Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid?:
Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
7108 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is 'no.' |
| Beschreibung: | 20, [22] S. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 7108 | |
| 520 | |a Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is 'no.' | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Weder, Beatrice 1965- |
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| geographic | Developing countries Economic policy |
| geographic_facet | Developing countries Economic policy |
| id | DE-604.BV012702437 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:32:10Z |
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| language | English |
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| physical | 20, [22] S. |
| publishDate | 1999 |
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| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? Alberto Alesina ; Beatrice Weder Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999 20, [22] S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 7108 Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is 'no.' Aide économique - Aspect politique ram Corruption politique ram Demokratisierung Entwicklungsländer Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Democratization Economic aspects Developing countries Economic assistance Political aspects Political corruption Economic aspects Developing countries Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftshilfe (DE-588)4190054-6 gnd rswk-swf Ausland (DE-588)4068999-2 gnd rswk-swf Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd rswk-swf Developing countries Economic policy Electronic books Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s Wirtschaftshilfe (DE-588)4190054-6 s Ausland (DE-588)4068999-2 s DE-604 Weder, Beatrice 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)129196355 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 7108 (DE-604)BV002801238 7108 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7108.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Weder, Beatrice 1965- Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Aide économique - Aspect politique ram Corruption politique ram Demokratisierung Entwicklungsländer Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Democratization Economic aspects Developing countries Economic assistance Political aspects Political corruption Economic aspects Developing countries Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wirtschaftshilfe (DE-588)4190054-6 gnd Ausland (DE-588)4068999-2 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4190054-6 (DE-588)4068999-2 (DE-588)4049012-9 |
| title | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? |
| title_auth | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? |
| title_exact_search | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? |
| title_full | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? Alberto Alesina ; Beatrice Weder |
| title_fullStr | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? Alberto Alesina ; Beatrice Weder |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? Alberto Alesina ; Beatrice Weder |
| title_short | Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? |
| title_sort | do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid |
| topic | Aide économique - Aspect politique ram Corruption politique ram Demokratisierung Entwicklungsländer Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Democratization Economic aspects Developing countries Economic assistance Political aspects Political corruption Economic aspects Developing countries Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wirtschaftshilfe (DE-588)4190054-6 gnd Ausland (DE-588)4068999-2 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Aide économique - Aspect politique Corruption politique Demokratisierung Entwicklungsländer Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Democratization Economic aspects Developing countries Economic assistance Political aspects Political corruption Economic aspects Developing countries Korruption Wirtschaftshilfe Ausland Regierung Developing countries Economic policy Electronic books |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7108.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto docorruptgovernmentsreceivelessforeignaid AT wederbeatrice docorruptgovernmentsreceivelessforeignaid |