Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis: a sequential three-players moral hazard model
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Zürich
ECOFIN
2002
|
| Series: | [ECOFIN-Schriftenreihe]
5 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2001 |
| Physical Description: | 173 S. |
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Record in the Search Index
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| adam_text | Contents
1 Introduction 7
1.1 Problem description 7
1.2 Outline 11
2 The model 13
2.1 Verbal description 13
2.2 Formal description 26
3 The IMF rescue package 31
3.1 The IMF s optimal loan 32
3.1.1 Lending with conditionality (partial insurance) 32
3.1.2 Lending with ineffective conditionality (partial insurance) 40
3.1.3 Lending without conditionality (partial insurance) 42
3.1.4 Lending with conditionality (full insurance): No contract 43
3.2 The IMF s optimal policy 44
4 IMF package changes government s behavior 47
4.1 The bank s optimal loan 47
4.1.1 Uncertain IMF lending 47
4.1.2 No IMF lending 53
4.2 The IMF package prevents government s borrowing from the bank 55
4.3 Robustness of the main result 56
5 Opportunity set under varying circumstances 57
5.1 Formal description 58
6 IMF package changes government and bank s behavior 61
6.1 The bank s optimal loan 61
6.1.1 Uncertain IMF lending 61
6.1.2 No IMF lending 65
6.1.3 Certain IMF lending 65
6.1.4 Certain IMF lending without conditionality 66
6.2 The IMF s impact on the bank s optimal loan 67
6.2.1 Different probabilities of IMF lending 67
6.2.2 Different designs of IMF lending 69
6.3 The IMF s impact on the bank s optimal policy 70
7 IMF package changes bank s behavior 77
7.1 The bank s optimal loan 77
7.2 The IMF s impact on the bank s optimal loan 79
5
CONTENTS 8 Application: A developing country 83
8.1 The IMF rescue package 83
8.1.1 Lending with conditionality (partial insurance) 83
8.1.2 Lending with ineffective and without conditionality (partial insurance) 86
8.1.3 Lending with conditionality (full insurance): No contract 89
8.2 The impact of the IMF rescue package on international lending 94
8.2.1 Change in government s behavior 9°
8.2.2 Change in bank and government s behavior 95
8.2.3 Change in bank s behavior 101
9 Conclusion 105
A IMF Government relationship (partial insurance) 115
A.I The IMF s optimal loan 115
A.1.1 Lending with conditionality A.1.2 Lending without conditionality 0
A.2 The IMF s optimal policy 122
A.2.1 Lending with conditionality A.2.2 Lending without conditionality 12°
B Bank Government IMF relationship (partial insurance) 127
B.I The bank s optimal loan 127
B.I.I Uncertain IMF lending with conditionality 127
B.1.2 No IMF lending 136
B.I.3 Certain IMF lending with conditionality 139
B.I.4 Certain IMF lending without conditionality 142
B.2 Nonexistence of the Bank Government IMF relationship 4
B.3 Condition for an existing Bank Government IMF relationship 146
B.4 Range of the bank s optimal loan B.4.1 Different probabilities of IMF lending 149
B.4.2 Different designs of IMF lending 152
B.5 The bank s optimal policy B.5.1 Uncertain IMF lending with conditionality B.5.2 No IMF lending 16°
B.5.3 Certain IMF lending with conditionality 160
B.5.4 Certain IMF lending without conditionality C IMF Government relationship (full insurance)
C.I The IMF s optimal loan under lending with conditionality
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| indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:23:33Z |
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| language | English |
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| physical | 173 S. |
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| series2 | [ECOFIN-Schriftenreihe] |
| spelling | Döbeli, Barbara Verfasser aut Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model Barbara Döbeli Zürich ECOFIN 2002 173 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier [ECOFIN-Schriftenreihe] 5 Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2001 Internationaler Währungsfonds (DE-588)1013082-2 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Kreditpolitik (DE-588)4032941-0 gnd rswk-swf Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Internationaler Währungsfonds (DE-588)1013082-2 b Kreditpolitik (DE-588)4032941-0 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s DE-604 [ECOFIN-Schriftenreihe] 5 (DE-604)BV013055392 5 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010760315&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Döbeli, Barbara Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model [ECOFIN-Schriftenreihe] Internationaler Währungsfonds (DE-588)1013082-2 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Kreditpolitik (DE-588)4032941-0 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)1013082-2 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4032941-0 (DE-588)4322425-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model |
| title_auth | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model |
| title_exact_search | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model |
| title_full | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model Barbara Döbeli |
| title_fullStr | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model Barbara Döbeli |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis a sequential three-players moral hazard model Barbara Döbeli |
| title_short | Bank lending under IMF lending in a financial crisis |
| title_sort | bank lending under imf lending in a financial crisis a sequential three players moral hazard model |
| title_sub | a sequential three-players moral hazard model |
| topic | Internationaler Währungsfonds (DE-588)1013082-2 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Kreditpolitik (DE-588)4032941-0 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Internationaler Währungsfonds Kontrakttheorie Kreditpolitik Moral Hazard Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=010760315&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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