Theory of public finance in a federal state:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2006
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. paperback version |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Sample text Publisher description Table of contents Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-210) and index |
| Beschreibung: | x, 214 p. ill. : 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 0521026873 9780521630351 0521630355 9780521026871 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Wellisch, Dietmar |d 1960- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)135682150 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Theory of public finance in a federal state |c Dietmar Wellisch |
| 250 | |a 1. paperback version | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a x, 214 p. |b ill. : 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-210) and index | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Finanzwirtschaft | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decentralization in government | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Federal government | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance, Public | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Intergovernmental fiscal relations | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135699002163200 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgments page x
1
Fiscal Decentralization: Benefits and Problems
1
1.1
Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility
1
1.1.1
A ssignment of Government Functions
1
1.1.2
Mobility and Taxation: Empirical Facts
3
1.2
Purpose, Justification, and Limits of the Study
9
1.2.1
Purpose of the Book
9
1.2.2
Justification of the Study
10
1.2.3
Limits of the Study
13
13
Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization
14
1.3.1
Sensitivity to Diverse Regional Preferences
14
1.3.2
Preference Revelation by Household Mobility
15
1.3.3
Protecting the Interests of Future Generations
15
1.3.4
Restraining the Leviathan
16
1.4
Problems of Fiscal Decentralization
17
1.4.1
Inefficient Interregional Resource Allocation
17
1.4.2
Destructive Tax Competition for Mobile Factors
18
1.4.3
Tax Export and Spillover Effects
19
1.4.4 Suboptimal
Income Distribution within Regions
19
1.4.5 Suboptimal
Income Distribution across Regions
20
1.4.6 Suboptimal
Stabilization Policy
21
1.4.7
Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization
22
1.5
Outline of the Book
22
2
Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems
27
2.1
Efficient Locational Pattern
28
2.1.1
The Model
28
2.1.2
First-Order Conditions
30
2.1.3
Efficient Interregional Resource Distribution
32
Contents
2.2 Efficiency-Supporting
Tax
Systems 35
2.2.1 Private
Behavior
35
2.2.2
Efficient
Taxation 37
Perfect Interregional Competition
40
3.1
Fiscal Decentralization with a Complete Tax
Instrument Set
42
3.1.1
Private Behavior
43
3.1.2
Local Government Behavior
45
3.2
Fiscal Decentralization with an Incomplete Tax
Instrument Set
46
3.2.1
A Direct Household Tax Is Not Available
47
3.2.2
A Direct Firm Tax Is Not Available
48
3.2.3
An Undistortive Tax Is Not Available
50
3.3
Appendix
53
3.3.1
First-Order Conditions and Migration Responses
53
3.3.2
Distortionary Taxation
55
Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital
58
4.1
Underprovision
of Local Public Goods
60
4.1.1
Private Behavior
60
4.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
63
4.1.3
Central Government Intervention
66
4.2
Tax Competition and Regional Size
69
4.3
The Advantage of Small Regions
71
4.4
Restraining the Leviathan by Interregional Tax
Competition
74
4.4.1
Government Behavior
75
4.4.2
Fiscal Decentralization with Undistortive Taxes
76
4.4.3
Fiscal Decentralization with Interregional
Tax Competition
11
4.5
Property Tax Incidence and Land Taxation
79
4.5.1
The Traditional View
79
4.5.2
The New View
81
4.5.3
The Benefit View
82
4.5.4
Land Taxation
85
4.6
Appendix
86
Optimal Structure of Local Governments
88
5.1
Tiebout and the Theory of Clubs
90
5.2
The Henry George Theorem
92
5.3
Overlapping Market Areas of Local Public Goods
95
Contents
vii
5.3.1 The Optimal
Allocation
95
5.3.2 Private
Behavior
98
5.3.3
Decentralization through Competing Metropolitan
Governments
99
5.3.4
Decentralization with Smaller Jurisdictions
100
5.4
Appendix
102
5.4.1
Optimal Allocation with Overlapping Market Areas
102
5.4.2
Optimal Decentralization through Metropolitan
Governments
103
Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility
105
6.1
Tax Export and Spillover Effects with Household Mobility
106
6.1.1
Private Behavior
106
6.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
108
6.2
Tax Competition and Household Mobility 111
6.2.1
Private Behavior 111
6.2.2
Regional Government Behavior
113
6.3
Appendix
115
6.3.1
Tax Export and Spillover Effects
115
6.3.2
Tax Competition
116
Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility
118
7.1
Efficient Allocation
120
7.1.1
The Model
120
7.1.2
First-Order Conditions
122
7.2
Decentralized Nash Equilibrium
124
7.2.1
Private Behavior
124
7.2.2
Regional Government Behavior
126
7.2.3
Transfer-Constrained Region
127
7.3
Different Degrees of Household Mobility
129
7.3.1
Perfect Household Mobility
129
7.3.2
Perfect Immobility of Households
130
7.3.3
Imperfect Household Mobility
131
7.4
Appendix
133
7.4.1
First-Order Conditions
133
7.4.2
Expressions of a Transfer-Constrained Region
136
Decentralized Redistribution Policy
137
8.1
Uncoordinated Regional Redistribution Policy
139
8.1.1
Private Behavior
139
8.1.2
Socially Optimal Allocation
141
8.1.3
Regional Government Policy
142
viii Contents
8.2
Internalizing Fiscal Externalities
146
8.2.1
Central Government Intervention
146
8.2.2
Corrected Equilibrium
148
8.3
Appendix
149
8.3.1
Derivation of Welfare Effects
149
8.3.2
Central Government Intervention
150
9
Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems
152
9.1
Efficient Allocation
155
9.1.1
The Model
155
9.1.2
First-Order Conditions
156
9.2
Decentralized Environmental Policy
158
9.2.1
Private Behavior
158
9.2.2
Local Government Behavior
160
9.3
Local Public Debt
162
9.3.1
Private Behavior
163
9.3.2
Local Government Behavior
164
9.4
Appendix
166
9.4.1
Decentralized Environmental Policy
166
9.4.2
Nonneutrality of Local Public Debt
168
10
Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and
the Center
170
10.1
Optimal Redistribution with Complete Information
172
10.1.1
Private Behavior
172
10.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
175
10.1.3
Socially Optimal Allocation
176
10.2
Incomplete Information, Adverse Selection, and Optimal
Redistribution
177
10.2.1
Incentive Compatibility Constraints
177
10.2.2
Central Government Policy
179
10.3
Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard
181
10.3.1
Private Behavior
181
10.3.2
Regional Government Behavior
183
10.3.3
Optimal Policy with Incomplete Information
183
10.4
Appendix
187
10.4.1
First-Order Conditions of the Central
Government Problem
187
10.4.2
First-Best Optimum
188
10.4.3
Optimum with Incomplete Information and
Adverse Selection
188
Contents ix
10.4.4 Optimum
with Incomplete
Information
and
Moral
Hazard
188
11
Conclusions
191
11.1
Efficiency and Decentralization
191
11.2
Redistribution and Decentralization
193
11.3
Policy Applications
194
11.3.1
Tax Autonomy of Local Governments
195
11.3.2
Interregional Tax Competition
195
11.3.3
Restructuring of Jurisdictional Boundaries
196
11.3.4
Degree of Higher Governmental Intervention
197
11.3.5
Redistribution Policy within the Regions of a
Federal State
198
11.3.6
Redistribution Policy across the Regions of a
Federal State
198
11.3.7
Harmonization of Debt and Pension Policies in
the
EU 199
References
201
Index
211
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Acknowledgments page x
1
Fiscal Decentralization: Benefits and Problems
1
1.1
Assignment of Government Functions and Mobility
1
1.1.1
A ssignment of Government Functions
1
1.1.2
Mobility and Taxation: Empirical Facts
3
1.2
Purpose, Justification, and Limits of the Study
9
1.2.1
Purpose of the Book
9
1.2.2
Justification of the Study
10
1.2.3
Limits of the Study
13
13
Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization
14
1.3.1
Sensitivity to Diverse Regional Preferences
14
1.3.2
Preference Revelation by Household Mobility
15
1.3.3
Protecting the Interests of Future Generations
15
1.3.4
Restraining the Leviathan
16
1.4
Problems of Fiscal Decentralization
17
1.4.1
Inefficient Interregional Resource Allocation
17
1.4.2
Destructive Tax Competition for Mobile Factors
18
1.4.3
Tax Export and Spillover Effects
19
1.4.4 Suboptimal
Income Distribution within Regions
19
1.4.5 Suboptimal
Income Distribution across Regions
20
1.4.6 Suboptimal
Stabilization Policy
21
1.4.7
Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization
22
1.5
Outline of the Book
22
2
Locational Efficiency and Efficiency-Supporting Tax Systems
27
2.1
Efficient Locational Pattern
28
2.1.1
The Model
28
2.1.2
First-Order Conditions
30
2.1.3
Efficient Interregional Resource Distribution
32
Contents
2.2 Efficiency-Supporting
Tax
Systems 35
2.2.1 Private
Behavior
35
2.2.2
Efficient
Taxation 37
Perfect Interregional Competition
40
3.1
Fiscal Decentralization with a Complete Tax
Instrument Set
42
3.1.1
Private Behavior
43
3.1.2
Local Government Behavior
45
3.2
Fiscal Decentralization with an Incomplete Tax
Instrument Set
46
3.2.1
A Direct Household Tax Is Not Available
47
3.2.2
A Direct Firm Tax Is Not Available
48
3.2.3
An Undistortive Tax Is Not Available
50
3.3
Appendix
53
3.3.1
First-Order Conditions and Migration Responses
53
3.3.2
Distortionary Taxation
55
Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital
58
4.1
Underprovision
of Local Public Goods
60
4.1.1
Private Behavior
60
4.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
63
4.1.3
Central Government Intervention
66
4.2
Tax Competition and Regional Size
69
4.3
The Advantage of Small Regions
71
4.4
Restraining the Leviathan by Interregional Tax
Competition
74
4.4.1
Government Behavior
75
4.4.2
Fiscal Decentralization with Undistortive Taxes
76
4.4.3
Fiscal Decentralization with Interregional
Tax Competition
11
4.5
Property Tax Incidence and Land Taxation
79
4.5.1
The Traditional View
79
4.5.2
The New View
81
4.5.3
The Benefit View
82
4.5.4
Land Taxation
85
4.6
Appendix
86
Optimal Structure of Local Governments
88
5.1
Tiebout and the Theory of Clubs
90
5.2
The Henry George Theorem
92
5.3
Overlapping Market Areas of Local Public Goods
95
Contents
vii
5.3.1 The Optimal
Allocation
95
5.3.2 Private
Behavior
98
5.3.3
Decentralization through Competing Metropolitan
Governments
99
5.3.4
Decentralization with Smaller Jurisdictions
100
5.4
Appendix
102
5.4.1
Optimal Allocation with Overlapping Market Areas
102
5.4.2
Optimal Decentralization through Metropolitan
Governments
103
Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility
105
6.1
Tax Export and Spillover Effects with Household Mobility
106
6.1.1
Private Behavior
106
6.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
108
6.2
Tax Competition and Household Mobility 111
6.2.1
Private Behavior 111
6.2.2
Regional Government Behavior
113
6.3
Appendix
115
6.3.1
Tax Export and Spillover Effects
115
6.3.2
Tax Competition
116
Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility
118
7.1
Efficient Allocation
120
7.1.1
The Model
120
7.1.2
First-Order Conditions
122
7.2
Decentralized Nash Equilibrium
124
7.2.1
Private Behavior
124
7.2.2
Regional Government Behavior
126
7.2.3
Transfer-Constrained Region
127
7.3
Different Degrees of Household Mobility
129
7.3.1
Perfect Household Mobility
129
7.3.2
Perfect Immobility of Households
130
7.3.3
Imperfect Household Mobility
131
7.4
Appendix
133
7.4.1
First-Order Conditions
133
7.4.2
Expressions of a Transfer-Constrained Region
136
Decentralized Redistribution Policy
137
8.1
Uncoordinated Regional Redistribution Policy
139
8.1.1
Private Behavior
139
8.1.2
Socially Optimal Allocation
141
8.1.3
Regional Government Policy
142
viii Contents
8.2
Internalizing Fiscal Externalities
146
8.2.1
Central Government Intervention
146
8.2.2
Corrected Equilibrium
148
8.3
Appendix
149
8.3.1
Derivation of Welfare Effects
149
8.3.2
Central Government Intervention
150
9
Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems
152
9.1
Efficient Allocation
155
9.1.1
The Model
155
9.1.2
First-Order Conditions
156
9.2
Decentralized Environmental Policy
158
9.2.1
Private Behavior
158
9.2.2
Local Government Behavior
160
9.3
Local Public Debt
162
9.3.1
Private Behavior
163
9.3.2
Local Government Behavior
164
9.4
Appendix
166
9.4.1
Decentralized Environmental Policy
166
9.4.2
Nonneutrality of Local Public Debt
168
10
Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and
the Center
170
10.1
Optimal Redistribution with Complete Information
172
10.1.1
Private Behavior
172
10.1.2
Regional Government Behavior
175
10.1.3
Socially Optimal Allocation
176
10.2
Incomplete Information, Adverse Selection, and Optimal
Redistribution
177
10.2.1
Incentive Compatibility Constraints
177
10.2.2
Central Government Policy
179
10.3
Incomplete Information and Moral Hazard
181
10.3.1
Private Behavior
181
10.3.2
Regional Government Behavior
183
10.3.3
Optimal Policy with Incomplete Information
183
10.4
Appendix
187
10.4.1
First-Order Conditions of the Central
Government Problem
187
10.4.2
First-Best Optimum
188
10.4.3
Optimum with Incomplete Information and
Adverse Selection
188
Contents ix
10.4.4 Optimum
with Incomplete
Information
and
Moral
Hazard
188
11
Conclusions
191
11.1
Efficiency and Decentralization
191
11.2
Redistribution and Decentralization
193
11.3
Policy Applications
194
11.3.1
Tax Autonomy of Local Governments
195
11.3.2
Interregional Tax Competition
195
11.3.3
Restructuring of Jurisdictional Boundaries
196
11.3.4
Degree of Higher Governmental Intervention
197
11.3.5
Redistribution Policy within the Regions of a
Federal State
198
11.3.6
Redistribution Policy across the Regions of a
Federal State
198
11.3.7
Harmonization of Debt and Pension Policies in
the
EU 199
References
201
Index
211 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Wellisch, Dietmar 1960- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)135682150 |
| author_facet | Wellisch, Dietmar 1960- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Wellisch, Dietmar 1960- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021789362 |
| classification_rvk | QL 000 QL 200 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)137886238 (DE-599)BVBBV021789362 |
| dewey-full | 336 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 336 - Public finance |
| dewey-raw | 336 |
| dewey-search | 336 |
| dewey-sort | 3336 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. paperback version |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021789362 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:44:00Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:44:39Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521026873 9780521630351 0521630355 9780521026871 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015002037 |
| oclc_num | 137886238 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-703 DE-N2 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-703 DE-N2 |
| physical | x, 214 p. ill. : 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Wellisch, Dietmar 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)135682150 aut Theory of public finance in a federal state Dietmar Wellisch 1. paperback version Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2006 x, 214 p. ill. : 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-210) and index Finanzwirtschaft Decentralization in government Federal government Finance, Public Intergovernmental fiscal relations Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd rswk-swf Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd rswk-swf Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 s Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 s DE-604 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99022729.html Sample text http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam029/99022729.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam026/99022729.html Table of contents Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015002037&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Wellisch, Dietmar 1960- Theory of public finance in a federal state Finanzwirtschaft Decentralization in government Federal government Finance, Public Intergovernmental fiscal relations Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4017214-4 (DE-588)4017754-3 |
| title | Theory of public finance in a federal state |
| title_auth | Theory of public finance in a federal state |
| title_exact_search | Theory of public finance in a federal state |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Theory of public finance in a federal state |
| title_full | Theory of public finance in a federal state Dietmar Wellisch |
| title_fullStr | Theory of public finance in a federal state Dietmar Wellisch |
| title_full_unstemmed | Theory of public finance in a federal state Dietmar Wellisch |
| title_short | Theory of public finance in a federal state |
| title_sort | theory of public finance in a federal state |
| topic | Finanzwirtschaft Decentralization in government Federal government Finance, Public Intergovernmental fiscal relations Finanzwirtschaft (DE-588)4017214-4 gnd Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Finanzwirtschaft Decentralization in government Federal government Finance, Public Intergovernmental fiscal relations Föderalismus |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99022729.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam029/99022729.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam026/99022729.html http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015002037&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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