
7.4.1
Feasibility under Budget Balance
269
7.4.2
Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
270
7.4.3
Efficiency Theorems
271
7.4.4
Inefficiency Theorems
275
7.4.5
Efficiency Limit Theorems
279
7.4.6
Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems
281
Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
284
7.5.1
Auctions
284
7.5.2
Efficient Bargaining Processes
288
Further Topics in Mechanism Design
292
7.6.1
Correlated Types
292
7.6.2
Risk Aversion
295
7.6.3
Informed Principal
297
7.6.4
Dynamic Mechanism Design
299
7.6.5
Common Agency
301
Appendix
303
Exercises
308
References
314
IV
Dynamie
Games of Incomplete Information
8
Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection
8.1
Introduction
8.2
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of
Incomplete Information
8.2.1
The Basic Signaling Game
8.2.2
Examples of Signaling Games
8.2.3
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and
Incomplete Information
8.3
Extensive-Form Refinements
8.3.1
Review of Game Trees
8.3.2
Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.3
Properties of Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.4
Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium
8.4
Strategic-Form Refinements
8.4.1
Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
8.4.2
Proper Equilibrium
Appendix
Exercises
References
9
Reputation Effects
9.1
Introduction
9.2
Games with a Single Long-Run Player
9.2.1
The Chain-Store Game
9.2.2
Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player:
The General Case
9.2.3
Extensive-Form Stage Games
9.3
Games with Many Long-Run Players
9.3.1
General Stage Games and General Reputations
9.3.2
Common-Interest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations
9.4
A Single Big Player against Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents
Exercises
References
10
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
10.1
Introduction
10.2
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
10.2.1
The Framework
10.2.2
A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics
10.2.3
An Infinite-Horizon Example of the
Coase
Conjecture
10.2.4
The Skimming Property
10.2.5
The Gap Case
10.2.6
The No-Gap Case
10.2.7
Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale
Model
10.3
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model
10.3.1
Short-Term Contracts
10.3.2
Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation
10.4
Price Offers by an Informed Buyer
10.4.1
One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information
10.4.2
Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information
10.4.3
Mechanism Design and Bargaining
Exercises
References
V Advanced Topics
11
More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
11.1
Strategic Stability
11.2
Signaling Games
11.3
Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and
Burning Money
11.4
Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty
Exercises
References
12
Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
12.1
Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
12.1.1
Number of Nash Equilibria
12.1.2
Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations
12.2
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
12.2.1
Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
12.2.2
Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
12.3
Supermodular
Games
489
Exercises
497
References
498
13
Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
13.1
Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
503
13.1.1
Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of
МРЕ
503
13.1.2
Separable Sequential Games
505
13.1.3
Examples from Economics
507
13.2
Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition
and Properties
513
13.2.1
Definition
513
13.2.2
Existence
515
13.2.3
Robustness to Payoff Perturbations
518
13.3
Differential Games
520
13.3.1
Definition
520
13.3.2
Equilibrium Conditions
521
13.3.3
Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
523
13.3.4
Technical Issues
525
13.3.5
Zero-Sum Differential Games
527
13.4
Capital-Accumulation Games
528
13.4.1
Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies
529
13.4.2
Differential-Game Strategies
534
Exercises
536
References
537
14
Common Knowledge and Games
541
14.1
Introduction
541
14.2
Knowledge and Common Knowledge
542
14.3
Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
546
14.3.1
The Dirty Faces and the Sage
547
14.3.2
Agreeing to Disagree
548
14.3.3
No-Speculation Theorems
550
14.3.4
Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts
554
14.4
Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and
the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
554
14.4.1
The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity
556
14.4.2
Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge
562
Exercises
570
References
571
Index
573
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I Static Games of Complete Information
1
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
1.1.1
Strategic-Form Games
1.1.2
Dominated Strategies
1.1.3
Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
1.2
Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1
Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2
Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3
Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4
Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto
Optimality
1.2.5
Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution
1.3
Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1
Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2
The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph
1.3.3
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
2
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium
2.1
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1
Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and
Properties
2.1.2
An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3
Rationalizability
2.1.4
Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5
Discussion
2.2
Correlated Equilibrium
2.3
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References
II
Dynamie
Games of Complete Information
65
3
Extensive-Form Games
67
3.1
Introduction
67
3.2
Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
70
Observed Actions
3.2.1
What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
70
3.2.2
Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
72
3.2.3
The Value of Commitment and "Time Consistency"
74
3.3
The Extensive Form
77
3.3.1
Definition
77
3.3.2
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
82
3.4
Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
83
3.4.1
Behavior Strategies
83
3.4.2
The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
Form Games
85
3.4.3
The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall
87
3.4.4
Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
90
3.5
Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
92
3.6
Critiques of Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
96
3.6.1
Critiques of Backward Induction
97
3.6.2
Critiques of
Subgame
Perfection
99
Exercises
100
References
105
4
Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Actions
107
4.1
Introduction
4.2
The Principle of Optimality and
Subgame
Perfection
4.3
A First Look at Repeated Games
4.3.1
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
4.3.2
A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria
4.4
The
Rubinstein-Ståhl
Bargaining Model
4.4.1
A Subgame-
Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2
Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium
4.4.3
Comparative Statics
4.5
Simple Timing Games
4.5.1
Definition of Simple Timing Games
4.5.2
The War of Attrition
4.5.3
Preemption Games
Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game
128
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
130
4.7.1
Definitions
130
4.7.2
A Two-Period Example
132
4.7.3
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players
133
Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria
134
Exercises
138
References
141
Repeated Games
145
Repeated Games with Observable Actions
146
5.1.1
The Model
146
5.1.2
The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games
150
5.1.3
Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
160
Finitely Repeated Games
165
Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
168
5.3.1
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
168
5.3.2
Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
171
5.3.3
Randomly Matched Opponents
172
Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Repeated Games
174
5.4.1
Introduction
174
5.4.2
Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
176
5.4.3
Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games
179
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
182
5.5.1
The Model
183
5.5.2
Trigger-Price Strategies
185
5.5.3
Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
187
5.5.4
Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation
188
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
192
Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
197
Exercises
200
References
203
Static Games of Incomplete Information
207
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
Incomplete Information
209
Example
6.1:
Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Information
211
The Notions of Type and Strategy
213
Bayesian
Equilibrium
215
Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
215
Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
226
6.6.1
Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
226
6.6.2
Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance
228
Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
230
6.7.1
Examples
230
6.7.2
Purification Theorem
233
The Distributional Approach
234
Exercises
237
References
241
Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
243
Examples of Mechanism Design
246
7.1.1
Nonlinear Pricing
246
7.1.2
Auctions
250
Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle
253
Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
258
7.3.1
Implementable Decisions and Allocations
258
7.3.2
Optimal Mechanisms
262
Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations,
Budget Balance, and Efficiency
268
7.4.1
Feasibility under Budget Balance
269
7.4.2
Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
270
7.4.3
Efficiency Theorems
271
7.4.4
Inefficiency Theorems
275
7.4.5
Efficiency Limit Theorems
279
7.4.6
Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems
281
Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
284
7.5.1
Auctions
284
7.5.2
Efficient Bargaining Processes
288
Further Topics in Mechanism Design
292
7.6.1
Correlated Types
292
7.6.2
Risk Aversion
295
7.6.3
Informed Principal
297
7.6.4
Dynamic Mechanism Design
299
7.6.5
Common Agency
301
Appendix
303
Exercises
308
References
314
IV
Dynamie
Games of Incomplete Information
8
Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection
8.1
Introduction
8.2
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of
Incomplete Information
8.2.1
The Basic Signaling Game
8.2.2
Examples of Signaling Games
8.2.3
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and
Incomplete Information
8.3
Extensive-Form Refinements
8.3.1
Review of Game Trees
8.3.2
Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.3
Properties of Sequential Equilibrium
8.3.4
Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium
8.4
Strategic-Form Refinements
8.4.1
Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
8.4.2
Proper Equilibrium
Appendix
Exercises
References
9
Reputation Effects
9.1
Introduction
9.2
Games with a Single Long-Run Player
9.2.1
The Chain-Store Game
9.2.2
Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player:
The General Case
9.2.3
Extensive-Form Stage Games
9.3
Games with Many Long-Run Players
9.3.1
General Stage Games and General Reputations
9.3.2
Common-Interest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations
9.4
A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents
Exercises
References
10
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
10.1
Introduction
10.2
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
10.2.1
The Framework
10.2.2
A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics
10.2.3
An Infinite-Horizon Example of the
Coase
Conjecture
10.2.4
The Skimming Property
10.2.5
The Gap Case
10.2.6
The No-Gap Case
10.2.7
Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale
Model
10.3
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model
10.3.1
Short-Term Contracts
10.3.2
Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation
10.4
Price Offers by an Informed Buyer
10.4.1
One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information
10.4.2
Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information
10.4.3
Mechanism Design and Bargaining
Exercises
References
V Advanced Topics
11
More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
11.1
Strategic Stability
11.2
Signaling Games
11.3
Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and
"Burning Money"
11.4
Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty
Exercises
References
12
Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
12.1
Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
12.1.1
Number of Nash Equilibria
12.1.2
Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations
12.2
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
12.2.1
Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
12.2.2
Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
12.3
Supermodular
Games
489
Exercises
497
References
498
13
Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
13.1
Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
503
13.1.1
Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of
МРЕ
503
13.1.2
Separable Sequential Games
505
13.1.3
Examples from Economics
507
13.2
Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition
and Properties
513
13.2.1
Definition
513
13.2.2
Existence
515
13.2.3
Robustness to Payoff Perturbations
518
13.3
Differential Games
520
13.3.1
Definition
520
13.3.2
Equilibrium Conditions
521
13.3.3
Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
523
13.3.4
Technical Issues
525
13.3.5
Zero-Sum Differential Games
527
13.4
Capital-Accumulation Games
528
13.4.1
Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies
529
13.4.2
Differential-Game Strategies
534
Exercises
536
References
537
14
Common Knowledge and Games
541
14.1
Introduction
541
14.2
Knowledge and Common Knowledge
542
14.3
Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
546
14.3.1
The Dirty Faces and the Sage
547
14.3.2
Agreeing to Disagree
548
14.3.3
No-Speculation Theorems
550
14.3.4
Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts
554
14.4
Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and
the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
554
14.4.1
The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity
556
14.4.2
Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge
562
Exercises
570
References
571
Index
573 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170071790 (DE-588)11488014X |
| author_facet | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- |
| author_variant | d f df j t jt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022652862 |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 SK 860 |
| classification_tum | MAT 920f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)552374121 (DE-599)BVBBV022652862 |
| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 12. print. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01702nam a2200421 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022652862</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20191114 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070827s2007 d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0262061414</subfield><subfield code="9">0-262-06141-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780262061414</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-262-06141-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)552374121</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022652862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29T</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 430</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141581:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 860</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143264:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAT 920f</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fudenberg, Drew</subfield><subfield code="d">1957-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170071790</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield><subfield code="c">Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">12. print.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">MIT Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2007]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXIII, 579 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4132280-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4132280-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tirole, Jean</subfield><subfield code="d">1953-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)11488014X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Passau</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015858848&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015858848</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV022652862 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:22:09Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:02:38Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262061414 9780262061414 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015858848 |
| oclc_num | 552374121 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-20 DE-29T DE-739 DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-20 DE-29T DE-739 DE-M382 |
| physical | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)170071790 aut Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole 12. print. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press [2007] XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 s 1\p DE-604 Tirole, Jean 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)11488014X aut Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015858848&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- Game theory Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4132280-0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Game theory |
| title_auth | Game theory |
| title_exact_search | Game theory |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Game theory |
| title_full | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_fullStr | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_short | Game theory |
| title_sort | game theory |
| topic | Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrie Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015858848&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fudenbergdrew gametheory AT tirolejean gametheory |