Economics and information systems:
Saved in:
| Format: | Book |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Amsterdam u.a.
Elsevier
2006
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| Edition: | 1. ed. |
| Series: | Handbooks in information systems
1 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Publisher description Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXI, 666 S. |
| ISBN: | 0444517715 9780444517715 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Economics and information systems |c ed. by T. Hendershott |
| 250 | |a 1. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Amsterdam u.a. |b Elsevier |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a XXI, 666 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Handbooks in information systems |v 1 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Information theory in economics | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hendershott, Terrence |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Handbooks in information systems |v 1 |w (DE-604)BV022432141 |9 1 | |
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1804136287773392896 |
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| adam_text | CONTENTS INTRODUCTION XV CHAPTER 1 DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES TO BUSINESSES C. FORMAN AND A. GOLDFARB 1 1.
INTRODUCTION 1 2. ICT DIFFUSION AND ITS IMPACT 4 2.1. DIFFUSION MODELING
4 2.2. THE IMPACT OF ICT DIFFUSION 8 3. ICT ADOPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS 9 3.1. ADOPTION, INTERNAL FIRM ORGANIZATION, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 9 3.2. ADOPTION AND FIRM BOUNDARIES 14 3.3.
ADOPTION AND SIZE 17 3.4. TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18 3.5. ADOPTION,
ASSIMILATION, INTRA-NRM DIFFUSION, AND USAGE 19 4. GEOGRAPHIC
DIFFERENCES IN ADOPTION 21 4.1. ADOPTION OF ICT ACROSS URBAN AND RURAL
AREAS 23 4.2. EVIDENCE OF HOW ICT USE INFLUENCES LOCATION PATTERNS 24
4.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 24 5. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN ORGANIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENT 25 ; 5.1. CO-INVENTION 26 5.2, STRATEGIC ISSUES IN
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 28 6. NETWORK EFFECTS 30 6.1. THEORETICAL LITERATURE
ON DIRECT AND INDIRECT NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 32 6.2. EVIDENCE OF NETWORK
EFFECTS OF ANY KIND IN ICT 33 6.3. EVIDENCE OF POSITIVE NETWORK
EXTERNALITIES IN ICT 35 7. INTERNET DIFFUSION ACROSS COUNTRIES 37 8.
CONCLUSION 42 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 43 REFERENCES 43 CHAPTER 2 ECONOMICS OF
DATA COMMUNICATIONS P. AFECHE 53 1. INTRODUCTION 53 2. PROBLEM
DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK 56 2.1. SERVICE DEMAND 57 2.2J.
SERVICE CONTRACTS: QOS GUARANTEES AND SERVICE DESIGNS 59 VI CONTENTS
2.3. SERVICE PRODUCTION 63 2.4. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES IN COMPARISON TO
TELEPHONY 67 2.5. PRICING DECISIONS 67 2.6. DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK 71 3.
PRICING GUARANTEED SERVICES . 73 3.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND OVERVIEW 73
3.2. BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 15 3.3. INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 78 3.4. MORE DIFFERENTIATION 78 3.5.
OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PRICING 80 3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS 81 4. PRICING
BEST EFFORT SERVICES 83 4.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND OVERVIEW 83 4.2.
BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 89 4.3. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 95 4.4. MORE DIFFERENTIATION 100 4.5. OPTIMAL
DYNAMIC PRICING 105 4.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS 105 5. PRICING
FLEXIBLE BANDWIDTH-SHARING SERVICES 106 5.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND
OVERVIEW 106 5.2. BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 109 5.3.
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 111 5.4. MORE
DIFFERENTIATION 115 5.5. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PRICING 115 5.6. CONCLUSIONS
AND DIRECTIONS 117 6. DISCUSSION 118 6.1. AUCTIONS VERSUS POSTED PRICES
118 6.2. FLAT-RATE VERSUS USAGE-BASED PRICING 124 6.3. PROVIDING QOS:
OVERPROVISIONING VERSUS CONTROL 126 7. CONCLUSIONS . 128 7.1. RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS 128 7.2. FURTHER TOPICS AND READINGS 129 REFERENCES 129
CHAPTER 3 FIRMS AND NETWORKS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS D. F. SPULBER 137 1.
INTRODUCTION 137 2. FIRMS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS 140 2.1. FIRMS IN
TWO-SIDED MARKETS: MATCHMAKING 142 2.2. FIRMS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS:
MARKET MAKING 143 2.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PLATFORMS 147 3. NETWORKS
IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS 151 3.1. TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKS IN TWO-SIDED
MARKETS 151 3.2. BASICS OF NETWORK THEORY 154 4. ASSIGNMENTS OF BUYERS
AND SELLERS IN A NETWORK: COSTLY COMMUNICATION 156 CONTENTS VII 4.1.
ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 157 4.2. ASSIGNMENTS WITH
DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 161 4.3. SECOND-BEST ASSIGNMENTS 165 5. NETWORKS
AND THE CORE IN A TWO-SIDED MARKET 166 5.1. THE CORE WITH HOMOGENOUS
PRODUCTS 166 5.2, THE CORE WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 167 6. STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS IN A DECENTRALIZED TWO-SIDED MARKET: COSTLY COMPUTATION 168
6.1. STABLE ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 169 6.2. STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 172 7. FIRMS .AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS IN A CENTRALIZED TWO-SIDED MARKET 173 7.1. FIRMS AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 174 7.2. FIRMS AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 179 8. MATCHMAKING AND MARKET
MAKING BY A FIRM USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS 181 8.1. MARKET MAKING BY A FIRM
USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS FOR HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 182 8.2. MATCHMAKING AND
MARKET MAKING BY A FIRM USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS FOR DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS 183 9. TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN RANDOM NETWORKS 188 9.1. SEARCH AND
RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS 188 9.2. MARKETS AND RANDOM NETWORKS 193 10.
CONCLUSION 196 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 197 REFERENCES 197 CHAPTER 4 ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE T. MARSCHAK 201 1. INTRODUCTION 201 2. GOALS, MECHANISMS, AND
INFORMATIONAL COSTS: THE INCENTIVE-FREE CASE, WHERE INDIVIDUALS OBEY
THE DESIGNER S RULES WITHOUT INDUCEMENT 204 2.1. TWO GENERAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR JUDGING THE ORGANIZATION S ACTIONS 204 2.2. HOW THE ORGANIZATION
FINDS ITS CURRENT ACTION WHEN INCENTIVES ARE NOT AN ISSUE 207 2.3.
FINITE APPROXIMATIONS OF MECHANISMS WHOSE MESSAGE SPACES ARE CONTINUA
230 2.4. THE DYNAMICS OF A MECHANISM 233 2.5. CONSTRUCTING AN
INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT MECHANISM 236 2.6. FINDING A BEST ACTION RULE
(OUTCOME FUNCTION) ONCE A MECHANISM HAS CONVEYED INFORMATION ABOUT THE
ENVIRONMENT TO EACH PERSON: THE METHODS OF THE THEORY OF TEAMS 238 2.7.
DESIGNING AN ORGANIZATION FROM SCRATCH : CHOOSING ITS MEMBERS, WHAT
EACH OBSERVES, AND THE SPEAK-ONCE-ONLY MECHANISM THAT THEY USE 240 3.
MODELS IN WHICH THE DESIGNER IS CONCERNED WITH INCENTIVES AS WELL AS
INFORMATIONAL COSTS 264 3.1. THE MESSAGE-SPACE SIZE REQUIRED FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF A GOAL 265 VIII CONTENTS 3.2. MODELS IN WHICH THE
ORGANIZATION S MECHANISM IS PARTLY DESIGNED BY ITS SELF-INTERESTED
MEMBERS, WHO BEAR SOME OF THE INFORMATIONAL COSTS 266 3.3. NETWORKS OF
SELF-INTERESTED DECISION-MAKERS, WHO BEAR THE NETWORK S INFORMATIONAL
COSTS 275 4. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS IN WHICH THE PRIMITIVE IS A TASK ,
PROBLEM , PROJECT , OR ITEM 278 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 280 REFERENCES
281 CHAPTER 5 OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: THE NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PARADIGM S. M. MAURER AND S. SCOTCHMER L. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. INTRODUCTION
INCENTIVES FOR R&D 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE OWN USE COMPLEMENTARY GOODS AND SERVICES
SIGNALING EDUCATION ACHIEVING NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND DENYING THEM TO
OTHERS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY STABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 3.1. 3,2.
3.3. 3.4. 3.5. WHO CONTRIBUTES, AND HOW MUCH? WHO PAYS? WHY LICENSES?
WHY LEADERSHIP? NETWORK EFFECTS EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS 4.1. 4.2. 4.3.
4.4. 4.5. 4.6. DISCLOSURE OF CODE MEETING USERS* NEEDS DEADWEIGHT LOSS
AND PRICING TRAINING AND USING PROGRAMMERS FREE RIDING MODULARITY AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT OPEN SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY
SOFTWARE 5.1. 5.2. COMPETITION BETWEEN OPEN SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY
SOFTWARE MARKET SEGMENTATION LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 6.1. 6.2. LIMITS
TO OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE BEYOND SOFTWARE: DRUG DISCOVERY, GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND WIKIPEDIA CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS REFERENCES
285 285 287 288 290 290 293 295 295 296 300 300 301 302 304 305 * 306
306 307 308 308 310 310 312 312 314 315 315 315 318 319 319 CONTENTS IX
CHAPTER 6 INFORMATION, SEARCH, AND PRICE DISPERSION M. R. BAYE, J.
MORGAN, AND P. SCHOLTEN , 323 1. INTRODUCTION 323 2. THEORETICAL MODELS
OF PRICE DISPERSION 331 2.1. SEARCH-THEORETIC MODELS OF PRICE DISPERSION
332 2.1.1. THE STIGLER MODEL 333 2.1.2. THE ROTHSCHILD CRITIQUE AND
DIAMOND S PARADOX 336 2.1.3. THE REINGANUM MODEL AND OPTIMAL SEQUENTIAL
SEARCH 338 2.1.4. REMARKS ON FIXED VERSUS SEQUENTIAL SEARCH 343 2.1.5.
THE MACMINN MODEL 343 2.1.6. THE BURDETT AND JUDD MODEL 346 2.2. MODELS
WITH AN INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE 348 2.2.1. THE ROSENTHAL MODEL 351
2.2.2. THE VARIAN MODEL 352 2.2.3. THE BAYE AND MORGAN MODEL 354 2.2.4.
MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC CONSUMERS 357 2.5.5. COST HETEROGENEITIES AND THE
SPULBER MODEL 357 2.3. BOUNDED RATIONALITY MODELS OF PRICE DISPERSION
358 2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THEORY 359 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE
DISPERSION 360 3.1. MEASURING PRICE DISPERSION 360 3.2. PRICE DISPERSION
IN THE FIELD 363 3.2.1. DISPERSION AND THE BENEFITS OF SEARCH 363
3.2.2. DISPERSION AND THE COST OF SEARCH 365 3.2.3. DISPERSION AND THE
NUMBER OF SELLERS 367 3.2.4. DISPERSION AND PRICE PERSISTENCE 369 3.3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: EMPIRICS 370 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 371 REFERENCES 371
CHAPTER 7 BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CUSTOMER RECOGNITION
D. FUDENBERG AND J. M. VILLAS-BOAS 377 1. INTRODUCTION 377 2. MONOPOLY
379 2.1. TWO-PERIOD MODEL 380 BASE MODEL 380 NO CUSTOMER RECOGNITION 382
CUSTOMER RECOGNITION AND BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION 382 THE
ROLE OF COMMITMENT 383 2.2. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF CONSUMERS 384 NO
CONSTANT PRICES IN EQUILIBRIUM 386 PRICE CYCLES IN EQUILIBRIUM 387 2.3.
LONG-LIVED CONSUMERS 389 X CONTENTS LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 391 RELATIONSHIP
TO DURABLE GOODS AND BARGAINING 393 2.4. TWO-GOOD MONOPOLY 396 3.
COMPETITION 398 3.1. TWO PERIODS, SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS * 399 ANALYSIS OF
THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL UNDER THE MHR ASSUMPTION 400 DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS
403 WELFARE 404 3.2. INFINITE LIVED FIRMS, OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF
CONSUMERS, AND SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS 404 3.3. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 406
3.4. SWITCHING COSTS 408 4. BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICING WITH MULTIPLE
PRODUCTS, AND PRODUCT DESIGN 413 4.1. UPGRADES AND BUYBACKS WITH AN
ANONYMOUS SECOND-HANDMARKET 414 4.2. UPGRADES AND BUYBACKS WITH
NON-ANONYMOUS CONSUMERS 417 4.3. ENDOGENOUS INNOVATION 418 4.4.
ENDOGENOUS LOCATION CHOICE IN DUOPOLY 420 5. RELATED TOPICS: PRIVACY,
CREDIT MARKETS, AND CUSTOMIZED PRICING 422 5.1. PRIVACY 422 5.2. CREDIT
MARKETS 426 5.3. CUSTOMIZED PRICING 429 6. CONCLUSION . 431
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 433 REFERENCES 433 CHAPTER 8 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
SWITCHING COSTS PEI-YU CHEN AND L. M. HITT . 437 1. INTRODUCTION , 438
2. SWITCHING COST; DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 440 3. SWITCHING
COSTS, COMPETITION, AND FIRM STRATEGY 444 3.1. SWITCHING COSTS AND
COMPETITION 444 3.2. ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING COSTS 444 3.3. SWITCHING COSTS
IN INFORMATION-INTENSIVE MARKETS 445 3.4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 448
SWITCHING COSTS IN SOFTWARE AND OTHER HIGH-TECH MARKETS 449 SWITCHING
COSTS IN ONLINE MARKETS 450 4. ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING COSTS AND FIRM
STRATEGY IN INFORMATION-INTENSIVE MARKETS 451 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR
MANAGING SWITCHING COSTS 455 5.1. INTRODUCTION 455 5.2. A MODEL OF
CUSTOMER RETENTION 457 5.3. MEASURING SWITCHING COSTS 461 6. CONCLUSION
464 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 466 REFERENCES 467 CONTENTS XI CHAPTER 9 THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY K.-L. HUI AND I.P.L. PNG 471 1. INTRODUCTION 471 2.
FREE MARKET APPROACH 475 3. WITHIN-MARKET CONSEQUENTIAL EXTERNALITIES
476 3.1. NON-PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION 477 3.2. PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION 480
4. CROSS-MARKET CONSEQUENTIAL EXTERNALITIES 481 5. DIRECT-EXTERNALITIES
483 6. PROPERTY RIGHTS 485 7. REGULATION 487 8. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE . 489
9. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 492 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 493 REFERENCES 493 CHAPTER 10
PRODUCT BUNDLING X. GENG, M. B. STINCHCOMBE, AND A. B. WHINSTON 499 1.
INTRODUCTION 499 2. BUNDLING FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF TWO
PRODUCTS 502 2.1. THE BASE MODEL 503 2.2. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN
MONOPOLY BUNDLING 503 2.2.1. PURE BUNDLING, MIXED BUNDLING, AND THE
COMBINATORIAL ISSUE 504 2.2.2. BUNDLING PRODUCTS AND BUNDLING BUYERS 504
2.2.3. MONITORING PURCHASE 504 2.2.4. POSTED PRICE AND AUCTION 505 2.3.
PURE BUNDLING 505 2.4. MIXED BUNDLING 508 2.5. EXTENSION: BUNDLING
COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES 510 3. BUNDLING FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE
CASE OF MANY PRODUCTS 510 3.1. THE INTEGER PROGRAMMING APPROACH 512 3.2.
PURE OR SIMPLE MIXED BUNDLING OF MANY PRODUCTS 513 4. BUNDLING AS
COMPETITION TOOLS 515 4.1. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A COMPETITIVE MARKET
517 4.2. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A POTENTIALLY DUOPOLY MARKET: THE
ADDITIVE VALUATIONS CASE 517 4.3. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A POTENTIALLY
DUOPOLY MARKET: THE COMPLEMENTS CASE 519 4.4. DUOPOLY BUNDLING 520 5.
CONCLUDING REMARKS 522 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 523 XII CONTENTS CHAPTER 11 ,
DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY R. P. MCAFEE AND VERA L. TE
VELDE 527 1. AIRLINE PRICING 529 2. EXISTING LITERATURE 529 3. DYNAMIC
PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH PRICE COMMITMENT 534 4. CONTINUOUS TIME THEORY
536 5. EFFICIENCY IN THE GALLEGO AND VAN RYZIN MODEL 541 6. EFFICIENTLY
ALLOCATING LIMITED CAPACITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 541 7. THE LOG NORMAL CASE
546 8. OPTIONS AND INTERRUPTIBLE SALES 548 9. ACTUAL AIRLINE PRICING
PATTERNS 551 10. RESEARCH PROJECTS AND MYSTERIES 556 11. CONCLUSION 56 1
APPENDIX 561 REFERENCES 567 CHAPTER 12 ONLINE AUCTIONS A. OCKENFELS,
D. H. REILEY, AND A. SADRIEH 571 1. WHY DO INFORMATION SYSTEMS MAKE
AUCTIONS (EVEN) MORE POPULAR? 571 2. SINGLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS: THEORY AND
EXPERIMENTS 573 2.1. STANDARD AUCTION MECHANISMS AND MODELS 573 2.2.
BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND AUCTION OUTCOMES IN THEORY 575 2.3. BIDDING
BEHAVIOR IN CONTROLLED LABORATORY AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS 577 3. RESERVE
PRICES, MINIMUM BIDS, AND SHILL BIDS 582 3.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
584 3.2. EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS 587 3.2.1. ENTRY AND
REVENUE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC AND SECRET RESERVE PRICES 587 3.2.2. AUCTION
FEVER 590 3.2.3. SHILL BIDS 591 4. LATE AND INCREMENTAL BIDDING 594 5.
THE BUY-NOW OPTION 599 5.1. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH
RISK-AVERSION 600 5.2. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH IMPATIENCE AND
OTHER TRANSACTION COSTS 601 5.3. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH A
SEQUENCE OF TRANSACTION OPPORTUNITIES 602 5.4. EMPIRICAL AND
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 603 6. PARALLEL MARKETS AND OTHER OUTSIDE OPTIONS
605 7. MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS 608 7.1. STANDARD MULTI-UNIT AUCTION
MECHANISMS 608 7.2. BID SHADING AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN MULTI-UNIT
AUCTIONS 610 7.3. COMPLEMENTARITIES AND COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 612
CONTENTS XIII 8. DESIGN OF ONLINE AUCTIONS 614 8.1. THE ADVANTAGES OF
LONG, OPEN AUCTIONS 614 8.2. CONTROLLING THE PACE OF BIDDING 616 8.3.
DESIGN ASPECTS IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS 620 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 621
REFERENCES 622 CHAPTER 13 REPUTATION MECHANISMS C. DELLAROCAS 629 1.
INTRODUCTION 629 2. SIGNALING AND SANCTIONING ROLE OF REPUTATION
MECHANISMS 633 3. REPUTATION IN GAME THEORY AND ECONOMICS 635 3.1. BASIC
CONCEPTS 635 3.2. REPUTATION DYNAMICS 638 3.3. WHEN IS REPUTATION BAD?
640 3.4. OTHER EXTENSIONS TO THE BASIC THEORY 642 4. NEW OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES OF ONLINE MECHANISMS 643 4.1. ELICITING SUFFICIENT AND
HONEST FEEDBACK 643 4.2. EXPLORING THE DESIGN SPACE OF FEEDBACK
MEDIATORS 645 4.3. COPING WITH CHEAP ONLINE IDENTITIES 647 4.4.
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC MANIPULATION 648 4.5.
DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MECHANISMS 649 5. EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
STUDIES 651 5.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS 651 5.2.
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS 654 6. CONCLUSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR IS RESEARCH
655 REFERENCES 657 SUBJECT INDEX 661
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION XV CHAPTER 1 DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES TO BUSINESSES C. FORMAN AND A. GOLDFARB 1 1.
INTRODUCTION 1 2. ICT DIFFUSION AND ITS IMPACT 4 2.1. DIFFUSION MODELING
4 2.2. THE IMPACT OF ICT DIFFUSION 8 3. ICT ADOPTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS 9 3.1. ADOPTION, INTERNAL FIRM ORGANIZATION, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 9 3.2. ADOPTION AND FIRM BOUNDARIES 14 3.3.
ADOPTION AND SIZE 17 3.4. TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18 3.5. ADOPTION,
ASSIMILATION, INTRA-NRM DIFFUSION, AND USAGE 19 4. GEOGRAPHIC
DIFFERENCES IN ADOPTION 21 4.1. ADOPTION OF ICT ACROSS URBAN AND RURAL
AREAS 23 4.2. EVIDENCE OF HOW ICT USE INFLUENCES LOCATION PATTERNS 24
4.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 24 5. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN ORGANIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENT 25 ; 5.1. CO-INVENTION 26 5.2, STRATEGIC ISSUES IN
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 28 6. NETWORK EFFECTS 30 6.1. THEORETICAL LITERATURE
ON DIRECT AND INDIRECT NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 32 6.2. EVIDENCE OF NETWORK
EFFECTS OF ANY KIND IN ICT 33 6.3. EVIDENCE OF POSITIVE NETWORK
EXTERNALITIES IN ICT 35 7. INTERNET DIFFUSION ACROSS COUNTRIES 37 8.
CONCLUSION 42 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 43 REFERENCES 43 CHAPTER 2 ECONOMICS OF
DATA COMMUNICATIONS P. AFECHE 53 1. INTRODUCTION 53 2. PROBLEM
DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK 56 2.1. SERVICE DEMAND 57 2.2J.
SERVICE CONTRACTS: QOS GUARANTEES AND SERVICE DESIGNS 59 VI CONTENTS
2.3. SERVICE PRODUCTION 63 2.4. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES IN COMPARISON TO
TELEPHONY 67 2.5. PRICING DECISIONS 67 2.6. DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK 71 3.
PRICING GUARANTEED SERVICES . 73 3.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND OVERVIEW 73
3.2. BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 15 3.3. INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 78 3.4. MORE DIFFERENTIATION 78 3.5.
OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PRICING 80 3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS 81 4. PRICING
BEST EFFORT SERVICES 83 4.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND OVERVIEW 83 4.2.
BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 89 4.3. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 95 4.4. MORE DIFFERENTIATION 100 '4.5. OPTIMAL
DYNAMIC PRICING 105 4.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS 105 5. PRICING
FLEXIBLE BANDWIDTH-SHARING SERVICES 106 5.1. FEATURES, MODELING AND
OVERVIEW 106 5.2. BASIC PRICING AND ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 109 5.3.
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND ADAPTIVE PRICING 111 5.4. MORE
DIFFERENTIATION 115 5.5. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PRICING 115 5.6. CONCLUSIONS
AND DIRECTIONS 117 6. DISCUSSION 118 6.1. AUCTIONS VERSUS POSTED PRICES
118 6.2. FLAT-RATE VERSUS USAGE-BASED PRICING 124 6.3. PROVIDING QOS:
OVERPROVISIONING VERSUS CONTROL 126 7. CONCLUSIONS . 128 7.1. RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS 128 7.2. FURTHER TOPICS AND READINGS 129 REFERENCES 129
CHAPTER 3 FIRMS AND NETWORKS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS D. F. SPULBER 137 1.
INTRODUCTION 137 2. FIRMS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS 140 2.1. FIRMS IN
TWO-SIDED MARKETS: MATCHMAKING 142 '2.2. FIRMS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS:
MARKET MAKING 143 2.3. INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PLATFORMS 147 3. NETWORKS
IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS 151 3.1. TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKS IN TWO-SIDED
MARKETS 151 3.2. BASICS OF NETWORK THEORY 154 4. ASSIGNMENTS OF BUYERS
AND SELLERS IN A NETWORK: COSTLY COMMUNICATION 156 CONTENTS VII 4.1.
ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 157 4.2. ASSIGNMENTS WITH
DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 161 4.3. SECOND-BEST ASSIGNMENTS 165 5. NETWORKS
AND THE CORE IN A TWO-SIDED MARKET 166 5.1. THE CORE WITH HOMOGENOUS
PRODUCTS 166 5.2, THE CORE WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 167 6. STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS IN A DECENTRALIZED TWO-SIDED MARKET: COSTLY COMPUTATION 168
6.1. STABLE ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 169 6.2. STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 172 7. FIRMS .AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS IN A CENTRALIZED TWO-SIDED MARKET 173 7.1. FIRMS AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 174 7.2. FIRMS AND STABLE
ASSIGNMENTS WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 179 8. MATCHMAKING AND MARKET
MAKING BY A FIRM USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS 181 8.1. MARKET MAKING BY A FIRM
USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS FOR HOMOGENOUS PRODUCTS 182 8.2. MATCHMAKING AND
MARKET MAKING BY A FIRM USING DOUBLE AUCTIONS FOR DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS 183 9. TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN RANDOM NETWORKS 188 9.1. SEARCH AND
RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS 188 9.2. MARKETS AND RANDOM NETWORKS 193 10.
CONCLUSION 196 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 197 REFERENCES 197 CHAPTER 4 ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE T. MARSCHAK 201 1. INTRODUCTION 201 2. GOALS, MECHANISMS, AND
INFORMATIONAL COSTS: THE "INCENTIVE-FREE" CASE, WHERE INDIVIDUALS OBEY
THE DESIGNER'S RULES WITHOUT INDUCEMENT 204 2.1. TWO GENERAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR JUDGING THE ORGANIZATION'S ACTIONS 204 2.2. HOW THE ORGANIZATION
FINDS ITS CURRENT ACTION WHEN INCENTIVES ARE NOT AN ISSUE 207 2.3.
FINITE APPROXIMATIONS OF MECHANISMS WHOSE MESSAGE SPACES ARE CONTINUA
230 2.4. THE DYNAMICS OF A MECHANISM 233 2.5. CONSTRUCTING AN
INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT MECHANISM 236 2.6. FINDING A BEST ACTION RULE
(OUTCOME FUNCTION) ONCE A MECHANISM HAS CONVEYED INFORMATION ABOUT THE
ENVIRONMENT TO EACH PERSON: THE METHODS OF THE THEORY OF TEAMS 238 2.7.
DESIGNING AN ORGANIZATION "FROM SCRATCH": CHOOSING ITS MEMBERS, WHAT
EACH OBSERVES, AND THE SPEAK-ONCE-ONLY MECHANISM THAT THEY USE 240 3.
MODELS IN WHICH THE DESIGNER IS CONCERNED WITH INCENTIVES AS WELL AS
INFORMATIONAL COSTS 264 3.1. THE MESSAGE-SPACE SIZE REQUIRED FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF A GOAL 265 VIII CONTENTS 3.2. MODELS IN WHICH THE
ORGANIZATION'S MECHANISM IS PARTLY DESIGNED BY ITS SELF-INTERESTED
MEMBERS, WHO BEAR SOME OF THE INFORMATIONAL COSTS 266 3.3. NETWORKS OF
SELF-INTERESTED DECISION-MAKERS, WHO BEAR THE NETWORK'S INFORMATIONAL
COSTS 275 4. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS IN WHICH THE PRIMITIVE IS A "TASK",
"PROBLEM", "PROJECT", OR "ITEM" 278 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 280 REFERENCES
281 CHAPTER 5 OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: THE NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PARADIGM S. M. MAURER AND S. SCOTCHMER L. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. INTRODUCTION
INCENTIVES FOR R&D 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE OWN USE COMPLEMENTARY GOODS AND SERVICES
SIGNALING EDUCATION ACHIEVING NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND DENYING THEM TO
OTHERS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY STABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 3.1. 3,2.
3.3. 3.4. 3.5. WHO CONTRIBUTES, AND HOW MUCH? WHO PAYS? WHY LICENSES?
WHY LEADERSHIP? NETWORK EFFECTS EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS 4.1. 4.2. 4.3.
4.4. 4.5. 4.6. DISCLOSURE OF CODE MEETING USERS* NEEDS DEADWEIGHT LOSS
AND PRICING TRAINING AND USING PROGRAMMERS FREE RIDING MODULARITY AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT OPEN SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY
SOFTWARE 5.1. 5.2. COMPETITION BETWEEN OPEN SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY
SOFTWARE MARKET SEGMENTATION LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 6.1. 6.2. LIMITS
TO OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE BEYOND SOFTWARE: DRUG DISCOVERY, GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND WIKIPEDIA CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS REFERENCES
285 285 287 288 290 290 293 295 295 296 300 300 301 302 304 305 * 306
306 307 308 308 310 310 312 312 314 315 315 315 318 319 319 CONTENTS IX
CHAPTER 6 INFORMATION, SEARCH, AND PRICE DISPERSION M. R. BAYE, J.
MORGAN, AND P. SCHOLTEN , 323 1. INTRODUCTION 323 2. THEORETICAL MODELS
OF PRICE DISPERSION 331 2.1. SEARCH-THEORETIC MODELS OF PRICE DISPERSION
332 2.1.1. THE STIGLER MODEL 333 2.1.2. THE ROTHSCHILD CRITIQUE AND
DIAMOND'S PARADOX 336 2.1.3. THE REINGANUM MODEL AND OPTIMAL SEQUENTIAL
SEARCH 338 2.1.4. REMARKS ON FIXED VERSUS SEQUENTIAL SEARCH 343 2.1.5.
THE MACMINN MODEL 343 2.1.6. THE BURDETT AND JUDD MODEL 346 2.2. MODELS
WITH AN "INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE" 348 2.2.1. THE ROSENTHAL MODEL 351
2.2.2. THE VARIAN MODEL 352 2.2.3. THE BAYE AND MORGAN MODEL 354 2.2.4.
MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC CONSUMERS 357 2.5.5. COST HETEROGENEITIES AND THE
SPULBER MODEL 357 2.3. BOUNDED RATIONALITY MODELS OF PRICE DISPERSION
358 2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THEORY 359 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE
DISPERSION 360 3.1. MEASURING PRICE DISPERSION 360 3.2. PRICE DISPERSION
IN THE FIELD 363 3.2.1. DISPERSION AND THE "BENEFITS" OF SEARCH 363
3.2.2. DISPERSION AND THE "COST" OF SEARCH 365 3.2.3. DISPERSION AND THE
NUMBER OF SELLERS 367 3.2.4. DISPERSION AND PRICE PERSISTENCE 369 3.3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: EMPIRICS 370 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 371 REFERENCES 371
CHAPTER 7 BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CUSTOMER RECOGNITION
D. FUDENBERG AND J. M. VILLAS-BOAS 377 1. INTRODUCTION 377 2. MONOPOLY
379 2.1. TWO-PERIOD MODEL 380 BASE MODEL 380 NO CUSTOMER RECOGNITION 382
CUSTOMER RECOGNITION AND BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION 382 THE
ROLE OF COMMITMENT 383 2.2. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF CONSUMERS 384 NO
CONSTANT PRICES IN EQUILIBRIUM 386 PRICE CYCLES IN EQUILIBRIUM 387 2.3.
LONG-LIVED CONSUMERS 389 X CONTENTS LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 391 RELATIONSHIP
TO DURABLE GOODS AND BARGAINING 393 2.4. TWO-GOOD MONOPOLY 396 3.
COMPETITION 398 3.1. TWO PERIODS, SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS * 399 ANALYSIS OF
THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL UNDER THE MHR ASSUMPTION 400 DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS
403 WELFARE 404 3.2. INFINITE LIVED FIRMS, OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF
CONSUMERS, AND SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS 404 3.3. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 406
3.4. SWITCHING COSTS 408 4. BEHAVIOR-BASED PRICING WITH MULTIPLE
PRODUCTS, AND PRODUCT DESIGN 413 4.1. UPGRADES AND BUYBACKS WITH AN
ANONYMOUS SECOND-HANDMARKET 414 4.2. UPGRADES AND BUYBACKS WITH
NON-ANONYMOUS CONSUMERS 417 4.3. ENDOGENOUS INNOVATION 418 4.4.
ENDOGENOUS LOCATION CHOICE IN DUOPOLY ' 420 5. RELATED TOPICS: PRIVACY,
CREDIT MARKETS, AND CUSTOMIZED PRICING 422 5.1. PRIVACY 422 5.2. CREDIT
MARKETS 426 5.3. CUSTOMIZED PRICING 429 6. CONCLUSION . 431
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 433 REFERENCES 433 CHAPTER 8 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
SWITCHING COSTS PEI-YU CHEN AND L. M. HITT . 437 1. INTRODUCTION , 438
2. SWITCHING COST; DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 440 3. SWITCHING
COSTS, COMPETITION, AND FIRM STRATEGY 444 3.1. SWITCHING COSTS AND
COMPETITION 444 3.2. ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING COSTS 444 3.3. SWITCHING COSTS
IN INFORMATION-INTENSIVE MARKETS 445 3.4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 448
SWITCHING COSTS IN SOFTWARE AND OTHER "HIGH-TECH" MARKETS 449 SWITCHING
COSTS IN ONLINE MARKETS 450 4. ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING COSTS AND FIRM
STRATEGY IN INFORMATION-INTENSIVE MARKETS 451 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR
MANAGING SWITCHING COSTS 455 '5.1. INTRODUCTION 455 5.2. A MODEL OF
CUSTOMER RETENTION 457 5.3. MEASURING SWITCHING COSTS 461 6. CONCLUSION
464 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 466 REFERENCES 467 CONTENTS XI CHAPTER 9 THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY K.-L. HUI AND I.P.L. PNG 471 1. INTRODUCTION 471 2.
"FREE MARKET" APPROACH 475 3. WITHIN-MARKET CONSEQUENTIAL EXTERNALITIES
476 3.1. NON-PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION 477 3.2. PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION 480
4. CROSS-MARKET CONSEQUENTIAL EXTERNALITIES 481 5. DIRECT-EXTERNALITIES
483 6. PROPERTY RIGHTS 485 7. REGULATION 487 8. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE . 489
9. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 492 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 493 REFERENCES 493 CHAPTER 10
PRODUCT BUNDLING X. GENG, M. B. STINCHCOMBE, AND A. B. WHINSTON 499 1.
INTRODUCTION 499 2. BUNDLING FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF TWO
PRODUCTS 502 2.1. THE BASE MODEL 503 2.2. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN
MONOPOLY BUNDLING 503 2.2.1. PURE BUNDLING, MIXED BUNDLING, AND THE
COMBINATORIAL ISSUE 504 2.2.2. BUNDLING PRODUCTS AND BUNDLING BUYERS 504
2.2.3. MONITORING PURCHASE 504 2.2.4. POSTED PRICE AND AUCTION 505 2.3.
PURE BUNDLING 505 2.4. MIXED BUNDLING 508 2.5. EXTENSION: BUNDLING
COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES 510 3. BUNDLING FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE
CASE OF MANY PRODUCTS 510 3.1. THE INTEGER PROGRAMMING APPROACH 512 3.2.
PURE OR SIMPLE MIXED BUNDLING OF MANY PRODUCTS 513 4. BUNDLING AS
COMPETITION TOOLS 515 4.1. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A COMPETITIVE MARKET
517 4.2. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A POTENTIALLY DUOPOLY MARKET: THE
ADDITIVE VALUATIONS CASE 517 4.3. A MONOPOLY MARKET PLUS A POTENTIALLY
DUOPOLY MARKET: THE COMPLEMENTS CASE 519 4.4. DUOPOLY BUNDLING 520 5.
CONCLUDING REMARKS 522 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 523 XII CONTENTS CHAPTER 11 ,
DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY R. P. MCAFEE AND VERA L. TE
VELDE 527 1. AIRLINE PRICING ' 529 2. EXISTING LITERATURE 529 3. DYNAMIC
PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH PRICE COMMITMENT 534 4. CONTINUOUS TIME THEORY
536 5. EFFICIENCY IN THE GALLEGO AND VAN RYZIN MODEL 541 6. EFFICIENTLY
ALLOCATING LIMITED CAPACITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 541 7. THE LOG NORMAL CASE
546 8. OPTIONS AND INTERRUPTIBLE SALES 548 9. ACTUAL AIRLINE PRICING
PATTERNS 551 10. RESEARCH PROJECTS AND MYSTERIES 556 11. CONCLUSION 56 1
APPENDIX ' 561 REFERENCES 567 CHAPTER 12 ONLINE AUCTIONS A. OCKENFELS,
D. H. REILEY, AND A. SADRIEH 571 1. WHY DO INFORMATION SYSTEMS MAKE
AUCTIONS (EVEN) MORE POPULAR? 571 2. SINGLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS: THEORY AND
EXPERIMENTS 573 2.1. STANDARD AUCTION MECHANISMS AND MODELS 573 2.2.
BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND AUCTION OUTCOMES IN THEORY 575 2.3. BIDDING
BEHAVIOR IN CONTROLLED LABORATORY AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS 577 3. RESERVE
PRICES, MINIMUM BIDS, AND SHILL BIDS 582 3.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
584 3.2. EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS 587 3.2.1. ENTRY AND
REVENUE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC AND SECRET RESERVE PRICES 587 3.2.2. AUCTION
FEVER 590 3.2.3. SHILL BIDS 591 4. LATE AND INCREMENTAL BIDDING 594 5.
THE BUY-NOW OPTION 599 5.1. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH
RISK-AVERSION 600 5.2. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH IMPATIENCE AND
OTHER TRANSACTION COSTS 601 5.3. EXPLAINING THE BUY-NOW OPTION WITH A
SEQUENCE OF TRANSACTION OPPORTUNITIES 602 ' 5.4. EMPIRICAL AND
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 603 6. PARALLEL MARKETS AND OTHER OUTSIDE OPTIONS
605 7. MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS 608 7.1. STANDARD MULTI-UNIT AUCTION
MECHANISMS 608 7.2. BID SHADING AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN MULTI-UNIT
AUCTIONS 610 7.3. COMPLEMENTARITIES AND COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 612
CONTENTS XIII 8. DESIGN OF ONLINE AUCTIONS 614 8.1. THE ADVANTAGES OF
LONG, OPEN AUCTIONS 614 8.2. CONTROLLING THE PACE OF BIDDING 616 8.3.
DESIGN ASPECTS IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS 620 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 621
REFERENCES 622 CHAPTER 13 REPUTATION MECHANISMS C. DELLAROCAS 629 1.
INTRODUCTION 629 2. SIGNALING AND SANCTIONING ROLE OF REPUTATION
MECHANISMS 633 3. REPUTATION IN GAME THEORY AND ECONOMICS 635 3.1. BASIC
CONCEPTS 635 3.2. REPUTATION DYNAMICS 638 3.3. WHEN IS REPUTATION BAD?
640 3.4. OTHER EXTENSIONS TO THE BASIC THEORY 642 4. NEW OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES OF ONLINE MECHANISMS 643 4.1. ELICITING SUFFICIENT AND
HONEST FEEDBACK 643 4.2. EXPLORING THE DESIGN SPACE OF FEEDBACK
MEDIATORS 645 4.3. COPING WITH CHEAP ONLINE IDENTITIES 647 4.4.
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC MANIPULATION 648 4.5.
DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MECHANISMS 649 5. EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
STUDIES 651 5.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND FIELD EXPERIMENTS 651 5.2.
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS 654 6. CONCLUSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR IS RESEARCH
655 REFERENCES 657 SUBJECT INDEX 661 |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Economics and information systems ed. by T. Hendershott 1. ed. Amsterdam u.a. Elsevier 2006 XXI, 666 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Handbooks in information systems 1 Information theory in economics Hendershott, Terrence Sonstige oth Handbooks in information systems 1 (DE-604)BV022432141 1 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0668/2006050768-d.html Publisher description SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015490145&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Economics and information systems Handbooks in information systems Information theory in economics |
| title | Economics and information systems |
| title_auth | Economics and information systems |
| title_exact_search | Economics and information systems |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Economics and information systems |
| title_full | Economics and information systems ed. by T. Hendershott |
| title_fullStr | Economics and information systems ed. by T. Hendershott |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economics and information systems ed. by T. Hendershott |
| title_short | Economics and information systems |
| title_sort | economics and information systems |
| topic | Information theory in economics |
| topic_facet | Information theory in economics |
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