The primacy of the subjective: foundations for a unified theory of mind and language
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
2006
|
| Series: | A Bradford book
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Physical Description: | XVI, 352 S. |
| ISBN: | 0262072653 |
Staff View
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The primacy of the subjective |b foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |c Nicholas Georgalis |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Subject (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Intentionality (Philosophy) | |
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| adam_text | The Primacy of the Subjective
Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language
Nicholas Georgalis
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xv
Credits xvii
1 The Fundamental Intentional State 1
Some Preliminaries 2
Privileged Access and Minimal Content 4
Intentional States and Minimal Content 8
Illustrative Applications of the Concepts 10
Further Development of Some of the Fundamental Ideas Presented 13
Understanding, Explicating, and Individuating 19
The Fundamental Intentional State 22
The New Problems of Absent and Inverted (Non-Phenomenal) Content 23
Constituting and Grasping Minimal Content: Fregean, Cartesian, and Searlean
Comparisons 25
Explaining the Appearance 28
2 Minimal Content and Some Failures of Third-Person Methodologies 31
Extemalism and Higher-Order Thoughts 31
Indeterminacy in Determining the Content, and More on Second-Order Thoughts 35
A Failure of Functionalism 40
A General Argument against Functionalism 43
Minimal Content and Twin Earth 49
Concluding Thoughts 57
3 Consciousness and Subjectivity 61
Diagnosis of Mistakes 1 and 2 62
Problems of the Conscious Aspects of Intentional States Are Not Dependent on Problems
of Phenomenal States 64
vi Contents
Another Illustration of the Collapse of Consciousness to Phenomenal Consciousness 65
Analysis of Mistake 2: The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality 67
A Different and Legitimate Application of WIL to Intentionality 76
Common Treatment of Problems of Intentionality and Phenomenality 78
An Objective Study of Subjectivity Is Possible, Though a Strictly Third-Person Methodology
Is Inadequate 80
inadequacy of Third-Person Accounts of Subjective Knowledge: New Facts 84
Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap 91
Concluding Remarks 93
4 Physicalism, the Explanatory Gap, and Chaos 95
Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap 95
An Early Attempt to Explain Subjective Qualities: Galileo 102
Chaos and Subjective States 105
Concluding Remarks 111
5 Representation and the First-Person Perspective 115
Methodological Chauvinism 117
Representing Particular Things: The Particularity Requirement 121
The Constituting of Minimal Content as It Relates to Representation 124
The Fundamental Fact of Representation 126
Information Bearers Contrasted with Genuine Represented 130
Represented, Information Bearers, and Methodological Chauvinism 134
The Churchlands: A Case Study 138
Represented and Information Bearers: A Different Look 142
Clarification of the Scope of the Arguments: Teleological Views Do Not Escape 144
There Are No Unconscious Representations 152
Does a First-Person Methodology Force the Results to Be Subjective? 163
Summary 165
6 Minimal Content and the Ambiguity of Sensory Terms 167
Common Sense and Galileo 168
Objectivists, Subjectivists, and Instruments 169
The Subjective/Objective and Real/Unreal Distinctions Compared 172
The Ambiguity in Sensory Terms and Why Talk of Real Essences Should Be Dismissed 173
Traditional Claims of Identity and Reduction in Light of the Ambiguity 177
The Importance of the Preceding for Mind-Brain Identity Claims: A Case Study 183
The Phenomenological Fallacy, Topic-Neutral Sentences, and the Explanatory Gap 192
An Argument on Behalf of the Subjective Side of the Ambiguity 197
Concluding Remarks 203
Contents vii
7 Rethinking Burge s Thought Experiment 205
The Thought Experiment 205
My Analysis—First Stage 208
Deeper Issues—Second-Stage Analysis 212
Diagnosis and More Criticism 215
Community Notions versus Individual Notions 218
Individuation of an Individual s Notion 221
Burge s Equivocation 223
An Independent Source of Difficulty for Burge 225
Answer to an Objection 225
Answers to Possible Objections 230
8 Minimal Content, Quine, and Determinate Meaning 233
The New Concepts 234
Intended Reference and Quine s Theses 239
Deferred Ostension and Paraphrase: Asymmetry of the First-Person and Third-Person
Cases 241
Quine s Quandary, Reference Frames, and the Problem of Particularity 244
Quine s Quandary, Background Languages, and the Problem of Particularity 249
Alternative Interpretations, Genuine Hypotheses, and the Vacuity of Quinean
Indeterminacy 253
An Answer to a Quinean Counter 256
Intended Reference, Mentalism, and Privacy 259
Objective Knowledge of Another s II or IR 262
Summary Comparison of the Two Methodologies 264
9 Ontology Downgraded All the Way 267
Indeterminacy of Translation and Transcendental Metaphysics 267
The Epistemology of Ontology 273
Holophrastic Observation Sentences and Realism 280
An Apparent Way Out Fails 285
The Dilemma for Holophrastic Observation Sentences 286
Holophrastic Conditioning versus Holophrastic Treatment 287
Two Dimensions of Observation Sentences 289
Epilogue 293
Notes 295
References 341
Index 351
|
| adam_txt |
The Primacy of the Subjective
Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language
Nicholas Georgalis
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xv
Credits xvii
1 The Fundamental Intentional State 1
Some Preliminaries 2
Privileged Access and Minimal Content 4
Intentional States and Minimal Content 8
Illustrative Applications of the Concepts 10
Further Development of Some of the Fundamental Ideas Presented 13
Understanding, Explicating, and Individuating 19
The Fundamental Intentional State 22
The New Problems of Absent and Inverted (Non-Phenomenal) Content 23
Constituting and Grasping Minimal Content: Fregean, Cartesian, and Searlean
Comparisons 25
Explaining the Appearance 28
2 Minimal Content and Some Failures of Third-Person Methodologies 31
Extemalism and Higher-Order Thoughts 31
Indeterminacy in Determining the Content, and More on Second-Order Thoughts 35
A Failure of Functionalism 40
A General Argument against Functionalism 43
Minimal Content and Twin Earth 49
Concluding Thoughts 57
3 Consciousness and Subjectivity 61
Diagnosis of Mistakes 1 and 2 62
Problems of the Conscious Aspects of Intentional States Are Not Dependent on Problems
of Phenomenal States 64
vi Contents
Another Illustration of the Collapse of Consciousness to Phenomenal Consciousness 65
Analysis of Mistake 2: The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality 67
A Different and Legitimate Application of WIL to Intentionality 76
Common Treatment of Problems of Intentionality and Phenomenality 78
An Objective Study of Subjectivity Is Possible, Though a Strictly Third-Person Methodology
Is Inadequate 80
inadequacy of Third-Person Accounts of Subjective Knowledge: New Facts 84
Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap 91
Concluding Remarks 93
4 Physicalism, the Explanatory Gap, and Chaos 95
Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap 95
An Early Attempt to Explain Subjective Qualities: Galileo 102
Chaos and Subjective States 105
Concluding Remarks 111
5 Representation and the First-Person Perspective 115
Methodological Chauvinism 117
Representing Particular Things: The Particularity Requirement 121
The Constituting of Minimal Content as It Relates to Representation 124
The Fundamental Fact of Representation 126
Information Bearers Contrasted with Genuine Represented 130
Represented, Information Bearers, and Methodological Chauvinism 134
The Churchlands: A Case Study 138
Represented and Information Bearers: A Different Look 142
Clarification of the Scope of the Arguments: Teleological Views Do Not Escape 144
There Are No Unconscious Representations 152
Does a First-Person Methodology Force the Results to Be Subjective? 163
Summary 165
6 Minimal Content and the Ambiguity of Sensory Terms 167
Common Sense and Galileo 168
Objectivists, Subjectivists, and Instruments 169
The Subjective/Objective and Real/Unreal Distinctions Compared 172
The Ambiguity in Sensory Terms and Why Talk of Real Essences Should Be Dismissed 173
Traditional Claims of Identity and Reduction in Light of the Ambiguity 177
The Importance of the Preceding for Mind-Brain Identity Claims: A Case Study 183
The Phenomenological Fallacy, Topic-Neutral Sentences, and the Explanatory Gap 192
An Argument on Behalf of the Subjective Side of the Ambiguity 197
Concluding Remarks 203
Contents vii
7 Rethinking Burge's Thought Experiment 205
The Thought Experiment 205
My Analysis—First Stage 208
Deeper Issues—Second-Stage Analysis 212
Diagnosis and More Criticism 215
Community Notions versus Individual Notions 218
Individuation of an Individual's Notion 221
Burge's Equivocation 223
An Independent Source of Difficulty for Burge 225
Answer to an Objection 225
Answers to Possible Objections 230
8 Minimal Content, Quine, and Determinate Meaning 233
The New Concepts 234
Intended Reference and Quine's Theses 239
Deferred Ostension and Paraphrase: Asymmetry of the First-Person and Third-Person
Cases 241
Quine's Quandary, Reference Frames, and the Problem of Particularity 244
Quine's Quandary, Background Languages, and the Problem of Particularity 249
Alternative Interpretations, Genuine Hypotheses, and the Vacuity of Quinean
Indeterminacy 253
An Answer to a Quinean Counter 256
Intended Reference, Mentalism, and Privacy 259
Objective Knowledge of Another's II or IR 262
Summary Comparison of the Two Methodologies 264
9 Ontology Downgraded All the Way 267
Indeterminacy of Translation and Transcendental Metaphysics 267
The Epistemology of Ontology 273
Holophrastic Observation Sentences and Realism 280
An Apparent Way Out Fails 285
The Dilemma for Holophrastic Observation Sentences 286
Holophrastic Conditioning versus Holophrastic Treatment 287
Two Dimensions of Observation Sentences 289
Epilogue 293
Notes 295
References 341
Index 351 |
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| spelling | Georgalis, Nicholas 1944- Verfasser (DE-588)1146737270 aut The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language Nicholas Georgalis Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 2006 XVI, 352 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier A Bradford book Includes bibliographical references and index Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Langage et langues - Philosophie Linguagem (filosofia) larpcal Mente (filosofia) larpcal Philosophie de l'esprit Subjetividade larpcal Sujet (Philosophie) Philosophie Sprache Philosophy of mind Subject (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Language and languages Philosophy Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd rswk-swf Sprachphilosophie (DE-588)4056486-1 gnd rswk-swf Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 s Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 s Sprachphilosophie (DE-588)4056486-1 s DE-604 HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014601748&sequence=000006&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Georgalis, Nicholas 1944- The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Langage et langues - Philosophie Linguagem (filosofia) larpcal Mente (filosofia) larpcal Philosophie de l'esprit Subjetividade larpcal Sujet (Philosophie) Philosophie Sprache Philosophy of mind Subject (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Language and languages Philosophy Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd Sprachphilosophie (DE-588)4056486-1 gnd Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4058323-5 (DE-588)4056486-1 (DE-588)4027264-3 (DE-588)4248301-3 |
| title | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| title_auth | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| title_exact_search | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| title_full | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language Nicholas Georgalis |
| title_fullStr | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language Nicholas Georgalis |
| title_full_unstemmed | The primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language Nicholas Georgalis |
| title_short | The primacy of the subjective |
| title_sort | the primacy of the subjective foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| title_sub | foundations for a unified theory of mind and language |
| topic | Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Langage et langues - Philosophie Linguagem (filosofia) larpcal Mente (filosofia) larpcal Philosophie de l'esprit Subjetividade larpcal Sujet (Philosophie) Philosophie Sprache Philosophy of mind Subject (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Language and languages Philosophy Subjektivität (DE-588)4058323-5 gnd Sprachphilosophie (DE-588)4056486-1 gnd Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Intentionnalité (Philosophie) Langage et langues - Philosophie Linguagem (filosofia) Mente (filosofia) Philosophie de l'esprit Subjetividade Sujet (Philosophie) Philosophie Sprache Philosophy of mind Subject (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Language and languages Philosophy Subjektivität Sprachphilosophie Intentionalität Philosophy of Mind |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014601748&sequence=000006&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT georgalisnicholas theprimacyofthesubjectivefoundationsforaunifiedtheoryofmindandlanguage |