Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change:
"Global games of regime change - 2013 that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it - have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political chang...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
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| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11017 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Global games of regime change - 2013 that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it - have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information over time and take actions in many periods. It is shown that dynamics may lead to multiple equilibria under the same information assumptions that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Multiplicity originates in the interaction between the arrival of information over time and the endogenous change in beliefs induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. This interaction also generates interesting equilibrium properties, such as the possibility that fundamentals predict the eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks, or that dynamics alternate between crises and phases of tranquility without changes in fundamentals"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |c George-Marios Angeletos ; Christian Hellwig ; Alessandro Pavan |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11017 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "Global games of regime change - 2013 that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it - have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information over time and take actions in many periods. It is shown that dynamics may lead to multiple equilibria under the same information assumptions that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Multiplicity originates in the interaction between the arrival of information over time and the endogenous change in beliefs induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. This interaction also generates interesting equilibrium properties, such as the possibility that fundamentals predict the eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks, or that dynamics alternate between crises and phases of tranquility without changes in fundamentals"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hellwig, Christian |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128636041 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Angeletos, Marios Hellwig, Christian Pavan, Alessandro |
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| author_facet | Angeletos, Marios Hellwig, Christian Pavan, Alessandro |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV019884238 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:08:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013208332 |
| oclc_num | 57424389 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 30 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Angeletos, Marios Verfasser (DE-588)128636017 aut Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change George-Marios Angeletos ; Christian Hellwig ; Alessandro Pavan Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 30 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11017 "Global games of regime change - 2013 that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it - have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information over time and take actions in many periods. It is shown that dynamics may lead to multiple equilibria under the same information assumptions that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Multiplicity originates in the interaction between the arrival of information over time and the endogenous change in beliefs induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. This interaction also generates interesting equilibrium properties, such as the possibility that fundamentals predict the eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks, or that dynamics alternate between crises and phases of tranquility without changes in fundamentals"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Game theory Hellwig, Christian Verfasser (DE-588)128636041 aut Pavan, Alessandro Verfasser (DE-588)128636114 aut National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11017 (DE-604)BV002801238 11017 |
| spellingShingle | Angeletos, Marios Hellwig, Christian Pavan, Alessandro Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Game theory |
| title | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |
| title_auth | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |
| title_exact_search | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |
| title_full | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change George-Marios Angeletos ; Christian Hellwig ; Alessandro Pavan |
| title_fullStr | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change George-Marios Angeletos ; Christian Hellwig ; Alessandro Pavan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change George-Marios Angeletos ; Christian Hellwig ; Alessandro Pavan |
| title_short | Information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |
| title_sort | information dynamcis and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change |
| topic | Game theory |
| topic_facet | Game theory |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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