The measure of mind: propositional attitudes and their attribution
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford University Press
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | X, 267 S. |
| ISBN: | 0199211256 9780199211258 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The measure of mind |b propositional attitudes and their attribution |c Robert J. Matthews |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS 1. A PROSPEETIVE INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE
RECEIVED VIEW 1 1.2. TROUBLES WITH THE RECEIVED VIEW 4 1.3. THE
PERSISTENCE OF THE RECEIVED VIEW: THE RELATIONALIST CONCEPTION 5 1.4. A
MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF THE ATTITUDES 8 1.5. THE EMPIRICAL
STRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES: THE ATTITUDES AS INTENTIONAL APTITUDES 11
1.6. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT 14 1.7. A FINAL
ADVERTISEMENT 15 I. THE RECEIVED VIEW AND ITS TROUBLES 2. THE RECEIVED
VIEW 19 2.1. THE BASIC T ENETS 19 2.2. THREE ENTAILMENTS 24 2.3.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 26 2.4. RECAP 35 3. TROUBLES WITH THE
RECEIVED VIEW 36 3.1. THE EMPIRICAL STATUS OF THE RECEIVED VIEW 36 3.2.
THINKERS AS REPRESENTATION-USING SYSTEMS 38 3.3. EXPLICIT REPRESENTATION
44 3.4. WHY BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE DOESN T SUFFICE 51 3.5. THE ARGUMENT
FROM LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE 55 3.5.1. PSYCHOLINGUISTICS:A TEST CASE FOR
CLAIMS OF EMPIRICAL SUPPORT 55 3.5.2. SPEAKERSAS
REPRESENTATION-USINGSYSTEMS 56 3.5.3. BRESNANAND KAPLAN SSTRONG
COMPETENCE HYPOTHESIS 57 3.5.4. THE RIGHT VIEWACCORDINGTO FODOR 60
3.5.5. THE COMPUTATIONAL REALIZATIONOF GRAMMARS 63 VLLL CONTENTS 3.6.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CENTRAL PROCESSING: THEORIES OF HUMAN REASONING 69
3.6.1. KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: EXPLAINING AWAY THE POTENTIAL
COUNTEREXAMPLES 69 3.6.2. CENTRAL PROCESSES 70 3.6.3. THEORIES OF
OEDUCTIVE REASONING 71 3.6.4. MENTAL LOGIC THEORIES OFOEDUCTIVE
REASONING 74 3.6.5. 00 MENTAL LOGIC THEORIES PROVIDE AUY SUPPON FOR THE
RECEIVED VIEW? 78 3.6.6. A CONCLUDING REMARK 84 3.7. EXPLAINING AWAY
APPARENT COUNTEREXARNPLES: FODOR S WAY 84 3.8. THE ABDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
FOR THE RECEIVED VIEW: THE STRIKING PARALLELISM 90 3.9. THE PERSISTENCE
OF THE RECEIVED VIEW 92 3.10. A WEAKER, NON-REDUCTIVE CONSTRUAL
OFPROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 94 4. ARE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES RELATIONS?
97 4.1. THE RECEIVED VIEW S RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE ATTITUDES 97
4.2. THE RELATIONAL LOGICAL FORM OF BELIEF SENTENCES 99 4.3. PROBLEMS
WITH THE RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OFBELIEF 102 4.4. SEMANTIC VS.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTS OFBELIEF 110 4.5. READING BACK LOGICAL FORM: THE
PROBLEM FOR RELATIONALISTS 115 4.6. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORT OFLOGICAL
FORM: A MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC WAY OFTHINKING ABOUT THE ISSUE 117 11. A
MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR
ATTRIBUTION 5. FOUNDATIONS OF A MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF THE
ATTITUDES 123 5.1. THE BASIC IDEA 123 5.2. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OFMEASUREMENT THEORY 128 5.3. HOMOMORPHISMS AND OTHER STRUETURAL
RELATIONS 133 5.4. REPRESENTATION, ABSTRACTION, IDEALIZATION, AND
REPRESENTATIONAL ATTIFACTS 138 CONTENTS IX 5.5. A SECOND-ORDER
INTENSIONAL VERSION OFMEASUREMENT THOORY 1~ 5.6. MEASUREMENT THEORY AND
MEASURE PREDICATES 144 5.7. THE KNOWLEDGE AFFORDED BY MEASUREMENT THEORY
147 6. THE BASIC MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT 150 6.1. WHY
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE PREDICATES MIGHT BE MEASURE PREDICATES 150 6.2.
MEASURING PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 155 6.3. GOALS AND STRATEGY 159 6.4.
THE STRUCTURE OFNATURAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATIONS OF PROPOSITIONAL
ATTITUDES 161 6.4.1. THE REPRESENTATIONALDOMAIN 161 6.4.2. PROPERTIESAND
RELATIONSOFREPRESENTATIVESOFPROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 169 6.4.3. RECAP 172
6.5. THE EMPIRICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES: WHAT ARE NATURAL LANGUAGE
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ATTITUDES IMAGES OF? 173 6.5.1. INFERRING THE
EMPIRICALSTRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES 173 6.5.2. PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE
ATTRIBUTIONS AND THEIR USE 175 6.5.3. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES, THEIR
BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS, AND IUFS 176 6.5.4. THE EMPIRICALSTRUCTURE OF
THE ATTITUDES 184 6.5.5. RECAP 195 6.6. INFORMAL SKETCH OF A
REPRESENTATION THEOREM 195 6.7. THE UNIQUENESS PROBLEM: WHEN HAVE WE
ATTRIBUTED THE SAME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE? 201 6.8. RECAP 210 7.
ELABORATION AND EXPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC
ACCOUNT 213 7.1. THE EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY OF THE ACCOUNT 214 7.1.1. WHAT
HAVING A PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE AMOUNTS TO 215 7.1.2. THE
ESSENTIAL PROPENIES OF PROPOSITIONALATTITUDES 216 7.1.3. WHY WE HAVE
THE PARTICULAR PREDICATIONSCHEMETHAC WEDO 223 7.1.4. ROLE OF ATTITUDE
ATTRIBUTIONS IN COMMON-SENSE CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS 227 X CONTENTS 7.1.5.
PUZZLESABOUT PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 230 7.1.6. ITERATED
PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 235 7.2. THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF THE
ATTITUDES 237 7.3. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES IN EMPIRICAL COMPUTATIONAL
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A MINIMALIST ACCOUNT OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ENTAILMENTS
OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 242 7.4. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF
THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT 249 7.4.1. INTENTIONAL REALISMAND THE
NATURALIZATION PROJEET 249 7.4.2. INTENTIONAL CONTENT ESSENTIALISM 251
7.4.3. PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE-BASEDSEMANTICSPROGRAMMES 253 7.4.4.
SCHIFF ER S AND FODOR S TRANSLATIONAL SEMANTICS PROGRAMME 253 7.5.
SUMMARY REMARKS 255 REFERENCES INDEX 257 265
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS 1. A PROSPEETIVE INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE
RECEIVED VIEW 1 1.2. TROUBLES WITH THE RECEIVED VIEW 4 1.3. THE
PERSISTENCE OF THE RECEIVED VIEW: THE RELATIONALIST CONCEPTION 5 1.4. A
MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF THE ATTITUDES 8 1.5. THE EMPIRICAL
STRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES: THE ATTITUDES AS INTENTIONAL APTITUDES 11
1.6. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT 14 1.7. A FINAL
ADVERTISEMENT 15 I. THE RECEIVED VIEW AND ITS TROUBLES 2. THE RECEIVED
VIEW 19 2.1. THE BASIC T ENETS 19 2.2. THREE ENTAILMENTS 24 2.3.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 26 2.4. RECAP 35 3. TROUBLES WITH THE
RECEIVED VIEW 36 3.1. THE EMPIRICAL STATUS OF THE RECEIVED VIEW 36 3.2.
THINKERS AS REPRESENTATION-USING SYSTEMS 38 3.3. EXPLICIT REPRESENTATION
44 3.4. WHY BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE DOESN'T SUFFICE 51 3.5. THE ARGUMENT
FROM LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE 55 3.5.1. PSYCHOLINGUISTICS:A TEST CASE FOR
CLAIMS OF EMPIRICAL SUPPORT 55 3.5.2. SPEAKERSAS
REPRESENTATION-USINGSYSTEMS 56 3.5.3. BRESNANAND KAPLAN'SSTRONG
COMPETENCE HYPOTHESIS 57 3.5.4. THE RIGHT VIEWACCORDINGTO FODOR 60
3.5.5. THE COMPUTATIONAL REALIZATIONOF GRAMMARS 63 VLLL CONTENTS 3.6.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CENTRAL PROCESSING: THEORIES OF HUMAN REASONING 69
3.6.1. KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: EXPLAINING AWAY THE POTENTIAL
COUNTEREXAMPLES 69 3.6.2. CENTRAL PROCESSES 70 3.6.3. THEORIES OF
OEDUCTIVE REASONING 71 3.6.4. MENTAL LOGIC THEORIES OFOEDUCTIVE
REASONING 74 3.6.5. 00 MENTAL LOGIC THEORIES PROVIDE AUY SUPPON FOR THE
RECEIVED VIEW? 78 3.6.6. A CONCLUDING REMARK 84 3.7. EXPLAINING AWAY
APPARENT COUNTEREXARNPLES: FODOR'S WAY 84 3.8. THE ABDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
FOR THE RECEIVED VIEW: THE STRIKING PARALLELISM 90 3.9. THE PERSISTENCE
OF THE RECEIVED VIEW 92 3.10. A WEAKER, NON-REDUCTIVE CONSTRUAL
OFPROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 94 4. ARE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES RELATIONS?
97 4.1. THE RECEIVED VIEW' S RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE ATTITUDES 97
4.2. THE RELATIONAL LOGICAL FORM OF BELIEF SENTENCES 99 4.3. PROBLEMS
WITH THE RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OFBELIEF 102 4.4. SEMANTIC VS.
PSYCHOLOGICAL 'OBJECTS' OFBELIEF 110 4.5. READING BACK LOGICAL FORM: THE
PROBLEM FOR RELATIONALISTS 115 4.6. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORT OFLOGICAL
FORM: A MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC WAY OFTHINKING ABOUT THE ISSUE 117 11. A
MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR
ATTRIBUTION 5. FOUNDATIONS OF A MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF THE
ATTITUDES 123 5.1. THE BASIC IDEA 123 5.2. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OFMEASUREMENT THEORY 128 5.3. HOMOMORPHISMS AND OTHER STRUETURAL
RELATIONS 133 5.4. REPRESENTATION, ABSTRACTION, IDEALIZATION, AND
REPRESENTATIONAL ATTIFACTS 138 CONTENTS IX 5.5. A SECOND-ORDER
INTENSIONAL VERSION OFMEASUREMENT THOORY 1~ 5.6. MEASUREMENT THEORY AND
MEASURE PREDICATES 144 5.7. THE KNOWLEDGE AFFORDED BY MEASUREMENT THEORY
147 6. THE BASIC MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC ACCOUNT 150 6.1. WHY
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE PREDICATES MIGHT BE MEASURE PREDICATES 150 6.2.
MEASURING PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 155 6.3. GOALS AND STRATEGY 159 6.4.
THE STRUCTURE OFNATURAL LANGUAGE REPRESENTATIONS OF PROPOSITIONAL
ATTITUDES 161 6.4.1. THE REPRESENTATIONALDOMAIN 161 6.4.2. PROPERTIESAND
RELATIONSOFREPRESENTATIVESOFPROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 169 6.4.3. RECAP 172
6.5. THE EMPIRICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES: WHAT ARE NATURAL LANGUAGE
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ATTITUDES IMAGES OF? 173 6.5.1. INFERRING THE
EMPIRICALSTRUCTURE OF THE ATTITUDES 173 6.5.2. PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE
ATTRIBUTIONS AND THEIR USE 175 6.5.3. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES, THEIR
BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS, AND IUFS 176 6.5.4. THE EMPIRICALSTRUCTURE OF
THE ATTITUDES 184 6.5.5. RECAP 195 6.6. INFORMAL SKETCH OF A
REPRESENTATION THEOREM 195 6.7. THE UNIQUENESS PROBLEM: WHEN HAVE WE
ATTRIBUTED THE SAME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE? 201 6.8. RECAP 210 7.
ELABORATION AND EXPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED MEASUREMENT- THEORETIC
ACCOUNT 213 7.1. THE EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY OF THE ACCOUNT 214 7.1.1. WHAT
HAVING A PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE AMOUNTS TO 215 7.1.2. THE
'ESSENTIAL'PROPENIES OF PROPOSITIONALATTITUDES 216 7.1.3. WHY WE HAVE
THE PARTICULAR PREDICATIONSCHEMETHAC WEDO 223 7.1.4. ROLE OF ATTITUDE
ATTRIBUTIONS IN COMMON-SENSE CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS 227 X CONTENTS 7.1.5.
PUZZLESABOUT PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 230 7.1.6. ITERATED
PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 235 7.2. THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF THE
ATTITUDES 237 7.3. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES IN EMPIRICAL COMPUTATIONAL
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A MINIMALIST ACCOUNT OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ENTAILMENTS
OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS 242 7.4. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF
THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT 249 7.4.1. INTENTIONAL REALISMAND THE
NATURALIZATION PROJEET 249 7.4.2. INTENTIONAL CONTENT ESSENTIALISM 251
7.4.3. PROPOSITIONALATTITUDE-BASEDSEMANTICSPROGRAMMES 253 7.4.4.
SCHIFF"ER'S AND FODOR'S TRANSLATIONAL SEMANTICS PROGRAMME 253 7.5.
SUMMARY REMARKS 255 REFERENCES INDEX 257 265 |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:00:12Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:59:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0199211256 9780199211258 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Matthews, Robert J. Verfasser aut The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution Robert J. Matthews 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford University Press 2007 X, 267 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Attributie gtt Cognitie gtt Proposition (Logique) Propositionele attitudes gtt Proposition (Logic) Propositionale Einstellung (DE-588)4407952-7 gnd rswk-swf Propositionale Einstellung (DE-588)4407952-7 s DE-604 V:DE-604 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015720314&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Matthews, Robert J. The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution Attributie gtt Cognitie gtt Proposition (Logique) Propositionele attitudes gtt Proposition (Logic) Propositionale Einstellung (DE-588)4407952-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4407952-7 |
| title | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| title_auth | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| title_exact_search | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| title_full | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution Robert J. Matthews |
| title_fullStr | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution Robert J. Matthews |
| title_full_unstemmed | The measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution Robert J. Matthews |
| title_short | The measure of mind |
| title_sort | the measure of mind propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| title_sub | propositional attitudes and their attribution |
| topic | Attributie gtt Cognitie gtt Proposition (Logique) Propositionele attitudes gtt Proposition (Logic) Propositionale Einstellung (DE-588)4407952-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Attributie Cognitie Proposition (Logique) Propositionele attitudes Proposition (Logic) Propositionale Einstellung |
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