We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, polit...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Acemoglu, Daron 1967- (VerfasserIn), Robinson, James A. 1960- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research 2002
Schriftenreihe:	NBER working paper series 8831
Schlagworte:	Geschichte Wirtschaftsentwicklung Aristocracy (Political science) Economic development > History Elite (Social sciences) > Attitudes Industrialization > History Social change
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development.
Beschreibung:	49 S. graph. Darst.