The second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability

"Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner - along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue - result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Darwall, Stephen L. 1946- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] Harvard Univ. Press 2006
Schlagworte:
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Zusammenfassung:"Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner - along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue - result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject - falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations - Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations : their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community."--BOOK JACKET.
Beschreibung:Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Includes bibliographical references and index
Beschreibung:XII, 348 S.
ISBN:9780674022744
0674022742
9780674034624