Contracting with companies:
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Hart
2005
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| Series: | Contemporary studies in corporate law
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Physical Description: | XXXIII, 321 S. |
| ISBN: | 1841131547 |
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| adam_text | CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES ANDREW GRIFFITHS SCHOOL OFLAW UNIVERSITY OF
MANCHESTER *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005 TABLE OF
CONTENTS PREFACE VII TABLE OFCASES XIX TABLE OFLEGISLATION XXIX 1
ATTRIBUTION AND RISK ASSIGNNTENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL AND 1
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 1 ATTRIBUTION 1 1.1
THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A COMPANY: 2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1.2 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A 6 COMPANY: THE CURRENT POSITION
1.3 THE APPROACH OF THIS BOOK 9 2 SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW
11 GOVERNING ATTRIBUTION 2.1 LACK OF FOCUS ON THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF
CORPORATE 11 PERSONALITY 2.2 STATUTORY REFORM 13 2.3 COMPETITIVENESS,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 15 AND COMPANY LAW 3 ATTRIBUTION AS ASSIGNMENTOF RISK
15 3.1 IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH RULES OF LAW 17 3.2
IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH THE DETAIL 18 OF RULES OF LAW 3.3
RULES OF LAW AND THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 20 2 ASSIGNING RISK: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE LAW GOVERNING 23 CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES
1 THE AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER 23 2 AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF RULES OF LAW 24 2.1
THE USE OF ECONOMICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LAW 24 2.2 THE ECONOMIC
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPANY LAW 25 2.3 COMPETITIVE COMPANIES: COMPETITION
AS A DYNAMIC 27 PROCESS 2.4 DIFFERING APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND 28 TO THE FUTURE 3 STANDARDS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 31 3.1
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 X CONTENTS 3.1.1 WEALTH MAXIMISATION
AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 31 3.1.2 PARETO EFFICIENCY 32 3.1.3
KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY 33 3.1.4 CONTRACTING IN NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 34 3.1.5 THE ROLE OF LEGAL RULES IN NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 34
3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 35 3.2.1 THE
NEO-INSTITUTIONAV SCHOOLS 35 3.2.2 CONTRACTING IN THE FACE OF
UNCERTAINTY 36 AND OPPORTUNISTN 3.2.3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING 37 3.3
OTHER NOTIONS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.1 PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 38
3.3.2 DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.3 LEGAL INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION 39 3.4
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INFORMATION 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND TRANSACTION
COSTS 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND THE STIMULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 43
AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE COMPANY 43 4.1 THE LEGAL INSTITUTION 43 4.2 THE
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COMPANY 46 4.2.1 THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS MODEL 46
4.2.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OFCORPORATE MANAGEMENT 47 4.2.3 THE SEPARATION
OF MANAGEMENT FROM OWNERSHIP 48 4.2.4 VOTING RIGHTS AS A CONTRACTUAL
SAFEGUARD 49 FOR SHAREHOLDERS 4.2.5 MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND THE DANGER
OF OPPORTUNISTN 50 4.3 DIFFERING ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO THE COMPANY 52
AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 53 5.1 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
OF A COMPANY 53 5.2 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 54
5.3 CORPORATE AGENCY 55 AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 56 THE RULES
GOVERNING CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 6.1 LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF
CORPORATE AGENTS 56 6.1.1 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF LIMITS ON ACTUAL
AUTHORITY 56 6.1.2 THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE REMEDY OF INVALIDITY
58 6.2 THE ECONOMIC COST FOR COMPANIES OF OVERRIDING RULES 60 OF
ATTRIBUTION 6.2.1 THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED CONTRACTS 60 6.2.2 AN
INCREASED RISK OFLOSS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 61 6.2.3 FACTORS THAT
MITIGATE THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED 62 CONTRACTS 6.2.4 TAKING
AVOIDING ACTION TO MINIMISE THE RISK OFLOSS 63 6.2.5 THE QUALITY
OFCORPORATE AGENTS 64 CONTENTS XI 6.2.6 THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OFTHE
REMEDY OFLNVALIDITY 65 6.3 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES OF A RISK OF
INVALIDITY 66 6.3.2 TRANSACTION COSTS 66 6.3.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION
FOR THIRD PARTIES 68 6.3.3 AGENTS BEHAVIOUR AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION
68 6.3.4 THIRD PARTIES AS THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 70 7 ANALYSING THE LAW
GOVERNING CONTRACTING 71 WITH COMPANIES 3 THE POWER TO MAKE CONTRACTS
FOR A COMPANY 73 1 THE LEGAL SOURCE OF CONTRACTUAL POWER 73 2 THE
CONSTITUNONOFA COMPANY 76 2.1 THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION 76 2.2
THE FORMAT OF A COMPANY S CONSTITUTION 77 2.3 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A
COMPANY S CONSTITUTION 78 2.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SHAREHOLDERS
81 RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 3 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTUREOFA COMPANY
82 3.1 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 82 3.2.2 THE BOARD AS A COMPANY S
PRINCIPAL ORGAN 82 OF MANAGEMENT 3.1.2 THE BOARD S AUTONOMY AS AN ORGAN
OFTHE COMPANY 83 3.1.3 THE OPERATION OFTHE BOARD AS AN ORGAN
OFGOVERNANCE 85 3.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS 88 3.2.2 THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 88 3.2.2 THE OPERATION OFTHE SHAREHOLDERS AS 90
A DECISION-MAKING BODY 3.2.3 THE SHAREHOLDERS POWERS OF MANAGEMENT 90
3.2.4 THE ANCILLARY POWERS OF RATIFICATION AND RELEASE 91 3.2.5
SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 92 3.2.6 THE GOVERNANCE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANCILLARY POWERS 93 3.2.7 DECISION-MAKING ON BEHALF
OF AN INSOLVENT COMPANY 94 4 THE ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFTHE BOARD TO MAKE 95
CONTRACTS 4.1 THE VESTING OF CONTRACTUAL POWER IN THE BOARD 95 4.2.2 THE
VESTING PROCESS 95 4.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE BOARD 96 4.2 THE SPECIFICATION
OF THE COMPANY S CONTRACTUAL POWER 97 4.2.2 THE CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY OF
A COMPANY 97 4.2.2 CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY AND THE OBJECTS CLAUSE 98 4.3
THE POWERS OF THE COMPANY 100 4.3.2 THE CONSTITUTION S ROLE IN DEFINING
THE POWERS OF THE 100 COMPANY 4.3.2 DISTINGUISHING LIMITS ON THE POWERS
OFTHE COMPANY FROM 101 LIMITS ON THE POWERS OFTHE BOARD XII CONTENTS 4.4
THE POWERS OF THE BOARD 102 4.4.2 THE LIMITING EFFECT OF THE OBJECTS
CLAUSE 102 4.4.2 OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE BOARD S POWERS 103
4.4.3 DIRECTORS DUTIES AS LIMITS ON THE BOARD S POWERS? 104 4.4.4 THE
PROPER PURPOSES DOCTRINE 106 CONTRACTING BEYOND THE LIMITS ON 108 THE
BOARD S AUTHORITY 5.1 THE SHAREHOLDERS ANCILLARY POWERS 108 5.1.2 THE
NEED TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS ON THE BOARD 108 5.1.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS
POWERS TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS 109 ON THE BOARD 5.1.3 THE ECONOMIC COSTS
OFSETTING LIMITS HO ON THE BOARD S AUTHORITY 5.2. OBTAINING THE
SHAREHOLDERS APPROVAL FOR A CONTRACT 111 5.2.2 EXPENSE, DELAY AND
UNCERTAINTY 111 5.2.2 MITIGATING THE UNCERTAINTY OF DELAY 112 5.2.3 THE
BOARD S AUTHORITY TO GIVE UNDERTAKINGS 113 ABOUT THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT
CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 115 6.1 THE RATIONALE OF LIMITING THE BOARD S
ACTUAL AUTHORITY 115 6.2 THE BALANDNG EXERCISE 117 6.3 THE SCOPE FOR
EVOLVING AN EFFICIENT DIVISION OF POWERS 118 6.4 PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE
DECISION-MAKING 119 6.5 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES 121 4
ISSUESOFLDENTITYANDEXISTENCE 123 1 INTRODUCTION 123 2 THE IDENTIFICATION
OF CORPORATE 126 CONTRACTING PARTIES 2.1 SEEKING THE PRESUMED COMMON
INTENTION 126 OF THE PARTIES 2.2 CONFUSING THE IDENTITY OF CONNECTED
COMPANIES 128 2.3 ENSURING THE ACCURATE USE OF A COMPANY S 130
REGISTERED NAME 3 THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A CORPORATE CONTRACTUAL 132
PARTY: PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AND OTHER SCENARIOS 3.1 THE RISK OF
NON-EXISTENCE 132 3.2 THE COMMON LAW RULES 133 3.3 PLANNING AHEAD OF
INCORPORATION 138 4 STATUTORY REFORM 139 4.1 THE FIRST EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVE 139 4.2 SECTION 36C OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 140 CONTENTS
XIII 4.2.2 THE TERMS OFTHE PROVISION 140 4.2.2 LEGAL ISSUES ARISINGFROM
THE WORDING OFTHE PROVISION 141 5 THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF SECTION 36C
141 5.1 THE PROVISO TO SECTION 36C 141 5.2 THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE
CONTRACT GIVEN EFFECT 142 BY SECTION 36C 5.2.2 CAN THE AGENT ENFORCE THE
CONTRACT AGAINST 142 THE THIRD PARTY? 5.2.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE:
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY 142 5.2.3 THE COURT OFAPPEAL S
JUDGMENT 143 5.2.4 REVIEW OFTHE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST
145 5.3 WHO IS THE PERSON PURPORTING TO ACT FOR THE COMPANY 146 OR AS
AGENT FOR IT IN SECTION 36C? 5.3.2 DISTINGUISHING DECISION-MAKING 146
FROM DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE: LIMITING
SECTION 36C 146 TO DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.3 REVIEW OFETHERTON
J S JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST 147 5.4 CONTRACTING WITH A COMPANY THAT 148
HAS NOT BEEN FORMED 5.4.2 PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AS PART 148 OF A
BROADER CATEGORY 5.4.2 TWO SUB-CATEGORIES OF PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT
148 5.4.3 COMPANIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN FORMED ? 149 5.4.4 MUST THE
NON-EXISTENT COMPANY 150 HAVE BEEN FORMED LATER? 5.4.5 THE PLACE OF
INCORPORATION OFA COMPANY 150 SUBSEAUENTLY FORMED 5.4.6 THE EXCLUSION OF
POST-DISSOLUTION CONTRACTS 152 5.4.7 REVIEW OFTHE COTRONIC DECISION 155
5.5 CLAIMS FOR A QUANTUM MERUIT FO R WORK DONE 155 6 THE CONTRACTS
(RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) 156 ACT 1999 6.1 NOVATION AND RATIFICATION AT
COMMON LAW 156 6.2 A COMPANY S RIGHT TO ENFORCE 157 PRE-INCORPORATION
CONTRACTS 7 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 158 CONTRACTING WITH THE BOARD 161 1
INTRODUCTION 161 1.1 THE NEED FOR A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 161 FOR
THIRD PARTIES 1.2 THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THIRD PARTIES ENJOY 163
SECURITY OF TRANSACTION XIV CONTENTS OVERRIDING A COMPANY S LIMITED
CONTRACTUAL 164 CAPACITY 2.1 THE CURRENT POSITION 164 2.2 THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES 165 2.2.1 THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE 165 2.2.2
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE 166 2.2.3 THE RATIONALE OF THE DOCTRINE
167 2.3 THE NEED FOR REFORM 168 2.4 SECTION 35 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985
169 2.4.2 A PRESUMPTION OF UNLIMITED CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY? 169 2.4.2
DISTINGUISHING A COMPANY S LIMITED CONTRACTUAL 170 CAPACITY FROM THE
LIMITED ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFITS BOARD THE BOARD S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170
3.1 THE LIMITS ON A BOARD S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170 3.2 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF
A CONTRACT MADE WITHOUT ACTUAL 173 AUTHORITY 3.3 THE OVERRIDING RULES OF
ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE 174 TO CONTRACTS MADE OR APPROVED BY A COMPANY S
BOARD 3.3.2 THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 174 3.3.2 THE NEED FOR STATUTORY
REFORM 177 THE STATUTORY RULES OF ATTRIBUTION 178 4.1 SECTION 36A(6) 178
4.2 SECTION 35A 179 4.2.2 THE NATURE OFTHE STATUTORY REFORM 179 4.2.2
ELABORATION OFTHE TERMS OF SECTION 35A 179 4.2.3 THE COMPANY LAW
REVIEW S RECOMMENDATIONS 180 4.2.4 QUALIFICATION BY SECTION 322A 180
4.2.5 ANALYSIS OF SECTION 35A 181 4.3 A PERSON DEALING WITH A COMPANY
182 4.3.2 ANY LEGAL PERSON OTHER THAN THE COMPANY 182 4.3.2 SECTION 35A
AND DIRECTORS 183 4.3.3 CERTAIN DIRECTORS CANNOT BE A PERSON DEALING
184 WITH A COMPANY 4.3.4 SECTION 35A AND SHAREHOLDERS 185 4.4 THE
POWER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 188 4.4.2 IDENTIFYING THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS 188 4.4.2 THE RELEVANCE OFPROCEDURAEL REGULATIONS SUCH 188 AS
QUORUM REAUIREMENTS 4.4.3 DO PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS DEFINE THE BOARD 189
OR MERELY LIMIT ITS POWERS? 4.4.4 THE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE IN THE
HENNIKER-MAJOR CASE 190 4.4.5 REVIEW OFTHE SECOND CONDITION OEFTER 192
THE HENNIKER-MAJOR JUDGMENTS 4.4.6 THE COMPLEMENTARY POWERS OFTHE
SHAREHOLDERS 193 CONTENTS XV 5 THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 194 5.1 A
THIRD CONDITION OF SECTION 35A 194 5.2 THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 195
5.2.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 195 5.2.2 A
DUTY TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY AS 196 AN EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OFRISK 5.3
REBUTTING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH 198 5.3.2 THE ECONOMIC
ROLE OFTHE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 198 5.3.2 THE INEFFICIENCY OF
KNOWLEDGE AS A QUALIFYING FACTOR 199 5.3.3 GOOD FAITH AND LIABILITYFOR
KNOWING RECEIPT 200 5.4 ATTRIBUTING KNOWLEDGE TO A CORPORATE THIRD PARTY
200 5.4.2 THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTING OR IMPUTING KNOWLEDGE 200 TO A
COMPANY 5.4.2 DETERMINING THE KNOWLEDGE OFA COMPANY 201 FOR THE PURPOSES
OF KNOWING RECEIPT 6 A THIRD PARTY S LIABILITYFOR KNOWING RECEIPT 203
6.1 THE CONDITIONS OF LIABILITY 203 6.2 THE REQUIREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 205
6.3 A THIRD PARTY S RIGHT TO PURSUE ITS OWN 206 COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
6.3.2 THE DANGER OF AN INEFFICIENT RISK OF LIABILITY 206 6.3.2 THE
AKINDELE CASE 208 6.3.3 THE AKINDELE TEST OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 209 6.4
THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION TO SECTION 35A 212 7 CONTRACTS WITH
DIRECTORS OR OTHER 213 DESIGNATED PERSONS 7.1 SECTION 322A 213 7.2.2 THE
AMBIT AND EFFECT OF SECTION 322A 213 7.1.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION 322A
214 7.2 SECTION 322A AND MULTI-PARTY CONTRACTS 215 8 CONCLUSIONS AND
REVIEW 216 6 CONTRACTING WITH OTHER CORPORATE AGENTS 219 1 INTRODUCTION
219 1.1 THE CASE FOR ENSURING RELIABILITY 219 1.2 THE AUTHORITY OF
SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.3 DEALING WITH SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.4 THE
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE OVERRIDING RULES 222 OF ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE TO
SUBORDINATE AGENTS 2 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAW 224 2.1 OSTENSIBLE
AUTHORITY 224 2.2 DETERMINING THE OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 225 OF CORPORATE
AGENTS 3 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 227 XVI CONTENTS 3.1 THE NATURE OF
THE RULE 227 3.2.2 APRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY 227 3.1.2 CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE OF IRREGULARITY 228 3.1.3 STATEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE
229 3.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 229 3.2.2 A CORPORATE
AGENT S APPEARANCE OF AUTHORITY 229 3.2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE 230 3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PUT A THIRD PARTY ON INQUIRY 232
3.3.2 A THIRD PARTY S DUTY TO FIND OUT MORE 232 3.3.2 CIRCUMSTANCES
PUTTING A THIRD PARTY ON INQUIRY 233 3.3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIRD
PARTIES ARE 234 THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 3.3.4 FACTORS PUTTING THIRD
PARTIES ON INQUIRY 236 3.4 THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT
RULE 238 3.4.2 THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AS AN INSTANCE 238 OF
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 3.4.2 THE PROBLEM OFFINDING A REPRESENTATION 239 OF
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY THE DIPLOCK APPROACH TO CORPORATE AGENCY 240 4.1
ADAPTING AGENCY LAW TO CORPORATE PERSONALITY 240 4.2 THE RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW IN THE FREEMAN 241 & LOCKYER CASE 4.3 THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244
4.3.1 THE FOUR CONDITIONS OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 244 4.3.2 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR
CONDITIONS 245 OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 5.1 A REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY
245 5.2.2 REPRESENTING THE AUTHORITY OFA CORPORATE AGENT 245 5.1.2 THE
SCOPE OFA REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY 246 5.2 SOMEONE WITH ACTUAL
AUTHORITY TO MANAGE 247 THE COMPANY MUST MAKE THE REPRESENTATION 5.2.2
THE REPRESENTATION MUST BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 247 COMPANY 5.2.2
AUTHORITY TO BE A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 248 FOR THIRD PARTIES? 5.2.3
THE ECONOMIC COST OFNOT HAVING 250 A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 5.2.4 THE
AGENT AS A REFERENCE POINT 252 5.2.5 THE AGENT AS A RELIABLE REFERENCE
POINT 253 5.2.6 THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY IN THE LAW 256 5.3 THE
REPRESENTATION MUST HAVE INDUCED THE THIRD PARTY 257 TO ENTER THE
CONTRACT CONTENTS XVII 5.3.2 THE NEED FOR RELIANCE 257 5.3.2 A THIRD
PARTY S SUSPICION MAY NEGATE RELIANCE 258 5.3.3 ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE
KNOWLEDGE NEGATES RELIANCE 258 5.4 THE COMPANY HAS THE CAPACITY TO ENTER
260 THE CONTRACT AND TO DELEGATE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO THE AGENT 6
THE ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE 261 OF CONSTRUCTIVE OR DEEMED NOTICE 7
CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 262 7 CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 265 1
INTRODUCTTON 265 1.1 THE MEANING OF SELF-DEALING 265 1.2 THE LEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-DEALING 266 1.3 THE LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTS
INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 267 1.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF REGULATING
SELF-DEALING 270 1.5 DISCLOSURE IN A UNITARY BOARD SYSTEM 272 1.6 THE
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW 273 2 IDENTIFYING CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING
274 2.1 DEFINING A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 274 2.2 THE AMBIT OF THE NO
CONFLICT RULE 275 2.3 THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW 276 3 THE EFFECT OF
SELF-DEALING ON THE POWER 277 TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR COMPANIES 3.1 ACTUAL
AUTHORITY 277 3.1.2 THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE POWER TO AWARD
REMUNERATION 277 3.1.2 OTHER SPECIAL LIMITS AFFECTING ACTUAL AUTHORITY
278 3.2 BREACH OF THE DIRECTORS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 280 4 SELF-DEALING
AND THE OVERRIDING RULES 281 OF ATTRIBUTION 4.1 SECTION 35A OF THE
COMPANIES ACT 1985 281 4.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 282 4.3 OSTENSIBLE
AUTHORITY AND THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 284 5 THE ADDITIONAL LAW GOVERNING
THE VALIDITY 285 OF CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 6 THE REQUIREMENT
TO DECLARE OR DISCLOSE AN 287 INTEREST IN A CONTRACT INVOLVING
SELF-DEALING 6.1 THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
287 6.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT S 288 HAVING TWO
LEGAL SOURCES 6.3 COMPLYING WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 290 6.4 WHAT
MUST A DIRECTOR DISCLOSE TO SATISFY 293 THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT? XVUEI
CONTENTS 6.4.1 INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE 293 6.4.2 LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE
DISCLOSURE 294 6.4.3 THE LIMITS OF THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE 295 6.5 THE
LEGAL EFFECT ON A CONTRACT OF A FAILURE TO COMPLY 296 WITH THE
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 6.5.1 THE COMPANY S RIGHT TO AVOID THE CONTRACT
296 6.5.2 AN ELECTION NOT TO RESCIND 297 6.5.3 AN INNOCENT THIRD PARTY
297 6.5.4 UNREASONABLE DELAY OR ACQUIESCENCE 298 6.5.5 IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RESTITUTION 299 7 SPECIAL REGIMES UNDER PART X 300 OF THE COMPANIES ACT
1985 7.1 CONTRACTS INVOLVING AN ENHANCED RISK OF ABUSE 300 7.2
DIRECTORS REMUNERATION 301 8 SECTION 320 OFTHE COMPANIES ACT 1985 303
8.1 SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 303 8.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION
320 303 8.2.1 ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE SHAREHOLDERS 303 8.2.2
SECTION 320 AND THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT RULE 306 8.3 THE CONDITIONS THAT
TRIGGER SECTION 320 307 8.3.1 THE STATUTORY CONDITIONS 307 8.3.2 AN
ARRANGEMENT 308 8.3.3 NON CASH ASSETS 308 8.3.4 THE VALUE OFTHE NON-CASH
ASSET 309 8.3.5 THE COMPANY S ASSET VALUE 311 8.4 CONSEQUENTIAL
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 322 311 9 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 312 INDEX 315
|
| adam_txt |
CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES ANDREW GRIFFITHS SCHOOL OFLAW UNIVERSITY OF
MANCHESTER *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005 TABLE OF
CONTENTS PREFACE VII TABLE OFCASES XIX TABLE OFLEGISLATION XXIX 1
ATTRIBUTION AND RISK ASSIGNNTENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL AND 1
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 1 ATTRIBUTION 1 1.1
THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A COMPANY: 2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1.2 THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS TO A 6 COMPANY: THE CURRENT POSITION
1.3 THE APPROACH OF THIS BOOK 9 2 SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW
11 GOVERNING ATTRIBUTION 2.1 LACK OF FOCUS ON THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF
CORPORATE 11 PERSONALITY 2.2 STATUTORY REFORM 13 2.3 COMPETITIVENESS,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 15 AND COMPANY LAW 3 ATTRIBUTION AS ASSIGNMENTOF RISK
15 3.1 IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH RULES OF LAW 17 3.2
IMPROVING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH THE DETAIL 18 OF RULES OF LAW 3.3
RULES OF LAW AND THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 20 2 ASSIGNING RISK: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE LAW GOVERNING 23 CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES
1 THE AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER 23 2 AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF RULES OF LAW 24 2.1
THE USE OF ECONOMICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF LAW 24 2.2 THE ECONOMIC
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPANY LAW 25 2.3 'COMPETITIVE' COMPANIES: COMPETITION
AS A DYNAMIC 27 PROCESS 2.4 DIFFERING APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND 28 TO THE FUTURE 3 STANDARDS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 31 3.1
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 X CONTENTS 3.1.1 WEALTH MAXIMISATION
AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 31 3.1.2 PARETO EFFICIENCY 32 3.1.3
KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY 33 3.1.4 CONTRACTING IN NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 34 3.1.5 THE ROLE OF LEGAL RULES IN NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 34
3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS 35 3.2.1 THE
'NEO-INSTITUTIONAV SCHOOLS 35 3.2.2 CONTRACTING IN THE FACE OF
UNCERTAINTY 36 AND OPPORTUNISTN 3.2.3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING 37 3.3
OTHER NOTIONS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.1 PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 38
3.3.2 DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 38 3.3.3 LEGAL INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION 39 3.4
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INFORMATION 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND TRANSACTION
COSTS 41 3.4.2 INFORMATION AND THE STIMULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 43
AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE COMPANY 43 4.1 THE LEGAL INSTITUTION 43 4.2 THE
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COMPANY 46 4.2.1 THE'NEXUS OF CONTRACTS'MODEL 46
4.2.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OFCORPORATE MANAGEMENT 47 4.2.3 THE SEPARATION
OF MANAGEMENT FROM OWNERSHIP 48 4.2.4 VOTING RIGHTS AS A CONTRACTUAL
SAFEGUARD 49 FOR SHAREHOLDERS 4.2.5 MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND THE DANGER
OF OPPORTUNISTN 50 4.3 DIFFERING ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO THE COMPANY 52
AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 53 5.1 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
OF A COMPANY 53 5.2 THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 54
5.3 CORPORATE AGENCY 55 AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 56 THE RULES
GOVERNING CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 6.1 LIMITING THE AUTHORITY OF
CORPORATE AGENTS 56 6.1.1 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF LIMITS ON ACTUAL
AUTHORITY 56 6.1.2 THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE REMEDY OF INVALIDITY
58 6.2 THE ECONOMIC COST FOR COMPANIES OF OVERRIDING RULES 60 OF
ATTRIBUTION 6.2.1 THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED CONTRACTS 60 6.2.2 AN
INCREASED RISK OFLOSS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 61 6.2.3 FACTORS THAT
MITIGATE THE RISK OFLOSSFROM UNAUTHORISED 62 CONTRACTS 6.2.4 TAKING
AVOIDING ACTION TO MINIMISE THE RISK OFLOSS 63 6.2.5 THE QUALITY
OFCORPORATE AGENTS 64 CONTENTS XI 6.2.6 THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OFTHE
REMEDY OFLNVALIDITY 65 6.3 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES OF A RISK OF
INVALIDITY 66 6.3.2 TRANSACTION COSTS 66 6.3.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION
FOR THIRD PARTIES 68 6.3.3 AGENTS' BEHAVIOUR AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION
68 6.3.4 THIRD PARTIES AS THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 70 7 ANALYSING THE LAW
GOVERNING CONTRACTING 71 WITH COMPANIES 3 THE POWER TO MAKE CONTRACTS
FOR A COMPANY 73 1 THE LEGAL SOURCE OF CONTRACTUAL POWER 73 2 THE
CONSTITUNONOFA COMPANY 76 2.1 THE LEGAL ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION 76 2.2
THE FORMAT OF A COMPANY'S CONSTITUTION 77 2.3 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A
COMPANY'S CONSTITUTION 78 2.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SHAREHOLDERS'
81 RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 3 THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTUREOFA COMPANY
82 3.1 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 82 3.2.2 THE BOARD AS A COMPANY'S
PRINCIPAL ORGAN 82 OF MANAGEMENT 3.1.2 THE BOARD'S AUTONOMY AS AN ORGAN
OFTHE COMPANY 83 3.1.3 THE OPERATION OFTHE BOARD AS AN ORGAN
OFGOVERNANCE 85 3.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS 88 3.2.2 THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 88 3.2.2 THE OPERATION OFTHE SHAREHOLDERS AS 90
A DECISION-MAKING BODY 3.2.3 THE SHAREHOLDERS' POWERS OF MANAGEMENT 90
3.2.4 THE ANCILLARY POWERS OF RATIFICATION AND RELEASE 91 3.2.5
SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 92 3.2.6 THE GOVERNANCE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANCILLARY POWERS 93 3.2.7 DECISION-MAKING ON BEHALF
OF AN INSOLVENT COMPANY 94 4 THE ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFTHE BOARD TO MAKE 95
CONTRACTS 4.1 THE VESTING OF CONTRACTUAL POWER IN THE BOARD 95 4.2.2 THE
VESTING PROCESS 95 4.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE BOARD 96 4.2 THE SPECIFICATION
OF THE COMPANY'S CONTRACTUAL POWER 97 4.2.2 THE CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY OF
A COMPANY 97 4.2.2 CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY AND THE OBJECTS CLAUSE 98 4.3
THE POWERS OF THE COMPANY 100 4.3.2 THE CONSTITUTION'S ROLE IN DEFINING
THE POWERS OF THE 100 COMPANY 4.3.2 DISTINGUISHING LIMITS ON THE POWERS
OFTHE COMPANY FROM 101 LIMITS ON THE POWERS OFTHE BOARD XII CONTENTS 4.4
THE POWERS OF THE BOARD 102 4.4.2 THE LIMITING EFFECT OF THE OBJECTS
CLAUSE 102 4.4.2 OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE BOARD'S POWERS 103
4.4.3 DIRECTORS' DUTIES AS LIMITS ON THE BOARD'S POWERS? 104 4.4.4 THE
PROPER PURPOSES DOCTRINE 106 CONTRACTING BEYOND THE LIMITS ON 108 THE
BOARD'S AUTHORITY 5.1 THE SHAREHOLDERS'ANCILLARY POWERS 108 5.1.2 THE
NEED TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS ON THE BOARD 108 5.1.2 THE SHAREHOLDERS'
POWERS TO OVERRIDE THE LIMITS 109 ON THE BOARD 5.1.3 THE ECONOMIC COSTS
OFSETTING LIMITS HO ON THE BOARD'S AUTHORITY 5.2. OBTAINING THE
SHAREHOLDERS' APPROVAL FOR A CONTRACT 111 5.2.2 EXPENSE, DELAY AND
UNCERTAINTY 111 5.2.2 MITIGATING THE UNCERTAINTY OF DELAY 112 5.2.3 THE
BOARD'S AUTHORITY TO GIVE UNDERTAKINGS 113 ABOUT THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT
CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 115 6.1 THE RATIONALE OF LIMITING THE BOARD'S
ACTUAL AUTHORITY 115 6.2 THE BALANDNG EXERCISE 117 6.3 THE SCOPE FOR
EVOLVING AN EFFICIENT DIVISION OF POWERS 118 6.4 PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE
DECISION-MAKING 119 6.5 THE COST FOR THIRD PARTIES 121 4
ISSUESOFLDENTITYANDEXISTENCE 123 1 INTRODUCTION 123 2 THE IDENTIFICATION
OF CORPORATE 126 CONTRACTING PARTIES 2.1 SEEKING THE 'PRESUMED COMMON
INTENTION' 126 OF THE PARTIES 2.2 CONFUSING THE IDENTITY OF CONNECTED
COMPANIES 128 2.3 ENSURING THE ACCURATE USE OF A COMPANY'S 130
REGISTERED NAME 3 THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A CORPORATE CONTRACTUAL 132
PARTY: PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AND OTHER SCENARIOS 3.1 THE RISK OF
NON-EXISTENCE 132 3.2 THE COMMON LAW RULES 133 3.3 PLANNING AHEAD OF
INCORPORATION 138 4 STATUTORY REFORM 139 4.1 THE FIRST EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVE 139 4.2 SECTION 36C OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985 140 CONTENTS
XIII 4.2.2 THE TERMS OFTHE PROVISION 140 4.2.2 LEGAL ISSUES ARISINGFROM
THE WORDING OFTHE PROVISION 141 5 THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF SECTION 36C
141 5.1 THE PROVISO TO SECTION 36C 141 5.2 THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE
CONTRACT GIVEN EFFECT 142 BY SECTION 36C 5.2.2 CAN THE AGENT ENFORCE THE
CONTRACT AGAINST 142 THE THIRD PARTY? 5.2.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE:
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY 142 5.2.3 THE COURT OFAPPEAL 'S
JUDGMENT 143 5.2.4 REVIEW OFTHE COURT OF APPEALS JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST
145 5.3 WHO IS 'THE PERSON PURPORTING TO ACT FOR THE COMPANY 146 OR AS
AGENT FOR IT' IN SECTION 36C? 5.3.2 DISTINGUISHING DECISION-MAKING 146
FROM DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.2 THE BRAYMIST CASE: LIMITING
SECTION 36C 146 TO DECISION-IMPLEMENTING AGENTS 5.3.3 REVIEW OFETHERTON
J'S JUDGMENT IN BRAYMIST 147 5.4 CONTRACTING WITH A COMPANY THAT 148
'HAS NOT BEEN FORMED' 5.4.2 PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AS PART 148 OF'A
BROADER CATEGORY 5.4.2 TWO SUB-CATEGORIES OF PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT
148 5.4.3 COMPANIES THAT 'HAVE NOT BEEN FORMED'? 149 5.4.4 MUST THE
NON-EXISTENT COMPANY 150 HAVE BEEN FORMED LATER? 5.4.5 THE PLACE OF
INCORPORATION OFA COMPANY 150 SUBSEAUENTLY FORMED 5.4.6 THE EXCLUSION OF
POST-DISSOLUTION CONTRACTS 152 5.4.7 REVIEW OFTHE COTRONIC DECISION 155
5.5 CLAIMS FOR A QUANTUM MERUIT FO R WORK DONE 155 6 THE CONTRACTS
(RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) 156 ACT 1999 6.1 NOVATION AND RATIFICATION AT
COMMON LAW 156 6.2 A COMPANY'S RIGHT TO ENFORCE 157 PRE-INCORPORATION
CONTRACTS 7 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 158 CONTRACTING WITH THE BOARD 161 1
INTRODUCTION 161 1.1 THE NEED FOR A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 161 FOR
THIRD PARTIES 1.2 THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THIRD PARTIES ENJOY 163
'SECURITY OF TRANSACTION' XIV CONTENTS OVERRIDING A COMPANY'S LIMITED
CONTRACTUAL 164 CAPACITY 2.1 THE CURRENT POSITION 164 2.2 THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES 165 2.2.1 THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE 165 2.2.2
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE 166 2.2.3 THE RATIONALE OF THE DOCTRINE
167 2.3 THE NEED FOR REFORM 168 2.4 SECTION 35 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1985
169 2.4.2 A PRESUMPTION OF UNLIMITED CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY? 169 2.4.2
DISTINGUISHING A COMPANY'S LIMITED CONTRACTUAL 170 CAPACITY FROM THE
LIMITED ACTUAL AUTHORITY OFITS BOARD THE BOARD'S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170
3.1 THE LIMITS ON A BOARD'S ACTUAL AUTHORITY 170 3.2 THE LEGAL EFFECT OF
A CONTRACT MADE WITHOUT ACTUAL 173 AUTHORITY 3.3 THE OVERRIDING RULES OF
ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE 174 TO CONTRACTS MADE OR APPROVED BY A COMPANY'S
BOARD 3.3.2 THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 174 3.3.2 THE NEED FOR STATUTORY
REFORM 177 THE STATUTORY RULES OF ATTRIBUTION 178 4.1 SECTION 36A(6) 178
4.2 SECTION 35A 179 4.2.2 THE NATURE OFTHE STATUTORY REFORM 179 4.2.2
ELABORATION OFTHE TERMS OF SECTION 35A 179 4.2.3 THE COMPANY LAW
REVIEW'S RECOMMENDATIONS 180 4.2.4 QUALIFICATION BY SECTION 322A 180
4.2.5 ANALYSIS OF SECTION 35A 181 4.3 A PERSON DEALING WITH A COMPANY
182 4.3.2 ANY LEGAL PERSON OTHER THAN THE COMPANY 182 4.3.2 SECTION 35A
AND DIRECTORS 183 4.3.3 CERTAIN DIRECTORS CANNOT BE 'A PERSON DEALING
184 WITH A COMPANY' 4.3.4 SECTION 35A AND SHAREHOLDERS 185 4.4 THE
'POWER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS' 188 4.4.2 IDENTIFYING THE 'BOARD OF
DIRECTORS' 188 4.4.2 THE RELEVANCE OFPROCEDURAEL REGULATIONS SUCH 188 AS
QUORUM REAUIREMENTS 4.4.3 DO PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS DEFINE THE BOARD 189
OR MERELY LIMIT ITS POWERS? 4.4.4 THE APPROACH TO THE ISSUE IN THE
HENNIKER-MAJOR CASE 190 4.4.5 REVIEW OFTHE SECOND CONDITION OEFTER 192
THE HENNIKER-MAJOR JUDGMENTS 4.4.6 THE COMPLEMENTARY POWERS OFTHE
SHAREHOLDERS 193 CONTENTS XV 5 THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 194 5.1 A
THIRD CONDITION OF SECTION 35A 194 5.2 THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 195
5.2.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 195 5.2.2 A
DUTY TO MAKE FURTHER INQUIRY AS 196 AN EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OFRISK 5.3
REBUTTING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH 198 5.3.2 THE ECONOMIC
ROLE OFTHE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION 198 5.3.2 THE INEFFICIENCY OF
KNOWLEDGE AS A QUALIFYING FACTOR 199 5.3.3 GOOD FAITH AND LIABILITYFOR
KNOWING RECEIPT 200 5.4 ATTRIBUTING KNOWLEDGE TO A CORPORATE THIRD PARTY
200 5.4.2 THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTING OR IMPUTING KNOWLEDGE 200 TO A
COMPANY 5.4.2 DETERMINING THE KNOWLEDGE OFA COMPANY 201 FOR THE PURPOSES
OF KNOWING RECEIPT 6 A THIRD PARTY'S LIABILITYFOR KNOWING RECEIPT 203
6.1 THE CONDITIONS OF LIABILITY 203 6.2 THE REQUIREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 205
6.3 A THIRD PARTY'S RIGHT TO PURSUE ITS OWN 206 COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
6.3.2 THE DANGER OF AN INEFFICIENT RISK OF LIABILITY 206 6.3.2 THE
AKINDELE CASE 208 6.3.3 THE AKINDELE TEST OF 'UNCONSCIONABILITY' 209 6.4
THE GOOD FAITH QUALIFICATION TO SECTION 35A 212 7 CONTRACTS WITH
DIRECTORS OR OTHER 213 DESIGNATED PERSONS 7.1 SECTION 322A 213 7.2.2 THE
AMBIT AND EFFECT OF SECTION 322A 213 7.1.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION 322A
214 7.2 SECTION 322A AND MULTI-PARTY CONTRACTS 215 8 CONCLUSIONS AND
REVIEW 216 6 CONTRACTING WITH OTHER CORPORATE AGENTS 219 1 INTRODUCTION
219 1.1 THE CASE FOR ENSURING RELIABILITY 219 1.2 THE AUTHORITY OF
SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.3 DEALING WITH SUBORDINATE AGENTS 220 1.4 THE
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE OVERRIDING RULES 222 OF ATTRIBUTION APPLICABLE TO
SUBORDINATE AGENTS 2 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAW 224 2.1 OSTENSIBLE
AUTHORITY 224 2.2 DETERMINING THE OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 225 OF CORPORATE
AGENTS 3 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 227 XVI CONTENTS 3.1 THE NATURE OF
THE RULE 227 3.2.2 APRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY 227 3.1.2 CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE OF IRREGULARITY 228 3.1.3 STATEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE
229 3.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 229 3.2.2 A CORPORATE
AGENT'S APPEARANCE OF AUTHORITY 229 3.2.2 THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE 230 3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PUT A THIRD PARTY 'ON INQUIRY' 232
3.3.2 A THIRD PARTY'S DUTY TO FIND OUT MORE 232 3.3.2 CIRCUMSTANCES
PUTTING A THIRD PARTY ON INQUIRY 233 3.3.3 CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THIRD
PARTIES ARE 234 THE LEAST-COST-AVOIDER 3.3.4 FACTORS PUTTING THIRD
PARTIES ON INQUIRY 236 3.4 THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT
RULE 238 3.4.2 THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AS AN INSTANCE 238 OF
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 3.4.2 THE PROBLEM OFFINDING A REPRESENTATION 239 OF
OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY THE DIPLOCK APPROACH TO CORPORATE AGENCY 240 4.1
ADAPTING AGENCY LAW TO CORPORATE PERSONALITY 240 4.2 THE RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW IN THE FREEMAN 241 & LOCKYER CASE 4.3 THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244
4.3.1 THE FOUR CONDITIONS OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 244 4.3.2 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 244 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR
CONDITIONS 245 OF OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY 5.1 A REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY
245 5.2.2 REPRESENTING THE AUTHORITY OFA CORPORATE AGENT 245 5.1.2 THE
SCOPE OFA REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY 246 5.2 SOMEONE WITH ACTUAL
AUTHORITY TO MANAGE 247 THE COMPANY MUST MAKE THE REPRESENTATION 5.2.2
THE REPRESENTATION MUST BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 247 COMPANY 5.2.2
AUTHORITY TO BE A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 248 FOR THIRD PARTIES? 5.2.3
THE ECONOMIC COST OFNOT HAVING 250 A RELIABLE REFERENCE POINT 5.2.4 THE
AGENT AS A REFERENCE POINT 252 5.2.5 THE AGENT AS A RELIABLE REFERENCE
POINT 253 5.2.6 THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY IN THE LAW 256 5.3 THE
REPRESENTATION MUST HAVE INDUCED THE THIRD PARTY 257 TO ENTER THE
CONTRACT CONTENTS XVII 5.3.2 THE NEED FOR RELIANCE 257 5.3.2 A THIRD
PARTY'S SUSPICION MAY NEGATE RELIANCE 258 5.3.3 ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE
KNOWLEDGE NEGATES RELIANCE 258 5.4 THE COMPANY HAS THE CAPACITY TO ENTER
260 THE CONTRACT AND TO DELEGATE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO THE AGENT 6
THE ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE 261 OF CONSTRUCTIVE OR DEEMED NOTICE 7
CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 262 7 CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 265 1
INTRODUCTTON 265 1.1 THE MEANING OF SELF-DEALING 265 1.2 THE LEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-DEALING 266 1.3 THE LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTS
INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 267 1.4 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF REGULATING
SELF-DEALING 270 1.5 DISCLOSURE IN A UNITARY BOARD SYSTEM 272 1.6 THE
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW 273 2 IDENTIFYING CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING
274 2.1 DEFINING A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 274 2.2 THE AMBIT OF THE NO
CONFLICT RULE 275 2.3 THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW 276 3 THE EFFECT OF
SELF-DEALING ON THE POWER 277 TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR COMPANIES 3.1 ACTUAL
AUTHORITY 277 3.1.2 THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE POWER TO AWARD
REMUNERATION 277 3.1.2 OTHER SPECIAL LIMITS AFFECTING ACTUAL AUTHORITY
278 3.2 BREACH OF THE DIRECTORS'DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 280 4 SELF-DEALING
AND THE OVERRIDING RULES 281 OF ATTRIBUTION 4.1 SECTION 35A OF THE
COMPANIES ACT 1985 281 4.2 THE INDOOR MANAGEMENT RULE 282 4.3 OSTENSIBLE
AUTHORITY AND THE DIPLOCK APPROACH 284 5 THE ADDITIONAL LAW GOVERNING
THE VALIDITY 285 OF CONTRACTS INVOLVING SELF-DEALING 6 THE REQUIREMENT
TO DECLARE OR DISCLOSE AN 287 INTEREST IN A CONTRACT INVOLVING
SELF-DEALING 6.1 THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
287 6.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT'S 288 HAVING TWO
LEGAL SOURCES 6.3 COMPLYING WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 290 6.4 WHAT
MUST A DIRECTOR DISCLOSE TO SATISFY 293 THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT? XVUEI
CONTENTS 6.4.1 INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE 293 6.4.2 LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE
DISCLOSURE 294 6.4.3 THE LIMITS OF THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE 295 6.5 THE
LEGAL EFFECT ON A CONTRACT OF A FAILURE TO COMPLY 296 WITH THE
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 6.5.1 THE COMPANY'S RIGHT TO AVOID THE CONTRACT
296 6.5.2 AN ELECTION NOT TO RESCIND 297 6.5.3 AN INNOCENT THIRD PARTY
297 6.5.4 UNREASONABLE DELAY OR ACQUIESCENCE 298 6.5.5 IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RESTITUTION 299 7 SPECIAL REGIMES UNDER PART X 300 OF THE COMPANIES ACT
1985 7.1 CONTRACTS INVOLVING AN ENHANCED RISK OF ABUSE 300 7.2
DIRECTORS'REMUNERATION 301 8 SECTION 320 OFTHE COMPANIES ACT 1985 303
8.1 SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 303 8.2 THE RATIONALE OF SECTION
320 303 8.2.1 ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE SHAREHOLDERS 303 8.2.2
SECTION 320 AND THE UNANIMOUS CONSENT RULE 306 8.3 THE CONDITIONS THAT
TRIGGER SECTION 320 307 8.3.1 THE STATUTORY CONDITIONS 307 8.3.2 AN
ARRANGEMENT 308 8.3.3 NON CASH ASSETS 308 8.3.4 THE VALUE OFTHE NON-CASH
ASSET 309 8.3.5 THE COMPANY'S ASSET VALUE 311 8.4 CONSEQUENTIAL
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 322 311 9 CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 312 INDEX 315 |
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| spelling | Griffiths, Andrew Verfasser aut Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2005 XXXIII, 321 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Contemporary studies in corporate law Contracts England Contracts Wales Commercial law England Commercial law Wales GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014748941&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Griffiths, Andrew Contracting with companies Contracts England Contracts Wales Commercial law England Commercial law Wales |
| title | Contracting with companies |
| title_auth | Contracting with companies |
| title_exact_search | Contracting with companies |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Contracting with companies |
| title_full | Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths |
| title_fullStr | Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths |
| title_full_unstemmed | Contracting with companies Andrew Griffiths |
| title_short | Contracting with companies |
| title_sort | contracting with companies |
| topic | Contracts England Contracts Wales Commercial law England Commercial law Wales |
| topic_facet | Contracts England Contracts Wales Commercial law England Commercial law Wales |
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