Cognitive pragmatism: the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective
Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans t...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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[Pittsburgh]
Univ. of Pittsburgh Press
2001
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there's no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, "If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State." In using dozens of real-world examples such as these Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain (albeit large) set of tools and conceptualizations available to us. |
| Beschreibung: | XI, 250 S. |
| ISBN: | 0822941538 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Cognitive Pragmatism
The Theory of Knowledge
in Pragmatic Perspective
NICHOLAS RESCHER
University of Pittsburgh Press
- amp;, * • * * *
CONTENTS
List of Figures and Displays ix
Preface xi
Introduction 1
ONE Knowledge of the Truth in Pragmatic Perspective 5
1 Internal Realism and Truth as (Available) Warrant 5
2 Interdependency Problems 8
3 A Different Approach: Methodological Pragmatism 13
4 Validation Issues 15
5 Being Realistic (in Both Senses) 16
TWO Epistemic Justification 21
1 Experience and Fact 21
2 Problems of Common Cause Epistemology 23
3 Modes of Justification 26
4 The Role of Presumption 27
5 Principles of Presumption 29
6 The Validation of Presumption as a General Policy 31
7 The Evolutionary Aspect of Sensory Epistemology 33
8 Rational versus Natural Selection 35
9 Against Pure Intellectualism 40
10 Conclusion 44
THREE Categories: A Pragmatic Approach 46
1 Categorical Sameness 46
2 Types of Categories 48
3 Different Category Schemes 52
4 The Translation Argument and Its Flaws 54
5 The Alternatives of Conceptual Schemes 57
6 The Appraisal of Conceptual
or Categorical Schemes 58
7 The Question of the Inherent Superiority
of Our Own Conceptual Schemes 61
vi Contents
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN
On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge 63
1 Knowledge about Ignorance 63
2 Scientific Progress: Difficulties
in Predicting Future Knowledge 64
3 Question Propagation 66
4 Incompleteness 68
5 Insolubilia 73
6 Relating Knowledge to Ignorance 75
7 Lessons: Learned Ignorance 80
The Deficits of Skepticism 81
1 On Rationality and Risk 81
2 Skepticism and Risk 84
3 The Deficiency of Skepticism 88
Cognitive Realism: A Pragmatic Perspective on
Existence and Our Knowledge of It 92
1 Existence 92
2 Being and Being Known: A Move toward Idealism 93
3 Is Man the Measure? 94
4 Realism and Incapacity 98
5 The Cognitive Inexhaustibility of Things 100
6 Cognitive Dynamics 103
7 The Conceptual Basis of Realism as a Postulate 105
8 Hidden Depths: The Impetus to Realism 109
9 The Pragmatic Foundation of Realism as a
Basis for Communication and Discourse 113
10 The Idealistic Aspect of Metaphysical Realism 119
Induction as Enthymematic Reasoning: A Pragmatic
Perspective on Inference to the Best Systematization 122
1 Enthymemes 122
2 The Enthymematic Approach to Induction 123
3 Induction as Estimation 126
4 Difficulties with Inference to the Best Explanation 128
5 Further Problems 130
6 Best Systematization as a Viable Alternative 133
7 Induction as a Practical Resource 136
8 A Postscript 138
Contents vii
EIGHT On Circularity and Regress in Rational Validation 140
1 Circular Reasoning 140
2 Iteration Processes and Infinite Regress 143
3 On the Rationale of Regressive Viciousness 147
4 Further Illustrations of Cognitive Viciousness 154
5 Thematic Homogeneity in Cognitive Regress 157
6 Harmless Circularity 159
7 Larger Pragmatic Implications 164
NINE Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities 166
1 Improperly Totalized Wholes and Illicit Reification 166
2 The Route to Paradox 173
3 The Root of the Problem 175
4 More on Illicit Totalities 177
5 A Russellian Digression 178
6 A Kantian Postscript 180
TEN What If Things Were Different? 186
1 On Counterfactual Conditionals
and Nonexistent Worlds 186
2 Some Counterfactual Conditionals 190
3 Further Examples 193
4 A Difficulty and Its Resolution 195
5 What s Wrong with Nonexistent Worlds? 196
6 Making the Actual World Do 198
APPENDIX Meta-Knowledge and Cognitive Limits:
Rudiments of Formalized Epistemology 201
1 Accessible Knowledge 201
2 Actual versus Putative Knowledge 203
3 Levels of Acceptance and Rejection 204
4 Level 1 Principles: Logicoconceptual Truths 207
5 Further Consequences 209
6 Cognitive Limitations 212
7 Summary 215
8 Observations on ~K~ 216
9 Yet Further Consequences 219
10 Modal Variations 221
11 Contingent Knowledge and Level 2 Principles 223
viii Contents
12 Level 3 Principles: Plausible Truth Candidates 224
13 Knowledge of the Unknown? 225
14 Conclusion 229
Postscript: Collective Knowledge 230
Notes 233
Bibliography 245
Name Index 249
|
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| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
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| callnumber-raw | BD161 |
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| dewey-full | 121 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
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| isbn | 0822941538 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Rescher, Nicholas 1928-2024 Verfasser (DE-588)118599836 aut Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective Nicholas Rescher [Pittsburgh] Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 2001 XI, 250 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there's no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, "If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State." In using dozens of real-world examples such as these Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain (albeit large) set of tools and conceptualizations available to us. Pragmatisme gtt Cognition Knowledge, Theory of Pragmatismus (DE-588)4047046-5 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Pragmatismus (DE-588)4047046-5 s DE-604 HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=009573628&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Rescher, Nicholas 1928-2024 Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective Pragmatisme gtt Cognition Knowledge, Theory of Pragmatismus (DE-588)4047046-5 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4047046-5 (DE-588)4070914-0 |
| title | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective |
| title_auth | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective |
| title_exact_search | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective |
| title_full | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective Nicholas Rescher |
| title_fullStr | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective Nicholas Rescher |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective Nicholas Rescher |
| title_short | Cognitive pragmatism |
| title_sort | cognitive pragmatism the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective |
| title_sub | the theory of knowledge in pragmatic perspective |
| topic | Pragmatisme gtt Cognition Knowledge, Theory of Pragmatismus (DE-588)4047046-5 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Pragmatisme Cognition Knowledge, Theory of Pragmatismus Erkenntnistheorie |
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