Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information:
Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budgetary ins...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Munich
CES
2005
Munich Ifo |
| Series: | CESifo working papers
1491 : Category 1, Public finance |
| Subjects: | |
| Summary: | Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions. |
| Item Description: | Literaturverz. S. 23 - 25. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar |
| Physical Description: | 25 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm |
Staff View
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| id | DE-604.BV020848177 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T13:18:59Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:26:33Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014169922 |
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| physical | 25 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | CES Ifo |
| record_format | marc |
| series | CESifo working papers |
| series2 | CESifo working papers |
| spelling | Huber, Bernd 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)121431169 aut Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information Bernd Huber ; Marco Runkel. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research Munich CES 2005 Munich Ifo 25 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 1491 : Category 1, Public finance Literaturverz. S. 23 - 25. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions. Finanzausgleich / Öffentliche Schulden / Region / Asymmetrische Information / Finanzföderalismus / Theorie Öffentlicher Kredit (DE-588)4133706-2 gnd rswk-swf Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Umverteilung (DE-588)4121808-5 gnd rswk-swf Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s DE-604 Umverteilung (DE-588)4121808-5 s Öffentlicher Kredit (DE-588)4133706-2 s Runkel, Marco 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)120795566 aut CESifo working papers 1491 : Category 1, Public finance (DE-604)BV013978326 1491 |
| spellingShingle | Huber, Bernd 1960- Runkel, Marco 1971- Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information CESifo working papers Finanzausgleich / Öffentliche Schulden / Region / Asymmetrische Information / Finanzföderalismus / Theorie Öffentlicher Kredit (DE-588)4133706-2 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Umverteilung (DE-588)4121808-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4133706-2 (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4121808-5 |
| title | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| title_auth | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| title_exact_search | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| title_full | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information Bernd Huber ; Marco Runkel. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_fullStr | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information Bernd Huber ; Marco Runkel. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_full_unstemmed | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information Bernd Huber ; Marco Runkel. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_short | Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| title_sort | interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information |
| topic | Finanzausgleich / Öffentliche Schulden / Region / Asymmetrische Information / Finanzföderalismus / Theorie Öffentlicher Kredit (DE-588)4133706-2 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Umverteilung (DE-588)4121808-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Finanzausgleich / Öffentliche Schulden / Region / Asymmetrische Information / Finanzföderalismus / Theorie Öffentlicher Kredit Asymmetrische Information Umverteilung |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT huberbernd interregionalredistributionandbudgetinstitutionsunderasymmetricinformation AT runkelmarco interregionalredistributionandbudgetinstitutionsunderasymmetricinformation |