Firms, contracts, and financial structure:
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford
Clarendon Press
1995
|
| Series: | Clarendon lectures in economics
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| Subjects: | |
| Summary: | This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contracting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers, as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and the transition from socialism to capitalism. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed |
| Item Description: | Literaturverz. S. [211] - 222 |
| Physical Description: | VIII, 228 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0198288506 0198288816 |
Staff View
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| 520 | 3 | |a This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important | |
| 520 | |a Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contracting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares | ||
| 520 | |a The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers, as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and the transition from socialism to capitalism. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed | ||
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| author | Hart, Oliver D. 1948- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
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| dewey-full | 658.15 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV021931872 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T16:06:23Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-03T15:00:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0198288506 0198288816 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015147028 |
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| physical | VIII, 228 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| publisher | Clarendon Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Clarendon lectures in economics |
| spelling | Hart, Oliver D. 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)124080243 aut Firms, contracts, and financial structure Oliver Hart Oxford Clarendon Press 1995 VIII, 228 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Clarendon lectures in economics Literaturverz. S. [211] - 222 This book provides a framework for thinking about economic institutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contracting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers, as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and the transition from socialism to capitalism. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed Contratos Corporaciones - Finanzas Eigendomsrecht gtt Empresas comerciales Financiële structuur gtt Theory of the firm gtt Unternehmen Business enterprises Contracts Corporations Finance Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd rswk-swf Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Finanzierungstheorie (DE-588)4154418-3 gnd rswk-swf Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s DE-604 Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 s Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 s Finanzierungstheorie (DE-588)4154418-3 s Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 s 1\p DE-604 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hart, Oliver D. 1948- Firms, contracts, and financial structure Contratos Corporaciones - Finanzas Eigendomsrecht gtt Empresas comerciales Financiële structuur gtt Theory of the firm gtt Unternehmen Business enterprises Contracts Corporations Finance Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Finanzierungstheorie (DE-588)4154418-3 gnd Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078614-6 (DE-588)4047479-3 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4154418-3 (DE-588)4063270-2 |
| title | Firms, contracts, and financial structure |
| title_auth | Firms, contracts, and financial structure |
| title_exact_search | Firms, contracts, and financial structure |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Firms, contracts, and financial structure |
| title_full | Firms, contracts, and financial structure Oliver Hart |
| title_fullStr | Firms, contracts, and financial structure Oliver Hart |
| title_full_unstemmed | Firms, contracts, and financial structure Oliver Hart |
| title_short | Firms, contracts, and financial structure |
| title_sort | firms contracts and financial structure |
| topic | Contratos Corporaciones - Finanzas Eigendomsrecht gtt Empresas comerciales Financiële structuur gtt Theory of the firm gtt Unternehmen Business enterprises Contracts Corporations Finance Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Property-Rights-Ansatz (DE-588)4047479-3 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Finanzierungstheorie (DE-588)4154418-3 gnd Vertrag (DE-588)4063270-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Contratos Corporaciones - Finanzas Eigendomsrecht Empresas comerciales Financiële structuur Theory of the firm Unternehmen Business enterprises Contracts Corporations Finance Unternehmenstheorie Property-Rights-Ansatz Finanzierungstheorie Vertrag |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hartoliverd firmscontractsandfinancialstructure |