Handbook of social choice and welfare: 1
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam [u.a.]
Elsevier
2002
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. ed. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Handbooks in economics
19,[1] |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 633, 23 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0444829148 9780444829146 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804129466462502912 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME 1
Introduction to the Series
v
Contents of the Handbook
vii
Preface to the Handbook
ix
Introduction
KOTARO
SUZUMURA
1
1.
Historical background
1
2.
Social choice and individual values
10
3.
Socialist planning controversy
13
4.
Significance of the subject and main lines of research
18
5.
A disclaimer
25
References
26
Part
1 -
ARROVIAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS
Chapter I
Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework
DONALD E. CAMPBELL and JERRY S. KELLY
35
Abstract
36
Keywords
36
1.
Introduction
37
2.
Definitions and framework
39
3.
Fundamental lemmas and Arrow s theorem
43
4.
Relaxing the Pareto criterion
52
5.
Relaxing transitivity
57
6.
Relaxing the domain condition
64
7.
Relaxing independence of irrelevant alternatives
70
8.
Modifications of the Arrovian framework
75
9.
Concluding remarks
84
References
85
xü
Contenis
of Volume I
Chapter
2
Categories of Arrovian Voting Schemes
FUAD ALESKEROV
95
Abstract
97
Keywords
97
1.
Introduction
98
2.
Voting: a general description
99
3.
Rationality of individual opinions and collective decisions
100
3.1.
Binary relations and choice functions
100
3.2.
Expansion-contraction axioms
101
4.
Social decision rules
103
4.1.
Locality
103
4.2.
Normative conditions
104
4.3.
Rules from the Central Class
105
4.4.
Rationality constraints and rules from the Central Class
108
4.5.
Remarks and guide to the literature
109
5.
Functional voting rules
H
2
5.Î.
Locality
112
5.2.
Normative conditions
ИЗ
5.3.
Rules from the Central Class
113
5.4.
Rationality constraints and rules from the Central Class
114
5.5.
Remarks and guide to the literature
115
6.
Social choice correspondences
Π
6
6.1.
Locality
116
6.2.
Normative conditions
11
6.3.
Rules from the Central Class
118
6.4.
Rules from the Symmetrically Central Class
120
6.5.
Rationality constraints and rules from the Central Class
122
6.6.
Remarks and guide to the literature
123
7.
Conclusion
125
References
126
Chapter
3
Domain Restrictions
WULFGAERTNER
131
Abstract
132
Keywords
132
1.
Introduction
133
2.
Notation and definitions
135
3.
The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for
finite sets of discrete alternatives
136
3.1.
Basic concepts
136
Contents
of
Volume 1 xiii
3.2.
The case where the individual preferences are
orderings
-
The method of majority
decision is a social welfare function or a social decision function
137
3.3.
The case where the individual preferences are quasi-transitive
-
The method of majority
decision is a social welfare function or a social decision function of type QT for
quasi-transitive individual preferences
139
3.4.
Alternative single-stage social decision rules and multi-stage majority decision rules
141
35.
The probability of no Condorcet winner
143
3.6.
Coalition formation and simple games
144
4.
The existence of Arrovian social welfare functions and the domain of the
simple majority rule
146
4.1.
Domains for Arrow-type social welfare functions
146
4.2.
The domain for the simple majority rule
152
5.
Distributional restrictions over the set of individual preferences under simple
majority rule
153
5.1.
Conditions on the distribution of preferences in the original profile
153
5.2.
Conditions on the distribution of preferences in the reduced profile
156
6.
Social choice in continuous space
160
6.1.
Impossibilities
160
6.2.
Contractibility and existence results
162
6.3.
Discrete vs. continuous choices
165
7.
Concluding remarks
166
References
167
Part
2 -
VOTING SCHEMES AND MECHANISMS
Chapter
4
Voting Procedures
STEVEN J.
BRAMŠ
and PETER
C. FISHBURN
173
Abstract
175
Keywords
175
1.
Introduction
176
2.
Voter preferences and social choice functions
180
3.
Voting procedures for two candidates
183
4.
Introduction to voting procedures for three or more candidates
186
5.
Nonranked voting and dominated strategies
189
5.1.
Examples
189
5.2.
Voter preferences
190
5.3.
Dominance between strategies
191
6.
Strategic analysis of nonranked voting
193
6.1.
Admissible strategies
193
6.2.
Sincere voting and strategyproomess
195
6.3.
Efficacy
197
6.4.
Plurality ballots and the median outcome
198
xiv
Contents of Volume
1
7.
Nonranked multistage voting: successive elimination
198
7.1.
Examples
198
7.2.
Binary multistage voting
199
7.3.
Paradoxes
201
8.
Condorcet choices and ranked voting
203
8.1.
Condorcet combinatorics
203
8.2.
Nonranked voting and Condorcet candidates
206
8.3.
Condorcet voting procedures
210
9.
Positional scoring procedures and
Borda
choices
212
9.1.
Positional scoring procedures
212
9.2.
Axioms
213
9.3.
Paradoxes
214
9.4.
In praise of
Borda,
mostly
216
10.
Point distribution procedures
218
И.
Proportional representation
219
11.1.
The Hare system of single transferable vote
220
11.2.
Additional-member systems
223
11.3.
Minimizing representational imbalance
225
12.
Conclusions
225
References
227
Chapter
5
Implementation Theory
ERIC
MASKIN
and
TOMAS SJÖSTRÖM
237
Abstract
238
Keywords
238
1.
Introduction
239
2.
Definitions
245
3.
Nash implementation
247
3.1.
Definitions
248
3.2.
Monotonicity
and no veto power
248
3.3.
Necessary and sufficient conditions
250
3.4.
Weak implementation
254
3.5.
Strategy-proofness and rich domains of preferences
254
3.6.
Unrestricted domain of strict preferences
256
3.7.
Economic environments
257
3.8.
Two agent implementation
259
4.
Implementation with complete information: further topics
260
4.1.
Refinements of Nash equilibrium
260
4.2.
Virtual implementation
264
4.3.
Mixed strategies
265
4.4.
Extensive form mechanisms
267
4.5.
Renegotiation
269
Contents
of
Volume
ì
xv
4.6.
The planner as a player
275
5.
Bayesian implementation
276
5.1.
Definitions
276
5.2.
Closure
277
5.3.
Incentive compatibility
278
5.4.
Bayesian
monotonicity
279
5.5.
Non-parametric, robust and fault tolerant implementation
281
6.
Concluding remarks
281
References
282
Chapter
6
Axiomatic Cost and Surplus Sharing
HERVÉ MOULIN
289
Abstract
290
Keywords
290
Introduction
291
1. Rationing
294
1.1.
The problem and some examples
294
1.2.
The proportional method
297
1.3.
Uniform Gains and Uniform Losses
298
1.4.
The Contested-Garment method and Self-Duality
301
1.5.
Consistent and symmetric methods
304
1.6.
Equal-sacrifice methods
307
1.7.
Asymmetric methods: combining the
invariance
axioms
309
1.8.
Fixed-path methods
312
1.9.
Rationing indivisible goods
З ІЗ
1.10.
Two variants of the rationing model
315
2.
Sharing variable returns
316
2.1.
The problem and some examples
316
2.2.
Average-cost method
318
2.3.
Serial cost sharing
319
2.4.
Additive cost sharing
322
2.5.
Variants of the model and further axioms
326
3.
Heterogeneous outputs or inputs
328
3.1.
The problem
328
3.2.
Binary demands: the Shapley value
330
3.3.
Variable demands of indivisible goods: the dr model
335
3.4.
Demand
Monotonicity
in the dr model
339
3.5.
Variable demands of divisible goods: the rr model
341
3.6.
Unit
Invariance
and Demand
Monotonicity
in the rr model
346
3.7.
Non-additive cost sharing methods
349
References
354
xvi Contents
of
Volume
I
Part
3 -
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
Chapter
7
Positional Rules of Collective Decision-Making
PRAS
ANTA
К.
PATTANAIK
361
Abstract
362
Keywords
362
1. Introduction
363
2.
The basic notation and definitions
364
3.
Some notions of
positionalist
social ranking rules and social decision rules
367
3.1.
The definition of positionality
367
3.2.
Some
positionalist
rules
371
4.
Arrow s conditions, the principle of simple majority, and
positionalist
SDRs
375
4.1.
Arrow s conditions and positionaiist rules
375
4.2.
The simple majority rule and
positionalist
SDRs
378
5.
The structure of the
Borda
rule
380
5.1.
Axiomatic characterizations of the
Borda
rule
380
5.2.
A Bayesian justification for the BDR (I)
384
5.3.
A Paretian
argument for the BDR
(1) 385
5.4.
A general comparison of the
Borda
procedure and other
positionalist
voting rules
386
6.
Score-based rules, dominance-based scoring rules, and runoff procedures
386
6.1.
Score-based ranking and decision rules
386
6.2.
Score-based ranking rules and the principle of dominance
388
6.3.
Runoff systems
390
7.
Concluding remarks
392
References
393
Chapter
8
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees
BEZALELPELEG
395
Abstract
396
Keywords
396
Introduction
397
1.
Plurality voting,
Borda
count, and feasible elimination procedures: some
examples
398
1.1.
The voting paradox
398
1.2.
The failure of plurality voting in the presence of manipulation of preferences by
coalitions
399
1.3.
The failure of the
Borda
count
399
1.4.
Feasible elimination procedures
400
2.
Basic concepts
401
2.1.
Committees
401
2.2.
Choice problems
403
Contents
of
Volume i
xvii
2.3.
Voting procedures
404
3.
Representations of committees
407
3.1.
The simple games associated with an SCC
407
3.2.
Cores of simple games
409
3.3.
Representations of committees by SCCs
410
3.4.
Representations of committees by SCFs
41 1
4.
Undistorted and consistent SCFs
412
4.1.
Voting games and Nash equilibria
412
4.2.
Exactly and strongly consistent SCFs
414
5.
Strong representations of committees
415
5.1.
Strong representations and effectivity functions
415
5.2.
Strong representations of weak and symmetric games
417
5.3.
The capacity of a committee
418
6.
Continuation and generalizations
419
7.
Concluding remarks
421
References
422
Chapter
9
Representative Democracy as Social Choice
NORMAN SCHOFIELD
425
Abstract
426
Keywords
426
1.
Introduction: Constitutional choices
427
2.
Voters as a committee
432
3.
A committee of politicians
436
4.
Elections as methods of belief aggregation
443
5.
Electoral risk-taking and economic or political quandaries
448
6.
Concluding remarks
452
References
452
Part
4 -
WELFARE, JUSTICE AND POVERTY
Chapter JO
Social Welfare Functional and Interpersonal Comparability
CLAUDE d ASPREMONT and LOUIS
GEVERS
459
Abstract
461
Keywords
461
1.
Introduction
462
2.
Social welfare functional and related concepts
465
2.1.
Definitions
465
2.2.
Examples
468
2.3.
Domain interpretation
474
2.4.
Some related concepts
476
xviii Contents
of
Volume 1
3.
Axioms and their use
477
3.1.
Preliminary
477
3.2.
Invariance
axioms
478
3.3.
Other information-filtering axioms and formal welfarism
489
3.4.
Pareto dominance principles and weak welfarism
499
3.5.
Equity axioms
503
4.
Independence and invariance-based characterisations
507
4.1.
Restricting interpersonal level comparability
507
4.2.
Full comparability: from cardinal to ordinal measurability
513
4.3.
Homothetic vs. translatable social welfare functionals
519
5.
Discarding neutrality or
invariance
520
5.1.
Uncertainty and risk: from Harsanyi to Relative Utilitarianism
521
5.2.
On some egalitarian social rankings
53 1
6.
Conclusion
534
References
537
Chapter
11
Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice
CHARLES BLACKORBY, WALTER BOSSERT and DAVID DONALDSON
543
Abstract
544
Keywords
544
1.
Introduction
545
2.
Social-evaluation functionals
549
3.
Welfarism
553
4.
Generalized utilitarianism
560
5.
Utilitarianism
566
6.
Variable-population extensions
571
7.
Uncertainty
581
8.
Conclusion
590
References
591
Chapter
12
Inequality, Poverty and Welfare
BHASKAR DUTTA
597
Abstract
598
Keywords
598
1.
Introduction
599
2.
Preliminaries
600
3.
Measurement of inequality
601
3.1.
The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen approach
60
1
3.2.
Dominance and inequality
607
3.3.
Characterization theorems
612
3.4.
Measuring mobility
616
Contents
of
Volume
ł
xix
4.
Measurement of poverty
619
5.
Concluding remarks
627
References
628
Author index
1-1
Subject Index
1-13
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)118986856 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV014731145 |
| classification_rvk | QC 160 |
| classification_tum | WIR 021b |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)165005746 (DE-599)BVBBV014731145 |
| dewey-full | 330.12/621 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
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| dewey-sort | 3330.12 16 221 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Aufsatzsammlung |
| id | DE-604.BV014731145 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T19:05:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0444829148 9780444829146 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-009982916 |
| oclc_num | 165005746 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-N2 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-20 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-12 DE-703 DE-83 DE-634 DE-11 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-N2 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-20 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-12 DE-703 DE-83 DE-634 DE-11 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-521 |
| physical | XIX, 633, 23 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| publishDateSearch | 2002 |
| publishDateSort | 2002 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Handbooks in economics |
| series2 | Handbooks in economics |
| spelling | Handbook of social choice and welfare 1 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... 1. ed. Amsterdam [u.a.] Elsevier 2002 XIX, 633, 23 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Handbooks in economics 19,[1] Handbooks in economics ... Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 s DE-604 Arrow, Kenneth Joseph 1921-2017 Sonstige (DE-588)118986856 oth (DE-604)BV014527301 1 Handbooks in economics 19,[1] (DE-604)BV000009734 19,1 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009982916&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Handbook of social choice and welfare Handbooks in economics Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4079009-5 (DE-588)4066735-2 (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_auth | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_exact_search | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_full | Handbook of social choice and welfare 1 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_fullStr | Handbook of social choice and welfare 1 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Handbook of social choice and welfare 1 ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow ... |
| title_short | Handbook of social choice and welfare |
| title_sort | handbook of social choice and welfare |
| topic | Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wahlverhalten Wohlfahrtstheorie Kollektiventscheidung Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009982916&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV014527301 (DE-604)BV000009734 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT arrowkennethjoseph handbookofsocialchoiceandwelfare1 |