The morality of conflict: reasonable disagreement and the law
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Hart
2005
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. [539] - 590 |
| Beschreibung: | XX, 601 S. |
| ISBN: | 1841134929 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The morality of conflict |b reasonable disagreement and the law |c Samantha Besson |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Ethik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Philosophie | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making |x Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Justice (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law |x Philosophy | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804135183461384192 |
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| adam_text | THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW SAMANTHA
BESSON *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005 ; :*
CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VII INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE ISSUE 1 II. THE
SIGNIFICANCE 7 III. THE APPROACH 10 IV. THE STRUCTURE 12 PART ONE: THE
NATURE OF DISAGREEMENT 17 1. THE NOTION AND TYPES OF DISAGREEMENT 19
INTRODUCTION 19 I. THE NOTION OF DISAGREEMENT 19 II. THE TYPES OF
DISAGREEMENT 22 1. POLITICAL-MORAL DISAGREEMENT 22 2. THE SCOPE OF
POLITICAL MORALITY 24 A. RAWLS SEPARATION OF POLITICAL MORALITY FROM
COMPREHENSIVE MORAL DOCTRINES 25 I. RAWLS OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 25 II.
RAWLS WAY OUT 27 III. A REVISED RAWLSIAN MODEL OF POLITICAL-MORAL
DISAGREEMENT 30 B. HABERMAS SEPARATION OF ETHICAL-POLITICAL DISCOURSE
FROM MORAL DEBATES 31 I. THE EARLY HABERMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF
POLITICAL-MORAL DISAGREEMENT 33 II. THE LATE HABERMAS AND THE SEPARATION
OF THE MORAL FROM THE ETHICAL 36 III. THE FACT OF DISAGREEMENT AND THE
ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 39 1. THE CHALLENGE 39 2. THE CHALLENGE S
DEFEASIBILITY 41 3. LEARNING FROM THE CHALLENGE 44 CONCLUSION 45 X
CONTENTS 2. THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT AND LEGAL INDETERMINACY 47
INTRODUCTION 47 I. THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT 47 1. VERBAL LACK OF
AGREEMENT 48 2. CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENT 48 A. BORDERLINE DISAGREEMENT 50
B. PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 51 3. NORMATIVE DISAGREEMENT 52 A. EPISTEMIC
DISAGREEMENT 53 B. METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT 54 I. FROM VALUE CONFLICT
TO METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT 54 II. TYPES OF METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT
55 II. FROM MORAL DISAGREEMENT TO LEGAL INDETERMINACY 57 1. THEDEBATE 57
2. THE NOTION OF INDETERMINACY 59 A. INDETERMINACY, UNCERTAINTY AND
OBJECTIVITY 59 B. FROM MORAL TO LEGAL INDETERMINACY 62 C. TYPES OF LEGAL
INDETERMINACY 64 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT AND LEGAL
INDETERMINACY 65 CONDUSION 66 3. THE ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY OF
NORMATIVE CONCEPTS 69 INTRODUCTION 69 I. THE CONCEPT OF ESSENTIALLY
CONTESTABLE CONCEPT 72 II. THE SOURCES OF ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY 74
1. VERBAL LACK OF AGREEMENT 75 2. CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENT 75 A.
BORDERLINE DISAGREEMENT 75 B. PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 78 3. NORMATIVE
DISAGREEMENT 80 III. MINIMAL AGREEMENT IN UNDERSTANDING AND DISPUTABLE
PARADIGMS 81 1. MINIMAL AGREEMENT IN UNDERSTANDING 82 2. THE
DISPUTABILITY OF PARADIGMS 84 3. SHARED PARADIGMS AND CONCEPTUAL TRUTH
86 CONCLUSION 88 4. THE REASONABLENESS OF DISAGREEMENT 91 INTRODUCTION
91 I. THE NOTION OF REASONABLENESS 91 1. THREE CAVEATS 92 CONTENTS XI 2.
FOUR DISTINCTIONS 93 A. REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY 93 B. PUBLIC
REASONABLENESS AND PRIVATE REASONABLENESS 95 C. PERSON-BASED
REASONABLENESS AND CONTENT-BASED REASONABLENESS 96 I. THE DISTINCTION IN
GENERAL 96 II. THE PERSON-BASED ACCOUNT OF REASONABLENESS 97 III. THE
CONTENT-BASED ACCOUNT OF REASONABLENESS 98 D. ACTUALIST REASONABLENESS
AND PROBABILISTIC REASONABLENESS 99 3. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS 101 A. RAWLS
PARTISAN CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC REASON 101 B. HABERMAS TRANSCENDENTAL
CONCEPTION OF REASONABLENESS 103 C. GUTMANN AND THOMPSON S RECIPROCAL
CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC REASON 104 II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REASON 105 1.
THE VALUE OF THE REASONABLE 105 A. A PRAGMATIC LEGITIMATION: STABILITY
AND COOPERATION 106 B. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION: THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH 107 C. A MORAL LEGITIMATION: MUTUAL JUSTIFICATION 107 I.
INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATION 108 II. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION 108 2. THE LIMITS
OF THE REASONABLE 110 III. THE BURDENS OF REASON 111 RV. THE
IMPLICATIONS OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 113 1. THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNAL
SCEPTICISM 113 2. FROM THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF PUBLIC REASON TO
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF POLITICAL LEGITIMATION 115 3. THE BENEFITS OF
REASONABLE PLURALISM AND THE LIVING RULE OF LAW 116 CONCLUSION 118 PART
TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 121 5. THE STATE OF NATURE FICTION
123 INTRODUCTION 123 I. THE FICTION AS ARGUMENT 124 1. GENERAL 124 2.
SETTING THE SCENE: THE STATE OF NATURE 126 A. HOBBES STATE OF NATURE 126
B. ROUSSEAU S STATE OF NATURE 128 C. KANT S STATE OF NATURE 131 D.
HUME S STATE OF NATURE 133 3. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM: THE EXTENT OF
DISAGREEMENT 137 XII CONTENTS A. HOBBES ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF
DISAGREEMENT 137 B. ROUSSEAU S ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 139
C. KANT S ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 141 D. HUME S ACCOUNT OF
THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 145 4. JUDGING THE SITUATION: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 147 A. HOBBES ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF DISAGREEMENT 147 B. ROUSSEAU S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
DISAGREEMENT 149 C. KANT S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT
151 D. HUME S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 152 II. SOME
NON-FICTIONAL OBJECTIONS 155 1. FROM THE CONCEPTUAL TRUTH TO THE FACT OF
DISAGREEMENT 155 2. SOME EMPIRICAL OBJECTIONS 156 CONCLUSION 159 6.
DISAGREEMENT AS A SOURCE OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS 161 INTRODUCTION 161
I. COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND WHY WE NEED TO SOLVE THEM 164 1. THE NEED
FOR COORDINATION 164 A. THE DESIRABILITY OF COORDINATION 165 B. THE
POSSIBILITY OF COORDINATION 167 2. COORDINATION PROBLEMS 168 A. GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 168 B. THE PRISONER S DILEMMA 171 C.
PURE COORDINATION PROBLEMS 172 D. PARTIAL CONFLICT COORDINATION PROBLEMS
173 3. THE RESOLUTION OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS 176 A. THE NEED TO SOLVE
COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND THE MORAL CASE FOR DETERMINATIO 176 B. FROM
THE NEED TO COORDINATE TO THE REASONS TO SOLVE COORDINATION PROBLEMS 178
C. CONSCIOUS COORDINATION AND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE OPTIONS 179 II.
LAW AS A WAY OF CONTRIBUTING TO SECURING COORDINATION 181 1. ON LEGAL
COORDINATION IN GENERAL 182 A. FROM NATURAL TO COLLECTIVE COORDINATION
182 B. FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL COORDINATION 185 2. FIRST-LEVEL
COORDINATION: THE CONSTITUTION OF A LEGAL ORDER 186 A. THE ARGUMENT 187
B. THE CHALLENGES 189 I. FROM CONVERGENT BEHAVIOUR TO RULE 190 II.
COORDINATION AND PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 192 3. SECOND-LEVEL COORDINATION:
THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW-MAKING PROCEDURES 195 CONTENTS XIII 4.
THIRD-LEVEL COORDINATION: THE CONSTITUTION OF CONCRETE LAWS 195 III.
COORDINATION AS LAW S MAIN FUNCTION 197 1. THE ARGUMENT 198 2. THE
CHALLENGES 200 A. THE ABSENCE OF ALL-ENCOMPASSING CONCERTED ACTION 200
B. THE ABSENCE OF ALL-ENCOMPASSING NEED FOR COOPERATION 201 CONCLUSION
203 PART THREE: THE RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT 205 SECTION ONE: LAW-MAKING
PROCEDURES 207 7. DELIBERATIVE VOTINGETHICS 209 INTRODUCTION 209 I. THE
LEGITIMACY OF PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY 212 1. THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY 212
2. THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 213 3. EPISTEMIC POPULISM OR SOFT
SUBSTANTIVISM 216 4. SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURALISM 220 A. PURE DECISIONISM
220 B. SUBSTANTIVELY LEGITIMATE PROCEDURALISM 221 I. THE MINIMAL
SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATION OF PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY 221 II. SUBSTANTIVE
CUM CONTINGENT PROCEDURALISM 222 II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION 223 1. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 224 2.
THE JUSTIFICATION OF DELIBERATION 226 III. DELIBERATION AND DISAGREEMENT
228 1. ACTUAL REASONABLE AGREEMENT QUA REGULATIVE IDEAL OF DELIBERATION
228 2. DELIBERATIVE DISAGREEMENT 229 3. POTENTIAL REASONABLE AGREEMENT
QUA INTERNAL LOGIC OF DELIBERATION 232 IV. THE INESCAPABILITY OFVOTING
233 1. THE NEED FOR CLOSURE 233 2. VARIOUS PROPOSALSOF MODES OF CLOSURE
236 A. NON-INSTITUTIONAL MODES OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 236 B. FROM
INSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION, THROUGH ACCOMMODATION, TO VOTE 237 V. VOTING
AFTER DELIBERATING 240 1. A DELIBERATIVE JUSTIFICATION OFVOTING 240 2.
THE MISGIVINGS OF THE DELIBERATIVE OPPOSITION TO AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES
243 XIV CONTENTS VI. DELIBERATIVE VOTING ETHICS 245 1. VOTING ETHICS
FROM WITHIN 245 2. THE DELIBERATIVE ETHICS OF VOTING: MINIMAL
DECISIVENESS 246 3. THE DELIBERATIVE ETHICS OF MAJORITY RULE: MAXIMAL
DECISIVENESS 248 A. FROM UNANIMITY, THROUGH MINORITY RULE, TO MAJORITY
RULE 248 B. THE ARGUMENT OF MAXIMAL DECISIVENESS 250 CONCLUSION 254 8.
FOUR ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPROMISING JUSTICE INTERNALLY 257 INTRODUCTION
257 I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPROMISE 259 1. A FEW DISTINCTIONS 259 2. A
CAVEAT: THE DISAGREEABLE NATURE OF COMPROMISE 262 II. THE JUSTIFICATION
OF COMPROMISE 263 1. COMPROMISE OF INTERESTS 264 2. COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLES 265 A. GENERAL 265 B. MULTIPRINCIPLE COMPROMISE 269 C.
SINGLE-PRINCIPLE COMPROMISE 270 III. THE LIMITATIONS OF COMPROMISE 271
1. INEFFICIENCY 272 2. POTENTIAL INJUSTICE 272 3. CONCEPT ATTRIBUTION
275 4. POLITICAL INTEGRITY 277 IV. DEMOCRACY AS A FAIR COMPROMISE 280 1.
DEMOCRACY AS COMPROMISE QUA PROCESS 280 2. DEMOCRACY AND FURTHER
COMPROMISES QUA OUTCOME 281 CONCLUSION 282 SECTION TWO: LAW-MAKING
INSTITUTIONS 285 9. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS QUA LEGISLATIVE PRECOMMITMENT
287 INTRODUCTION 287 I. A FEW DEFINITIONS 290 II. THE PRECOMMITMENT
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 292 1. ELSTER S MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL
PRECOMMITMENT 293 2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALOGY 294 A. THE PRINCIPLE OF
ANALOGY 295 B. THE ANALOGY APPLIED 296 III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
PRECOMMITMENT CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 298 1. GENERAL
298 CONTENTS XV 2. THE PRECOMMITTING SUBJECT: ULYSSES VERSUS A MAJORITY
OF THE VOTING POPULATION 299 A. ULYSSES VERSUS A COMPLEX COLLECTIVE
ENTITY, THE PEOPLE 299 B. ULYSSES VERSUS THE INTERGENERATIONAL PEOPLE
301 3. THE OBJECT OF THE PRECOMMITMENT: THE CHARM OF THE SIRENS VERSUS
RIGHTS MISCONCEPTIONS 302 4. THE TARGET OF PRECOMMITMENT: INDIVIDUAL
WEAKNESS OF WILL VERSUS REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 303 A. POLITICAL AKRASIA
AS PRECOMMITMENT MAIN TARGET 304 B. A FEW LIMITATIONS: REASONABLE
DISAGREEMENT VERSUS COLLECTIVE AKRASIA 305 I. THE LIMITATIONS 305 II.
ASSESSING THE RISKS 306 III. THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECOMMITMENT
309 5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRECOMMITMENT: ULYSSES CREW QUA
EXTERNAL ENFORCER VERSUS THE PEOPLE 310 6. THE OPERATION OF THE
PRECOMMITMENT: KEEPING SOMEONE TIED VERSUS JUDGING RIGHTS-VIOLATIONS 313
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 315
IV. A COUNTEROBJECTION: THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF DEMOCRACY 316 1.
DEMOCRACY-ENABLING AND DEMOCRACY-CONSTITUTIVE PRECOMMITMENT 317 2. A FEW
LIMITATIONS: CONSTITUTIVE PREDECISION VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECOMMITMENT 319 3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 322 V. THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL REVISITED 323 1.
THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ENTRENCHMENT MODEL 324 A. THE DIFFERENT RIGHTS
ENTRENCHED 324 B. THE DIFFERENT TIERS OF ENTRENCHMENT 325 I. FUNDAMENTAL
CIVIL AND NON-POLITICAL RIGHTS 326 II. CONSTITUTIVE PROCEDURAL RULES AND
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS 326 2. A FEW BUILT-IN CORRECTIVES 328 A. GENERAL 328
B. FLEXIBLE AMENDABILITY 329 C. ESSENTIALLY CONTESTABLE CONCEPTS 330 D.
THE PEOPLE S LAST WORD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 333 CONCLUSION
336 10. PARTICIPATION AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 339
INTRODUCTION 339 XVI CONTENTS I. THE CONTOURS OF DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION 343 1. NOTION AND SCOPE 343 2. FIVE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS
346 A. WHO IS REPRESENTED 346 B. WHO THE REPRESENTATIVES ARE 347 C. HOW
THE REPRESENTATIVES ARE CHOSEN 348 D. WHAT THE REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENT
349 E. HOW THE REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENT 352 II. THE CHALLENGE OF
DISAGREEMENT 353 1. THE CHALLENGE 353 A. WHY DISAGREEMENT SHOULD BE
REPRESENTED 353 B. HOW DISAGREEMENT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED 355 2. A
COMMON RESPONSE: DESCRIPTIVE GROUP REPRESENTATION 356 A. FROM
DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 356 B. THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DESCRIPTIVE DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION 358 III. THE
COUNTERCHALLENGE 360 1. THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 360 2.
THE COUNTERCHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY 361 IV. THE REPRESENTATION OF
DISAGREEMENT RECONCEPTUALISED 362 1. THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT AND REPRESENTATION 363 2. THE REVISED MODEL OF
DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION 364 A. A BALANCE OF DESCRIPTIVE AND
SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION 365 B. A BALANCE OF TRUSTEESHIP AND
DELEGATION 367 V. SOME IMPLICATIONS: THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF
REPRESENTATION 368 CONCLUSION 370 SECTION THREE: THE CONTENT OF LAW 373
11. INTEGRITY: SHOULD THE LAW SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE? 375 INTRODUCTION 375
I. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRITY 378 II. THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF
INTEGRITY 382 III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTEGRITY 386 1. FROM UTOPIA TO
ORDINARY POLITICS: THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRITY 386 2. FROM DYSTOPIA TO
ORDINARY POLITICS: THE PLAUSIBILITY OF INTEGRITY 387 3. BACK TO ORDINARY
POLITICS: THE PRACTICABILITY OF INTEGRITY 391 A. THE OBJECT-RELATED
LIMITATIONS OF INTEGRITY 391 B. THE PROCESS-RELATED LIMITATIONS OF
INTEGRITY 392 IV. THE VALUE OF INTEGRITY 392 CONTENTS XVII 1. THE
INDEPENDENCE OF INTEGRITY: THE SERVICE CONCEPTION OF INTEGRITY 393 2.
THREE ARGUMENTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRITY 396 A. THE
ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC MORALITY 396 I. THE PUBLIC DUTY OF INTEGRITY 396 II.
FROM INTEGRITY TO POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 399 III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTEGRITY AND JUSTICE IN PUBLIC MORALITY 401 B. THE ARGUMENT OF COMMUNAL
RESPONSIBILITY 403 I. THE PERSONAL DUTY OF INTEGRITY 404 II. THE
COMMUNITY PERSONIFIED 405 III. THE COMMUNAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INTEGRITY
406 C. THE ARGUMENT OF AUTHORITY QUA AUTHORSHIP 410 I. GENERAL 410 II.
RAZIAN AUTHORITY AND INTEGRITY 411 III. RAZ S COUNTERARGUMENT 415
CONCLUSION 416 12. CONFLICTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: NATURE, TYPOLOGY
AND RESOLUTION 419 INTRODUCTION 419 I. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 421 1. MORAL
RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 421 A. THE MODIFIED INTEREST THEORY OF
RIGHTS 422 B. FROM INTERESTS TO DUTIES 423 2. LEGAL RIGHTS 424 II. THE
NATURE OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 425 1. CONFLICTS OF MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS
IN GENERAL 425 A. THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 425 B. SOME
RESPONSES TO SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS 427 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 430 A.
THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 430 B. SOME RESPONSES TO
SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS 430 III. THE TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 431 1.
CONFLICTS OF MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 431 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL
RIGHTS 435 IV. THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 436 1. CONFLICTS OF
MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 436 A. GENERAL 436 B. THE QUALITATIVE
PRIORITY OF RIGHTS 437 C. THE QUANTITATIVE WEIGHING OF RIGHTS 439 I. THE
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERESTS PROTECTED 440 II. SOME CORRECTIVES
440 XVIUE CONTENTS D. CONCILIATION OR PRIORITISATION 442 I. THE CASE OF
RIGHTS OF DIFFERENT STRINGENCIES 442 II. THE CASE OF RIGHTS OF EQUAL
STRINGENCY 443 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 443 A. INTERNAL RESOLUTION
444 I. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS 444 II. RULES OF CONFLICT 445 B. EXTERNAL
RESOLUTION 448 I. WEIGHING 448 II. CONCILIATION OR PRIORITISATION 449
III. CRITERIA OF CONCILIATION 451 CONCLUSION 453 SECTION FOUR: THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 457 13. COORDINATION-BASED OBLIGATIONS TO OBEY THE LAW
459 INTRODUCTION 459 I. DEFINITIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 461 1. THE CONCEPT
OF AUTHORITY 461 2. THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY 463 II. THE MIXED PEDIGREE OF
COORDINATION-BASED DUTIES TO OBEY THE LAW 465 1. NATURAL DUTIES TO
COORDINATE 466 A. ROOT DUTIES TO COORDINATE 466 I. THE SCOPE OF NATURAL
DUTIES 467 II. THE BACKGROUND OF NATURAL DUTIES 469 III. THE STRINGENCY
OF NATURAL DUTIES 470 B. AUXILIARY DUTIES TO ABIDE BY THE COORDINATION
OUTCOME 472 2. ACQUIRED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 473 A. CONSENT-BASED DUTIES
TO COORDINATE 473 B. SEMI-VOLUNTARILY ACQUIRED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 474
3. MIXED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 475 III. COORDINATION-BASED OBLIGATIONS
QUA OBLIGATIONS OF FAIR PLAY 477 1. THE MAIN REGIME OF FAIR PLAY
OBLIGATIONS 478 A. THE BASIC DEFINITION 478 B. TWO ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS
479 2. A GENERAL CHALLENGE: LAW AS A COOPERATIVE SCHEME 481 3. AN
ADDITIONAL CONDITION 483 A. THE CONDITION: THE POSITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF
BENEFITS 483 B. A GENERAL CHALLENGE: THE IDEA OF ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS
484 C. A SPECIFIC CHALLENGE: THE ACCEPTANCE OF LEGALLY PROCURED BENEFITS
486 I. THE WILLING ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS 487 II. THE KNOWING ACCEPTANCE
OF BENEFITS 489 CONTENTS XIX IV. RAZ S THREE CONDITIONS FOR AUTHORITY
490 1. GENERAL 490 2. LEGAL REASONS TO COORDINATE 492 3. CONFORMITY TO
THE THREE THESES 493 A. THE PRE-EMPTION THESIS 493 B. THE DEPENDENCE
THESIS 495 C. THE NORMAL JUSTIFICATION THESIS 496 I. A FIRST CHALLENGE:
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION 497 II. A SECOND CHALLENGE: THE NEED
FOR COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 498 CONCLUSION 499 14. DEMOCRACY,
DISAGREEMENT AND DISOBEDIENCE 503 INTRODUCTION 503 I. THE AUTHORITY OF
DEMOCRATIC LAW 505 II. DISOBEDIENCE TO DEMOCRATIC LAW 506 1. LARGE-SCALE
RESISTANCE: REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE 506 2. SMALL-SCALE RESISTANCE AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN PARTICULAR 507 A. GENERAL 508 B. SOME CONSTITUTIVE
ELEMENTS 508 I. ILLEGALITY 509 II. PUBLICITY 510 III. POLITICAL AND
MORAL MOTIVATION 510 IV. NON-VIOLENCE 512 V. THE EXHAUSTION OF LEGAL
MEANS: ULTIMA RATIO 512 VI. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE S
ACTIONS AND IN PARTICULAR ONE S PUNISHMENT 513 III. THE JUSTIFICATION OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 514 1. LEGAL J USTIFICATION 514 A. A PRIORI
JUSTIFICATION 514 B. A POSTERIORI JUSTIFICATION 515 2. MORAL
JUSTIFICATION 516 A. GENERA] 516 B. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE QUA DEMOCRATIC
TEST OF LEGITIMACY 518 C. A FEW LIMITATIONS TO THE JUSTIFICATION OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 519 3. THE RIGHT TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 522 CONCLUSION
524 CONCLUSIONS 527 I. TAKING REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT SERIOUSLY 527 1.
FROM DISAGREEMENT TO LAW AND BACK AGAIN 527 2. THE RULE OF LAW AS
RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT 528 XX CONTENTS 3. DISAGREEMENT AS RESPONSE TO
THE RULE OF LAW 530 4. MEANS TO KEEP A BALANCE 532 II. TOWARDS GLOBAL
LEGAL PLURALISM 534 1. THE IDEA 534 2. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS 535
BIBLIOGRAPHY 539 INDEX 591
|
| adam_txt |
THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW SAMANTHA
BESSON *HART- PUBLISHING OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2005 '" ; :*
CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VII INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE ISSUE 1 II. THE
SIGNIFICANCE 7 III. THE APPROACH 10 IV. THE STRUCTURE 12 PART ONE: THE
NATURE OF DISAGREEMENT 17 1. THE NOTION AND TYPES OF DISAGREEMENT 19
INTRODUCTION 19 I. THE NOTION OF DISAGREEMENT 19 II. THE TYPES OF
DISAGREEMENT 22 1. POLITICAL-MORAL DISAGREEMENT 22 2. THE SCOPE OF
POLITICAL MORALITY 24 A. RAWLS' SEPARATION OF POLITICAL MORALITY FROM
COMPREHENSIVE MORAL DOCTRINES 25 I. RAWLS' OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 25 II.
RAWLS' WAY OUT 27 III. A REVISED RAWLSIAN MODEL OF POLITICAL-MORAL
DISAGREEMENT 30 B. HABERMAS' SEPARATION OF ETHICAL-POLITICAL DISCOURSE
FROM MORAL DEBATES 31 I. THE EARLY HABERMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF
POLITICAL-MORAL DISAGREEMENT 33 II. THE LATE HABERMAS AND THE SEPARATION
OF THE MORAL FROM THE ETHICAL 36 III. THE FACT OF DISAGREEMENT AND THE
ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 39 1. THE CHALLENGE 39 2. THE CHALLENGE'S
DEFEASIBILITY 41 3. LEARNING FROM THE CHALLENGE 44 CONCLUSION 45 X
CONTENTS 2. THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT AND LEGAL INDETERMINACY 47
INTRODUCTION 47 I. THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT 47 1. VERBAL LACK OF
AGREEMENT 48 2. CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENT 48 A. BORDERLINE DISAGREEMENT 50
B. PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 51 3. NORMATIVE DISAGREEMENT 52 A. EPISTEMIC
DISAGREEMENT 53 B. METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT 54 I. FROM VALUE CONFLICT
TO METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT 54 II. TYPES OF METAPHYSICAL DISAGREEMENT
55 II. FROM MORAL DISAGREEMENT TO LEGAL INDETERMINACY 57 1. THEDEBATE 57
2. THE NOTION OF INDETERMINACY 59 A. INDETERMINACY, UNCERTAINTY AND
OBJECTIVITY 59 B. FROM MORAL TO LEGAL INDETERMINACY 62 C. TYPES OF LEGAL
INDETERMINACY 64 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT AND LEGAL
INDETERMINACY 65 CONDUSION 66 3. THE ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY OF
NORMATIVE CONCEPTS 69 INTRODUCTION 69 I. THE CONCEPT OF 'ESSENTIALLY
CONTESTABLE CONCEPT' 72 II. THE SOURCES OF ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY 74
1. VERBAL LACK OF AGREEMENT 75 2. CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENT 75 A.
BORDERLINE DISAGREEMENT 75 B. PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 78 3. NORMATIVE
DISAGREEMENT 80 III. MINIMAL AGREEMENT IN UNDERSTANDING AND DISPUTABLE
PARADIGMS 81 1. MINIMAL AGREEMENT IN UNDERSTANDING 82 2. THE
DISPUTABILITY OF PARADIGMS 84 3. SHARED PARADIGMS AND CONCEPTUAL TRUTH
86 CONCLUSION 88 4. THE REASONABLENESS OF DISAGREEMENT 91 INTRODUCTION
91 I. THE NOTION OF REASONABLENESS 91 1. THREE CAVEATS 92 CONTENTS XI 2.
FOUR DISTINCTIONS 93 A. REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY 93 B. PUBLIC
REASONABLENESS AND PRIVATE REASONABLENESS 95 C. PERSON-BASED
REASONABLENESS AND CONTENT-BASED REASONABLENESS 96 I. THE DISTINCTION IN
GENERAL ' 96 II. THE PERSON-BASED ACCOUNT OF REASONABLENESS 97 III. THE
CONTENT-BASED ACCOUNT OF REASONABLENESS 98 D. ACTUALIST REASONABLENESS
AND PROBABILISTIC REASONABLENESS 99 3. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS 101 A. RAWLS'
PARTISAN CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC REASON 101 B. HABERMAS'TRANSCENDENTAL
CONCEPTION OF REASONABLENESS 103 C. GUTMANN AND THOMPSON'S RECIPROCAL
CONCEPTION OF PUBLIC REASON 104 II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REASON 105 1.
THE VALUE OF THE REASONABLE 105 A. A PRAGMATIC LEGITIMATION: STABILITY
AND COOPERATION 106 B. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION: THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH 107 C. A MORAL LEGITIMATION: MUTUAL JUSTIFICATION 107 I.
INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATION 108 II. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION 108 2. THE LIMITS
OF THE REASONABLE 110 III. THE BURDENS OF REASON 111 RV. THE
IMPLICATIONS OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 113 1. THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNAL
SCEPTICISM 113 2. FROM THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF PUBLIC REASON TO
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF POLITICAL LEGITIMATION 115 3. THE BENEFITS OF
REASONABLE PLURALISM AND THE LIVING RULE OF LAW 116 CONCLUSION 118 PART
TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 121 5. THE STATE OF NATURE FICTION
123 INTRODUCTION 123 I. THE FICTION AS ARGUMENT 124 1. GENERAL 124 2.
SETTING THE SCENE: THE STATE OF NATURE 126 A. HOBBES'STATE OF NATURE 126
B. ROUSSEAU'S STATE OF NATURE 128 C. KANT'S STATE OF NATURE 131 D.
HUME'S STATE OF NATURE 133 3. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM: THE EXTENT OF
DISAGREEMENT 137 XII CONTENTS A. HOBBES'ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF
DISAGREEMENT 137 B. ROUSSEAU'S ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 139
C. KANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 141 D. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF
THE EXTENT OF DISAGREEMENT 145 4. JUDGING THE SITUATION: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 147 A. HOBBES' ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF DISAGREEMENT 147 B. ROUSSEAU'S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
DISAGREEMENT 149 C. KANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT
151 D. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT 152 II. SOME
NON-FICTIONAL OBJECTIONS 155 1. FROM THE CONCEPTUAL TRUTH TO THE FACT OF
DISAGREEMENT 155 2. SOME EMPIRICAL OBJECTIONS 156 CONCLUSION 159 6.
DISAGREEMENT AS A SOURCE OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS 161 INTRODUCTION 161
I. COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND WHY WE NEED TO SOLVE THEM 164 1. THE NEED
FOR COORDINATION 164 A. THE DESIRABILITY OF COORDINATION 165 B. THE
POSSIBILITY OF COORDINATION 167 2. COORDINATION PROBLEMS 168 A. GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 168 B. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 171 C.
PURE COORDINATION PROBLEMS 172 D. PARTIAL CONFLICT COORDINATION PROBLEMS
173 3. THE RESOLUTION OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS 176 A. THE NEED TO SOLVE
COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND THE MORAL CASE FOR DETERMINATIO 176 B. FROM
THE NEED TO COORDINATE TO THE REASONS TO SOLVE COORDINATION PROBLEMS 178
C. CONSCIOUS COORDINATION AND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE OPTIONS 179 II.
LAW AS A WAY OF CONTRIBUTING TO SECURING COORDINATION 181 1. ON LEGAL
COORDINATION IN GENERAL 182 A. FROM NATURAL TO COLLECTIVE COORDINATION
182 B. FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL COORDINATION 185 2. FIRST-LEVEL
COORDINATION: THE CONSTITUTION OF A LEGAL ORDER 186 A. THE ARGUMENT 187
B. THE CHALLENGES 189 I. FROM CONVERGENT BEHAVIOUR TO RULE 190 II.
COORDINATION AND PIVOTAL DISAGREEMENT 192 3. SECOND-LEVEL COORDINATION:
THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW-MAKING PROCEDURES 195 CONTENTS XIII 4.
THIRD-LEVEL COORDINATION: THE CONSTITUTION OF CONCRETE LAWS 195 III.
COORDINATION AS LAW'S MAIN FUNCTION 197 1. THE ARGUMENT 198 2. THE
CHALLENGES 200 A. THE ABSENCE OF ALL-ENCOMPASSING CONCERTED ACTION 200
B. THE ABSENCE OF ALL-ENCOMPASSING NEED FOR COOPERATION 201 CONCLUSION
203 PART THREE: THE RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT 205 SECTION ONE: LAW-MAKING
PROCEDURES 207 7. DELIBERATIVE'VOTINGETHICS' 209 INTRODUCTION 209 I. THE
LEGITIMACY OF PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY 212 1. THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY 212
2. THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 213 3. EPISTEMIC POPULISM OR SOFT
SUBSTANTIVISM 216 4. SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURALISM 220 A. PURE DECISIONISM
220 B. SUBSTANTIVELY LEGITIMATE PROCEDURALISM 221 I. THE MINIMAL
SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATION OF PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY 221 II. SUBSTANTIVE
CUM CONTINGENT PROCEDURALISM 222 II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION 223 1. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 224 2.
THE JUSTIFICATION OF DELIBERATION 226 III. DELIBERATION AND DISAGREEMENT
228 1. ACTUAL REASONABLE AGREEMENT QUA REGULATIVE IDEAL OF DELIBERATION
228 2. DELIBERATIVE DISAGREEMENT 229 3. POTENTIAL REASONABLE AGREEMENT
QUA INTERNAL LOGIC OF DELIBERATION 232 IV. THE INESCAPABILITY OFVOTING
233 1. THE NEED FOR CLOSURE 233 2. VARIOUS PROPOSALSOF MODES OF CLOSURE
236 A. NON-INSTITUTIONAL MODES OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 236 B. FROM
INSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION, THROUGH ACCOMMODATION, TO VOTE 237 V. VOTING
AFTER DELIBERATING 240 1. A DELIBERATIVE JUSTIFICATION OFVOTING 240 2.
THE MISGIVINGS OF THE DELIBERATIVE OPPOSITION TO AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES
243 XIV CONTENTS VI. DELIBERATIVE 'VOTING ETHICS' 245 1. VOTING ETHICS
FROM WITHIN 245 2. THE DELIBERATIVE ETHICS OF VOTING: MINIMAL
DECISIVENESS 246 3. THE DELIBERATIVE ETHICS OF MAJORITY RULE: MAXIMAL
DECISIVENESS 248 A. FROM UNANIMITY, THROUGH MINORITY RULE, TO MAJORITY
RULE 248 B. THE ARGUMENT OF MAXIMAL DECISIVENESS 250 CONCLUSION 254 8.
FOUR ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPROMISING JUSTICE INTERNALLY 257 INTRODUCTION
257 I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPROMISE 259 1. A FEW DISTINCTIONS 259 2. A
CAVEAT: THE DISAGREEABLE NATURE OF COMPROMISE 262 II. THE JUSTIFICATION
OF COMPROMISE 263 1. COMPROMISE OF INTERESTS 264 2. COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLES 265 A. GENERAL 265 B. MULTIPRINCIPLE COMPROMISE 269 C.
SINGLE-PRINCIPLE COMPROMISE 270 III. THE LIMITATIONS OF COMPROMISE 271
1. INEFFICIENCY 272 2. POTENTIAL INJUSTICE 272 3. CONCEPT ATTRIBUTION
275 4. POLITICAL INTEGRITY 277 IV. DEMOCRACY AS A FAIR COMPROMISE 280 1.
DEMOCRACY AS COMPROMISE QUA PROCESS 280 2. DEMOCRACY AND FURTHER
COMPROMISES QUA OUTCOME 281 CONCLUSION 282 SECTION TWO: LAW-MAKING
INSTITUTIONS 285 9. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS QUA LEGISLATIVE PRECOMMITMENT
287 INTRODUCTION 287 I. A FEW DEFINITIONS 290 II. THE PRECOMMITMENT
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 292 1. ELSTER'S MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL
PRECOMMITMENT 293 2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALOGY 294 A. THE PRINCIPLE OF
ANALOGY 295 B. THE ANALOGY APPLIED 296 III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
PRECOMMITMENT CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 298 1. GENERAL
298 CONTENTS XV 2. THE PRECOMMITTING SUBJECT: ULYSSES VERSUS A MAJORITY
OF THE VOTING POPULATION 299 A. ULYSSES VERSUS A COMPLEX COLLECTIVE
ENTITY, THE PEOPLE 299 B. ULYSSES VERSUS THE INTERGENERATIONAL PEOPLE
301 3. THE OBJECT OF THE PRECOMMITMENT: THE CHARM OF THE SIRENS VERSUS
RIGHTS MISCONCEPTIONS 302 4. THE TARGET OF PRECOMMITMENT: INDIVIDUAL
WEAKNESS OF WILL VERSUS REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 303 A. POLITICAL AKRASIA
AS PRECOMMITMENT MAIN TARGET 304 B. A FEW LIMITATIONS: REASONABLE
DISAGREEMENT VERSUS COLLECTIVE AKRASIA 305 I. THE LIMITATIONS 305 II.
ASSESSING THE RISKS 306 III. THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECOMMITMENT
309 5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRECOMMITMENT: ULYSSES' CREW QUA
EXTERNAL ENFORCER VERSUS THE PEOPLE 310 6. THE OPERATION OF THE
PRECOMMITMENT: KEEPING SOMEONE TIED VERSUS JUDGING RIGHTS-VIOLATIONS 313
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 315
IV. A COUNTEROBJECTION: THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF DEMOCRACY 316 1.
DEMOCRACY-ENABLING AND DEMOCRACY-CONSTITUTIVE PRECOMMITMENT 317 2. A FEW
LIMITATIONS: CONSTITUTIVE PREDECISION VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECOMMITMENT 319 3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 322 V. THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL REVISITED 323 1.
THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ENTRENCHMENT MODEL 324 A. THE DIFFERENT RIGHTS
ENTRENCHED 324 B. THE DIFFERENT TIERS OF ENTRENCHMENT 325 I. FUNDAMENTAL
CIVIL AND NON-POLITICAL RIGHTS 326 II. CONSTITUTIVE PROCEDURAL RULES AND
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS 326 2. A FEW BUILT-IN CORRECTIVES 328 A. GENERAL 328
B. FLEXIBLE AMENDABILITY 329 C. ESSENTIALLY CONTESTABLE CONCEPTS 330 D.
THE PEOPLE'S LAST WORD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 333 CONCLUSION
336 10. PARTICIPATION AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 339
INTRODUCTION 339 XVI CONTENTS I. THE CONTOURS OF DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION 343 1. NOTION AND SCOPE 343 2. FIVE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS
346 A. WHO IS REPRESENTED 346 B. WHO THE REPRESENTATIVES ARE 347 C. HOW
THE REPRESENTATIVES ARE CHOSEN 348 D. WHAT THE REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENT
349 E. HOW THE REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENT 352 II. THE CHALLENGE OF
DISAGREEMENT 353 1. THE CHALLENGE 353 A. WHY DISAGREEMENT SHOULD BE
REPRESENTED 353 B. HOW DISAGREEMENT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED 355 2. A
COMMON RESPONSE: DESCRIPTIVE GROUP REPRESENTATION 356 A. FROM
DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 356 B. THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DESCRIPTIVE DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION 358 III. THE
COUNTERCHALLENGE 360 1. THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 360 2.
THE COUNTERCHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY 361 IV. THE REPRESENTATION OF
DISAGREEMENT RECONCEPTUALISED 362 1. THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DISAGREEMENT AND REPRESENTATION 363 2. THE REVISED MODEL OF
DISAGREEMENT REPRESENTATION 364 A. A BALANCE OF DESCRIPTIVE AND
SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION 365 B. A BALANCE OF TRUSTEESHIP AND
DELEGATION 367 V. SOME IMPLICATIONS: THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF
REPRESENTATION 368 CONCLUSION 370 SECTION THREE: THE CONTENT OF LAW 373
11. INTEGRITY: SHOULD THE LAW SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE? 375 INTRODUCTION 375
I. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRITY 378 II. THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF
INTEGRITY 382 III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTEGRITY 386 1. FROM UTOPIA TO
ORDINARY POLITICS: THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRITY 386 2. FROM DYSTOPIA TO
ORDINARY POLITICS: THE PLAUSIBILITY OF INTEGRITY 387 3. BACK TO ORDINARY
POLITICS: THE PRACTICABILITY OF INTEGRITY 391 A. THE OBJECT-RELATED
LIMITATIONS OF INTEGRITY 391 B. THE PROCESS-RELATED LIMITATIONS OF
INTEGRITY 392 IV. THE VALUE OF INTEGRITY 392 CONTENTS XVII 1. THE
INDEPENDENCE OF INTEGRITY: THE SERVICE CONCEPTION OF INTEGRITY 393 2.
THREE ARGUMENTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRITY 396 A. THE
ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC MORALITY 396 I. THE PUBLIC DUTY OF INTEGRITY 396 II.
FROM INTEGRITY TO POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 399 III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTEGRITY AND JUSTICE IN PUBLIC MORALITY 401 B. THE ARGUMENT OF COMMUNAL
RESPONSIBILITY 403 I. THE PERSONAL DUTY OF INTEGRITY 404 II. THE
COMMUNITY PERSONIFIED 405 III. THE COMMUNAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INTEGRITY
406 C. THE ARGUMENT OF AUTHORITY QUA AUTHORSHIP 410 I. GENERAL 410 II.
RAZIAN AUTHORITY AND INTEGRITY 411 III. RAZ'S COUNTERARGUMENT 415
CONCLUSION 416 12. CONFLICTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: NATURE, TYPOLOGY
AND RESOLUTION 419 INTRODUCTION 419 I. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 421 1. MORAL
RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 421 A. THE MODIFIED INTEREST THEORY OF
RIGHTS 422 B. FROM INTERESTS TO DUTIES 423 2. LEGAL RIGHTS 424 II. THE
NATURE OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 425 1. CONFLICTS OF MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS
IN GENERAL 425 A. THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 425 B. SOME
RESPONSES TO SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS 427 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 430 A.
THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 430 B. SOME RESPONSES TO
SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS 430 III. THE TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 431 1.
CONFLICTS OF MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 431 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL
RIGHTS 435 IV. THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 436 1. CONFLICTS OF
MORAL RIGHTS OR RIGHTS IN GENERAL 436 A. GENERAL 436 B. THE QUALITATIVE
PRIORITY OF RIGHTS 437 C. THE QUANTITATIVE WEIGHING OF RIGHTS 439 I. THE
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERESTS PROTECTED 440 II. SOME CORRECTIVES
440 XVIUE CONTENTS D. CONCILIATION OR PRIORITISATION 442 I. THE CASE OF
RIGHTS OF DIFFERENT STRINGENCIES 442 II. THE CASE OF RIGHTS OF EQUAL
STRINGENCY 443 2. CONFLICTS OF LEGAL RIGHTS 443 A. INTERNAL RESOLUTION
444 I. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS 444 II. RULES OF CONFLICT 445 B. EXTERNAL
RESOLUTION 448 I. WEIGHING 448 II. CONCILIATION OR PRIORITISATION 449
III. CRITERIA OF CONCILIATION 451 CONCLUSION 453 SECTION FOUR: THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 457 13. COORDINATION-BASED OBLIGATIONS TO OBEY THE LAW
459 INTRODUCTION 459 I. DEFINITIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 461 1. THE CONCEPT
OF AUTHORITY 461 2. THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY 463 II. THE MIXED PEDIGREE OF
COORDINATION-BASED DUTIES TO OBEY THE LAW 465 1. NATURAL DUTIES TO
COORDINATE 466 A. ROOT DUTIES TO COORDINATE 466 I. THE SCOPE OF NATURAL
DUTIES 467 II. THE BACKGROUND OF NATURAL DUTIES 469 III. THE STRINGENCY
OF NATURAL DUTIES 470 B. AUXILIARY DUTIES TO ABIDE BY THE COORDINATION
OUTCOME 472 2. ACQUIRED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 473 A. CONSENT-BASED DUTIES
TO COORDINATE 473 B. SEMI-VOLUNTARILY ACQUIRED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 474
3. MIXED DUTIES TO COORDINATE 475 III. COORDINATION-BASED OBLIGATIONS
QUA OBLIGATIONS OF FAIR PLAY 477 1. THE MAIN REGIME OF FAIR PLAY
OBLIGATIONS 478 A. THE BASIC DEFINITION 478 B. TWO ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS
479 2. A GENERAL CHALLENGE: LAW AS A COOPERATIVE SCHEME 481 3. AN
ADDITIONAL CONDITION 483 A. THE CONDITION: THE POSITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF
BENEFITS 483 B. A GENERAL CHALLENGE: THE IDEA OF ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS
484 C. A SPECIFIC CHALLENGE: THE ACCEPTANCE OF LEGALLY PROCURED BENEFITS
486 I. THE WILLING ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS 487 II. THE KNOWING ACCEPTANCE
OF BENEFITS 489 CONTENTS XIX IV. RAZ'S THREE CONDITIONS FOR AUTHORITY
490 1. GENERAL 490 2. LEGAL REASONS TO COORDINATE 492 3. CONFORMITY TO
THE THREE THESES 493 A. THE PRE-EMPTION THESIS 493 B. THE DEPENDENCE
THESIS 495 C. THE NORMAL JUSTIFICATION THESIS 496 I. A FIRST CHALLENGE:
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION 497 II. A SECOND CHALLENGE: THE NEED
FOR COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 498 CONCLUSION 499 14. DEMOCRACY,
DISAGREEMENT AND DISOBEDIENCE 503 INTRODUCTION 503 I. THE AUTHORITY OF
DEMOCRATIC LAW 505 II. DISOBEDIENCE TO DEMOCRATIC LAW 506 1. LARGE-SCALE
RESISTANCE: REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE 506 2. SMALL-SCALE RESISTANCE AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN PARTICULAR 507 A. GENERAL 508 B. SOME CONSTITUTIVE
ELEMENTS 508 I. ILLEGALITY 509 II. PUBLICITY 510 III. POLITICAL AND
MORAL MOTIVATION 510 IV. NON-VIOLENCE 512 V. THE EXHAUSTION OF LEGAL
MEANS: ULTIMA RATIO 512 VI. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S
ACTIONS AND IN PARTICULAR ONE'S PUNISHMENT 513 III. THE JUSTIFICATION OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 514 1. LEGAL J USTIFICATION 514 A. A PRIORI
JUSTIFICATION 514 B. A POSTERIORI JUSTIFICATION 515 2. MORAL
JUSTIFICATION 516 A. GENERA] 516 B. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE QUA DEMOCRATIC
TEST OF LEGITIMACY 518 C. A FEW LIMITATIONS TO THE JUSTIFICATION OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 519 3. THE RIGHT TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 522 CONCLUSION
524 CONCLUSIONS 527 I. TAKING REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT SERIOUSLY 527 1.
FROM DISAGREEMENT TO LAW AND BACK AGAIN 527 2. THE RULE OF LAW AS
RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENT 528 XX CONTENTS 3. DISAGREEMENT AS RESPONSE TO
THE RULE OF LAW 530 4. MEANS TO KEEP A BALANCE 532 II. TOWARDS GLOBAL
LEGAL PLURALISM 534 1. THE IDEA 534 2. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS 535
BIBLIOGRAPHY 539 INDEX 591 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Besson, Samantha 1973- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)141214473 |
| author_facet | Besson, Samantha 1973- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Besson, Samantha 1973- |
| author_variant | s b sb |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021459991 |
| callnumber-first | K - Law |
| callnumber-label | K231 |
| callnumber-raw | K231 |
| callnumber-search | K231 |
| callnumber-sort | K 3231 |
| callnumber-subject | K - General Law |
| classification_rvk | PI 3520 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)60371435 (DE-599)BVBBV021459991 |
| dewey-full | 340.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 340 - Law |
| dewey-raw | 340.1 |
| dewey-search | 340.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3340.1 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| discipline_str_mv | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV021459991 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T14:07:24Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:36:27Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1841134929 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014679977 |
| oclc_num | 60371435 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-384 DE-703 DE-188 DE-29 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-384 DE-703 DE-188 DE-29 |
| physical | XX, 601 S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Hart |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Besson, Samantha 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)141214473 aut The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law Samantha Besson Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2005 XX, 601 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverz. S. [539] - 590 Droit - Philosophie Justice (Philosophie) Meningsverschillen gtt Prise de décision - Aspect moral Recht gtt Rechtvaardigheid gtt Ethik Philosophie Recht Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Justice (Philosophy) Law Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd rswk-swf Ethischer Konflikt (DE-588)4153093-7 gnd rswk-swf Ethischer Konflikt (DE-588)4153093-7 s Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 s DE-604 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014679977&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Besson, Samantha 1973- The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law Droit - Philosophie Justice (Philosophie) Meningsverschillen gtt Prise de décision - Aspect moral Recht gtt Rechtvaardigheid gtt Ethik Philosophie Recht Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Justice (Philosophy) Law Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Ethischer Konflikt (DE-588)4153093-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4048821-4 (DE-588)4153093-7 |
| title | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law |
| title_auth | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law |
| title_exact_search | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law |
| title_full | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law Samantha Besson |
| title_fullStr | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law Samantha Besson |
| title_full_unstemmed | The morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law Samantha Besson |
| title_short | The morality of conflict |
| title_sort | the morality of conflict reasonable disagreement and the law |
| title_sub | reasonable disagreement and the law |
| topic | Droit - Philosophie Justice (Philosophie) Meningsverschillen gtt Prise de décision - Aspect moral Recht gtt Rechtvaardigheid gtt Ethik Philosophie Recht Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Justice (Philosophy) Law Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie (DE-588)4048821-4 gnd Ethischer Konflikt (DE-588)4153093-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Droit - Philosophie Justice (Philosophie) Meningsverschillen Prise de décision - Aspect moral Recht Rechtvaardigheid Ethik Philosophie Decision making Moral and ethical aspects Justice (Philosophy) Law Philosophy Rechtsphilosophie Ethischer Konflikt |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014679977&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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