Efficient unemployment insurance:
This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high u...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1998
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| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
6686 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any UI. In contrast, in an economy with risk-averse workers, a positive level of UI maximizes output. Therefore, moderate UI not only improves risk-sharing, but also increases output. |
| Beschreibung: | 32 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 6686 | |
| 520 | |a This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any UI. In contrast, in an economy with risk-averse workers, a positive level of UI maximizes output. Therefore, moderate UI not only improves risk-sharing, but also increases output. | ||
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| geographic | USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV012274005 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T18:24:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 32 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124929575 aut Efficient unemployment insurance Daron Acemoglu ; Robert Shimer Cambridge, Mass. 1998 32 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6686 This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any UI. In contrast, in an economy with risk-averse workers, a positive level of UI maximizes output. Therefore, moderate UI not only improves risk-sharing, but also increases output. Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 s DE-604 Shimer, Robert 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)129263397 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 6686 (DE-604)BV002801238 6686 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6686.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Shimer, Robert 1968- Efficient unemployment insurance National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4137265-7 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_auth | Efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_exact_search | Efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_full | Efficient unemployment insurance Daron Acemoglu ; Robert Shimer |
| title_fullStr | Efficient unemployment insurance Daron Acemoglu ; Robert Shimer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Efficient unemployment insurance Daron Acemoglu ; Robert Shimer |
| title_short | Efficient unemployment insurance |
| title_sort | efficient unemployment insurance |
| topic | Arbeitslosenversicherung (DE-588)4137265-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Arbeitslosenversicherung USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6686.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron efficientunemploymentinsurance AT shimerrobert efficientunemploymentinsurance |