Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes:
In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the eas...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CES
2004
Munich Ifo |
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
1193 : Category 8, Resources and environment |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 25 - 27. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar |
| Beschreibung: | 27 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm |
Internformat
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| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 25 - 27. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar | ||
| 520 | 8 | |a In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Macho-Stadler, Inés 1959- Pérez-Castrillo, J. David 1961- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124294006 (DE-588)124294014 |
| author_facet | Macho-Stadler, Inés 1959- Pérez-Castrillo, J. David 1961- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Macho-Stadler, Inés 1959- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV019640465 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:01:57Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-012969363 |
| oclc_num | 249270213 |
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| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-521 |
| physical | 27 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | CES Ifo |
| record_format | marc |
| series | CESifo working papers |
| series2 | CESifo working papers |
| spelling | Macho-Stadler, Inés 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)124294006 aut Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes Inés Macho-Stadler ; David Pérez-Castrillo. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research Munich CES 2004 Munich Ifo 27 S. graph. Darst. 21 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 1193 : Category 8, Resources and environment Literaturverz. S. 25 - 27. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo.de verfügbar In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes. Ökosteuer / Umweltabgabe / Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung / Theorie Umweltaudit (DE-588)4335050-1 gnd rswk-swf Umweltsteuer (DE-588)4239879-4 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Umweltsteuer (DE-588)4239879-4 s Umweltaudit (DE-588)4335050-1 s DE-604 Pérez-Castrillo, J. David 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)124294014 aut CESifo working papers 1193 : Category 8, Resources and environment (DE-604)BV013978326 1193 |
| spellingShingle | Macho-Stadler, Inés 1959- Pérez-Castrillo, J. David 1961- Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes CESifo working papers Ökosteuer / Umweltabgabe / Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung / Theorie Umweltaudit (DE-588)4335050-1 gnd Umweltsteuer (DE-588)4239879-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4335050-1 (DE-588)4239879-4 (DE-588)4061963-1 |
| title | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| title_auth | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| title_exact_search | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| title_full | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes Inés Macho-Stadler ; David Pérez-Castrillo. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_fullStr | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes Inés Macho-Stadler ; David Pérez-Castrillo. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes Inés Macho-Stadler ; David Pérez-Castrillo. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_short | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| title_sort | optimal enforcement policy and firms emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| topic | Ökosteuer / Umweltabgabe / Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung / Theorie Umweltaudit (DE-588)4335050-1 gnd Umweltsteuer (DE-588)4239879-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ökosteuer / Umweltabgabe / Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung / Theorie Umweltaudit Umweltsteuer Unternehmen |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT machostadlerines optimalenforcementpolicyandfirmsemissionsandcompliancewithenvironmentaltaxes AT perezcastrillojdavid optimalenforcementpolicyandfirmsemissionsandcompliancewithenvironmentaltaxes |