Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work?: randomized trials in four US states
In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitleme...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6982 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitlements result in greater work effort. In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment (UI) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on non-experimental data failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively seek work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system. |
| Beschreibung: | 28 S. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV012672334 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 990721s1999 xxu |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)41333175 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV012672334 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-473 |a DE-19 |a DE-521 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 084 | |a QB 910 |0 (DE-625)141231: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Ashenfelter, Orley |d 1942- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124081886 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? |b randomized trials in four US states |c Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |c 1999 | |
| 300 | |a 28 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6982 | |
| 520 | |a In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitlements result in greater work effort. In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment (UI) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on non-experimental data failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively seek work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques |2 ram | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonometrisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Public welfare |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Welfare fraud investigation |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Welfare recipients |x Employment |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Ashmore, David |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Deschênes, Olivier |d 1973- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)122161440 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6982 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 6982 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6982.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008611777 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804127332452007936 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Ashmore, David Deschênes, Olivier 1973- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124081886 (DE-588)122161440 |
| author_facet | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Ashmore, David Deschênes, Olivier 1973- |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- |
| author_variant | o a oa d a da o d od |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV012672334 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| classification_rvk | QB 910 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)41333175 (DE-599)BVBBV012672334 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02647nam a2200445 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV012672334</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">990721s1999 xxu |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)41333175</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV012672334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QB 910</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141231:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ashenfelter, Orley</subfield><subfield code="d">1942-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124081886</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work?</subfield><subfield code="b">randomized trials in four US states</subfield><subfield code="c">Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">28 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">6982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitlements result in greater work effort. In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment (UI) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on non-experimental data failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively seek work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques</subfield><subfield code="2">ram</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques</subfield><subfield code="2">ram</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ökonometrisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Public welfare</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Welfare fraud investigation</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Welfare recipients</subfield><subfield code="x">Employment</subfield><subfield code="z">United States</subfield><subfield code="x">Econometric models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ashmore, David</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Deschênes, Olivier</subfield><subfield code="d">1973-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)122161440</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">6982</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">6982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6982.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008611777</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV012672334 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:31:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008611777 |
| oclc_num | 41333175 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 28 S. |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
| publishDateSort | 1999 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Verfasser (DE-588)124081886 aut Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes Cambridge, Mass. 1999 28 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6982 In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitlements result in greater work effort. In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment (UI) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on non-experimental data failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively seek work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system. Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Ökonometrisches Modell Public welfare United States Econometric models Welfare fraud investigation United States Econometric models Welfare recipients Employment United States Econometric models USA Ashmore, David Verfasser aut Deschênes, Olivier 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)122161440 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6982 (DE-604)BV002801238 6982 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6982.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ashenfelter, Orley 1942- Ashmore, David Deschênes, Olivier 1973- Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Ökonometrisches Modell Public welfare United States Econometric models Welfare fraud investigation United States Econometric models Welfare recipients Employment United States Econometric models |
| title | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states |
| title_auth | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states |
| title_exact_search | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states |
| title_full | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes |
| title_fullStr | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? randomized trials in four US states Orley Ashenfelter ; David Ashmore ; Olivier Deschênes |
| title_short | Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? |
| title_sort | do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work randomized trials in four us states |
| title_sub | randomized trials in four US states |
| topic | Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques ram Ökonometrisches Modell Public welfare United States Econometric models Welfare fraud investigation United States Econometric models Welfare recipients Employment United States Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Aide sociale - Bénéficiaires - Travail - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques Aide sociale - États-Unis - Modèles économétriques Ökonometrisches Modell Public welfare United States Econometric models Welfare fraud investigation United States Econometric models Welfare recipients Employment United States Econometric models USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6982.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ashenfelterorley dounemploymentinsurancerecipientsactivelyseekworkrandomizedtrialsinfourusstates AT ashmoredavid dounemploymentinsurancerecipientsactivelyseekworkrandomizedtrialsinfourusstates AT deschenesolivier dounemploymentinsurancerecipientsactivelyseekworkrandomizedtrialsinfourusstates |