Topics in microeconomics: industrial organization, auctions and incentives
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2003
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ., digital print. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 370 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0521642280 0521645344 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Topics in microeconomics |b industrial organization, auctions and incentives |c Elmar Wolfstetter |
| 250 | |a 1. publ., digital print. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2003 | |
| 300 | |a XVI, 370 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Competition, Imperfect | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial organization | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Microeconomics | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135287065935872 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface page xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
I Imperfect Competition 1
1 Monopoly 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Cournot Monopoly - Weak Monopoly 5
1.2.1 Coumot Point 5
1.2.2 Deadweight Loss of Monopoly 14
1.2.3 Social Loss of Monopoly and Rent Seeking 16
1.2.4 Monopoly and Innovation 17
1.2.5 Monopoly and Product Quality 21
1.3 Price-Discriminating or Strong Monopoly 22
1.3.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination 23
1.3.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination 24
1.3.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination 24
1.3.4 Limits of Price Discrimination 26
1.4 Hidden Information and Price Discrimination 26
1.4.1 Solution of the Restricted Program 29
1.4.2 The Optimal Sales Plan 30
1.4.3 Why it Pays to “Distort” Efficiency 31
1.4.4 Sorting, Bunching, and Exclusion 32
1.5 Price Discrimination and Public Goods* 34
1.6 Intertemporal Price Discrimination 36
1.6.1 Durable-Goods Monopoly 37
1.6.2 Time-Inconsistency Problem 39
1.6.3 Optimal Time-Consistent Price Discrimination 40
1.6.4 Coase Conjecture 42
1.6.5 An Example Where the Coase Conjecture Fails* 42
1.7 Bilateral Monopoly and Bargaining* 43
1.7.1 A Finite-Horizon Bargaining Game 44
1.7.2 Infinite-Horizon Bargaining 45
vi Contents
1.8 Digression: The Case Against Microsoft 49
1.9 Concluding Remarks 50
1.10 Bibliographic Notes 50
2 Regulation of Monopoly 52
2.1 Introduction 52
2.2 Positive Theory: The Averch-Johnson Effect* 53
2.2.1 Assumptions 53
2.2.2 Effects of Regulation 54
2.2.3 Relation to Cost Minimization 55
2.2.4 Welfare Implication 56
2.3 Normative Theory: Ttoo Almost Perfect Regulations 57
2.3.1 The Total Surplus Subsidy Mechanism 57
2.3.2 The Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) Mechanism 58
2.4 Bibliographic Notes 63
3 Oligopoly and Industrial Organization 65
3.1 Introduction 65
3.1.1 Game-Theoretic Foundations 65
3.1.2 Historical Note 67
3.2 Three Perspectives 67
3.2.1 The Three Market Games 68
3.2.2 Coumot Competition 70
3.2.3 Bertrand Competition 72
3.2.4 Stackelberg Competition 74
3.2.5 Welfare Ranking 77
3.2.6 The Dual of Coumot Duopoly 77
3.2.7 Discussion 78
3.3 More on Stackelberg Competition 79
3.3.1 Criticism and Extensions 79
3.3.2 Managerial Incentives as Commitment Mechanism 80
3.3.3 Commitment and Observability 85
3.4 More on Coumot Competition 89
3.4.1 Existence and Uniqueness 89
3.4.2 Digression: A Prescription for Leviathan* 95
3.4.3 What Does a Coumot Equilibrium Maximize?* 97
3.4.4 What If Suppliers Form a Cartel? 98
3.4.5 Selten’s “Four Are Few and Six Are Many” 100
3.4.6 Are Mergers Profitable? 102
3.4.7 The Welfare Loss of Coumot Oligopoly 104
3.4.8 A Corrective Tax 105
3.4.9 The Generalized ISS Regulatory Mechanism* 106
3.4.10 Entry* 107
3.4.11 Exit* 111
Contents vii
3.5 More on Bertrand Competition 116
3.5.1 Capacity-Constrained Price Competition: An Example 117
3.5.2 An Alternative Rationing Rule 122
3.5.3 Generalizations 124
3.6 A Defense of Cournot Competition* 125
3.6.1 Benchmark Cournot Equilibrium 125
3.6.2 The Price-Competition Subgame 126
3.6.3 Equilibrium of the Overall Game 130
3.6.4 Excess Capacity and Collusion 131
3.6.5 Discussion 131
3.7 Bibliographic Notes 132
II Risk, Stochastic Dominance, and Risk Aversion 133
4 Stochastic Dominance: Theory 135
4.1 Introduction 135
4.2 Assumptions and Definitions 136
4.3 First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) 136
4.3.1 Main Results 137
4.3.2 FSD and the “Stochastically Larger” Relationship* 138
4.3.3 Relationship to Other Stochastic Orderings 139
4.4 Second-Order Stochastic Dominance 140
4.4.1 Main Results 141
4.4.2 SSD and the “Stochastically More Risky” Relationship* 142
4.5 An Invariance Property* 143
4.6 Ranking Transformations of Random Variables* 144
4.7 Comparative Statics of Risk 145
4.7.1 Framework 145
4.7.2 Key Issue 145
4.7.3 Summary Table 148
4.8 Bibliographic Notes 148
5 Stochastic Dominance: Applications 149
5.1 Introduction 149
5.2 Portfolio Selection I 149
5.3 The Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty 150
5.4 Labor Supply 152
5.5 Entry in Cournot Oligopoly 153
5.6 Auctions 155
5.7 Portfolio Selection II* 155
5.8 Income Inequality* 157
5.9 Supplement: Variance-Minimizing Portfolios* 159
5.9.1 Portfolios 160
5.9.2 Conjectures 160
5.9.3 Outlook 160
viii
Contents
5.9.4 Assumptions 161
5.9.5 A Lemma That Clears the Road 161
5.9.6 Main Result 162
5.9.7 Summary 163
5.9.8 Discussion 163
5.10 Bibliographic Notes 163
6 Risk Aversion 165
6.1 Introduction 165
6.2 Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion 165
6.2.1 Pratt’s Theorem 166
6.2.2 An Incomplete-Insurance Puzzle 167
6.3 Strong Absolute Risk Aversion* 168
6.3.1 Ross’s Theorem 169
6.3.2 A Portfolio Selection Puzzle 170
6.4 Wealth-Dependent Risk Aversion* 171
6.5 Bibliographic Notes 172
III Incomplete Information and Incentives 173
7 Matching: The Marriage Problem* 175
7.1 Introduction 175
7.2 Notation and Basic Assumptions 175
7.3 Stable Two-Sided Matchings 176
7.4 Who Benefits from Which Procedure? 178
7.5 Strategic Issues 179
7.5.1 Two Impossibility Results 179
7.5.2 Stable Matchings? 180
7.6 Bibliographic Notes 181
8 Auctions 182
8.1 Introduction 182
8.1.1 Information Problem 182
8.1.2 Basic Assumptions 182
8.1.3 Coumot-Monopoly Approach 183
8.1.4 Auctions - What, Where, and Why 184
8.1.5 Popular Auctions 185
8.1.6 Early History of Auctions 186
8.2 The Basics of Private-Value Auctions 186
8.2.1 Some Basic Results on Dutch and English Auctions 186
8.2.2 Revenue Equivalence 187
8.2.3 Solution of Some Auction Games - Assuming
Uniformly Distributed Valuations 188
8.2.4 An Alternative Solution Procedure* 195
8.2.5 General Solution of Symmetric Auction Games 196
8.2.6 Vickrey Auction as a Clarke-Groves Mechanism* 202
Contents ix
8.3 Robustness* 203
8.3.1 Introducing Numbers Uncertainty 204
8.3.2 Discrete Valuations 204
8.3.3 Removing Bidders’ Risk Neutrality 205
8.3.4 Removing Independence: Correlated Beliefs 205
8.3.5 Removing Symmetry 206
8.3.6 Multiunit Auctions 207
8.3.7 Split-Award Auctions 208
8.3.8 Repeated Auctions 208
8.4 Auction Rings 209
8.5 Optimal Auctions 211
8.5.1 A Simplified Approach 212
8.5.2 The Mechanism-Design Approach 214
8.5.3 Secret Reservation Price? 221
8.5.4 Optimal Auctions with Stochastic Entry* 222
8.6 Common-Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse 225
8.6.1 An Example: The Wallet Auction 225
8.6.2 Some General Results 226
8.7 Affiliated Values* 229
8.7.1 Private and Common Value Generalized 229
8.7.2 Stochastic Similarity: Affiliation 230
8.7.3 Generalized Solution of the Vickrey Auction 230
8.7.4 Linkage Principle 232
8.7.5 Why the English Auction Benefits the Seller 233
8.7.6 Limits of the Linkage Principle 234
8.8 Further Applications* 235
8.8.1 Auctions and Oligopoly 235
8.8.2 Natural-Gas and Electric Power Auctions 238
8.8.3 Treasury-Bill Auctions 239
8.9 Bibliographic Notes 241
8.10 Appendix: Second-Order Conditions (Pseudoconcavity) 241
9 Hidden Information and Adverse Selection 243
9.1 Introduction 243
9.2 Adverse Selection 243
9.2.1 The Market for Lemons 244
9.2.2 Adverse Selection in Labor Markets 245
9.3 Positive Selection: Too Many Professors? 248
9.3.1 Assumptions 248
9.3.2 Occupational Choice 249
9.3.3 Positive vs. Adverse Selection 249
9.3.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 250
9.3.5 A Corrective Tax 250
9.4 Adverse Selection and Rationing 251
X
Contents
9.5 Adverse Selection and Screening 252
9.5.1 Screening in Insurance Markets 253
9.5.2 Screening in Labor and Credit Markets 258
9.5.3 Alternative Equilibrium Concepts 258
9.5.4 Limits of Screening 259
9.6 Screening without Competition* 259
9.6.1 Price Discrimination with a Continuum of Types 259
9.6.2 Implementation by Nonlinear Pricing 265
9.7 Bibliographic Notes 266
10 Hidden Information and Signaling 267
10.1 Introduction 267
10.2 The Education Game 268
10.2.1 Rules of the Game 268
10.2.2 Payoff Functions 269
10.2.3 Subgame 269
10.2.4 Sequential Equilibrium 269
10.3 Equilibrium ֊ Embarrassment of Riches 270
10.4 Equilibrium Selection: Intuitive Criterion* 272
10.4.1 The Criterion When Type 2 Is Rare 273
10.4.2 The Criterion When Type 1 Is Rare 274
10.5 Screening vs. Signaling 275
10.6 Bibliographic Notes 276
11 Hidden Action and Moral Hazard 278
11.1 Introduction 278
11.2 Risk Aversion and Incentives 279
11.2.1 A Simple Model 279
11.2.2 Generalization 285
11.3 Limited Liability and Incentives 288
11.3.1 A Simple Model 289
11.3.2 Generalization 291
11.3.3 Monitoring and Incentives* 294
11.4 Renegotiation Problem 297
11.5 Bibliographic Notes 299
11.6 Appendix 300
12 Rank-Order Tournaments 302
12.1 Introduction 302
12.2 A Simple Model 302
12.2.1 First Best Effort and Wage 303
12.2.2 Tournament Game 304
12.3 Tournaments under Risk Neutrality 304
12.3.1 Tournament Subgame 304
12.3.2 Equilibrium Prizes 305
Contents xi
12.3.3 Two Illustrations 306
12.3.4 Discussion 307
12.4 Tournaments under Common Shocks 307
12.5 Bibliographic Notes 308
IV Technical Supplements 309
A Nonlinear Optimization: The Classical Approach 311
A.l Introduction 311
A.2 Unconstrained Optimization 311
A.3 Equality-Constrained Optimization 314
A. 4 Digression: Quadratic Forms 317
B Inequality-Constrained Optimization 320
B. l Introduction 320
B.2 The Problem 320
B.3 First-Order Necessary Conditions 321
B. 4 Second-Order Conditions 323
C Convexity and Generalizations 324
C. 1 Introduction 324
C.2 Convex Sets 324
C.3 Convex Functions 325
C.4 Strongly Convex Functions 327
C.5 Convexity and Global Extreme Values 328
C.6 Generalized Convexity: Quasiconvexity 329
C.7 Convexity Properties of Composite Functions 333
C. 8 Convexifiable Quasiconvex Programs 336
D From Expected Values to Order Statistics 339
D. l Introduction 339
D.2 Expected Value 339
D.3 Variance, Covariance, and Correlation 340
D.4 Rules to Remember 340
D.4.1 Expected Value 340
D.4.2 Variance, Covariance, Correlation 341
D.4.3 Expected Utility 342
D.4.4 Transformations of Random Variables 343
D.4.5 Order Statistics 344
D.5 Proofs 345
Bibliography 351
Index 365
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface page xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
I Imperfect Competition 1
1 Monopoly 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Cournot Monopoly - Weak Monopoly 5
1.2.1 Coumot Point 5
1.2.2 Deadweight Loss of Monopoly 14
1.2.3 Social Loss of Monopoly and Rent Seeking 16
1.2.4 Monopoly and Innovation 17
1.2.5 Monopoly and Product Quality 21
1.3 Price-Discriminating or Strong Monopoly 22
1.3.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination 23
1.3.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination 24
1.3.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination 24
1.3.4 Limits of Price Discrimination 26
1.4 Hidden Information and Price Discrimination 26
1.4.1 Solution of the Restricted Program 29
1.4.2 The Optimal Sales Plan 30
1.4.3 Why it Pays to “Distort” Efficiency 31
1.4.4 Sorting, Bunching, and Exclusion 32
1.5 Price Discrimination and Public Goods* 34
1.6 Intertemporal Price Discrimination 36
1.6.1 Durable-Goods Monopoly 37
1.6.2 Time-Inconsistency Problem 39
1.6.3 Optimal Time-Consistent Price Discrimination 40
1.6.4 Coase Conjecture 42
1.6.5 An Example Where the Coase Conjecture Fails* 42
1.7 Bilateral Monopoly and Bargaining* 43
1.7.1 A Finite-Horizon Bargaining Game 44
1.7.2 Infinite-Horizon Bargaining 45
vi Contents
1.8 Digression: The Case Against Microsoft 49
1.9 Concluding Remarks 50
1.10 Bibliographic Notes 50
2 Regulation of Monopoly 52
2.1 Introduction 52
2.2 Positive Theory: The Averch-Johnson Effect* 53
2.2.1 Assumptions 53
2.2.2 Effects of Regulation 54
2.2.3 Relation to Cost Minimization 55
2.2.4 Welfare Implication 56
2.3 Normative Theory: Ttoo Almost Perfect Regulations 57
2.3.1 The Total Surplus Subsidy Mechanism 57
2.3.2 The Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) Mechanism 58
2.4 Bibliographic Notes 63
3 Oligopoly and Industrial Organization 65
3.1 Introduction 65
3.1.1 Game-Theoretic Foundations 65
3.1.2 Historical Note 67
3.2 Three Perspectives 67
3.2.1 The Three Market Games 68
3.2.2 Coumot Competition 70
3.2.3 Bertrand Competition 72
3.2.4 Stackelberg Competition 74
3.2.5 Welfare Ranking 77
3.2.6 The Dual of Coumot Duopoly 77
3.2.7 Discussion 78
3.3 More on Stackelberg Competition 79
3.3.1 Criticism and Extensions 79
3.3.2 Managerial Incentives as Commitment Mechanism 80
3.3.3 Commitment and Observability 85
3.4 More on Coumot Competition 89
3.4.1 Existence and Uniqueness 89
3.4.2 Digression: A Prescription for Leviathan* 95
3.4.3 What Does a Coumot Equilibrium Maximize?* 97
3.4.4 What If Suppliers Form a Cartel? 98
3.4.5 Selten’s “Four Are Few and Six Are Many” 100
3.4.6 Are Mergers Profitable? 102
3.4.7 The Welfare Loss of Coumot Oligopoly 104
3.4.8 A Corrective Tax 105
3.4.9 The Generalized ISS Regulatory Mechanism* 106
3.4.10 Entry* 107
3.4.11 Exit* 111
Contents vii
3.5 More on Bertrand Competition 116
3.5.1 Capacity-Constrained Price Competition: An Example 117
3.5.2 An Alternative Rationing Rule 122
3.5.3 Generalizations 124
3.6 A Defense of Cournot Competition* 125
3.6.1 Benchmark Cournot Equilibrium 125
3.6.2 The Price-Competition Subgame 126
3.6.3 Equilibrium of the Overall Game 130
3.6.4 Excess Capacity and Collusion 131
3.6.5 Discussion 131
3.7 Bibliographic Notes 132
II Risk, Stochastic Dominance, and Risk Aversion 133
4 Stochastic Dominance: Theory 135
4.1 Introduction 135
4.2 Assumptions and Definitions 136
4.3 First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FSD) 136
4.3.1 Main Results 137
4.3.2 FSD and the “Stochastically Larger” Relationship* 138
4.3.3 Relationship to Other Stochastic Orderings 139
4.4 Second-Order Stochastic Dominance 140
4.4.1 Main Results 141
4.4.2 SSD and the “Stochastically More Risky” Relationship* 142
4.5 An Invariance Property* 143
4.6 Ranking Transformations of Random Variables* 144
4.7 Comparative Statics of Risk 145
4.7.1 Framework 145
4.7.2 Key Issue 145
4.7.3 Summary Table 148
4.8 Bibliographic Notes 148
5 Stochastic Dominance: Applications 149
5.1 Introduction 149
5.2 Portfolio Selection I 149
5.3 The Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty 150
5.4 Labor Supply 152
5.5 Entry in Cournot Oligopoly 153
5.6 Auctions 155
5.7 Portfolio Selection II* 155
5.8 Income Inequality* 157
5.9 Supplement: Variance-Minimizing Portfolios* 159
5.9.1 Portfolios 160
5.9.2 Conjectures 160
5.9.3 Outlook 160
viii
Contents
5.9.4 Assumptions 161
5.9.5 A Lemma That Clears the Road 161
5.9.6 Main Result 162
5.9.7 Summary 163
5.9.8 Discussion 163
5.10 Bibliographic Notes 163
6 Risk Aversion 165
6.1 Introduction 165
6.2 Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion 165
6.2.1 Pratt’s Theorem 166
6.2.2 An Incomplete-Insurance Puzzle 167
6.3 Strong Absolute Risk Aversion* 168
6.3.1 Ross’s Theorem 169
6.3.2 A Portfolio Selection Puzzle 170
6.4 Wealth-Dependent Risk Aversion* 171
6.5 Bibliographic Notes 172
III Incomplete Information and Incentives 173
7 Matching: The Marriage Problem* 175
7.1 Introduction 175
7.2 Notation and Basic Assumptions 175
7.3 Stable Two-Sided Matchings 176
7.4 Who Benefits from Which Procedure? 178
7.5 Strategic Issues 179
7.5.1 Two Impossibility Results 179
7.5.2 Stable Matchings? 180
7.6 Bibliographic Notes 181
8 Auctions 182
8.1 Introduction 182
8.1.1 Information Problem 182
8.1.2 Basic Assumptions 182
8.1.3 Coumot-Monopoly Approach 183
8.1.4 Auctions - What, Where, and Why 184
8.1.5 Popular Auctions 185
8.1.6 Early History of Auctions 186
8.2 The Basics of Private-Value Auctions 186
8.2.1 Some Basic Results on Dutch and English Auctions 186
8.2.2 Revenue Equivalence 187
8.2.3 Solution of Some Auction Games - Assuming
Uniformly Distributed Valuations 188
8.2.4 An Alternative Solution Procedure* 195
8.2.5 General Solution of Symmetric Auction Games 196
8.2.6 Vickrey Auction as a Clarke-Groves Mechanism* 202
Contents ix
8.3 Robustness* 203
8.3.1 Introducing Numbers Uncertainty 204
8.3.2 Discrete Valuations 204
8.3.3 Removing Bidders’ Risk Neutrality 205
8.3.4 Removing Independence: Correlated Beliefs 205
8.3.5 Removing Symmetry 206
8.3.6 Multiunit Auctions 207
8.3.7 Split-Award Auctions 208
8.3.8 Repeated Auctions 208
8.4 Auction Rings 209
8.5 Optimal Auctions 211
8.5.1 A Simplified Approach 212
8.5.2 The Mechanism-Design Approach 214
8.5.3 Secret Reservation Price? 221
8.5.4 Optimal Auctions with Stochastic Entry* 222
8.6 Common-Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse 225
8.6.1 An Example: The Wallet Auction 225
8.6.2 Some General Results 226
8.7 Affiliated Values* 229
8.7.1 Private and Common Value Generalized 229
8.7.2 Stochastic Similarity: Affiliation 230
8.7.3 Generalized Solution of the Vickrey Auction 230
8.7.4 Linkage Principle 232
8.7.5 Why the English Auction Benefits the Seller 233
8.7.6 Limits of the Linkage Principle 234
8.8 Further Applications* 235
8.8.1 Auctions and Oligopoly 235
8.8.2 Natural-Gas and Electric Power Auctions 238
8.8.3 Treasury-Bill Auctions 239
8.9 Bibliographic Notes 241
8.10 Appendix: Second-Order Conditions (Pseudoconcavity) 241
9 Hidden Information and Adverse Selection 243
9.1 Introduction 243
9.2 Adverse Selection 243
9.2.1 The Market for Lemons 244
9.2.2 Adverse Selection in Labor Markets 245
9.3 Positive Selection: Too Many Professors? 248
9.3.1 Assumptions 248
9.3.2 Occupational Choice 249
9.3.3 Positive vs. Adverse Selection 249
9.3.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 250
9.3.5 A Corrective Tax 250
9.4 Adverse Selection and Rationing 251
X
Contents
9.5 Adverse Selection and Screening 252
9.5.1 Screening in Insurance Markets 253
9.5.2 Screening in Labor and Credit Markets 258
9.5.3 Alternative Equilibrium Concepts 258
9.5.4 Limits of Screening 259
9.6 Screening without Competition* 259
9.6.1 Price Discrimination with a Continuum of Types 259
9.6.2 Implementation by Nonlinear Pricing 265
9.7 Bibliographic Notes 266
10 Hidden Information and Signaling 267
10.1 Introduction 267
10.2 The Education Game 268
10.2.1 Rules of the Game 268
10.2.2 Payoff Functions 269
10.2.3 Subgame 269
10.2.4 Sequential Equilibrium 269
10.3 Equilibrium ֊ Embarrassment of Riches 270
10.4 Equilibrium Selection: Intuitive Criterion* 272
10.4.1 The Criterion When Type 2 Is Rare 273
10.4.2 The Criterion When Type 1 Is Rare 274
10.5 Screening vs. Signaling 275
10.6 Bibliographic Notes 276
11 Hidden Action and Moral Hazard 278
11.1 Introduction 278
11.2 Risk Aversion and Incentives 279
11.2.1 A Simple Model 279
11.2.2 Generalization 285
11.3 Limited Liability and Incentives 288
11.3.1 A Simple Model 289
11.3.2 Generalization 291
11.3.3 Monitoring and Incentives* 294
11.4 Renegotiation Problem 297
11.5 Bibliographic Notes 299
11.6 Appendix 300
12 Rank-Order Tournaments 302
12.1 Introduction 302
12.2 A Simple Model 302
12.2.1 First Best Effort and Wage 303
12.2.2 Tournament Game 304
12.3 Tournaments under Risk Neutrality 304
12.3.1 Tournament Subgame 304
12.3.2 Equilibrium Prizes 305
Contents xi
12.3.3 Two Illustrations 306
12.3.4 Discussion 307
12.4 Tournaments under Common Shocks 307
12.5 Bibliographic Notes 308
IV Technical Supplements 309
A Nonlinear Optimization: The Classical Approach 311
A.l Introduction 311
A.2 Unconstrained Optimization 311
A.3 Equality-Constrained Optimization 314
A. 4 Digression: Quadratic Forms 317
B Inequality-Constrained Optimization 320
B. l Introduction 320
B.2 The Problem 320
B.3 First-Order Necessary Conditions 321
B. 4 Second-Order Conditions 323
C Convexity and Generalizations 324
C. 1 Introduction 324
C.2 Convex Sets 324
C.3 Convex Functions 325
C.4 Strongly Convex Functions 327
C.5 Convexity and Global Extreme Values 328
C.6 Generalized Convexity: Quasiconvexity 329
C.7 Convexity Properties of Composite Functions 333
C. 8 Convexifiable Quasiconvex Programs 336
D From Expected Values to Order Statistics 339
D. l Introduction 339
D.2 Expected Value 339
D.3 Variance, Covariance, and Correlation 340
D.4 Rules to Remember 340
D.4.1 Expected Value 340
D.4.2 Variance, Covariance, Correlation 341
D.4.3 Expected Utility 342
D.4.4 Transformations of Random Variables 343
D.4.5 Order Statistics 344
D.5 Proofs 345
Bibliography 351
Index 365 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)108962571 |
| author_facet | Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945- |
| author_variant | e w ew |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021537458 |
| classification_rvk | QC 100 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)315580511 (DE-599)BVBBV021537458 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ., digital print. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021537458 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:27:12Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:38:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0521642280 0521645344 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014753717 |
| oclc_num | 315580511 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-703 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-703 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | XVI, 370 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945- Verfasser (DE-588)108962571 aut Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives Elmar Wolfstetter 1. publ., digital print. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2003 XVI, 370 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Competition, Imperfect Industrial organization Microeconomics Unvollständige Konkurrenz (DE-588)4121834-6 gnd rswk-swf Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Unvollständige Konkurrenz (DE-588)4121834-6 s DE-604 Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 s 1\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753717&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Wolfstetter, Elmar 1945- Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives Competition, Imperfect Industrial organization Microeconomics Unvollständige Konkurrenz (DE-588)4121834-6 gnd Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4121834-6 (DE-588)4037174-8 (DE-588)4039225-9 |
| title | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives |
| title_auth | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives |
| title_exact_search | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives |
| title_full | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives Elmar Wolfstetter |
| title_fullStr | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives Elmar Wolfstetter |
| title_full_unstemmed | Topics in microeconomics industrial organization, auctions and incentives Elmar Wolfstetter |
| title_short | Topics in microeconomics |
| title_sort | topics in microeconomics industrial organization auctions and incentives |
| title_sub | industrial organization, auctions and incentives |
| topic | Competition, Imperfect Industrial organization Microeconomics Unvollständige Konkurrenz (DE-588)4121834-6 gnd Makroökonomie (DE-588)4037174-8 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Competition, Imperfect Industrial organization Microeconomics Unvollständige Konkurrenz Makroökonomie Mikroökonomie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014753717&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wolfstetterelmar topicsinmicroeconomicsindustrialorganizationauctionsandincentives |