The principal agent model: the economic theory of incentives
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| Format: | Book |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cheltenham, UK
E. Elgar Pub.
2003
|
| Series: | The International Library of critical writings in economics
162 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Physical Description: | xxi, 683 p. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 1843762404 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The principal agent model |b the economic theory of incentives |c edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont |
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Record in the Search Index
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| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction Jean Jacques Laffont xi
PART I FOUNDATIONS
1. Adam Smith (1776), Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the
Ancient State of Europe after the Fall of the Roman Empire , in An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 3:
Of the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations, Chapter
II, 1 8, reset 3
2. Chester I. Barnard (1938/1968), The Economy of Incentives , in
The Functions of the Executive, Part III, Chapter XI, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 139 60 11
3. Kenneth J. Arrow (1963), Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care , American Economic Review, LIII (5), December,
941 73 33
4. Mark V. Pauly (1968), The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment ,
American Economic Review, 58 (3, Part 1), June, 531 7 66
5. Richard Zeckhauser (1970), Medical Insurance: A Case Study of
the Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives ,
Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 10 26 73
6. Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser (1971), Insurance,
Information, and Individual Action , American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, LXI (2), May, 380 87 90
7. Stephen A. Ross (1973), The Economic Theory of Agency: The
Principal s Problem , American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, 63 (2), May, 134 9 98
PART II MORAL HAZARD
8. J. A. Mirrlees (1999), The Theory of Moral Hazard and
Unobservable Behaviour: Part I , Review of Economic Studies, 66,
3 21 107
9. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), Moral Hazard and Observability , Bell
Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74 91 126
10. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), An Analysis of the
Principal agent Problem , Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 7 45 144
11. Ian Jewitt (1988), Justifying the First order Approach to Principal
agent Problems , Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1177 90 183
vi The Principal Agent Model __^
12. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), Multitask Principal
Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job
Design , Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, Special
Issue, 24 52 197
13. William P. Rogerson (1985), Repeated Moral Hazard ,
Econometrica, 53 (1), January, 69 76 226
PART III ADVERSE SELECTION
14. J.A. Mirrlees (1971), An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation , Review of Economic Studies, XXXVIII, 175 208 237
15. Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), Monopoly and Product
Quality , Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 301 17 271
16. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977), Monopoly, Non linear Pricing and
Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market , Review of Economic
Studies, XLIV (3, No. 138), October, 407 30 288
17. David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson (1982), Regulating a
Monopolist with Unknown Costs , Econometrica, 50 (4), July,
911 30 312
18. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), Regulation, Asymmetric
Information, and Auditing , Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (4),
Winter, 447 70 332
19. Roger Guesnerie and Jean Jacques Laffont (1984), A Complete
Solution to a Class of Principal agent Problems with an Application
to the Control of a Self managed Firm , Journal of Public Economics,
25 (3), December, 329 69 356
20. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), Regulation and
Information in a Continuing Relationship , Information Economics
and Policy, 1 (3), 267 302 397
21. Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig (1985), Incentive Compatible
Debt Contracts: The One Period Problem , Review of Economic
Studies, LII, 647 63 433
22. Jean Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), Using Cost
Observation to Regulate Finns , Journal of Political Economy, 94
(3, Part I), June, 614 41 450
23. Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1989), Countervailing
Incentives in Agency Problems , Journal of Economic Theory, 49
(2), December, 294 313 478
24. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1988), Optimal
Contracts with Public ex post Information , Journal of Economic
Theory, 45 (1), June, 189 99 498
PART IV ADVANCED TOPICS
25. Eric Maskin (1999), Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality ,
Review of Economic Studies, 66,23 38 511
The Principal Agent Model vii
26. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), Subgame Perfect
Implementation , Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191 220 527
27. Jerry R. Green and Jean Jacques Laffont (1986), Incentive Theory
with Data Compression , in Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr and
David A. Starrett (eds), Uncertainty, Information, and
Communication: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume III,
Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239 53 557
28. Jerry R. Green and Jean Jacques Laffont (1986), Partially Verifiable
Information and Mechanism Design , Review of Economic Studies,
LIII (3, No. 174), July, 447 56 572
29. Jacques Cremer, Fahad Khalil and Jean Charles Rochet (1998),
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering , Games and
Economic Behavior, 25, 174 93 582
30. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987), Aggregation and
Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives ,
Econometrica, 55 (2), March, 303 28 602
31. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1990), The Principal agent
Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private
Values , Econometrica, 58 (2), March, 379^109 628
32. Mark Armstrong and Jean Charles Rochet (1999), Multi¬
dimensional Screening: A User s Guide , European Economic
Review, 43,959 79 659
Name Index 681
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| spelling | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont Cheltenham, UK E. Elgar Pub. 2003 xxi, 683 p. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The International Library of critical writings in economics 162 An Elgar reference collection Includes bibliographical references and index Agency theorie gtt Economia (teoria) larpcal Mandat Stimulants dans l'industrie Incentives in industry Agency (Law) Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 s Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s DE-604 Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 s DE-188 Laffont, Jean-Jacques 1947-2004 Sonstige (DE-588)11006061X oth The International Library of critical writings in economics 162 (DE-604)BV004220075 162 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=013329081&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives The International Library of critical writings in economics Agency theorie gtt Economia (teoria) larpcal Mandat Stimulants dans l'industrie Incentives in industry Agency (Law) Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4133767-0 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4079351-5 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives |
| title_auth | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives |
| title_exact_search | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives |
| title_full | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont |
| title_fullStr | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont |
| title_full_unstemmed | The principal agent model the economic theory of incentives edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont |
| title_short | The principal agent model |
| title_sort | the principal agent model the economic theory of incentives |
| title_sub | the economic theory of incentives |
| topic | Agency theorie gtt Economia (teoria) larpcal Mandat Stimulants dans l'industrie Incentives in industry Agency (Law) Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Agency theorie Economia (teoria) Mandat Stimulants dans l'industrie Incentives in industry Agency (Law) Anreiz Agency-Theorie Theorie Wirtschaftstheorie Aufsatzsammlung |
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