The law of antitrust: an integrated handbook
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
St. Paul, Minn.
Thomson/West
2006
|
| Edition: | 2. ed. |
| Series: | Hornbook Series
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXXIV, 1135 S. |
| ISBN: | 0314147063 9780314147066 |
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MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The law of antitrust |b an integrated handbook |c by Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
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Summary of Contents
Page
FOREWORD TO THE FlEST EDITION V
FOREWORD TO THE SeCOND EDITION VÜ
Westlaw Overview ix
Chapter I. Antitrust and the Market Mechanism 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Antitrust as a Response to the Oppressive Use of Economic
Power 2
1.3 The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws 4
1.4 Who Makes Antitrust Policy? 8
1.5 The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy Today 10
1.6 The Role of Economics in Antitrust 19
1.7 Antitrust Challenges 21
1.8 Conclusion 23
Chapter II. Market Power as a Basis for Antitrust Enforce
ment: Effects and Measurement 24
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 Market Power Defined 26
2.3 The Effects of Market Power 33
2.4 Formsof Market Power 39
2.5 Market Power and Price Discrimination 60
2.6 Measuring Market Power 62
2.7 Market Power on the Buyer's Side: Monopsony, Oligopsony
and Gatekeeper Power 75
Chapter III. Monopoly, Monopsony and Attempts or Con
spiracies toMonopolize 81
3.1 Introduction 82
3.2 Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization 92
3.3 Market Power in Monopolization 98
3.4 The Conduct Test for Monopolization 113
3.5 Monopolization Cases in the Lower Federal Courts 144
3.6 Attempts to Monopolize 149
3.7 Conspiracy to Monopolize 154
3.8 Monopsony 155
Chapter IV. Price Predation 158
4.1 Introduction 158
4.2 Historical Overview of Price Predation 165
4.3 Price Predation Screens 166
xi
Page
4.4 A Structured Rule of Reason for Price Predation 174
4.5 Price Predation Cases — 178
Chapter V. Horizontal Restraints — 184
5.1 Introduction 185
5.2 Definition of a Conspiracy — — 196
5.3 Historical Overview of Law Precluding Horizontal Restraints 212
5.4 Pricing Restraints — 243
5.5 Division of Markets and Other Supply and Output Restric
tions 251
5.6 Information Exchange 260
5.7 Cooperation in Research, Standardization, Procurement,
Output or Distribution 270
5.8 Boycotts and Other Concerted Refusals to Deal 295
Chapter VI. The Economics of Distribution Restraints 316
6.1 Introduction 317
6.2 Historical Overview of Brand Marketing and Intrabrand
Competition 329
6.3 Downstream Power Restraints: The Competitive Effects of
Intrabrand Competition 332
6.4 Upstream Power Restraints: The Nature of the Power and
How It Injures Competition 349
Chapter VII. Distribution Restraints Based on Down¬
stream Power: Vertical Minimum Price and Other
Distribution Restraints 370
7.1 Introduction 371
7.2 Evolution of the Law 373
7.3 A Structured Rule of Reason for Downstream Power Re¬
straints 383
7.4 Minimum Price Restraints 392
7.5 Nonprice Downstream Power Distribution Restraints 405
7.6 Boycotts and Refusals to Deal Used to Enforce Distribution
Restraints 412
Chapter VIII. Distribution Restraints Based on Upstream
Power: Foreclosure and Vertical Maximum Price Re¬
straints; Franchising Abuses 415
8.1 Introduction 417
8.2 Foreclosure Restraints 418
8.3 Tie Ins 423
8.4 Forced Exclusive Dealing 470
8.5 Forced Reciprocal Dealing 481
8.6 Most Favored Nation Clauses 487
8.7 Maximum Price Restraints 490
8.8 National Accounts and Dual Distribution 511
8.9 Franchise Antitrust Claims in the Courts 512
Page
Chapter IX. Mergers: An Overview 548
9.1 Introduction 548
9.2 Historical Overview 551
9.3 The Causes and Effects of Mergers 563
Chapter X. Mergers: The Enforcement Mechanism 574
10.1 Introduction 574
10.2 Federal Enforcement — —. 575
10.3 State Enforcement — — 589
10.4 Private Enforcement 591
10.5 An Overview of Merger Enforcement 595
10.6 Unresolved Procedural Issues of Merger Enforcement — 603
Chapter XI. Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers 610
11.1 Introduction 611
11.2 Horizontal Mergers 612
11.3 Conglomerate Mergers 655
Chapter XII. Vertical Mergers 667
12.1 Overview of Vertical Mergers — 667
12.2 The Chicago Critique of Vertical Enforcement — 670
12.3 Benefits and Costs of Vertical Integration 673
12.4 Remedies in Vertical Merger Enforcement — 682
12.5 The Future of Vertical Merger Enforcement 684
Chapter XIII. Joint Ventures 685
13.1 Introduction 686
13.2 The Benefits and Costs of Joint Ventures — 689
13.3 Evaluating Possible Benefits and Harms of a Joint Venture 701
13.4 Health Care Joint Ventures 709
13.5 High Technology Joint Ventures — 725
13.6 Remedies in Joint Venture Cases 735
Chapter XIV. Antitrust and Competition Policy in Regulat¬
ed Markets 737
14.1 Introduction 738
14.2 Public Utilities and the Natural Monopoly Concept 741
14.3 Statutory Exemptions to the Antitrust Laws 755
14.4 Petitioning Government to Interfere with Competition: The
Noerr Pennington Immunity 772
14.5 Balancing Between Antitrust and Agency Control in Federal
ly Regulated Markets 777
14.6 Federal Protection for Competition in State Regulated Mar¬
kets 798
14.7 Tripartite Competition Policy: Antitrust, Regulation and De
regulation in Concert 816
14.8 Antitrust and Federal Commercial Activity 837
Page
Chapter XV. Antitrust and Intellectual Property 840
15.1 Introduction — 841
15.2 Theoretical Justifications for and Explanations of Intellectu¬
al Property 848
15.3 Patent Law and Resource Allocation — 854
15.4 Copyright Law and Resource Allocation 858
15.5 Trademark Law and Resource Allocation 866
15.6 Strategie Use of Intellectual Property in Competition 866
15.7 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Proper¬
ty 871
15.8 Intellectual Property and Monopolization 874
15.9 Intellectual Property Transfers and Horizontal Restraints 902
15.10 Vertical Restraints 921
15.11 Patent Misuse and the Copyright Analog — 925
Chapter XVI. Government Enforcement 930
16.1 Introduction 930
16.2 Federal Enforcement — — 931
16.3 State and Local Antitrust Enforcement — 946
Chapter XVII. Private Enforcement — — 951
17.1 The Private Antitrust Claim — — — — 952
17.2 Causation, Antitrust Injury, Statutory Standing, Passing on,
and the Business and Property Concept: Limitations on
Private Enforcement . — . — 959
17.3 Standards for Summary Disposition — — 979
17.4 Interstate Commerce — — — 983
17.5 Statute of Limitations and Doctrines of Repose — 987
17.6 Class Actions — — — 990
17.7 Proving Damages — — 1000
17.8 Private Enforcement Issues 1006
Chapter XVIII. Antitrust in Global Markets: The Extra
Territorial Reach of Unilateral Rules; Comparative
Antitrust; And Conflicting National Requirements
and Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts to Resolve
Them 1012
18.1 Introduction — 1013
18.2 The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust 1014
18.3 EU Antitrust and Domestic Conduct by U.S. Firms —. 1034
18.4 Conduct in Europe That Does Competitive Harm Abroad:
Can EC Antitrust Be Used to Protect U.S. Markets? 1036
18.5 Can Foreign Governmental Undertakings Violate U.S. Anti¬
trust Law? 1036
18.6 Comparative Antitrust: Similarities and Differences Between
U.S. and EU Antitrust 1040
18.7 International Conflicts and Efforts to Resolve Them 1055
18.8 Unifying Efforts: an International Antitrust Code, Harmoni
zation, or a Conflict of Laws Compact? 1066
Page
Appendix A. Researching Antitrust Law 1073
Appendix B. Federal Agency Enforcement Guidelines — 1089
Table of Cases — — 1091
Index — — 1121
*
Table of Contents
Page
FOREWORD TO THE FlRST EDITION V
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION VÜ
Westlaw Overview ix
Chapter I. Antitrust and the Market Mechanism — 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Antitrust as a Response to the Oppressive Use of Economic
Power 2
1.3 The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws 4
1.4 Who Makes Antitrust Policy? 8
1.5 The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy Today 10
1.5a. Antitrust as a Protector of the Market Mechanism 10
1.5b. Consumer Weifare Goals of Antitrust Policy 12
1.5bl. Maintaining Allocative Efficiency 12
1.5b2. Preventing Wealth Transfer 12
1.5b3. Preserving Consumer Choice — 15
1.5c. Promoting Innovation and Technological Progress 16
1.5d. Protecting Individual Firms: Fairness and Equity
Interests 17
1.5e. Decentralized Economic Power: Populist Values 18
1.6 The Role of Economics in Antitrust 19
1.7 Antitrust Challenges 21
1. 7a. The Oligopoly/Oligopsony Problem 22
1.7b. Unresolved Vertical Restraints Issues 22
1.7c. Can Competition Policy Work in High Tech Mar
kets? 22
1.8 Conclusion 23
Chapter II. Market Power as a Basis for Antitrust Enforce
ment: Effects and Measurement 24
See.
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 Market Power Defined 26
2.2a. Varying Market Power Thresholds in the Courts.— 29
2.2b. Criticisms of a Market Power Definition Keyed to
Inelastic Demand 30
2.3 The Effects of Market Power 33
2.3a. Monopoly and Perfect Competition 33
2.3b. Allocative, Wealth Transfer and Other Injuries
from Monopoly 36
xvii
Page
See.
2.4 Forms of Market Power — 39
2.4a. Monopoly Power — 39
2.4b. Oligopoly — 40
2.4c. Cartels and Collusion 42
2.4d. Strategie Parallel Behavior 43
2.4e. Single Brand Market Power — 44
2.4el. Criticisms of the Concept of Single Brand
Market Power 47
2.4e2. Types of Single Brand Market Power 52
2.4e2i. Single Brand Market Power
and Intrabrand Distribution
Restraints 52
2.4e2ii. Single Brand Market Power
and Interbrand Distribution
Restraints 53
2.4e2iii. Power in Aftermarkets 54
2.4e2iv. Relational Market Power 57
2.5 Market Power and Price Discrimination 60
2.6 Measuring Market Power 62
2.6a. A Universal Measure of Market Power 62
2.6b. Measuring Market Power Through Market Share 63
2.6bl. Defining the Product or Service Market —. 64
2.6b2. Defining the Geographie Market 67
2.6b3. Barriers to Entry 68
2.6b4. Measures of Industry Concentration 70
2.6c. Alternative Measures of Market Power 71
2.6d. A Showing of Anticompetitive Effect May Obviate
the Need for Market Definition 74
2.7 Market Power on the Buyer's Side: Monopsony, Oligopsony
and Gatekeeper Power 75
2.7a. Buying Power Abuses Involving Atomistic Seilers. 77
2.7b. Buying Power and Sunk Costs: Athletes, Profes¬
sionals and Skilied Employees 77
2.7c. Buyer Power in Retailing 78
2.7d. Determining the Likelihood and Extent of Buying
Power _ 79
2. 7e. Monopsony and Countervailing Power 80
Chapter in. Monopoly, Monopsony and Attempts or Con
spiracies to Monopolize 81
See.
3.1 Introduction 82
3.1a. Summary of the Law 82
3.1b. Critical Policy Issues in Monopolization Litigation. 83
3.1bl. Limiting Power Without Stifling Competi
tion 83
3.1b2. The Definition of Monopoly Power 86
Page
See.
3.1b3. Monopolization Suits as a Tool for Re
strueturing Industry 88
3.1b4. Remedial Issues — 90
3.1b5. International Reach of Monopolization En
forcement — 92
3.2 Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization 92
3.3 Market Power in Monopolization 98
3.3a. Market Definition in Monopolization Litigation 99
3.3b. Evaluating Power in Monopolization Litigation 106
3.3c. Intrabrand Market Power in Monopolization 109
3.4 The Conduct Test for Monopolization ~ 113
3.4a. Direct Acquisition of Monopoly Power 116
3.4b. Exclusionary Strategies — 117
3.4bl. Leveraging Theory— — 118
3.4bli. Traditional Leveraging Theory 119
3.4blii. Chicago School Challenge to
Leveraging Theory 120
3.4bliii. Obscuring the Monopoly 121
3.4bliv. Isolating Market Participants 122
3.4b lv. Limit Pricing and Leveraging ~ 122
3.4blvi. Remedial Aspects of Leverage
Abuses — — 123
3.4b2. Exclusionary Conduct that Raises Rivals'
Costs 123
3.4b3. Denying Access to an Essential Facility 124
3.4b4. Duty to Deal or Continue to Deal on Non
discriminatory Terms 128
3.4b5. Tying and Loyalty Rebates That Violate
Section 2 — 131
3.4b6. Aftermarket Abuses 134
3.4b7. Contract Penalty Clauses — 134
3.4b8. Control of a Secondary Market—Lease
Only Provisions 135
3.4b9. Design Change or Product Integration Ty¬
ing 136
3.4blO. Miscellaneous Predation: Predatory Over
capacity and Abusive Advertising 141
3.4bll. Disclosure and Nondisclosure Tactics 141
3.5 Monopolization Cases in the Lower Federal Courts — 144
3.6 Attempts to Monopolize 149
3.6a. Policy Issues in Attempt to Monopolize Cases 150
3.6al. Balancing Power and Conduct 150
3.6a2. TheRoleoflntent 151
3.6b. Attempt to Monopolize Cases in the Courts 152
3.7 Conspiracy to Monopolize 154
3.8 Monopsony 155
Page
Chapter IV. Price Predation. 158
See.
4.1 Introduction 158
4.1a. Price Predation Defined 158
4.1b. Summary of the Law 160
4.1c. The Narrow View of Price Predation 161
4. Id. An Alternate View of Price Predation 162
4.2 Historical Overview of Price Predation 165
4.3 Price Predation Screens 166
4.3a. Below Cost Pricing 167
4.3b. Recoupment 169
4.3c. Intent 172
4.3d. Market Power — 173
4.4 A Structured Rule of Reason for Price Predation 174
4.4a. Monopoly or Oligopoly Power . 175
4.4b. A Credible Theory of Predation 175
4.4c. Targeted Price Cuts—A Practical Guide 176
4.5 Price Predation Cases 178
Chapter V. Horizontal Restraints 184
See.
5.1 Introduction 185
5.1a. Summary of the Law 186
5.1b. Horizontal Restraints and Market Power 187
5.1bl. Cartels 187
5.1b2. Interdependent Conduct 191
5.1b3. Cartel Variations — —. 193
5.1b4. Coercion With or Without Market Power. 194
5.1b5. Buyer Cartels 195
5.2 Definition of a Conspiracy —. — 196
5.2a. Interdependent But Noncollusive Conduct 197
5.2b. The Evidentiary Showing of Concerted Conduct 199
5.2c. Intra Enterprise Conspiracy 210
5.3 Historical Overview of Law Precluding Horizontal Restraints 212
5.3a. Common Law Cases — 212
5.3b. Early Section 1 Cases — 215
5.3c. Development of the Rule of Reason 217
5.3d. Development of the Per Se Doctrine 224
5.3e. The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Doctrine from
1940 1978— 227
5.3f. The Modern Synthesis of Per Se and Rule of Rea¬
son Analysis 229
5.4 Pricing Restraints 243
5.4a. Distinguishing Rule of Reason from Per Se Cases — 244
5.4b. The New Paradigm in the Agencies and Lower
Courts 247
Page
See.
5.5 Division of Markets and Other Supply and Output Restric
tions 251
5.5a. Introduction ~ 251
5.5b. Horizontal Market Division, Intrabrand Cases and
Truncated Analysis: The Characterization De
fense to Per Se Analysis 254
5.5c. Characterization in Market Divisions Ancillary to
Capital Transactions 258
5.5d. Other Supply and Output Restraints 258
5.6 Information Exchange 260
5.6a. Introduction 260
5.6b. Intent Analysis in the Early Cases— 262
5.6c. The Modern Structural Approach 266
5.6d. Inferring Price Fixing from the Exchange of Price
Information 269
5.7 Cooperation in Research, Standardization, Procurement,
Output or Distribution 270
5.7a. Cooperative Research 271
5.7b. The Essential Facility Doctrine 276
5.7c. Cooperation in Setting Standards for Products or
Trade Terms 281
5.7cl. Product Standardization — 281
5.7c2. Standardization of Nonprice Contract
Terms — 283
5.7d. Cooperation in Obtaining Inputs 286
5.7e. Output Cooperation: Joint Promotion, Sales, Dis¬
tribution and Production— 289
5.7el. Cooperative Promotion 289
5.7e2. Joint Sales Agencies and Teamingto Bid 290
5.7e3. Cooperation in Distribution 293
5.7e4. Cooperation in Production 294
5.7f. Business to Business Electronic Marketplaces 295
5.8 Boycotts and Other Concerted Refusals to Deal 295
5.8a. Concerted Action by Horizontal Competitors to Ex
clude or Discipline Other Competitors: A Per Se
Rule for Competitor Exclusion Through Boy¬
cotts? 295
5.8b. Refusals to Deal with Suppliers or Customers Who
Reject Concertedly Established Nonprice Terms 299
5.8c. Concerted Refusals to Deal Prompted by a Single
Buyer or Seiler 301
5.8d. Concerted Exclusions in the Context of Industry
Self Regulation: Can Even Classic Boycotts Be
Justified? 306
5.8dl. The Dilemma: Industry Self Regulators
Have Conflicting Incentives 306
5.8d2. Industry Self Regulation Where Coopera¬
tion Is Essential to Attain Accessible
Efficiencies 307
Page
See.
5.8d3. Industry Self Regulation Where Common
Conduct Is Essential to Mitigate a Mar¬
ket Failure 310
5.8e. Boycotts by Consumers to Achieve Political, Social
or Economic Goals — 312
Chapter VI. The Economics of Distribution Restraints 316
See.
6.1 Introduction 317
6.1a. Contending Economic Views of Distribution Re¬
straints 318
6.1al. Promotional Benefits of Distribution Re¬
straints 319
6.1a2. Transaction Cost Benefits 320
6.1a3. Facilitating Cartel or Collusive Behavior. 321
6.1a4. Benefits of Downstream Intrabrand Com
petition 322
6.1b. The Noneconomic Arguments 323
6.1c. The Emerging Economic Assessment of Distribu¬
tion Restraints 325
6.1cl. The Locus of Vertically Exercised Power. 326
6.1c2. Economic Analysis of Downstream Power
Restraints 327
6.1c3. Economic Analysis of Upstream Power Re¬
straints 328
6.2 Historical Overview of Brand Marketing and Intrabrand
Competition — — . 329
6.2a. The Evolution of Brand Marketing — 329
6.2b. The Growth of Intrabrand Competition and Efforts
to Restraint It — 330
6.2c. The Growth of Power Retailers— 331
6.3 Downstream Power Restraints: The Competitive Effects of
Intrabrand Competition .— 332
6.3a. Understanding the Benefits of Intrabrand Competi¬
tion _ 333
6.3al. The Arbitrage Function 333
6.3a2. Preserving Efficiency and Innovation in
Retailing— 334
6.3a3. Upstream Benefits of Intrabrand Competi¬
tion — 335
6.3a4. Reducing the Risk of Exploitation of Infor¬
mation Asymmetries — 335
6.3b. Promotional and Other Benefits from Intrabrand
Distribution Restraints 336
6.3bl. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Promotion 336
6.3b2. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Maintaining Inventory 339
Page
See.
6.3b3. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Downstream Capital Investment 341
6.3c. Competitive Injury from Intrabrand Distribution
Restraints — 341
6.3cl. Costs to Innovative and Procompetitive
Distribution 341
6.3c2. Multibrand Retailing: Exploitation of Con
sumer Information Gaps 343
6.3c3. Injury from Emulation of a Distribution
Restraint 345
6.3c4. Injury from Higher Prices to the Infra
marginal Consumer 346
6.3d. Summary of Downstream Power and Intrabrand
Distribution Restraints 348
6.4 Upstream Power Restraints: The Nature of the Power and
How It Injures Competition 349
6.4a. Lock ins in Aftermarkets for Parts and Services 349
6.4b. Franchising Lock Ins — 350
6.4c. The Economics of Franchising 352
6.4cl. Market Efficiency Theories 352
6.4cli. Benefits of Franchisor Control 354
6.4clii. Control Without Ownership:
The Franchisor's Incentives
to Distort Competition 356
6.4c2. Franchisor Relational Market Power 357
6.4c2i. Market Power Defined as Pow¬
er over Price 358
6.4c2ii. Postcontractual Nature of
Franchisor Relational Mar¬
ket Power 360
6.4c3. Constraints on Franchisor Abuse of Mar¬
ket Power 361
6.4c3i. The Franchisee's Freedom to
Negotiate Contractual Pro
tection 362
6.4c3ii. The Franchisor's Need to
Maintain Reputation 364
Chapter VII. Distribution Restraints Based on Down¬
stream Power: Vertical Minimum Price and Other
Distribution Restraints 370
See.
7.1 Introduction 371
7.1a. Summary of the Law — 372
7.2 Evolution of the Law 373
7.2a. The Law Governing Intrabrand Price Restraints ~~ 373
7.2b. The Law Governing Intrabrand Nonprice Re¬
straints 377
nage
See.
7.2c. The Conspiracy Doctrine in Distribution Restraint
Cases 380
7.3 A Structured Rule of Reason for Downstream Power Re
straints 383
7.3a. Screening Tests for Downstream Power Restraints 384
7.3al. Market Power 384
7.3a2. The Restraint Will Not Significantly Im
pair Intrabrand Competition 388
7.3a3. Dealers Bear Little or No Risk of Loss in
Marketing a Brand 389
7.3b. The Second Level: A Balancing Test 389
7.3bl. Assessing Competitive Harms 389
7.3b2. Assessing Competitive Benefits 391
7.3b3. Weighing Harms Against Benefits 391
7.4 Minimum Price Restraints 392
7.4a. The Conspiracy Requirement in Vertical Minimum
Price Fixing Cases 395
7.4b. Variations on Minimum Price Restraints 396
7.4bl. Minimum Price Restraints in Multibrand
Retailing 396
7.4b2. Minimum Price Restraints on Premium or
High Image Products 397
7.4b3. Minimum Advertised Prices 399
7.4b4. Minimum Price Restraints Imposed at the
Distributor Level 400
7.4b5. Termination of a Discounter in the Ab
sence of Minimum Resale Price Limits 401
7.4b6. The Consignment Exception 403
7.5 Nonprice Downstream Power Distribution Restraints 405
7.5a. Customer Allocations 407
7.5b. Customer Allocation Schemes as a Tool for Price
Discrimination. 408
7.5c. Location Clauses 410
7.5d. Exclusive Selling (Exclusive Distributorships) 411
7.6 Boycotts and Refusals to Deal Used to Enforce Distribution
Restraints 412
Chapter VIII. Distribution Restraints Based on Upstream
Power: Foreclosure and Vertical Maximum Price Re¬
straints; Franchising Abuses 415
See.
8.1 Introduction 417
8.2 Foreclosure Restraints 418
8.2a. Summary of the Law 418
8.2b. Contending Views of Foreclosure Restraints 420
8.3 Tie Ins 423
8.3a. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Tie Ins 425
8.3b. Procompetitive Bundling and Tie Ins 426
Page
See.
8.3bl. Distinguishing Ties from Efficient Bun
dling ._ _._. 426
8.3b2. Can Requirements Ties Be Efficient Price
Discrimination? 430
8.3b3. Enhancing Entry or Market Penetration. 434
8.3b4. Maintaining Producer's Reputation 436
8.3b5. Increased Return for Innovation 437
8.3b6. Increasing the Informational Flow on
Technologically Advanced Products 438
8.3c. Anticompetitive Potential of Ties 438
8.3cl. Leverage Theory After Bowman 439
8.3c2. Anticompetitive Injury Associated with
High Market Share of Tying Seilers 441
8.3c3. Buyer's Informational Deficiencies — 442
8.3c3i. Deferred Purchase of the Tied
Product 443
8.3c3ü. Buyer's Attention Focused on
the Tying Product 444
8.3c3iii. The Complexity of the Prod¬
ucts Subject to the Tie In 445
8.3c3iv. The Tie Excludes Large or So
phisticated Buyers 445
8.3c4. Buyer's Motivational Deficiencies 446
8.3c4i. The Defendant's Control of a
Buyer's Purchase Decision — 446
8.3c4ii. Buyer Pass On 446
8.3c5. Should Buyer's Informational and Motiva¬
tional Deficiencies Be Excluded from
Antitrust Tie In Analysis? 447
8.3c6. Avoiding Price Controls ~ 451
8.3d. Tie Ins in the Courts — 452
8.3dl. Application of the Modified Per Se Rule —. 452
8.3d2. The Defendant's Economic Benefit in the
Tied Product 455
8.3d3. FailuretoEstablishaConspiracy 456
8.3d4. The Quality Control Defense 457
8.3d5. Does Kodak Alter Preexisting Case Law
Governing Tie Ins? 458
8.3d6. A Post Kodak Wrinkle—The Timing of
Plaintiffs Knowledge of the Tie 463
8.3d7. Requirements Ties and Full Line Ties in
Dealer Supplier Relationships 466
8.3d8. Standing toChallenge an Unlawful Tie — 466
8.3d9. Tie Ins and Intellectual Property 467
8.3dlO. Product Integration Tie Ins 469
Page
See.
8.4 Forced Exclusive Dealing 470
8.4a. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Exclu¬
sive Dealing 471
8.4b. Procompetitive Potential of Exclusive Dealing 474
8.4c. Anticompetitive Potential of Exclusive Dealing 475
8.4cl. The Seller's Interbrand Market Power 476
8.4c2. Exploitation of Single Brand Market Pow¬
er 476
8.4d. Exclusive Dealing in the Courts 477
8.4dl. Failure to Establish an Agreement Under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act 478
8.4d2. Failure to Establish the Requisite Foreclo
sure Effects 478
8.4d3. Toward More Consistent Treatment of
Forced Exclusive Dealing and Tie Ins 480
8.5 Forced Reciprocal Dealing — ~ 481
8.5a. Summary of the Law Governing Reciprocal Dealing 481
8.5b. Procompetitive Potential of Reciprocal Dealing 482
8.5c. Anticompetitive Potential of Reciprocal Dealing 483
8.6 Most Favored Nation Clauses — 487
8.6a. Competitive Effects of MFN Clauses 488
8.6b. Agency and Private Attacks on MFN Clauses 489
8.7 Maximum Price Restraints 490
8.7a. The Evolution of the Law Governing Vertical Maxi¬
mum Price Fixing — 491
8.7b. The Market Power Allowing a Supplier to Impose
Maximum Resale Price Limits 496
8.7bl. A Supplier's Unexercised Market Power. . 498
8.7b2. Distribution Restraints that Limit Dealer
Intrabrand Competition 499
8.7b3. A Supplier's Relational Market Power over
a Dealer 500
8.7c. The Antitrust Injury from Exploitation of Relation¬
al Market Power 502
8.7d. Post Khan: A Structured Rule of Reason 504
8.7dl. A Presumption of Legality When the Sup¬
plier Lacks Significant Relational Mar¬
ket Power 504
8.7d2. A Presumption of Illegality if the Dealer
Possesses Significant Relational Market
Power 505
8.7d3. Is the Defendant's Conduct Lawful if No
Market Power Existed When the Maxi¬
mum Resale Price Was Imposed? 505
8.7d4. Rebutting the Presumption of Anticompet¬
itive Effect 506
8.7e. The Aftermath of Khan: Some Pitfalls of Counsel
ing 508
Page
See.
8.7el. Distinguishing Between Maximum and
Minimum Resale Prices 508
8.7e2. Attacking Maximum Prices Under a Hori¬
zontal Theory — — 509
8.7e3. Vulnerability of Maximum Prices to Non
Sherman Act Claims 510
8.7e4. Other Administrative and Legal Costs 510
8.8 National Accounts and Dual Distribution 511
8.9 Franchise Antitrust Claims in the Courts 512
8.9a. Early Precedents— — — 512
8.9al. Unfocused Scrutiny — — 512
8.9a2. An Analytical Approach Begins — 514
8.9b. Standing and Pretrial Hurdles to Antitrust Fran¬
chise Claims — 515
8.9c. Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust Cases — 516
8.9cl. A Market That Assesses the Franchisor's
Relational Market Power 516
8.9c2. A Market Consisting of All Rivals That
Could Supply Franchisee Input Products 518
8.9c3. A Market Consisting of All Franchisee
Precontractual Opportunities 519
8.9c4. The Limits of Relational Market Power:
Individual Contract Disputes and Other
Matters Outside the Reach of Antitrust
Law — 521
8.9c4i. The Absence of Relational
Market Power 522
8.9c4ii. Insubstantial Volume of Com
merce 522
8.9c4iii. Inability to Show a Substantial
Threatened Competitive In
jury — 523
8.9c4iv. Defenses Based on Protecting
the Goodwill of the Fran¬
chise System 523
8.9d. Tie In Cases 524
8.9dl. Requirements Ties 525
8.9dli. The Tie as an Efficient Meter¬
ing Device 525
8.9dlii. Maintaining Quality Standards 527
8.9dlüi. Anticompetitive Aspects of Re¬
quirements Ties 529
8.9d2. Inventory Disposition Ties 533
8.9d3. The Economic Benefit Requirement in
Franchise Tying Cases 535
8.9e. Forced Exclusive Dealing 536
8.9f. Vertical Maximum Price Füring— — 536
Page
See.
8.9fl. Franchising as Fertile Ground for Vertical
Maximum Price Fixing 537
8.9f2. Maximum Resale Prices Set in Franchisor
Promotional Campaigns 539
8.9f3. Maximum Resale Prices Set to Counter
Price Gouging 540
8.9f4. Maximum Resale Prices Under a Rule of
Reason — 541
8.9g. Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
Claims 541
8.9gl. Attempted Monopoly Based on Sourcing or
Pricing Abuses 542
8.9g2. Attempted Monopoly Based on Encroach
ment or Wrongful Termination 542
8.9h. Antitrust Claims Against Franchisees — 546
Chapter IX. Mergers: An Overview 548
w6Ci
9.1 Introduction — 548
9.1a. Defmitions — 550
9.1b. Summary of the Law 550
9.2 Historical Overview — 551
9.2a. The First Merger Wave and Early Merger Cases 551
9.2b. The Clayton Act and the Second Merger Wave 553
9.2c. The Celler Kefauver Amendment 555
9.2d. Populist Enforcement and Inadequate Remedies in
the 1950s and 1960s — 556
9.2e. Merger Guidelines and Premerger Notification 559
9.2f. The 1980s Merger Wave 560
9.2g. The 1990s Merger Wave 561
9.3 The Causes and Effects of Mergers 563
9.3a. Why Mergers Occur 563
9.3b. A Cost Benefit Analysis 564
9.3bl. BenefitsofMergers— 564
9.3bli. Economies of Scale and Other
Efficiencies ~~ 564
9.3blii. Capital Market Liquidity 566
9.3bliii. Increased Buying Power 566
9.3bliv. Synergies 567
9.3b2. Costs and Anticompetitive Risks of Merg¬
ers _ 568
9.3b2i. Creating Market Power
Through Horizontal Mergers 568
9.3b2ii. Creating Market Power
Through Vertical Mergers —. 570
9.3b2iii. Costs Associated with Size 570
9.3b2iv. Transaction Costs of Mergers . 571
9.3b2v. Social Costs of Mergers 571
Page
9.3c. Overview of the Costs and Benefits of Mergers 572
Chapter X. Mergers: The Enforcement Mechanism 574
See.
10.1 Introduction 574
10.2 Federal Enforcement — 575
10.2a. Federal Agency Guidelines . 576
10.2b. Premerger Notification 578
10.2bl. Compliance Issues ~ 581
10.2b2. The Costs and Burdens of Premerger No¬
tification — 582
10.2b3. Exercise of Control over the To Be Ac
quired Firm During Premerger Review 584
10.2c. International Conflict and Cooperation 584
10.2d. Remedial Issues 586
10.2dl. Preliminary Injunction 586
10.2d2. Failure to Execute an Agreed upon Dives
titure . 587
10.2e. Problems with Litigated Cases. 588
10.3 State Enforcement 589
10.4 Private Enforcement 591
10.4a. The Role of Private Enforcement 591
10.4b. Standing Issues 592
10.5 An Overview of Merger Enforcement 595
10.5a. Merger Enforcement During the 1980s 596
10.5b. Merger Enforcement During the 1990s 602
10.6 Unresolved Procedural Issues of Merger Enforcement 603
10.6a. The Role for Private Enforcement 604
10.6b. Visibility and Accountability of Merger Enforce¬
ment — 605
10.6c. Coordination Among Enforcers 607
Chapter XI. Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers 610
See.
11.1 Introduction 611
11.2 Horizontal Mergers 612
11.2a. Some Flash Points of Horizontal Merger Analysis 612
11.2b. Defining the Market 615
11.2bl. Product Market 615
11.2b2. Geographie Market 620
11.2b3. Submarkets 623
11.2b4. Identifying Firms in the Relevant Market 626
11.2c. Determining Market Shares 627
11.2d. Evaluating Concentration and Applying the Pre
sumption — 628
11.2e. Predicting Anticompetitive Effects 632
11.2el. Anticompetitive Effects from Coordinated
Interaction 634
Page
See.
11.2e2. Anticompetitive Effects from Unilateral
Action — — 636
11.2e3. Anticompetitive Effects from Strategie
Conduct 637
11.2f. Halting a Trend Toward Concentration in Its In
cipiency — 637
11. 2g. Preventing Injury to Dynamic Competition 640
11.2h. Defenses — — 642
11.2hl. EaseofEntry— 642
11.2h2. Efficiencies — 646
11.2h3. Power Buyers or Power Seilers — 651
11.2h4. Averting a Business Failure 653
11.2h5. Financial Weakness—The Flailing Compa¬
ny Defense 654
11.3 Conglomerate Mergers — — 655
11.3a. Overview of Conglomerate Mergers 656
11.3b. The Potential Competition Doctrine 659
11.3bl. The Distinction Between Perceived and
Actual Likely Entry 660
11.3b2. Determining Likely Entrants 661
11.3b3. The Future of the Potential Competition
Doctrine 661
11.3c. Anticompetitive Effects Related to the Acquiring
Firm's Large Size 662
11.3cl. Entrenchment 663
11.3c2. Enhancing Price Leadership or Strategie
Power 664
11.3c3. Reciprocity 665
11.3d. The Merger Guidelines and Potential Competition 665
Chapter Xu. Vertical Mergers 667
See.
12.1 Overview of Vertical Mergers 667
12.2 The Chicago Critique of Vertical Enforcement 670
12.3 Benefits and Costs of Vertical Integration 673
12.3a. The Efficiencies and Inefficiencies of Vertical Inte¬
gration 673
12.3b. The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical
Integration 676
12.3bl. Substantial Foreclosure — 677
12.3b2. Facilitating Price Discrimination 678
12.3b3. Facilitating Collusion or Cooperative In
teraction 680
12.3b4. Facilitating the Evasion of Price Regula¬
tion 680
12.3b5. High Entry Barriers in the Secondary
Market 681
12.3c. Relevance of a Trend Toward Vertical Integration 681
Page
See.
12.4 Remedies in Vertical Merger Enforcement 682
12.5 The Futureof Vertical Merger Enforcement 684
ChapterXIII. Joint Ventures — . 685
See.
13.1 Introduction — 686
13.2 The Benefits and Costs of Joint Ventures — — 689
13.2a. Competitive Benefits of Joint Ventures 690
13.2al. Benefits of Horizontal Ventures —. 690
13.2ali. Scale and Transaction Cost
Economies 690
13.2alii. Complimentary Resources 692
13.2aliii. Establishing a Standard — 693
13.2aliv. NewEntry 693
13.2alv. Facilitating Innovation 694
13.2a2. Benefits of Vertical Ventures— — 694
13.2a2i. Transaction Costs 694
13.2a2ii. Design and Flow Coordination 694
13.2a2iii. Internalizing Marketing and
Promotional Incentives 694
13.2a2iv. Facilitating Marginal Cost
Guidance 695
13.2a2v. Scale Economies — — 695
13.2a2vi. Synergistic Product or Service
Improvement 695
13.2a2vii. NewEntry— — 696
13.2a2viii. Facilitating Innovation — 696
13.2a3. Benefits ofConglomerate Joint Ventures 696
13.2b. Competitive Harms of Joint Ventures 697
13.2bl. Managerial Intimacy and Information
Sharing —. 697
13.2b2. Structural Harm 699
13.2b3. Foreclosure — 700
13.2b4. Ancillary and Collateral Terms 701
13.3 Evaluating Possible Benefits and Harms ofa Joint Venture . 701
13.3a. The Ancillary Restraint Doctrine 702
13.3b. Market Definition For Rule of Reason Evaluation
of Ventures 705
13.3c. Balancing Harms and Benefits 706
13.3cl. Horizontal Ventures — 706
13.3c2. Vertical Ventures — 707
13.3c3. Conglomerate Ventures 709
13.4 Health Care Joint Ventures 709
13.4a. Horizontal Ventures Among Physicians or Other
Professionals 710
13.4al. Ventures Involving Cooperative Price Set
ting 710
Page
See.
14.3b. The Insurance Exemption. 766
14.3bl. The Business of Insurance — 767
14.3b2. Regulation by State Law — 769
14.3b3. Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation — 770
14.3c. Miscellaneous Express Exemptions 772
14.4 Petitioning Government to Interfere with Competition: The
Noerr Pennington Immunity .— — 772
14.5 Balancing Between Antitrust and Agency Control in Federal
ly Regulated Markets— — — 777
14.5a. Antitrust Challenges to Conduct in Federally Regu¬
lated Transportation Markets — —. 780
14.5b. Interstate Transportation and Antitrust Today 786
14.5c. Antitrust Challenges to Conduct in Other Federally
Regulated Markets 788
14.5cl. Agriculture 788
14.5c2. Organized Markets — — 789
14.5c3. Electric Power — 791
14.5c4. Telecommunications ~~ 791
14.5d. Federal Structural Regulation and Antitrust— 793
14.6 Federal Protection for Competition in State Regulated Mar¬
kets — 798
14.6a. An Analytical Framework for the State Action
{Parker) Exemption — 798
14.6b. Protecting the State and Protecting Private Par¬
ties: Two Aspects of the State Action Exemption 799
14.6c. Identifying State Action for Parker Exemption Pur
poses — — 803
14.6d. Determining When Private Parties Can Shelter
Under Parker 804
14.6dl. The Substantive Criterion of Midcal: Has
the State Itself Compelled or Authorized
the Conduct? 808
14.6d2. The Process Criterion of Midcal: Has The
State Actively Supervised? 809
14.6e. Determining When Municipalities Can Shelter un¬
der Parker — 811
14.6f. Limiting Municipal Damages: The Local Govern¬
ment Antitrust Act 812
14.6g. Antitrust and Classic Preemption 813
14.6gl. Preemption Due to Direct Conflict 814
14.6g2. Anticompetitive State Law Not in Direct
Conflict — 814
14.6g3. Non Preemption of Procompetitive State
Law 815
Page
See.
14.7 Tripartite Competition Policy: Antitrust, Regulation and De
regulation in Concert — — 816
14.7a. The Interplay of Regulation, Deregulation and An¬
titrust in Telecommunications 817
14.7al. The 1949 Antitrust Case — 817
14.7a2. The 1974 Case and the Modified Final
Judgment 818
14.7a3. The Effects of the MFJ: Long Distance
and Manufacturing 820
14.7a4. Developments in Local Exchange Markets
Under the MFJ 822
14.7a5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 824
14.7b. Transportation Industries and Common Carriage. 826
14.7c. The Example of International Ocean Carriage 828
14.7cl. The Shipping Act of 1916 829
14.7c2. The Shipping Act of 1984 — 830
14.7c3. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 . 834
14.7c4. The Impact of the 1984 Act and the 1998
Amendment — 834
14.7c4i. Rate Discrimination as a Tool
for Entrenchment 835
14.7c4ii. Competition Safeguards— 837
14.8 Antitrust and Federal Commercial Activity 837
Chapter XV. Antitrust and Intellectual Property 840
See.
15.1 Introduction 841
15.2 Theoretical Justifications for and Explanations of Intellectu¬
al Property 848
15.2a. Economic Theory Supporting Intellectual Property 850
15.2b. "Moral Imperative" Theories 853
15.3 Patent Law and Resource Allocation 854
15.4 Copyright Law and Resource Allocation 858
15.4a. Copyright Basics 858
15.4b. Computers and the Integration of IP and Competi¬
tion Policy: The Judicial Role 861
15.5 Trademark Law and Resource Allocation 866
15.6 Strategie Use of Intellectual Property in Competition 866
15.7 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Proper¬
ty 871
15.8 Intellectual Property and Monopolization 874
15.8a. Market Definition in Cases Involving Intellectual
Property 875
15.8b. Intellectual Property Acquisitions and Sherman
Act Section 2 876
15.8bl. Enforcing a Fraudulently Obtained, Or
Otherwise Invalid, Patent 876
15.8b2. Acquisition by a Market Transaction 879
15.8b3. Acquisition by Grant Back 885
15.8b4. Improper Extension of the Life of a Patent 885
Page
See.
15.8c. Exclusive Dealing and Leveraging to Protect or
Expand Markets Monopolized Through Intellec
tualProperty — —~ 885
15.8cl. Exclusive Dealing with Intellectual Prop
erty —~ 887
15.8c2. Leveraging with Intellectual Property 890
15.8c3. Exclusive Dealing or Leveraging Attained
Through Refusal to Deal — 891
15.8c4. Exclusives, Leveraging and Related Tac
tics Challenged in the Government's
Case Against Microsoft — — 896
15.8c5. Other Refusals To Deal By Intellectual
Property Proprietors — 900
15.9 Intellectual Property Transfers and Horizontal Restraints —. 902
15.9a. Analytical Framework for Horizontal License Re¬
straints — — 904
15.9b. Economic Analysis: License Restrictions that Hurt
Competition by Limiting Licensee Marketing
Choices — — — 904
15.9bl. Purposes and Effects of License Restraints
Fixing Resale Prices — 905
15.9b2. Purposes and Effects of License Restraints
Dividing Markets — 908
15.9b3. Purposes and Effects of Restrictions Lim¬
iting Output — 908
15.9b4. Cartelizing Through Restrictions — 908
15.9c. Applying the Antitrust Laws to Licenses that Re
strict Licensee Marketing Choices — 909
15.9cl. Antitrust and Price Fixing Licenses 910
15.9c2. Antitrust and Field of Use Restrictions in
Licenses 913
15.9d. Pooling and Cross Licensing Intellectual Property 914
15.9dl. Possible Harms and Benefits 914
15.9d2. The Relevant Case Law — 917
15.9e. Exclusive Dealing Licenses 919
15.9f. Grant Back Clauses — 920
15.9g. Patent Settlement Agreements 921
15.10 Vertical Restraints 921
15.10a. Leveraging Power Through Tying or Package Sales 921
15.10b. Resale Price Maintenance, Territorial and Field of
Use Restraints Having Only Vertical Effects 924
15.11 Patent Misuse and the Copyright Analog — 925
15.11a. The Development and Present Status of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine 925
15.1 Ib. The Misuse Doctrine as Applied to Copyright 928
Page
ChapterXVI. Government Enforcement 930
16.1 Introduction — 930
16.2 Federal Enforcement — 931
16.2a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus¬
tice 931
16.2b. The Federal Trade Commission 933
16.2c. Agency Investigations 934
16.2d. Department of Justice Criminal Proceedings 935
16.2dl. Criminal Sanctions— 937
16.2e. Suits for Injunctive Relief 938
16.2f. FTC Administrative Complaints— 939
16.2g. FTC Reports 941
16.2h. Consensual Resolution of Litigation 942
16.2i. Regulatory Decrees 944
16.3 State and Local Antitrust Enforcement 946
16.3a. State Enforcement — — — 946
16.3al. Parens Patriae Actions 946
16.3b. Local Enforcement 948
16.3c. Useof State Antitrust Law — 949
16.3d. Policy Issues Involving State and Local Enforce¬
ment 949
Chapter XVII. Private Enforcement — 951
See.
17.1 The Private Antitrust Claim — 952
17.1a. The History of Private Enforcement 952
17.1b. The Policy Debate Concerning Private Enforce¬
ment 953
17.1c. Comparing the Efficiencies of Private and Public
Enforcement . . — 957
17.2 Causation, Antitrust Injury, Statutory Standing, Passing on,
and the Business and Property Concept: Limitations on
Private Enforcement — — 959
17.2a. Antitrust Injury — 960
17.2al. Development of the Antitrust Injury Con¬
cept — 960
17.2a2. Antitrust Injury and Incentive Incompati
bility— — 966
17.2b. Antitrust Causation and Target Area Limitations 966
17.2c. Indirect Purchaser or Passing on Doctrine —. 970
17.2cl. The Rejection of Passing on and Its Ratio¬
nales . 970
17.2c2. Illinois Brick and the Indirect Purchaser
Doctrine 972
17.2c3. Criticismof Illinois Brick 973
17.2c4. Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule 975
17.2d. Injury to Business and Property 978
17.3 Standards for Summary Disposition 979
17.4 Interstate Commerce 983
Page
See.
17.5 Statute of Limitations and Doctrines of Repose 987
17.5a. Accrual of a Cause of Action — 987
17.5b. Tolling the Statute 988
17.6 Class Actions 990
17.6a. Requirements for Class Action Suits — 991
17.6b. Managing Antitrust Class Action Suits— 992
17.6bl. Certification — — 993
17.6b2. Notice — — 996
17.6b3. DamageRemedies— — —~ 997
17.6c. The Balance Sheet on Class Actions 998
17.7 Proving Damages —~ 1000
17.7a. Proving Damages Distinguished from Proving Inju
ry 1001
17.7b. The Economic Debate Concerning the Measure of
Damages — 1002
17.7c. Damages for Cartel or Monopoly Overcharges 1003
17.7d. Loss of Profits and Its Proof 1006
17.8 Private Enforcement Issues — — 1006
17.8a. Prima Facie Evidence and Offensive Collateral Es
toppel 1006
17.8b. Joint and Several Liability and Contribution 1007
17.8c. Evidentiary Limitations on Expert Witnesses 1010
Chapter XVIII. Antitrust in Global Market«: The Extra
Territorial Reach of Unilateral Rules; Comparative
Antitrust; and Conflicting National Requirements and
Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts to Resolve Them 1012
See.
18.1 Introduction — — 1013
18.2 The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust 1014
18.2a. Foreign Conduct by Foreign Firms Affecting U.S.
Imports — 1014
18.2al. The Purpose and Effects Test: The Basic
U.S. Rule for Imports 1014
18.2a2. Development of the Purpose and Effects
Test 1018
18.2a3. Purpose and Effect in Criminal Enforce¬
ment 1021
18.2a4. Conflicts of Law, International Law and
Judicial Comity 1022
18.2a4i. Before Hartford 1022
18.2a4ii. After Hartford 1024
18.2a4iii. Empagran 1025
18.2a4iv. Diplomatie Comity 1027
18.2a4v. The International Guidelines— 1028
18.2a4vi. Bilateral Cooperation 1029
18.2a4vii. Multilateral Cooperation 1030
Page
See.
18.2b. Domestic Conduct By U.S. Firms Affecting U.S.
Exports — — 1031
18.3 EU Antitrust and Domestic Conduct by U.S. Firms 1034
18.4 Conduct in Europe That Does Competitive Harm Abroad:
Can EC Antitrust Be Used to Protect U.S. Markets? 1036
18.5 Can Foreign Governmental Undertakings Violate U.S. Anti¬
trust Law? — 1036
18.5a. The Sovereign Immunities Act — 1037
18.5b. The Act of State Doctrine 1038
18.5c. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion 1040
18.6 Comparative Antitrust: Similarities and Differences Between
U.S. and EU Antitrust — — — — 1040
18.6a. Basic Antitrust Ideologies 1040
18.6b. Treatment of Firms with Power— 1042
18.6bl. Single Firm Power 1042
18.6b2. Oligopoly 1043
18.6b3. Mergers and Other Consolidations — — 1043
18.6c. Horizontal Restraints 1050
18.6d. Vertical Restraints —. 1051
18.6e. Regulatory Immunity or Preemption — 1053
18.7 International Conflicts and Efforts to Resolve Them 1055
18.7a. IBM 1055
18.7b. Wood Pulp and Hartford 1056
18.7c. Boeing McDonnell Douglas — 1056
18.7d. General Electric Honeywell — 1062
18.7e. Microsoft 1064
18.8 Unifying Efforts: an International Antitrust Code, Harmoni
zation, or a Conflict of Laws Compact? 1066
Appendix A. Researching Antitrust Law 1073
Appendix B. Federal Agency Enforcement Guidelines —~ 1089
Table of Cases 1091
Index 1121 |
| adam_txt |
Summary of Contents
Page
FOREWORD TO THE FlEST EDITION V
FOREWORD TO THE SeCOND EDITION VÜ
Westlaw Overview ix
Chapter I. Antitrust and the Market Mechanism 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Antitrust as a Response to the Oppressive Use of Economic
Power 2
1.3 The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws 4
1.4 Who Makes Antitrust Policy? 8
1.5 The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy Today 10
1.6 The Role of Economics in Antitrust 19
1.7 Antitrust Challenges 21
1.8 Conclusion 23
Chapter II. Market Power as a Basis for Antitrust Enforce
ment: Effects and Measurement 24
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 Market Power Defined 26
2.3 The Effects of Market Power 33
2.4 Formsof Market Power 39
2.5 Market Power and Price Discrimination 60
2.6 Measuring Market Power 62
2.7 Market Power on the Buyer's Side: Monopsony, Oligopsony
and Gatekeeper Power 75
Chapter III. Monopoly, Monopsony and Attempts or Con
spiracies toMonopolize 81
3.1 Introduction 82
3.2 Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization 92
3.3 Market Power in Monopolization 98
3.4 The Conduct Test for Monopolization 113
3.5 Monopolization Cases in the Lower Federal Courts 144
3.6 Attempts to Monopolize 149
3.7 Conspiracy to Monopolize 154
3.8 Monopsony 155
Chapter IV. Price Predation 158
4.1 Introduction 158
4.2 Historical Overview of Price Predation 165
4.3 Price Predation Screens 166
xi
Page
4.4 A Structured Rule of Reason for Price Predation 174
4.5 Price Predation Cases — 178
Chapter V. Horizontal Restraints — 184
5.1 Introduction 185
5.2 Definition of a Conspiracy — — 196
5.3 Historical Overview of Law Precluding Horizontal Restraints 212
5.4 Pricing Restraints — 243
5.5 Division of Markets and Other Supply and Output Restric
tions 251
5.6 Information Exchange 260
5.7 Cooperation in Research, Standardization, Procurement,
Output or Distribution 270
5.8 Boycotts and Other Concerted Refusals to Deal 295
Chapter VI. The Economics of Distribution Restraints 316
6.1 Introduction 317
6.2 Historical Overview of Brand Marketing and Intrabrand
Competition 329
6.3 Downstream Power Restraints: The Competitive Effects of
Intrabrand Competition 332
6.4 Upstream Power Restraints: The Nature of the Power and
How It Injures Competition 349
Chapter VII. Distribution Restraints Based on Down¬
stream Power: Vertical Minimum Price and Other
Distribution Restraints 370
7.1 Introduction 371
7.2 Evolution of the Law 373
7.3 A Structured Rule of Reason for Downstream Power Re¬
straints 383
7.4 Minimum Price Restraints 392
7.5 Nonprice Downstream Power Distribution Restraints 405
7.6 Boycotts and Refusals to Deal Used to Enforce Distribution
Restraints 412
Chapter VIII. Distribution Restraints Based on Upstream
Power: Foreclosure and Vertical Maximum Price Re¬
straints; Franchising Abuses 415
8.1 Introduction 417
8.2 Foreclosure Restraints 418
8.3 Tie Ins 423
8.4 Forced Exclusive Dealing 470
8.5 Forced Reciprocal Dealing 481
8.6 Most Favored Nation Clauses 487
8.7 Maximum Price Restraints 490
8.8 National Accounts and Dual Distribution 511
8.9 Franchise Antitrust Claims in the Courts 512
Page
Chapter IX. Mergers: An Overview 548
9.1 Introduction 548
9.2 Historical Overview 551
9.3 The Causes and Effects of Mergers 563
Chapter X. Mergers: The Enforcement Mechanism 574
10.1 Introduction 574
10.2 Federal Enforcement — —. 575
10.3 State Enforcement — — 589
10.4 Private Enforcement 591
10.5 An Overview of Merger Enforcement 595
10.6 Unresolved Procedural Issues of Merger Enforcement — 603
Chapter XI. Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers 610
11.1 Introduction 611
11.2 Horizontal Mergers 612
11.3 Conglomerate Mergers 655
Chapter XII. Vertical Mergers 667
12.1 Overview of Vertical Mergers — 667
12.2 The Chicago Critique of Vertical Enforcement — 670
12.3 Benefits and Costs of Vertical Integration 673
12.4 Remedies in Vertical Merger Enforcement — 682
12.5 The Future of Vertical Merger Enforcement 684
Chapter XIII. Joint Ventures 685
13.1 Introduction 686
13.2 The Benefits and Costs of Joint Ventures — 689
13.3 Evaluating Possible Benefits and Harms of a Joint Venture 701
13.4 Health Care Joint Ventures 709
13.5 High Technology Joint Ventures — 725
13.6 Remedies in Joint Venture Cases 735
Chapter XIV. Antitrust and Competition Policy in Regulat¬
ed Markets 737
14.1 Introduction 738
14.2 Public Utilities and the Natural Monopoly Concept 741
14.3 Statutory Exemptions to the Antitrust Laws 755
14.4 Petitioning Government to Interfere with Competition: The
Noerr Pennington Immunity 772
14.5 Balancing Between Antitrust and Agency Control in Federal
ly Regulated Markets 777
14.6 Federal Protection for Competition in State Regulated Mar¬
kets 798
14.7 Tripartite Competition Policy: Antitrust, Regulation and De
regulation in Concert 816
14.8 Antitrust and Federal Commercial Activity 837
Page
Chapter XV. Antitrust and Intellectual Property 840
15.1 Introduction — 841
15.2 Theoretical Justifications for and Explanations of Intellectu¬
al Property 848
15.3 Patent Law and Resource Allocation — 854
15.4 Copyright Law and Resource Allocation 858
15.5 Trademark Law and Resource Allocation 866
15.6 Strategie Use of Intellectual Property in Competition 866
15.7 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Proper¬
ty 871
15.8 Intellectual Property and Monopolization 874
15.9 Intellectual Property Transfers and Horizontal Restraints 902
15.10 Vertical Restraints 921
15.11 Patent Misuse and the Copyright Analog — 925
Chapter XVI. Government Enforcement 930
16.1 Introduction 930
16.2 Federal Enforcement — — 931
16.3 State and Local Antitrust Enforcement — 946
Chapter XVII. Private Enforcement — — 951
17.1 The Private Antitrust Claim — — — — 952
17.2 Causation, Antitrust Injury, Statutory Standing, Passing on,
and the Business and Property Concept: Limitations on
Private Enforcement . — . — 959
17.3 Standards for Summary Disposition — — 979
17.4 Interstate Commerce — — — 983
17.5 Statute of Limitations and Doctrines of Repose — 987
17.6 Class Actions — — — 990
17.7 Proving Damages — — 1000
17.8 Private Enforcement Issues 1006
Chapter XVIII. Antitrust in Global Markets: The Extra
Territorial Reach of Unilateral Rules; Comparative
Antitrust; And Conflicting National Requirements
and Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts to Resolve
Them 1012
18.1 Introduction — 1013
18.2 The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust 1014
18.3 EU Antitrust and Domestic Conduct by U.S. Firms —. 1034
18.4 Conduct in Europe That Does Competitive Harm Abroad:
Can EC Antitrust Be Used to Protect U.S. Markets? 1036
18.5 Can Foreign Governmental Undertakings Violate U.S. Anti¬
trust Law? 1036
18.6 Comparative Antitrust: Similarities and Differences Between
U.S. and EU Antitrust 1040
18.7 International Conflicts and Efforts to Resolve Them 1055
18.8 Unifying Efforts: an International Antitrust Code, Harmoni
zation, or a Conflict of Laws Compact? 1066
Page
Appendix A. Researching Antitrust Law 1073
Appendix B. Federal Agency Enforcement Guidelines — 1089
Table of Cases — — 1091
Index — — 1121
*
Table of Contents
Page
FOREWORD TO THE FlRST EDITION V
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION VÜ
Westlaw Overview ix
Chapter I. Antitrust and the Market Mechanism — 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Antitrust as a Response to the Oppressive Use of Economic
Power 2
1.3 The Evolution of United States Antitrust Laws 4
1.4 Who Makes Antitrust Policy? 8
1.5 The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy Today 10
1.5a. Antitrust as a Protector of the Market Mechanism 10
1.5b. Consumer Weifare Goals of Antitrust Policy 12
1.5bl. Maintaining Allocative Efficiency 12
1.5b2. Preventing Wealth Transfer 12
1.5b3. Preserving Consumer Choice — 15
1.5c. Promoting Innovation and Technological Progress 16
1.5d. Protecting Individual Firms: Fairness and Equity
Interests 17
1.5e. Decentralized Economic Power: Populist Values 18
1.6 The Role of Economics in Antitrust 19
1.7 Antitrust Challenges 21
1. 7a. The Oligopoly/Oligopsony Problem 22
1.7b. Unresolved Vertical Restraints Issues 22
1.7c. Can Competition Policy Work in High Tech Mar
kets? 22
1.8 Conclusion 23
Chapter II. Market Power as a Basis for Antitrust Enforce
ment: Effects and Measurement 24
See.
2.1 Introduction 25
2.2 Market Power Defined 26
2.2a. Varying Market Power Thresholds in the Courts.— 29
2.2b. Criticisms of a Market Power Definition Keyed to
Inelastic Demand 30
2.3 The Effects of Market Power 33
2.3a. Monopoly and Perfect Competition 33
2.3b. Allocative, Wealth Transfer and Other Injuries
from Monopoly 36
xvii
Page
See.
2.4 Forms of Market Power — 39
2.4a. Monopoly Power — 39
2.4b. Oligopoly — 40
2.4c. Cartels and Collusion 42
2.4d. Strategie Parallel Behavior 43
2.4e. Single Brand Market Power — 44
2.4el. Criticisms of the Concept of Single Brand
Market Power 47
2.4e2. Types of Single Brand Market Power 52
2.4e2i. Single Brand Market Power
and Intrabrand Distribution
Restraints 52
2.4e2ii. Single Brand Market Power
and Interbrand Distribution
Restraints 53
2.4e2iii. Power in Aftermarkets 54
2.4e2iv. Relational Market Power 57
2.5 Market Power and Price Discrimination 60
2.6 Measuring Market Power 62
2.6a. A Universal Measure of Market Power 62
2.6b. Measuring Market Power Through Market Share 63
2.6bl. Defining the Product or Service Market —. 64
2.6b2. Defining the Geographie Market 67
2.6b3. Barriers to Entry 68
2.6b4. Measures of Industry Concentration 70
2.6c. Alternative Measures of Market Power 71
2.6d. A Showing of Anticompetitive Effect May Obviate
the Need for Market Definition 74
2.7 Market Power on the Buyer's Side: Monopsony, Oligopsony
and Gatekeeper Power 75
2.7a. Buying Power Abuses Involving Atomistic Seilers. 77
2.7b. Buying Power and Sunk Costs: Athletes, Profes¬
sionals and Skilied Employees 77
2.7c. Buyer Power in Retailing 78
2.7d. Determining the Likelihood and Extent of Buying
Power _ 79
2. 7e. Monopsony and Countervailing Power 80
Chapter in. Monopoly, Monopsony and Attempts or Con
spiracies to Monopolize 81
See.
3.1 Introduction 82
3.1a. Summary of the Law 82
3.1b. Critical Policy Issues in Monopolization Litigation. 83
3.1bl. Limiting Power Without Stifling Competi
tion 83
3.1b2. The Definition of Monopoly Power 86
Page
See.
3.1b3. Monopolization Suits as a Tool for Re
strueturing Industry 88
3.1b4. Remedial Issues — 90
3.1b5. International Reach of Monopolization En
forcement — 92
3.2 Historical Overview of the Law Governing Monopolization 92
3.3 Market Power in Monopolization 98
3.3a. Market Definition in Monopolization Litigation 99
3.3b. Evaluating Power in Monopolization Litigation 106
3.3c. Intrabrand Market Power in Monopolization 109
3.4 The Conduct Test for Monopolization ~ 113
3.4a. Direct Acquisition of Monopoly Power 116
3.4b. Exclusionary Strategies — 117
3.4bl. Leveraging Theory— — 118
3.4bli. Traditional Leveraging Theory 119
3.4blii. Chicago School Challenge to
Leveraging Theory 120
3.4bliii. Obscuring the Monopoly 121
3.4bliv. Isolating Market Participants 122
3.4b lv. Limit Pricing and Leveraging ~ 122
3.4blvi. Remedial Aspects of Leverage
Abuses — — 123
3.4b2. Exclusionary Conduct that Raises Rivals'
Costs 123
3.4b3. Denying Access to an Essential Facility 124
3.4b4. Duty to Deal or Continue to Deal on Non
discriminatory Terms 128
3.4b5. Tying and Loyalty Rebates That Violate
Section 2 — 131
3.4b6. Aftermarket Abuses 134
3.4b7. Contract Penalty Clauses — 134
3.4b8. Control of a Secondary Market—Lease
Only Provisions 135
3.4b9. Design Change or Product Integration Ty¬
ing 136
3.4blO. Miscellaneous Predation: Predatory Over
capacity and Abusive Advertising 141
3.4bll. Disclosure and Nondisclosure Tactics 141
3.5 Monopolization Cases in the Lower Federal Courts — 144
3.6 Attempts to Monopolize 149
3.6a. Policy Issues in Attempt to Monopolize Cases 150
3.6al. Balancing Power and Conduct 150
3.6a2. TheRoleoflntent 151
3.6b. Attempt to Monopolize Cases in the Courts 152
3.7 Conspiracy to Monopolize 154
3.8 Monopsony 155
Page
Chapter IV. Price Predation. 158
See.
4.1 Introduction 158
4.1a. Price Predation Defined 158
4.1b. Summary of the Law 160
4.1c. The Narrow View of Price Predation 161
4. Id. An Alternate View of Price Predation 162
4.2 Historical Overview of Price Predation 165
4.3 Price Predation Screens 166
4.3a. Below Cost Pricing 167
4.3b. Recoupment 169
4.3c. Intent 172
4.3d. Market Power — 173
4.4 A Structured Rule of Reason for Price Predation 174
4.4a. Monopoly or Oligopoly Power . 175
4.4b. A Credible Theory of Predation 175
4.4c. Targeted Price Cuts—A Practical Guide 176
4.5 Price Predation Cases 178
Chapter V. Horizontal Restraints 184
See.
5.1 Introduction 185
5.1a. Summary of the Law 186
5.1b. Horizontal Restraints and Market Power 187
5.1bl. Cartels 187
5.1b2. Interdependent Conduct 191
5.1b3. Cartel Variations — —. 193
5.1b4. Coercion With or Without Market Power. 194
5.1b5. Buyer Cartels 195
5.2 Definition of a Conspiracy —. — 196
5.2a. Interdependent But Noncollusive Conduct 197
5.2b. The Evidentiary Showing of Concerted Conduct 199
5.2c. Intra Enterprise Conspiracy 210
5.3 Historical Overview of Law Precluding Horizontal Restraints 212
5.3a. Common Law Cases — 212
5.3b. Early Section 1 Cases — 215
5.3c. Development of the Rule of Reason 217
5.3d. Development of the Per Se Doctrine 224
5.3e. The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Doctrine from
1940 1978— 227
5.3f. The Modern Synthesis of Per Se and Rule of Rea¬
son Analysis 229
5.4 Pricing Restraints 243
5.4a. Distinguishing Rule of Reason from Per Se Cases — 244
5.4b. The New Paradigm in the Agencies and Lower
Courts 247
Page
See.
5.5 Division of Markets and Other Supply and Output Restric
tions 251
5.5a. Introduction ~ 251
5.5b. Horizontal Market Division, Intrabrand Cases and
Truncated Analysis: The Characterization De
fense to Per Se Analysis 254
5.5c. Characterization in Market Divisions Ancillary to
Capital Transactions 258
5.5d. Other Supply and Output Restraints 258
5.6 Information Exchange 260
5.6a. Introduction 260
5.6b. Intent Analysis in the Early Cases— 262
5.6c. The Modern Structural Approach 266
5.6d. Inferring Price Fixing from the Exchange of Price
Information 269
5.7 Cooperation in Research, Standardization, Procurement,
Output or Distribution 270
5.7a. Cooperative Research 271
5.7b. The Essential Facility Doctrine 276
5.7c. Cooperation in Setting Standards for Products or
Trade Terms 281
5.7cl. Product Standardization — 281
5.7c2. Standardization of Nonprice Contract
Terms — 283
5.7d. Cooperation in Obtaining Inputs 286
5.7e. Output Cooperation: Joint Promotion, Sales, Dis¬
tribution and Production— 289
5.7el. Cooperative Promotion 289
5.7e2. Joint Sales Agencies and Teamingto Bid 290
5.7e3. Cooperation in Distribution 293
5.7e4. Cooperation in Production 294
5.7f. Business to Business Electronic Marketplaces 295
5.8 Boycotts and Other Concerted Refusals to Deal 295
5.8a. Concerted Action by Horizontal Competitors to Ex
clude or Discipline Other Competitors: A Per Se
Rule for Competitor Exclusion Through Boy¬
cotts? 295
5.8b. Refusals to Deal with Suppliers or Customers Who
Reject Concertedly Established Nonprice Terms 299
5.8c. Concerted Refusals to Deal Prompted by a Single
Buyer or Seiler 301
5.8d. Concerted Exclusions in the Context of Industry
Self Regulation: Can Even Classic Boycotts Be
Justified? 306
5.8dl. The Dilemma: Industry Self Regulators
Have Conflicting Incentives 306
5.8d2. Industry Self Regulation Where Coopera¬
tion Is Essential to Attain Accessible
Efficiencies 307
Page
See.
5.8d3. Industry Self Regulation Where Common
Conduct Is Essential to Mitigate a Mar¬
ket Failure 310
5.8e. Boycotts by Consumers to Achieve Political, Social
or Economic Goals — 312
Chapter VI. The Economics of Distribution Restraints 316
See.
6.1 Introduction 317
6.1a. Contending Economic Views of Distribution Re¬
straints 318
6.1al. Promotional Benefits of Distribution Re¬
straints 319
6.1a2. Transaction Cost Benefits 320
6.1a3. Facilitating Cartel or Collusive Behavior. 321
6.1a4. Benefits of Downstream Intrabrand Com
petition 322
6.1b. The Noneconomic Arguments 323
6.1c. The Emerging Economic Assessment of Distribu¬
tion Restraints 325
6.1cl. The Locus of Vertically Exercised Power. 326
6.1c2. Economic Analysis of Downstream Power
Restraints 327
6.1c3. Economic Analysis of Upstream Power Re¬
straints 328
6.2 Historical Overview of Brand Marketing and Intrabrand
Competition — — . 329
6.2a. The Evolution of Brand Marketing — 329
6.2b. The Growth of Intrabrand Competition and Efforts
to Restraint It — 330
6.2c. The Growth of Power Retailers— 331
6.3 Downstream Power Restraints: The Competitive Effects of
Intrabrand Competition .— 332
6.3a. Understanding the Benefits of Intrabrand Competi¬
tion _ 333
6.3al. The Arbitrage Function 333
6.3a2. Preserving Efficiency and Innovation in
Retailing— 334
6.3a3. Upstream Benefits of Intrabrand Competi¬
tion — 335
6.3a4. Reducing the Risk of Exploitation of Infor¬
mation Asymmetries — 335
6.3b. Promotional and Other Benefits from Intrabrand
Distribution Restraints 336
6.3bl. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Promotion 336
6.3b2. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Maintaining Inventory 339
Page
See.
6.3b3. Distribution Restraints as an Incentive for
Downstream Capital Investment 341
6.3c. Competitive Injury from Intrabrand Distribution
Restraints — 341
6.3cl. Costs to Innovative and Procompetitive
Distribution 341
6.3c2. Multibrand Retailing: Exploitation of Con
sumer Information Gaps 343
6.3c3. Injury from Emulation of a Distribution
Restraint 345
6.3c4. Injury from Higher Prices to the Infra
marginal Consumer 346
6.3d. Summary of Downstream Power and Intrabrand
Distribution Restraints 348
6.4 Upstream Power Restraints: The Nature of the Power and
How It Injures Competition 349
6.4a. Lock ins in Aftermarkets for Parts and Services 349
6.4b. Franchising Lock Ins — 350
6.4c. The Economics of Franchising 352
6.4cl. Market Efficiency Theories 352
6.4cli. Benefits of Franchisor Control 354
6.4clii. Control Without Ownership:
The Franchisor's Incentives
to Distort Competition 356
6.4c2. Franchisor Relational Market Power 357
6.4c2i. Market Power Defined as Pow¬
er over Price 358
6.4c2ii. Postcontractual Nature of
Franchisor Relational Mar¬
ket Power 360
6.4c3. Constraints on Franchisor Abuse of Mar¬
ket Power 361
6.4c3i. The Franchisee's Freedom to
Negotiate Contractual Pro
tection 362
6.4c3ii. The Franchisor's Need to
Maintain Reputation 364
Chapter VII. Distribution Restraints Based on Down¬
stream Power: Vertical Minimum Price and Other
Distribution Restraints 370
See.
7.1 Introduction 371
7.1a. Summary of the Law — 372
7.2 Evolution of the Law 373
7.2a. The Law Governing Intrabrand Price Restraints ~~ 373
7.2b. The Law Governing Intrabrand Nonprice Re¬
straints 377
nage
See.
7.2c. The Conspiracy Doctrine in Distribution Restraint
Cases 380
7.3 A Structured Rule of Reason for Downstream Power Re
straints 383
7.3a. Screening Tests for Downstream Power Restraints 384
7.3al. Market Power 384
7.3a2. The Restraint Will Not Significantly Im
pair Intrabrand Competition 388
7.3a3. Dealers Bear Little or No Risk of Loss in
Marketing a Brand 389
7.3b. The Second Level: A Balancing Test 389
7.3bl. Assessing Competitive Harms 389
7.3b2. Assessing Competitive Benefits 391
7.3b3. Weighing Harms Against Benefits 391
7.4 Minimum Price Restraints 392
7.4a. The Conspiracy Requirement in Vertical Minimum
Price Fixing Cases 395
7.4b. Variations on Minimum Price Restraints 396
7.4bl. Minimum Price Restraints in Multibrand
Retailing 396
7.4b2. Minimum Price Restraints on Premium or
High Image Products 397
7.4b3. Minimum Advertised Prices 399
7.4b4. Minimum Price Restraints Imposed at the
Distributor Level 400
7.4b5. Termination of a Discounter in the Ab
sence of Minimum Resale Price Limits 401
7.4b6. The Consignment Exception 403
7.5 Nonprice Downstream Power Distribution Restraints 405
7.5a. Customer Allocations 407
7.5b. Customer Allocation Schemes as a Tool for Price
Discrimination. 408
7.5c. Location Clauses 410
7.5d. Exclusive Selling (Exclusive Distributorships) 411
7.6 Boycotts and Refusals to Deal Used to Enforce Distribution
Restraints 412
Chapter VIII. Distribution Restraints Based on Upstream
Power: Foreclosure and Vertical Maximum Price Re¬
straints; Franchising Abuses 415
See.
8.1 Introduction 417
8.2 Foreclosure Restraints 418
8.2a. Summary of the Law 418
8.2b. Contending Views of Foreclosure Restraints 420
8.3 Tie Ins 423
8.3a. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Tie Ins 425
8.3b. Procompetitive Bundling and Tie Ins 426
Page
See.
8.3bl. Distinguishing Ties from Efficient Bun
dling ._ _._. 426
8.3b2. Can Requirements Ties Be Efficient Price
Discrimination? 430
8.3b3. Enhancing Entry or Market Penetration. 434
8.3b4. Maintaining Producer's Reputation 436
8.3b5. Increased Return for Innovation 437
8.3b6. Increasing the Informational Flow on
Technologically Advanced Products 438
8.3c. Anticompetitive Potential of Ties 438
8.3cl. Leverage Theory After Bowman 439
8.3c2. Anticompetitive Injury Associated with
High Market Share of Tying Seilers 441
8.3c3. Buyer's Informational Deficiencies — 442
8.3c3i. Deferred Purchase of the Tied
Product 443
8.3c3ü. Buyer's Attention Focused on
the Tying Product 444
8.3c3iii. The Complexity of the Prod¬
ucts Subject to the Tie In 445
8.3c3iv. The Tie Excludes Large or So
phisticated Buyers 445
8.3c4. Buyer's Motivational Deficiencies 446
8.3c4i. The Defendant's Control of a
Buyer's Purchase Decision — 446
8.3c4ii. Buyer Pass On 446
8.3c5. Should Buyer's Informational and Motiva¬
tional Deficiencies Be Excluded from
Antitrust Tie In Analysis? 447
8.3c6. Avoiding Price Controls ~ 451
8.3d. Tie Ins in the Courts — 452
8.3dl. Application of the Modified Per Se Rule —. 452
8.3d2. The Defendant's Economic Benefit in the
Tied Product 455
8.3d3. FailuretoEstablishaConspiracy 456
8.3d4. The Quality Control Defense 457
8.3d5. Does Kodak Alter Preexisting Case Law
Governing Tie Ins? 458
8.3d6. A Post Kodak Wrinkle—The Timing of
Plaintiffs Knowledge of the Tie 463
8.3d7. Requirements Ties and Full Line Ties in
Dealer Supplier Relationships 466
8.3d8. Standing toChallenge an Unlawful Tie — 466
8.3d9. Tie Ins and Intellectual Property 467
8.3dlO. Product Integration Tie Ins 469
Page
See.
8.4 Forced Exclusive Dealing 470
8.4a. Historical Overview of the Law Governing Exclu¬
sive Dealing 471
8.4b. Procompetitive Potential of Exclusive Dealing 474
8.4c. Anticompetitive Potential of Exclusive Dealing 475
8.4cl. The Seller's Interbrand Market Power 476
8.4c2. Exploitation of Single Brand Market Pow¬
er 476
8.4d. Exclusive Dealing in the Courts 477
8.4dl. Failure to Establish an Agreement Under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act 478
8.4d2. Failure to Establish the Requisite Foreclo
sure Effects 478
8.4d3. Toward More Consistent Treatment of
Forced Exclusive Dealing and Tie Ins 480
8.5 Forced Reciprocal Dealing — ~ 481
8.5a. Summary of the Law Governing Reciprocal Dealing 481
8.5b. Procompetitive Potential of Reciprocal Dealing 482
8.5c. Anticompetitive Potential of Reciprocal Dealing 483
8.6 Most Favored Nation Clauses — 487
8.6a. Competitive Effects of MFN Clauses 488
8.6b. Agency and Private Attacks on MFN Clauses 489
8.7 Maximum Price Restraints 490
8.7a. The Evolution of the Law Governing Vertical Maxi¬
mum Price Fixing — 491
8.7b. The Market Power Allowing a Supplier to Impose
Maximum Resale Price Limits 496
8.7bl. A Supplier's Unexercised Market Power. . 498
8.7b2. Distribution Restraints that Limit Dealer
Intrabrand Competition 499
8.7b3. A Supplier's Relational Market Power over
a Dealer 500
8.7c. The Antitrust Injury from Exploitation of Relation¬
al Market Power 502
8.7d. Post Khan: A Structured Rule of Reason 504
8.7dl. A Presumption of Legality When the Sup¬
plier Lacks Significant Relational Mar¬
ket Power 504
8.7d2. A Presumption of Illegality if the Dealer
Possesses Significant Relational Market
Power 505
8.7d3. Is the Defendant's Conduct Lawful if No
Market Power Existed When the Maxi¬
mum Resale Price Was Imposed? 505
8.7d4. Rebutting the Presumption of Anticompet¬
itive Effect 506
8.7e. The Aftermath of Khan: Some Pitfalls of Counsel
ing 508
Page
See.
8.7el. Distinguishing Between Maximum and
Minimum Resale Prices 508
8.7e2. Attacking Maximum Prices Under a Hori¬
zontal Theory — — 509
8.7e3. Vulnerability of Maximum Prices to Non
Sherman Act Claims 510
8.7e4. Other Administrative and Legal Costs 510
8.8 National Accounts and Dual Distribution 511
8.9 Franchise Antitrust Claims in the Courts 512
8.9a. Early Precedents— — — 512
8.9al. Unfocused Scrutiny — — 512
8.9a2. An Analytical Approach Begins — 514
8.9b. Standing and Pretrial Hurdles to Antitrust Fran¬
chise Claims — 515
8.9c. Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust Cases — 516
8.9cl. A Market That Assesses the Franchisor's
Relational Market Power 516
8.9c2. A Market Consisting of All Rivals That
Could Supply Franchisee Input Products 518
8.9c3. A Market Consisting of All Franchisee
Precontractual Opportunities 519
8.9c4. The Limits of Relational Market Power:
Individual Contract Disputes and Other
Matters Outside the Reach of Antitrust
Law — 521
8.9c4i. The Absence of Relational
Market Power 522
8.9c4ii. Insubstantial Volume of Com
merce 522
8.9c4iii. Inability to Show a Substantial
Threatened Competitive In
jury — 523
8.9c4iv. Defenses Based on Protecting
the Goodwill of the Fran¬
chise System 523
8.9d. Tie In Cases 524
8.9dl. Requirements Ties 525
8.9dli. The Tie as an Efficient Meter¬
ing Device 525
8.9dlii. Maintaining Quality Standards 527
8.9dlüi. Anticompetitive Aspects of Re¬
quirements Ties 529
8.9d2. Inventory Disposition Ties 533
8.9d3. The Economic Benefit Requirement in
Franchise Tying Cases 535
8.9e. Forced Exclusive Dealing 536
8.9f. Vertical Maximum Price Füring— — 536
Page
See.
8.9fl. Franchising as Fertile Ground for Vertical
Maximum Price Fixing 537
8.9f2. Maximum Resale Prices Set in Franchisor
Promotional Campaigns 539
8.9f3. Maximum Resale Prices Set to Counter
Price Gouging 540
8.9f4. Maximum Resale Prices Under a Rule of
Reason — 541
8.9g. Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
Claims 541
8.9gl. Attempted Monopoly Based on Sourcing or
Pricing Abuses 542
8.9g2. Attempted Monopoly Based on Encroach
ment or Wrongful Termination 542
8.9h. Antitrust Claims Against Franchisees — 546
Chapter IX. Mergers: An Overview 548
w6Ci
9.1 Introduction — 548
9.1a. Defmitions — 550
9.1b. Summary of the Law 550
9.2 Historical Overview — 551
9.2a. The First Merger Wave and Early Merger Cases 551
9.2b. The Clayton Act and the Second Merger Wave 553
9.2c. The Celler Kefauver Amendment 555
9.2d. Populist Enforcement and Inadequate Remedies in
the 1950s and 1960s — 556
9.2e. Merger Guidelines and Premerger Notification 559
9.2f. The 1980s Merger Wave 560
9.2g. The 1990s Merger Wave 561
9.3 The Causes and Effects of Mergers 563
9.3a. Why Mergers Occur 563
9.3b. A Cost Benefit Analysis 564
9.3bl. BenefitsofMergers— 564
9.3bli. Economies of Scale and Other
Efficiencies ~~ 564
9.3blii. Capital Market Liquidity 566
9.3bliii. Increased Buying Power 566
9.3bliv. Synergies 567
9.3b2. Costs and Anticompetitive Risks of Merg¬
ers _ 568
9.3b2i. Creating Market Power
Through Horizontal Mergers 568
9.3b2ii. Creating Market Power
Through Vertical Mergers —. 570
9.3b2iii. Costs Associated with Size 570
9.3b2iv. Transaction Costs of Mergers . 571
9.3b2v. Social Costs of Mergers 571
Page
9.3c. Overview of the Costs and Benefits of Mergers 572
Chapter X. Mergers: The Enforcement Mechanism 574
See.
10.1 Introduction 574
10.2 Federal Enforcement — 575
10.2a. Federal Agency Guidelines . 576
10.2b. Premerger Notification 578
10.2bl. Compliance Issues ~ 581
10.2b2. The Costs and Burdens of Premerger No¬
tification — 582
10.2b3. Exercise of Control over the To Be Ac
quired Firm During Premerger Review 584
10.2c. International Conflict and Cooperation 584
10.2d. Remedial Issues 586
10.2dl. Preliminary Injunction 586
10.2d2. Failure to Execute an Agreed upon Dives
titure . 587
10.2e. Problems with Litigated Cases. 588
10.3 State Enforcement 589
10.4 Private Enforcement 591
10.4a. The Role of Private Enforcement 591
10.4b. Standing Issues 592
10.5 An Overview of Merger Enforcement 595
10.5a. Merger Enforcement During the 1980s 596
10.5b. Merger Enforcement During the 1990s 602
10.6 Unresolved Procedural Issues of Merger Enforcement 603
10.6a. The Role for Private Enforcement 604
10.6b. Visibility and Accountability of Merger Enforce¬
ment — 605
10.6c. Coordination Among Enforcers 607
Chapter XI. Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers 610
See.
11.1 Introduction 611
11.2 Horizontal Mergers 612
11.2a. Some Flash Points of Horizontal Merger Analysis 612
11.2b. Defining the Market 615
11.2bl. Product Market 615
11.2b2. Geographie Market 620
11.2b3. Submarkets 623
11.2b4. Identifying Firms in the Relevant Market 626
11.2c. Determining Market Shares 627
11.2d. Evaluating Concentration and Applying the Pre
sumption — 628
11.2e. Predicting Anticompetitive Effects 632
11.2el. Anticompetitive Effects from Coordinated
Interaction 634
Page
See.
11.2e2. Anticompetitive Effects from Unilateral
Action — — 636
11.2e3. Anticompetitive Effects from Strategie
Conduct 637
11.2f. Halting a Trend Toward Concentration in Its In
cipiency — 637
11. 2g. Preventing Injury to Dynamic Competition 640
11.2h. Defenses — — 642
11.2hl. EaseofEntry— 642
11.2h2. Efficiencies — 646
11.2h3. Power Buyers or Power Seilers — 651
11.2h4. Averting a Business Failure 653
11.2h5. Financial Weakness—The Flailing Compa¬
ny Defense 654
11.3 Conglomerate Mergers — — 655
11.3a. Overview of Conglomerate Mergers 656
11.3b. The Potential Competition Doctrine 659
11.3bl. The Distinction Between Perceived and
Actual Likely Entry 660
11.3b2. Determining Likely Entrants 661
11.3b3. The Future of the Potential Competition
Doctrine 661
11.3c. Anticompetitive Effects Related to the Acquiring
Firm's Large Size 662
11.3cl. Entrenchment 663
11.3c2. Enhancing Price Leadership or Strategie
Power 664
11.3c3. Reciprocity 665
11.3d. The Merger Guidelines and Potential Competition 665
Chapter Xu. Vertical Mergers 667
See.
12.1 Overview of Vertical Mergers 667
12.2 The Chicago Critique of Vertical Enforcement 670
12.3 Benefits and Costs of Vertical Integration 673
12.3a. The Efficiencies and Inefficiencies of Vertical Inte¬
gration 673
12.3b. The Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical
Integration 676
12.3bl. Substantial Foreclosure — 677
12.3b2. Facilitating Price Discrimination 678
12.3b3. Facilitating Collusion or Cooperative In
teraction 680
12.3b4. Facilitating the Evasion of Price Regula¬
tion 680
12.3b5. High Entry Barriers in the Secondary
Market 681
12.3c. Relevance of a Trend Toward Vertical Integration 681
Page
See.
12.4 Remedies in Vertical Merger Enforcement 682
12.5 The Futureof Vertical Merger Enforcement 684
ChapterXIII. Joint Ventures — . 685
See.
13.1 Introduction — 686
13.2 The Benefits and Costs of Joint Ventures — — 689
13.2a. Competitive Benefits of Joint Ventures 690
13.2al. Benefits of Horizontal Ventures —. 690
13.2ali. Scale and Transaction Cost
Economies 690
13.2alii. Complimentary Resources 692
13.2aliii. Establishing a Standard — 693
13.2aliv. NewEntry 693
13.2alv. Facilitating Innovation 694
13.2a2. Benefits of Vertical Ventures— — 694
13.2a2i. Transaction Costs 694
13.2a2ii. Design and Flow Coordination 694
13.2a2iii. Internalizing Marketing and
Promotional Incentives 694
13.2a2iv. Facilitating Marginal Cost
Guidance 695
13.2a2v. Scale Economies — — 695
13.2a2vi. Synergistic Product or Service
Improvement 695
13.2a2vii. NewEntry— — 696
13.2a2viii. Facilitating Innovation — 696
13.2a3. Benefits ofConglomerate Joint Ventures 696
13.2b. Competitive Harms of Joint Ventures 697
13.2bl. Managerial Intimacy and Information
Sharing —. 697
13.2b2. Structural Harm 699
13.2b3. Foreclosure — 700
13.2b4. Ancillary and Collateral Terms 701
13.3 Evaluating Possible Benefits and Harms ofa Joint Venture . 701
13.3a. The Ancillary Restraint Doctrine 702
13.3b. Market Definition For Rule of Reason Evaluation
of Ventures 705
13.3c. Balancing Harms and Benefits 706
13.3cl. Horizontal Ventures — 706
13.3c2. Vertical Ventures — 707
13.3c3. Conglomerate Ventures 709
13.4 Health Care Joint Ventures 709
13.4a. Horizontal Ventures Among Physicians or Other
Professionals 710
13.4al. Ventures Involving Cooperative Price Set
ting 710
Page
See.
14.3b. The Insurance Exemption. 766
14.3bl. The Business of Insurance — 767
14.3b2. Regulation by State Law — 769
14.3b3. Boycott, Coercion or Intimidation — 770
14.3c. Miscellaneous Express Exemptions 772
14.4 Petitioning Government to Interfere with Competition: The
Noerr Pennington Immunity .— — 772
14.5 Balancing Between Antitrust and Agency Control in Federal
ly Regulated Markets— — — 777
14.5a. Antitrust Challenges to Conduct in Federally Regu¬
lated Transportation Markets — —. 780
14.5b. Interstate Transportation and Antitrust Today 786
14.5c. Antitrust Challenges to Conduct in Other Federally
Regulated Markets 788
14.5cl. Agriculture 788
14.5c2. Organized Markets — — 789
14.5c3. Electric Power — 791
14.5c4. Telecommunications ~~ 791
14.5d. Federal Structural Regulation and Antitrust— 793
14.6 Federal Protection for Competition in State Regulated Mar¬
kets — 798
14.6a. An Analytical Framework for the State Action
{Parker) Exemption — 798
14.6b. Protecting the State and Protecting Private Par¬
ties: Two Aspects of the State Action Exemption 799
14.6c. Identifying State Action for Parker Exemption Pur
poses — — 803
14.6d. Determining When Private Parties Can Shelter
Under Parker 804
14.6dl. The Substantive Criterion of Midcal: Has
the State Itself Compelled or Authorized
the Conduct? 808
14.6d2. The Process Criterion of Midcal: Has The
State Actively Supervised? 809
14.6e. Determining When Municipalities Can Shelter un¬
der Parker — 811
14.6f. Limiting Municipal Damages: The Local Govern¬
ment Antitrust Act 812
14.6g. Antitrust and Classic Preemption 813
14.6gl. Preemption Due to Direct Conflict 814
14.6g2. Anticompetitive State Law Not in Direct
Conflict — 814
14.6g3. Non Preemption of Procompetitive State
Law 815
Page
See.
14.7 Tripartite Competition Policy: Antitrust, Regulation and De
regulation in Concert — — 816
14.7a. The Interplay of Regulation, Deregulation and An¬
titrust in Telecommunications 817
14.7al. The 1949 Antitrust Case — 817
14.7a2. The 1974 Case and the Modified Final
Judgment 818
14.7a3. The Effects of the MFJ: Long Distance
and Manufacturing 820
14.7a4. Developments in Local Exchange Markets
Under the MFJ 822
14.7a5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 824
14.7b. Transportation Industries and Common Carriage. 826
14.7c. The Example of International Ocean Carriage 828
14.7cl. The Shipping Act of 1916 829
14.7c2. The Shipping Act of 1984 — 830
14.7c3. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 . 834
14.7c4. The Impact of the 1984 Act and the 1998
Amendment — 834
14.7c4i. Rate Discrimination as a Tool
for Entrenchment 835
14.7c4ii. Competition Safeguards— 837
14.8 Antitrust and Federal Commercial Activity 837
Chapter XV. Antitrust and Intellectual Property 840
See.
15.1 Introduction 841
15.2 Theoretical Justifications for and Explanations of Intellectu¬
al Property 848
15.2a. Economic Theory Supporting Intellectual Property 850
15.2b. "Moral Imperative" Theories 853
15.3 Patent Law and Resource Allocation 854
15.4 Copyright Law and Resource Allocation 858
15.4a. Copyright Basics 858
15.4b. Computers and the Integration of IP and Competi¬
tion Policy: The Judicial Role 861
15.5 Trademark Law and Resource Allocation 866
15.6 Strategie Use of Intellectual Property in Competition 866
15.7 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Proper¬
ty 871
15.8 Intellectual Property and Monopolization 874
15.8a. Market Definition in Cases Involving Intellectual
Property 875
15.8b. Intellectual Property Acquisitions and Sherman
Act Section 2 876
15.8bl. Enforcing a Fraudulently Obtained, Or
Otherwise Invalid, Patent 876
15.8b2. Acquisition by a Market Transaction 879
15.8b3. Acquisition by Grant Back 885
15.8b4. Improper Extension of the Life of a Patent 885
Page
See.
15.8c. Exclusive Dealing and Leveraging to Protect or
Expand Markets Monopolized Through Intellec
tualProperty — —~ 885
15.8cl. Exclusive Dealing with Intellectual Prop
erty —~ 887
15.8c2. Leveraging with Intellectual Property 890
15.8c3. Exclusive Dealing or Leveraging Attained
Through Refusal to Deal — 891
15.8c4. Exclusives, Leveraging and Related Tac
tics Challenged in the Government's
Case Against Microsoft — — 896
15.8c5. Other Refusals To Deal By Intellectual
Property Proprietors — 900
15.9 Intellectual Property Transfers and Horizontal Restraints —. 902
15.9a. Analytical Framework for Horizontal License Re¬
straints — — 904
15.9b. Economic Analysis: License Restrictions that Hurt
Competition by Limiting Licensee Marketing
Choices — — — 904
15.9bl. Purposes and Effects of License Restraints
Fixing Resale Prices — 905
15.9b2. Purposes and Effects of License Restraints
Dividing Markets — 908
15.9b3. Purposes and Effects of Restrictions Lim¬
iting Output — 908
15.9b4. Cartelizing Through Restrictions — 908
15.9c. Applying the Antitrust Laws to Licenses that Re
strict Licensee Marketing Choices — 909
15.9cl. Antitrust and Price Fixing Licenses 910
15.9c2. Antitrust and Field of Use Restrictions in
Licenses 913
15.9d. Pooling and Cross Licensing Intellectual Property 914
15.9dl. Possible Harms and Benefits 914
15.9d2. The Relevant Case Law — 917
15.9e. Exclusive Dealing Licenses 919
15.9f. Grant Back Clauses — 920
15.9g. Patent Settlement Agreements 921
15.10 Vertical Restraints 921
15.10a. Leveraging Power Through Tying or Package Sales 921
15.10b. Resale Price Maintenance, Territorial and Field of
Use Restraints Having Only Vertical Effects 924
15.11 Patent Misuse and the Copyright Analog — 925
15.11a. The Development and Present Status of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine 925
15.1 Ib. The Misuse Doctrine as Applied to Copyright 928
Page
ChapterXVI. Government Enforcement 930
16.1 Introduction — 930
16.2 Federal Enforcement — 931
16.2a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus¬
tice 931
16.2b. The Federal Trade Commission 933
16.2c. Agency Investigations 934
16.2d. Department of Justice Criminal Proceedings 935
16.2dl. Criminal Sanctions— 937
16.2e. Suits for Injunctive Relief 938
16.2f. FTC Administrative Complaints— 939
16.2g. FTC Reports 941
16.2h. Consensual Resolution of Litigation 942
16.2i. Regulatory Decrees 944
16.3 State and Local Antitrust Enforcement 946
16.3a. State Enforcement — — — 946
16.3al. Parens Patriae Actions 946
16.3b. Local Enforcement 948
16.3c. Useof State Antitrust Law — 949
16.3d. Policy Issues Involving State and Local Enforce¬
ment 949
Chapter XVII. Private Enforcement — 951
See.
17.1 The Private Antitrust Claim — 952
17.1a. The History of Private Enforcement 952
17.1b. The Policy Debate Concerning Private Enforce¬
ment 953
17.1c. Comparing the Efficiencies of Private and Public
Enforcement . . — 957
17.2 Causation, Antitrust Injury, Statutory Standing, Passing on,
and the Business and Property Concept: Limitations on
Private Enforcement — — 959
17.2a. Antitrust Injury — 960
17.2al. Development of the Antitrust Injury Con¬
cept — 960
17.2a2. Antitrust Injury and Incentive Incompati
bility— — 966
17.2b. Antitrust Causation and Target Area Limitations 966
17.2c. Indirect Purchaser or Passing on Doctrine —. 970
17.2cl. The Rejection of Passing on and Its Ratio¬
nales . 970
17.2c2. Illinois Brick and the Indirect Purchaser
Doctrine 972
17.2c3. Criticismof Illinois Brick 973
17.2c4. Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule 975
17.2d. Injury to Business and Property 978
17.3 Standards for Summary Disposition 979
17.4 Interstate Commerce 983
Page
See.
17.5 Statute of Limitations and Doctrines of Repose 987
17.5a. Accrual of a Cause of Action — 987
17.5b. Tolling the Statute 988
17.6 Class Actions 990
17.6a. Requirements for Class Action Suits — 991
17.6b. Managing Antitrust Class Action Suits— 992
17.6bl. Certification — — 993
17.6b2. Notice — — 996
17.6b3. DamageRemedies— — —~ 997
17.6c. The Balance Sheet on Class Actions 998
17.7 Proving Damages —~ 1000
17.7a. Proving Damages Distinguished from Proving Inju
ry 1001
17.7b. The Economic Debate Concerning the Measure of
Damages — 1002
17.7c. Damages for Cartel or Monopoly Overcharges 1003
17.7d. Loss of Profits and Its Proof 1006
17.8 Private Enforcement Issues — — 1006
17.8a. Prima Facie Evidence and Offensive Collateral Es
toppel 1006
17.8b. Joint and Several Liability and Contribution 1007
17.8c. Evidentiary Limitations on Expert Witnesses 1010
Chapter XVIII. Antitrust in Global Market«: The Extra
Territorial Reach of Unilateral Rules; Comparative
Antitrust; and Conflicting National Requirements and
Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts to Resolve Them 1012
See.
18.1 Introduction — — 1013
18.2 The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust 1014
18.2a. Foreign Conduct by Foreign Firms Affecting U.S.
Imports — 1014
18.2al. The Purpose and Effects Test: The Basic
U.S. Rule for Imports 1014
18.2a2. Development of the Purpose and Effects
Test 1018
18.2a3. Purpose and Effect in Criminal Enforce¬
ment 1021
18.2a4. Conflicts of Law, International Law and
Judicial Comity 1022
18.2a4i. Before Hartford 1022
18.2a4ii. After Hartford 1024
18.2a4iii. Empagran 1025
18.2a4iv. Diplomatie Comity 1027
18.2a4v. The International Guidelines— 1028
18.2a4vi. Bilateral Cooperation 1029
18.2a4vii. Multilateral Cooperation 1030
Page
See.
18.2b. Domestic Conduct By U.S. Firms Affecting U.S.
Exports — — 1031
18.3 EU Antitrust and Domestic Conduct by U.S. Firms 1034
18.4 Conduct in Europe That Does Competitive Harm Abroad:
Can EC Antitrust Be Used to Protect U.S. Markets? 1036
18.5 Can Foreign Governmental Undertakings Violate U.S. Anti¬
trust Law? — 1036
18.5a. The Sovereign Immunities Act — 1037
18.5b. The Act of State Doctrine 1038
18.5c. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion 1040
18.6 Comparative Antitrust: Similarities and Differences Between
U.S. and EU Antitrust — — — — 1040
18.6a. Basic Antitrust Ideologies 1040
18.6b. Treatment of Firms with Power— 1042
18.6bl. Single Firm Power 1042
18.6b2. Oligopoly 1043
18.6b3. Mergers and Other Consolidations — — 1043
18.6c. Horizontal Restraints 1050
18.6d. Vertical Restraints —. 1051
18.6e. Regulatory Immunity or Preemption — 1053
18.7 International Conflicts and Efforts to Resolve Them 1055
18.7a. IBM 1055
18.7b. Wood Pulp and Hartford 1056
18.7c. Boeing McDonnell Douglas — 1056
18.7d. General Electric Honeywell — 1062
18.7e. Microsoft 1064
18.8 Unifying Efforts: an International Antitrust Code, Harmoni
zation, or a Conflict of Laws Compact? 1066
Appendix A. Researching Antitrust Law 1073
Appendix B. Federal Agency Enforcement Guidelines —~ 1089
Table of Cases 1091
Index 1121 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1923-2007 Grimes, Warren S. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170270475 (DE-588)1096826445 |
| author_facet | Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1923-2007 Grimes, Warren S. |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1923-2007 |
| author_variant | l a s la las w s g ws wsg |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)63818896 (DE-599)BVBBV021723670 |
| dewey-full | 343.0721 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 343 - Military, tax, trade & industrial law |
| dewey-raw | 343.0721 |
| dewey-search | 343.0721 |
| dewey-sort | 3343.0721 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft |
| edition | 2. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| genre_facet | Hornbooks |
| geographic | USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV021723670 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T15:24:09Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-20T03:23:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0314147063 9780314147066 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2006275269 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014937303 |
| oclc_num | 63818896 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-384 DE-188 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | XXXIV, 1135 S. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Thomson/West |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Hornbook Series |
| spelling | Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1923-2007 Verfasser (DE-588)170270475 aut The law of antitrust an integrated handbook by Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes 2. ed. St. Paul, Minn. Thomson/West 2006 XXXIV, 1135 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hornbook Series Antitrust law United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Hornbooks gtlm USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 s 1\p DE-604 Grimes, Warren S. Verfasser (DE-588)1096826445 aut HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014937303&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Sullivan, Lawrence A. 1923-2007 Grimes, Warren S. The law of antitrust an integrated handbook Antitrust law United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4140732-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook |
| title_auth | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook |
| title_exact_search | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook |
| title_full | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook by Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes |
| title_fullStr | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook by Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes |
| title_full_unstemmed | The law of antitrust an integrated handbook by Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes |
| title_short | The law of antitrust |
| title_sort | the law of antitrust an integrated handbook |
| title_sub | an integrated handbook |
| topic | Antitrust law United States Antitrustrecht (DE-588)4140732-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Antitrust law United States Antitrustrecht USA Hornbooks |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014937303&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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