Is Europe going too far?:
This paper examines the process of European political integration. We start with a political economy model of monetary policy, illustrating a general principle: economic integration requires setting up European institutions endowed with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies. However, when coun...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1999
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6883 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | This paper examines the process of European political integration. We start with a political economy model of monetary policy, illustrating a general principle: economic integration requires setting up European institutions endowed with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies. However, when countries can take advantage of scale effects thanks to economic integration, the need for large countries is reduced. Thus increased economic integration reduces the need for political integration in Europe. To reconcile these views, we propose a model for the optimal allocation of prerogatives across levels of government. When the provision of public goods is characterized by cross-border spillovers, some centralization of policies may be needed to internalize the externality. These gains from centralization must be traded-off against the costs from imposing the same policies upon heterogeneous groups. The optimal allocation of prerogatives results from this trade-off. Using our model as a benchmark, we analyze the institutional incentives at play for the allocation of political prerogatives in Europe and conclude that the EU has gone too far on most issues. |
| Physical Description: | 45 S. |
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| geographic | Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Europe Economic integration Political aspects Econometric models European Union countries Politics and government Econometric models |
| geographic_facet | Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Europe Economic integration Political aspects Econometric models European Union countries Politics and government Econometric models |
| id | DE-604.BV012497375 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:28:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-008484700 |
| oclc_num | 40910615 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
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| physical | 45 S. |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
| publishDateSort | 1999 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut Is Europe going too far? Alberto Alesina ; Romain Wacziarg Cambridge, Mass. 1999 45 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6883 This paper examines the process of European political integration. We start with a political economy model of monetary policy, illustrating a general principle: economic integration requires setting up European institutions endowed with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies. However, when countries can take advantage of scale effects thanks to economic integration, the need for large countries is reduced. Thus increased economic integration reduces the need for political integration in Europe. To reconcile these views, we propose a model for the optimal allocation of prerogatives across levels of government. When the provision of public goods is characterized by cross-border spillovers, some centralization of policies may be needed to internalize the externality. These gains from centralization must be traded-off against the costs from imposing the same policies upon heterogeneous groups. The optimal allocation of prerogatives results from this trade-off. Using our model as a benchmark, we analyze the institutional incentives at play for the allocation of political prerogatives in Europe and conclude that the EU has gone too far on most issues. Europäische Union Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Decentralization in government European Union countries Econometric models European Union Monetary policy Political aspects European Union countries Econometric models Sovereignty Econometric models Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Europe Economic integration Political aspects Econometric models European Union countries Politics and government Econometric models Wacziarg, Romain Verfasser (DE-588)12897012X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6883 (DE-604)BV002801238 6883 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6883.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Wacziarg, Romain Is Europe going too far? National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Europäische Union Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Decentralization in government European Union countries Econometric models European Union Monetary policy Political aspects European Union countries Econometric models Sovereignty Econometric models |
| title | Is Europe going too far? |
| title_auth | Is Europe going too far? |
| title_exact_search | Is Europe going too far? |
| title_full | Is Europe going too far? Alberto Alesina ; Romain Wacziarg |
| title_fullStr | Is Europe going too far? Alberto Alesina ; Romain Wacziarg |
| title_full_unstemmed | Is Europe going too far? Alberto Alesina ; Romain Wacziarg |
| title_short | Is Europe going too far? |
| title_sort | is europe going too far |
| topic | Europäische Union Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Decentralization in government European Union countries Econometric models European Union Monetary policy Political aspects European Union countries Econometric models Sovereignty Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Europäische Union Politik Ökonometrisches Modell Decentralization in government European Union countries Econometric models European Union Monetary policy Political aspects European Union countries Econometric models Sovereignty Econometric models Europa Europäische Union. Mitgliedsstaaten Europe Economic integration Political aspects Econometric models European Union countries Politics and government Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6883.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto iseuropegoingtoofar AT wacziargromain iseuropegoingtoofar |